Report September 2025

Submitted

Your organisation description

Advertising

Commitment 1

Relevant signatories participating in ad placements commit to defund the dissemination of disinformation, and improve the policies and systems which determine the eligibility of content to be monetised, the controls for monetisation and ad placement, and the data to report on the accuracy and effectiveness of controls and services around ad placements.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 1.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Not applicable

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

LinkedIn plans to continue to assess its policies and services and to update them as warranted.

Measure 1.3

Relevant Signatories responsible for the selling of advertising, inclusive of publishers, media platforms, and ad tech companies, will take commercial and technically feasible steps, including support for relevant third-party approaches, to give advertising buyers transparency on the placement of their advertising.

QRE 1.3.1

Signatories will report on the controls and transparency they provide to advertising buyers with regards to the placement of their ads as it relates to Measure 1.3.

LinkedIn provides a range of information and tools to give advertisers transparency and control regarding the placement of their advertising. For example, LinkedIn publishes for the public and advertisers a semiannual transparency report pursuant the DSA, which discloses metrics regarding the amount of violating member content, including misinformation, that LinkedIn removed from the platform during the period. For the period from 1 July to 31 December 2024, for example, LinkedIn removed 12,100 pieces of DSA-relevant content as misinformation under own initiative moderation. LinkedIn’s most recent DSA transparency report is available here.

For ads on the LinkedIn Audience Network, as discussed in QRE 1.2.1, LinkedIn provides tools to assist advertisers in controlling where their ads appear within the network. For example, advertisers can set up category-level blocking based on the Interactive Advertising Bureau’s (IAB) publisher category taxonomy to prevent their ads from running on certain types of publishers within the network. Similarly, advertisers can review the list of publishers within the network and create custom allow lists and block lists to ensure their ads are placed on apps and sites that meet an advertiser’s specific standards.

Commitment 2

Relevant Signatories participating in advertising commit to prevent the misuse of advertising systems to disseminate Disinformation in the form of advertising messages.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 2.1 Measure 2.3 Measure 2.4

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Not applicable

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

LinkedIn plans to continue to assess its policies and services and to update them as warranted.

Measure 2.1

Relevant Signatories will develop, deploy, and enforce appropriate and tailored advertising policies that address the misuse of their advertising systems for propagating harmful Disinformation in advertising messages and in the promotion of content.

QRE 2.1.1

Signatories will disclose and outline the policies they develop, deploy, and enforce to meet the goals of Measure 2.1 and will link to relevant public pages in their help centres.

LinkedIn prohibits misinformation and disinformation on its platform, whether in the form of organic content or in the form of advertising content. LinkedIn’s Professional Community Policies, which apply to all content on the platform, expressly prohibit false and misleading content, including misinformation and disinformation:

Do not share false or misleading content: Do not share content that is false, misleading, or intended to deceive. Do not share content to interfere with or improperly influence an election or other civic process. Do not share synthetic or manipulated media that depicts a person saying something they did not say or doing something they did not do without clearly disclosing the fake or altered nature of the material. Do not share content that directly contradicts guidance from leading global health organisations and public health authorities; including false information about the safety or efficacy of vaccines or medical treatments. Do not share content or endorse someone or something in exchange for personal benefit (including personal or family relationships, monetary payment, free products or services, or other value), unless you have included a clear and conspicuous notice of the personal benefit you receive and have otherwise complied with our Advertising Policies.

LinkedIn provides specific examples of false and misleading content that violates its policy via a Help Center article on False or Misleading Content.

LinkedIn’s Advertising Policies incorporate the Professional Community Policies provision, and similarly prohibit misinformation and disinformation. In addition, LinkedIn’s Advertising Policies separately prohibit fraudulent and deceptive ads, and require that claims in an ad have factual support:

Fraud and Deception: Ads must not be fraudulent or deceptive. Your product or service must accurately match the content of your ad. Any claims in your ad must have factual support. Do not make deceptive or inaccurate claims about competitive products or services. Do not imply you or your product are affiliated with or endorsed by others without their permission. Additionally, make sure to disclose any pertinent partnerships when sharing advertising content on LinkedIn. Do not advertise prices or offers that are inaccurate – any advertised discount, offer or price must be easily discoverable from the link in your ad.

SLI 2.1.1

Signatories will report, quantitatively, on actions they took to enforce each of the policies mentioned in the qualitative part of this service level indicator, at the Member State or language level. This could include, for instance, actions to remove, to block, or to otherwise restrict harmful Disinformation in advertising messages and in the promotion of content.

The table below reports the number of ads LinkedIn restricted under the misinformation policies in QRE 2.1.1 above between 1 January – 30 June 2025, broken out by EEA Member State.

The metrics are assigned to EEA Member State based on the primary country targeting of the ad.

The following factors may contribute to the number of ads reported by LinkedIn being low:

LinkedIn is primarily a business-to-business advertising platform - that is, businesses marketing their products and services to other businesses and members in a professional capacity.
Because of the business-to-business nature of LinkedIn’s advertising platform, ads on LinkedIn may cost more than ads placed in other settings, impacting the ads run on LinkedIn.

Country	The number of ads LinkedIn restricted under the misinformation policies in QRE 2.1.1 between 1 January - 30 June 2025
Austria	0
Belgium	0
Bulgaria	0
Croatia	0
Cyprus	0
Czech Republic	0
Denmark	0
Estonia	0
Finland	0
France	1
Germany	0
Greece	0
Hungary	0
Ireland	0
Italy	0
Latvia	0
Lithuania	0
Luxembourg	0
Malta	0
Netherlands	0
Poland	0
Portugal	0
Romania	0
Slovakia	0
Slovenia	0
Spain	1
Sweden	0
Iceland	0
Liechtenstein	0
Norway	0
Total EU	2
Total EEA	2

Measure 2.3

Relevant Signatories will adapt their current ad verification and review systems as appropriate and commercially feasible, with the aim of preventing ads placed through or on their services that do not comply with their advertising policies in respect of Disinformation to be inclusive of advertising message, promoted content, and site landing page.

QRE 2.3.1

Signatories will describe the systems and procedures they use to ensure that ads placed through their services comply with their advertising policies as described in Measure 2.1.

All advertising that runs on LinkedIn’s platform is subject to LinkedIn’s Advertising Policies. LinkedIn has implemented both automated and manual systems to help ensure that advertising on the platform complies with its Advertising Policies, and that ads that do not comply with its policies are removed.

When an advertiser submits an advertising campaign, the campaign is evaluated by LinkedIn automated systems. If those systems determine a campaign may violate LinkedIn’s policies, the campaign is rejected or forwarded to LinkedIn’s advertising review team for manual review.

The advertising review team is trained in LinkedIn’s Advertising Policies and dedicated to advertising review. LinkedIn also employs a dedicated team of trainers, who not only support the onboarding of new ad reviewers, but also provide ongoing educational opportunities for reviewers.

LinkedIn similarly employs quality assurance analysts, who provide one-on-one coaching, as well as regular monthly forums to discuss reviewers’ most frequent challenges. For complex issues, reviewers have direct access to global advertising policy managers through regular office hours and dedicated escalation pathways.

LinkedIn members may also report ads that they believe violate LinkedIn’s advertising policies, and when members report ads LinkedIn’s advertising review team reviews them. To report an ad, members can click on the three-dot icon in the upper right-hand corner of every ad and select the “Hide or report this ad” option. Members are then directed to select a reporting reason, with “Misinformation” provided as a reporting option.

SLI 2.3.1

Signatories will report quantitatively, at the Member State level, on the ads removed or prohibited from their services using procedures outlined in Measure 2.3. In the event of ads successfully removed, parties should report on the reach of violatory content and advertising.

The table below reports metrics concerning ads LinkedIn restricted under the misinformation policies in QRE 2.1.1. The metrics include: (1) the number of ads LinkedIn restricted under the misinformation policies in QRE 2.1.1 between 1 January - 30 June 2025, broken out by EEA Member State; (2) the number of impressions those ads received before they were restricted. The metrics are assigned to EEA Member States based on the primary country targeting of the ad.

The following factors may contribute to the number of ads reported by LinkedIn being lower than other platforms:

LinkedIn is primarily a business-to-business advertising platform – that is, businesses marketing their products and services to other businesses and members in a professional capacity.
Because of the business-to-business nature of LinkedIn’s advertising platform, ads on LinkedIn may cost more than ads on other platforms, impacting the ads run on LinkedIn.

Country	The number of ads LinkedIn restricted under the misinformation policies in QRE 2.1.1 between 1 January 30 June 2025	The number of impressions the ads received before they were restricted
Austria	0	0
Belgium	0	0
Bulgaria	0	0
Croatia	0	0
Cyprus	0	0
Czech Republic	0	0
Denmark	0	0
Estonia	0	0
Finland	0	0
France	0	0
Germany	0	0
Greece	0	0
Hungary	0	0
Ireland	0	0
Italy	0	0
Latvia	0	0
Lithuania	0	0
Luxembourg	0	0
Malta	0	0
Netherlands	0	0
Poland	0	0
Portugal	0	0
Romania	0	0
Slovakia	0	0
Slovenia	0	0
Spain	0	0
Sweden	0	0
Iceland	0	0
Liechtenstein	0	0
Norway	0	0
Total EU	2	0
Total EEA	2	0

Measure 2.4

Relevant Signatories will provide relevant information to advertisers about which advertising policies have been violated when they reject or remove ads violating policies described in Measure 2.1 above or disable advertising accounts in application of these policies and clarify their procedures for appeal.

QRE 2.4.1

Signatories will describe how they provide information to advertisers about advertising policies they have violated and how advertisers can appeal these policies.

When LinkedIn rejects or restricts an ad for violation of its policies, as described in QRE 2.3.1, LinkedIn sends the advertiser an email notification. The email notification outlines the rejection reason and advertising policy that the ad has violated.

The notification also provides advertisers instructions regarding how they can address the violation, including by revising the ad in LinkedIn Campaign Manager to address the violations, or by contacting their sales representative or LinkedIn customer support if they require clarification or believe there has been a mistake.

Because advertisers can address rejections a number of ways – by revising and resubmitting the advertisement, by creating a new advertisement that complies with LinkedIn’s policies, or by contacting their LinkedIn sales representative or customer support – LinkedIn does not report “appeal” and “appeal grant” metrics for ad rejections. LinkedIn has provided metrics on the number of ad restrictions as part of SLI 2.3.1 above.

SLI 2.4.1

Signatories will report quantitatively, at the Member State level, on the number of appeals per their standard procedures they received from advertisers on the application of their policies and on the proportion of these appeals that led to a change of the initial policy decision.

LinkedIn does not report “appeal” and “appeal grant” metrics for ad rejections as outlined in our response to QRE 2.4.1. LinkedIn has provided metrics on the number of ad restrictions as part of SLI 2.3.1 above.

	Nr of appeals	Proportion of appeals that led to a change of the initial decision
Global	Not applicable	Not applicable

Transparency Centre

Commitment 34

To ensure transparency and accountability around the implementation of this Code, Relevant Signatories commit to set up and maintain a publicly available common Transparency Centre website.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 34.1 Measure 34.2 Measure 34.3 Measure 34.4 Measure 34.5

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Not applicable

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Not applicable

Commitment 35

Signatories commit to ensure that the Transparency Centre contains all the relevant information related to the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures and that this information is presented in an easy-to-understand manner, per service, and is easily searchable.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 35.1 Measure 35.2 Measure 35.3 Measure 35.4 Measure 35.5 Measure 35.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

LinkedIn will upload its September 2025 Report to the Transparency Centre website.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Not applicable

Permanent Task-Force

Commitment 37

Signatories commit to participate in the permanent Task-force. The Task-force includes the Signatories of the Code and representatives from EDMO and ERGA. It is chaired by the European Commission, and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Task-force can also invite relevant experts as observers to support its work. Decisions of the Task-force are made by consensus.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 37.1 Measure 37.2 Measure 37.3 Measure 37.4 Measure 37.5 Measure 37.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

LinkedIn has actively engaged in and contributed to the work of the Task-force and relevant Subgroups and Working Groups that were active during the reporting period.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

LinkedIn is committed to continuing its active engagement in and contribution to the Task-force in the upcoming six-month period. During that period, LinkedIn is also committed to continuing its active engagement in and contributions to Subgroups and Working Groups to the extent they pertain to Measures to which LinkedIn Ireland has subscribed in its Subscription Document.

Measure 37.2

Signatories agree to work in the Task-force in particular – but not limited to – on the following tasks: Establishing a risk assessment methodology and a rapid response system to be used in special situations like elections or crises; Cooperate and coordinate their work in special situations like elections or crisis; Agree on the harmonised reporting templates for the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures, the refined methodology of the reporting, and the relevant data disclosure for monitoring purposes; Review the quality and effectiveness of the harmonised reporting templates, as well as the formats and methods of data disclosure for monitoring purposes, throughout future monitoring cycles and adapt them, as needed; Contribute to the assessment of the quality and effectiveness of Service Level and Structural Indicators and the data points provided to measure these indicators, as well as their relevant adaptation; Refine, test and adjust Structural Indicators and design mechanisms to measure them at Member State level; Agree, publish and update a list of TTPs employed by malicious actors, and set down baseline elements, objectives and benchmarks for Measures to counter them, in line with the Chapter IV of this Code.

Per LinkedIn Ireland’s Subscription Document dated 15 January 2025, LinkedIn will commit to perform the obligations outlined in this Measure to the extent they pertain to the other Measures to which LinkedIn has subscribed under its Subscription Document and in a manner and level that is proportional to LinkedIn’s risk profile with respect to disinformation.

Measure 37.6

Signatories agree to notify the rest of the Task-force when a Commitment or Measure would benefit from changes over time as their practices and approaches evolve, in view of technological, societal, market, and legislative developments. Having discussed the changes required, the Relevant Signatories will update their subscription document accordingly and report on the changes in their next report.

QRE 37.6.1

Signatories will describe how they engage in the work of the Task-force in the reporting period, including the sub-groups they engaged with.

During the period covered by this report, LinkedIn actively engaged in and participated to all the plenary meetings of the Task-Force of the Code as well as to the meetings of the Elections Working Group, which was the only group active in the current reporting cycle under the Task-force. As part of the Elections Working Group, LinkedIn actively contributed to the development of the standardised version of the Rapid Response System for elections.

LinkedIn also participated in the Rapid Response Systems set up for the elections in Germany, Romania, Portugal and Poland.

Monitoring of the Code

Commitment 38

The Signatories commit to dedicate adequate financial and human resources and put in place appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of their commitments under the Code.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 38.1

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Not applicable

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Not applicable

Measure 38.1

Relevant Signatories will outline the teams and internal processes they have in place, per service, to comply with the Code in order to achieve full coverage across the Member States and the languages of the EU.

QRE 38.1.1

LinkedIn has a dedicated team to ensure proper tracking and compliance with the Code of Practice, consisting of members of our legal, public policy, content policy and data science teams.

Furthermore, as noted elsewhere in this report, LinkedIn had approximately 1,757 content moderators globally (for 24/7 coverage), with approximately 180 content moderators located in the EU as of 30 June 2025, and includes specialists in a number of EEA languages. LinkedIn’s in-house Editorial team also provides members with trustworthy content regarding global events.

Commitment 40

Signatories commit to provide regular reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs). The reports and data provided should allow for a thorough assessment of the extent of the implementation of the Code’s Commitments and Measures by each Signatory, service and at Member State level.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 40.1 Measure 40.2 Measure 40.3 Measure 40.4 Measure 40.5 Measure 40.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Not applicable

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Not applicable

Commitment 42

Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Task-force.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

During the reporting period, LinkedIn has participated to the Task-force’s Elections Working Group, in particular in view of elections that took place in the EU as well as in the context of the discussions towards an Elections Rapid Response System.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

LinkedIn will continue its participation in the Task-force’s Crisis Response Subgroup and Elections Working Group, as relevant.

Commitment 43

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

LinkedIn has provided its September 2025 Report in accordance with the revised Harmonised Reporting Template and underlying methodologies as jointly developed by Signatories in the Monitoring and Reporting Subgroup under the Code’s Task-force.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

LinkedIn will continue its engagement in the respective Task-force Subgroups to keep the Harmonised Reporting Template and underlying methodologies up to date, where necessary in view of its experience with reporting.

Crisis and Elections Response

Elections 2025

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories’ abilities to measure them].

Threats observed or anticipated

LinkedIn is an online professional networking site with a real identity requirement, which means that content posted by our members is visible to that member’s professional network, including colleagues, managers, and potential future employers. As a result of LinkedIn’s professional context, our members come to LinkedIn for economic opportunity, and as such, do not tend to post misinformation, nor does misinformation content gain traction on LinkedIn. Nonetheless, LinkedIn may be subject to certain members inadvertently posting misinformation during elections.

Mitigations in place

LinkedIn’s Professional Community Policies expressly prohibit false and misleading content, including misinformation and disinformation, and its in-house Editorial team provides members with trustworthy content regarding global events, including as applicable European national elections in Germany, Romania, Portugal and Poland. LinkedIn had approximately 1,757 content moderators globally (for 24/7) coverage, with approximately 180 content moderators located in the EU as at 30 June 2025, and includes specialists in a number of languages including French. These reviewers use policies and guidance developed by a dedicated content policy team and experienced lawyers, and work with external fact checkers as needed. When LinkedIn sees content or behaviour that violates its Professional Community Policies, it takes action, including for example the removal of content.

Political ads are banned on LinkedIn, which includes prohibitions on ads that exploit a sensitive political issue, including European Elections.

LinkedIn continues to mature its crisis response processes as applicable. In addition to the increase in resource allocation and process improvements, best practices include: 1) quickly coordinating with industry peers regarding the exchange of threat indicators; 2) engaging with external stakeholders regarding trends and TTPs; 3) continuously providing updated policy guidance to internal teams to assist with the removal of misinformation; and 4) continuing to proactively provide localised trustworthy information to our members.

LinkedIn has continued to mature its crisis response playbook by continually monitoring crisis situations globally, expanding internal teams that work on crisis response, and maturing our processes to respond more efficiently and effectively to crisis situations. LinkedIn will continue to follow its processes related to the removal of misinformation, and continually increase investments in resource allocation and process improvements where necessary to respond to the demands of the crisis.

LinkedIn also implemented a specialized intake and operations process under the Elections Working Group Rapid Response System as applicable for European national elections.

Policies and Terms and Conditions

Outline any changes to your policies

Policy - 50.1.1

False or misleading content

Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation) - 50.1.2

LinkedIn continually updates its policies as appropriate during any major global event, including European national elections in Germany, Romania, Portugal and Poland.

Rationale - 50.1.3

Misinformation, disinformation campaigns, coordinated manipulative behaviours, malicious use of advertising products, and the involvement of foreign state actors, are all harms that existed prior to the European national elections in Germany, Romania, Portugal and Poland, and therefore LinkedIn already had policies in place to address these harms.

Scrutiny of Ads Placements

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Description of intervention - 50.2.2

Political ads are banned on LinkedIn, which includes prohibitions on ads that exploit a sensitive political issue, including European national elections in Germany, Romania, Portugal and Poland.

Indication of impact - 50.2.3

Not applicable

Political Advertising

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Description of intervention - 50.3.2

Political ads are banned on LinkedIn, which includes prohibitions on ads that exploit a sensitive political issue, including European elections.

Indication of impact - 50.3.3

Not applicable

Integrity of Services

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Description of intervention - 50.4.2

LinkedIn also maintains a robust automated and manual ad-review process to prevent ads related to European Elections from running on our platform.

LinkedIn regularly exchanges information with industry peers to identify and share granular information related to manipulative behaviours, coordinated influence operations, and TTPs. All such content that violates LinkedIn’s Professional Community Policies is removed.

Indication of impact - 50.4.3

LinkedIn does not track misinformation content removal by subject matter, and a comprehensive listing of its misinformation content takedowns is provided in this disclosure and in its Transparency Report. See also SLI 18.2.1.

Impact metrics for malicious advertising removals are available in SLI 2.1.1 and 2.3.1.

Empowering Users

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Description of intervention - 50.5.2

LinkedIn has an internal team of global news editors that provides trustworthy and authoritative content as applicable to its member-base at all times. During important events in European elections, this team provides manually curated and localised storylines.

Empowering the Research Community

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Description of intervention - 50.6.2

None for LinkedIn

Indication of impact - 50.6.3

None for LinkedIn

Crisis 2025

Threats observed or anticipated

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
LinkedIn is an online professional networking site with a real identity requirement, which means that content posted by our members is visible to that member’s professional network, including colleagues, managers, and potential future employers. As a result of LinkedIn’s professional context, our members do not tend to post misinformation, nor does misinformation content gain traction on LinkedIn. Nonetheless, LinkedIn may be subject to certain members inadvertently posting misinformation during crisis situations.

Israel-Hamas Conflict
LinkedIn is an online professional networking site with a real identity requirement, which means that content posted by our members is visible to that member’s professional network, including colleagues, managers, and potential future employers. As a result of LinkedIn’s professional context, our members come to LinkedIn for economic opportunity, and as such, do not tend to post misinformation, nor does misinformation content gain traction on LinkedIn. Nonetheless, LinkedIn may be subject to certain members inadvertently posting misinformation during crisis situations.

Mitigations in place

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
LinkedIn’s Professional Community Policies expressly prohibit false and misleading content, including misinformation and disinformation, and its in-house Editorial team provides members with trustworthy content regarding global events, including the war in Ukraine. LinkedIn had approximately 1,757 content moderators globally (for 24/7 coverage), with approximately 180 content moderators located in the EU as of 30 June 2025, and includes specialists in a number of languages including English, German, French, Russian, and Ukrainian. These reviewers use policies and guidance developed by a dedicated content policy team and experienced lawyers, and work with external fact checkers as needed. When LinkedIn sees content or behaviour that violates its Professional Community Policies, it takes action, including for example the removal of content. LinkedIn has been banned in Russia since 2016 and has implemented the European bans on Russian state media. In addition to not operating in Russia, political ads are banned on LinkedIn, which includes prohibitions on ads that exploit a sensitive political issue, including the current Russia-Ukraine war.

LinkedIn continues to mature its crisis response processes as applicable including 1) quickly coordinating with industry peers regarding the exchange of threat indicators; 2) engaging with external stakeholders regarding trends and TTPs; 3) continuously providing updated policy guidance to internal teams to assist with the removal of misinformation; and 4) continuing to proactively provide localised trustworthy information to our members.

Israel-Hamas Conflict
LinkedIn’s Professional Community Policies expressly prohibit false and misleading content, including misinformation and disinformation, and its in-house Editorial team provides members with trustworthy content regarding global events, including the Israel-Hamas conflict. LinkedIn had approximately 1,757 content moderators globally (for 24/7 coverage), with approximately 180 content moderators located in the EU as at 30 June 2025, , and includes specialists in languages supported on LinkedIn. These reviewers use policies and guidance developed by a dedicated content policy team and experienced lawyers, and work with external fact checkers as needed. When LinkedIn sees content or behaviour that violates its Professional Community Policies, it takes action, including for example the removal of content. Political ads are banned on LinkedIn, which includes prohibitions on ads that exploit a sensitive political issue, including the current Israel-Hamas conflict.

LinkedIn continues to mature its crisis response processes as applicable including 1) quickly coordinating with industry peers regarding the exchange of threat indicators; 2) engaging with external stakeholders regarding trends and TTPs; 3) continuously providing updated policy guidance to internal teams to assist with the removal of misinformation; and 4) continuing to proactively provide localised trustworthy information to our members.

Policies and Terms and Conditions

Outline any changes to your policies

Policy - 51.1.1

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
False or misleading content

Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation) - 51.1.2

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
LinkedIn continually updates its policies as appropriate during any crisis, including the Ukraine crisis.

Rationale - 51.1.3

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
Misinformation, disinformation campaigns, coordinated manipulative behaviours, malicious use of advertising products, and the involvement of foreign state actors, are all harms that existed prior to the Ukraine crisis, and therefore LinkedIn already had policies in place to address these harms.

Policy - 51.1.4

Israel-Hamas Conflict
False or misleading content

Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation) - 51.1.5

Israel-Hamas Conflict
LinkedIn continually updates its policies as appropriate during any crisis, including the Israel-Hamas conflict.

Rationale - 51.1.6

Israel-Hamas Conflict
Misinformation, disinformation campaigns, coordinated manipulative behaviours, malicious use of advertising products, and the involvement of foreign state actors, are all harms that existed prior to the Israel-Hamas conflict, and therefore LinkedIn already had policies in place to address these harms.

Scrutiny of Ads Placements

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Description of intervention - 51.2.2

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
Political ads are banned on LinkedIn, which includes prohibitions on ads that exploit a sensitive political issue.

Indication of impact - 51.2.3

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
Not applicable

Description of intervention - 51.2.5

Israel-Hamas Conflict
Political ads are banned on LinkedIn, which includes prohibitions on ads that exploit a sensitive political issue, including the current Israel-Hamas conflict.

Political Advertising

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Description of intervention - 51.3.2

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
Not applicable. Political ads are banned on LinkedIn, which includes prohibitions on ads that exploit a sensitive political issue.

Indication of impact - 51.3.3

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
Not applicable

Description of intervention - 51.3.5

Israel-Hamas Conflict
Not applicable. Political ads are banned on LinkedIn, which includes prohibitions on ads that exploit a sensitive political issue, including the current Israel-Hamas conflict.

Indication of impact - 51.3.6

Israel-Hamas Conflict
Not applicable

Integrity of Services

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Description of intervention - 51.4.2

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
LinkedIn’s Professional Community Policies prohibit misinformation, and misinformation is removed from the LinkedIn platform.

Members that post misinformation are notified of LinkedIn’s removal of their content. State-sponsored attempts to post misinformation, if any, are removed.

LinkedIn also maintains a robust ad-review process to prevent malicious advertising wherein ads related to crises, including the Ukraine war, are manually reviewed and approved by our internal team.

Indication of impact - 51.4.3

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
LinkedIn does not track misinformation content removal by subject matter, and a comprehensive listing of its misinformation content takedowns is provided in this disclosure and in its Transparency Report. See also SLI 18.2.1.

Impact metrics for malicious advertising removals are available in SLI 2.1.1 and 2.3.1, whereas metrics related to manipulative behaviors and TTPs are available in SLI 12.1.1 and 14.2.1.

Description of intervention - 51.4.5

Israel-Hamas Conflict
LinkedIn’s Professional Community Policies prohibit misinformation, and misinformation is removed from the LinkedIn platform.

Members that post misinformation are notified of LinkedIn’s removal of their content. State-sponsored attempts to post misinformation, if any, are removed.

LinkedIn also maintains a robust ad-review process to prevent malicious advertising wherein ads related to crises, including the Israel-Hamas conflict, are manually reviewed and approved by our internal team.

Indication of impact - 51.4.6

Israel-Hamas Conflict
Impact metrics for malicious advertising removals are available in SLI 2.1.1 and 2.3.1, whereas metrics related to manipulative behaviors and TTPs are available in SLI 12.1.1 and 14.2.1.

Empowering Users

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Description of intervention - 51.5.2

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
LinkedIn has an internal team of global news editors that provides trustworthy and authoritative content to its member-base at all times. During important events in the Ukraine crisis, this team provides manually curated and localised storylines.

Description of intervention - 51.5.5

Israel-Hamas Conflict
LinkedIn has an internal team of global news editors that provides trustworthy and authoritative content to its member-base at all times. During important events in the Israel-Hamas conflict, this team provides manually curated and localised storylines.

Empowering the Research Community

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Description of intervention - 51.6.2

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
None for LinkedIn

Indication of impact - 51.6.3

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
None for LinkedIn

Description of intervention - 51.6.5

Israel-Hamas Conflict
None for LinkedIn

Indication of impact - 51.6.6

Israel-Hamas Conflict
None for LinkedIn