Report September 2025

Submitted

Your organisation description

Integrity of Services

Commitment 14

In order to limit impermissible manipulative behaviours and practices across their services, Relevant Signatories commit to put in place or further bolster policies to address both misinformation and disinformation across their services, and to agree on a cross-service understanding of manipulative behaviours, actors and practices not permitted on their services. Such behaviours and practices include: The creation and use of fake accounts, account takeovers and bot-driven amplification, Hack-and-leak operations, Impersonation, Malicious deep fakes, The purchase of fake engagements, Non-transparent paid messages or promotion by influencers, The creation and use of accounts that participate in coordinated inauthentic behaviour, User conduct aimed at artificially amplifying the reach or perceived public support for disinformation.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 14.1 Measure 14.2 Measure 14.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 14.1

Relevant Signatories will adopt, reinforce and implement clear policies regarding impermissible manipulative behaviours and practices on their services, based on the latest evidence on the conducts and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) employed by malicious actors, such as the AMITT Disinformation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Framework.

QRE 14.1.1

Relevant Signatories will list relevant policies and clarify how they relate to the threats mentioned above as well as to other Disinformation threats.

Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.

Google Search’s systems are designed to elevate high-quality information and combat the threats listed in Commitment 14. While many of those tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are not relevant to search engines (e.g. TTPs 1 through 5, TTP 11), by seeking to elevate trustworthy, high-quality information, Search’s ranking systems directly tackle threats like inauthentic domains (TTP 4), obfuscation (TTP 6), deceptive manipulated media (TTP 7), hack and leak operations (TTP 8), inauthentic coordination (TTP 9), and a broad range of deceptive practices (TTP 10). More information about the design of Search’s ranking systems is outlined in the User Empowerment chapter.

Google Search’s Overall Content Policies outline that Search takes action against spam, which is content that exhibits deceptive or manipulative behaviour designed to deceive users or game search systems. Learn more about Google Search Webmaster Guidelines.

In line with these policies, Search deploys spam protection tools. These efforts address a range of deceptive practices and help reduce the spread of low quality content on Google Search through inauthentic behaviours outlined in relevant TTPs.

Moreover, Search has policies and community guidelines specifically governing what can appear in Google Search features (e.g. knowledge panels, content advisories, ‘About This Result’, etc.) to make sure that Search is showing high-quality and helpful content, while also taking action against content that may promote harmful mis-/disinformation. Relevant policies to the threats listed above include the following:

Deceptive Practices Policy: This policy prohibits content that impersonates any person or organisation, misrepresentation or concealment of ownership or primary purpose, and engagement in inauthentic or coordinated behaviour to deceive, defraud, or mislead. This policy does not cover content with certain artistic, educational, historical, documentary, or scientific considerations, or other substantial benefits to the public.
Manipulated Media Policy: This policy prohibits audio, video, or image content that has been manipulated to deceive, defraud, or mislead by means of creating a representation of actions or events that verifiably did not take place.
Transparency Policy: This policy notes that news sources on Google should provide clear dates and bylines, as well as information about authors, the publication, the publisher, company or network behind it, and contact information.

QRE 14.1.2

Signatories will report on their proactive efforts to detect impermissible content, behaviours, TTPs and practices relevant to this commitment.

Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.

Google Search uses a variety of proactive detection efforts to counter spam, which overlaps significantly with tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used to disseminate disinformation. As outlined in the overall Google Search Content Policies and Community Guidelines for user generated content, action is taken against spam, which is content that exhibits deceptive or manipulative behaviour designed to deceive users or game search systems.

Pursuant to the Spam Content Policy, Google Search deploys spam protection tools, such as SpamBrain (Google’s AI-based spam-prevention system), to protect search quality and user safety. Addressing a wider range of content than only mis-/disinformation, these efforts help reduce the spread of low quality content on Google Search. Additional information can be found in the 2022 Google Search Webspam Report. In March 2024, Google Search released an update to its Spam Policies that addresses ‘scaled content abuse’ - artificially-generated content (including AI-generated content) that seeks to manipulate Google’s search ranking.

In addition, Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) and Trust and Safety Teams are central to Google’s work to monitor malicious actors around the globe, including but not limited to coordinated information operations that may affect EU Member States. More information about this work is outlined in QRE 16.1.1.

Measure 14.2

Relevant Signatories will keep a detailed, up-to-date list of their publicly available policies that clarifies behaviours and practices that are prohibited on their services and will outline in their reports how their respective policies and their implementation address the above set of TTPs, threats and harms as well as other relevant threats.

QRE 14.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on actions taken to implement the policies they list in their reports and covering the range of TTPs identified/employed, at the Member State level.

Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.

Google Search relies on a combination of people and technology to enforce Google Search policies. Machine learning, for example, plays a critical role in content moderation on Google Search. Google Search systems are built to identify and weigh signals of high-quality information so people can find the most reliable and timely information available. Google Search algorithms look at many factors and signals to raise high-quality content and reduce low quality content. Google Search’s publicly available website, How Search Works, explains the key factors that help determine which results are returned for a query. Google Search works continuously to improve the quality and effectiveness of automated systems to protect platforms and users from harmful content.

Furthermore, to ensure its algorithms meet high standards of relevance and quality, Google Search has a rigorous process that involves both live tests and thousands of trained external Search Quality Raters from around the world. Raters do not determine the ranking of an individual, specific page or website, but they help to benchmark the quality of Google Search’s results so that Google Search can meet a high bar for users all around the world. Under the Google Search Quality Rater Guidelines, raters are instructed to assign the lowest rating to pages that are potentially harmful to users or specified groups, misleading, untrustworthy, and spammy. Google Search also provides users the ability to flag content that might be violating Google Search policies.

SLI 14.2.1

Number of instances of identified TTPs and actions taken at the Member State level under policies addressing each of the TTPs as well as information on the type of content.

TTPs covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter

6. Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g. via personalised advertising, location spoofing or obfuscation);

9. Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers);

10. Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers;

12. Coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts.

Methodology

(1) Manual enforcement instances under relevant policy violations (including Deceptive Practices, Manipulated Media, Medical Content, Misleading Content and Transparency Policies) on a global level in H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025).

(2) Domains affected by manual and algorithmic actions for Spam Policies for Google web search on a global level in H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025).

Response

(1) In H1 2025, there were 31,308 instances of policy enforcement, globally, which resulted in removal of false, disputed, non-representative facts, misrepresentation information, content that contradicts scientific or medical based consensus and evidence based best practices. The actions were enforced across Search features including knowledge engine, webanswers, news, discover, image and video search.

(2) In H1 2025, there were 513,525 manual actions and 37,216,430 algorithmic actions taken against spam policies. Globally, a total of 37,429,641 unique domains were affected by manual and algorithmic actions for Spam Policies for Google web search.

Country	TTP OR ACTION1 - Nr of instances	TTP OR ACTION1 - Nr of actions	TTP OR ACTION2 - Nr of instances	TTP OR ACTION2 - Nr of actions	TTP OR ACTION3 - Nr of instances	TTP OR ACTION3 - Nr of actions	TTP OR ACTION4 - Nr of instances	TTP OR ACTION4 - Nr of actions	TTP OR ACTION5 - Nr of instances	TTP OR ACTION5 - Nr of actions	TTP OR ACTION6 - Nr of instances	TTP OR ACTION6 - Nr of actions	TTP OR ACTION7 - Nr of instances	TTP OR ACTION7 - Nr of actions	TTP OR ACTION8 - Nr of instances	TTP OR ACTION8 - Nr of actions	TTP OR ACTION9 - Nr of instances	TTP OR ACTION9 - Nr of actions	TTP OR ACTION10 - Nr of instances	TTP OR ACTION10 - Nr of actions	TTP OR ACTION11 - Nr of instances	TTP OR ACTION11 - Nr of actions	TTP OR ACTION12 - Nr of instances	TTP OR ACTION12 - Nr of actions
Austria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Belgium	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Croatia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cyprus	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Czech Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Denmark	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Estonia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Finland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
France	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Germany	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Greece	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hungary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Iceland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ireland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Italy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Latvia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lithuania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Malta	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Poland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Portugal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Romania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Slovenia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Spain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sweden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Norway	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

SLI 14.2.2

Views/impressions of and interaction/engagement at the Member State level (e.g. likes, shares, comments), related to each identified TTP, before and after action was taken.

These metrics are not feasible for Google Search as it is not known what queries a user will issue and, therefore, Google Search cannot do a before and after comparison. Google Search’s systems are trained to block policy-violating content.

Country	TTP OR ACTION1 - Views before action	TTP OR ACTION1 - Engagement before action	TTP OR ACTION1 - Views after action	TTP OR ACTION1 - Engagement after action	TTP OR ACTION2 - Views before action	TTP OR ACTION2 - Engagement before action	TTP OR ACTION2 - Views after action	TTP OR ACTION2 - Engagement after action	TTP OR ACTION3 - Views before action	TTP OR ACTION3 - Engagement before action	TTP OR ACTION3 - Views after action	TTP OR ACTION3 - Engagement after action	TTP OR ACTION4 - Views before action	TTP OR ACTION4 - Engagement before action	TTP OR ACTION4 - Views after action	TTP OR ACTION4 - Engagement after action	TTP OR ACTION5 - Views before action	TTP OR ACTION5 - Engagement before action	TTP OR ACTION5 - Views after action	TTP OR ACTION5 - Engagement after action	TTP OR ACTION6 - Views before action	TTP OR ACTION6 - Engagement before action	TTP OR ACTION6 - Views after action	TTP OR ACTION6 - Engagement after action	TTP OR ACTION7 - Views before action	TTP OR ACTION7 - Engagement before action	TTP OR ACTION7 - Views after action	TTP OR ACTION7 - Engagement after action	TTP OR ACTION8 - Views before action	TTP OR ACTION8 - Engagement before action	TTP OR ACTION8 - Views after action	TTP OR ACTION8 - Engagement after action	TTP OR ACTION9 - Views before action	TTP OR ACTION9 - Engagement before action	TTP OR ACTION9 - Views after action	TTP OR ACTION9 - Engagement after action	TTP OR ACTION10 - Views before action	TTP OR ACTION10 - Engagement before action	TTP OR ACTION10 - Views after action	TTP OR ACTION10 - Engagement after action	TTP OR ACTION11 - Views before action	TTP OR ACTION11 - Engagement before action	TTP OR ACTION11 - Views after action	TTP OR ACTION11 - Engagement after action	TTP OR ACTION12 - Views before action	TTP OR ACTION12 - Engagement before action	TTP OR ACTION12 - Views after action	TTP OR ACTION12 - Engagement after action
Austria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Belgium	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Croatia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cyprus	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Czech Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Denmark	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Estonia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Finland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
France	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Germany	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Greece	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hungary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ireland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Italy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Latvia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lithuania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Malta	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Poland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Portugal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Romania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Slovenia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Spain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sweden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Iceland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Norway	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

SLI 14.2.3

Metrics to estimate the penetration and impact that e.g. Fake/Inauthentic accounts have on genuine users and report at the Member State level (including trends on audiences targeted; narratives used etc.).

This SLI is not applicable for Google Search, as users do not need accounts to use the search engine, and generally do not post content on Google Search.

Country	TTP OR ACTION1 - Penetration and impact on genuine users	TTP OR ACTION1 - Trends on targeted audiences	TTP OR ACTION1 - Trends on narratives used	TTP OR ACTION2 - Penetration and impact on genuine users	TTP OR ACTION2 - Trends on targeted audiences	TTP OR ACTION2 - Trends on narratives used	TTP OR ACTION3 - Penetration and impact on genuine users	TTP OR ACTION3 - Trends on targeted audiences	TTP OR ACTION3 - Trends on narratives used	TTP OR ACTION4 - Penetration and impact on genuine users	TTP OR ACTION4 - Trends on targeted audiences	TTP OR ACTION4 - Trends on narratives used	TTP OR ACTION5 - Penetration and impact on genuine users	TTP OR ACTION5 - Trends on targeted audiences	TTP OR ACTION5 - Trends on narratives used	TTP OR ACTION6 - Penetration and impact on genuine users	TTP OR ACTION6 - Trends on targeted audiences	TTP OR ACTION6 - Trends on narratives used	TTP OR ACTION7 - Penetration and impact on genuine users	TTP OR ACTION7 - Trends on targeted audiences	TTP OR ACTION7 - Trends on narratives used	TTP OR ACTION8 - Penetration and impact on genuine users	TTP OR ACTION8 - Trends on targeted audiences	TTP OR ACTION8 - Trends on narratives used	TTP OR ACTION9 - Penetration and impact on genuine users	TTP OR ACTION9 - Trends on targeted audiences	TTP OR ACTION9 - Trends on narratives used	TTP OR ACTION10 - Penetration and impact on genuine users	TTP OR ACTION10 - Trends on targeted audiences	TTP OR ACTION10 - Trends on narratives used	TTP OR ACTION11 - Penetration and impact on genuine users	TTP OR ACTION11 - Trends on targeted audiences	TTP OR ACTION11 - Trends on narratives used	TTP OR ACTION12 - Penetration and impact on genuine users	TTP OR ACTION12 - Trends on targeted audiences	TTP OR ACTION12 - Trends on narratives used
Austria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Belgium	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Croatia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cyprus	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Czech Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Denmark	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Estonia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Finland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
France	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Germany	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Greece	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hungary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ireland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Italy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Latvia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lithuania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Malta	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Poland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Portugal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Romania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Slovenia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Spain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sweden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Iceland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Norway	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

SLI 14.2.4

Estimation, at the Member State level, of TTPs related content, views/impressions and interaction/engagement with such content as a percentage of the total content, views/impressions and interaction/engagement on relevant signatories' service.

Country	TTP OR ACTION1 - TTPs related content in relation to overall content	TTP OR ACTION1 - Views of TTP content	TTP OR ACTION1 - Engagement with TTP content	TTP OR ACTION2 - TTPs related content in relation to overall content	TTP OR ACTION2 - Views of TTP content	TTP OR ACTION2 - Engagement with TTP content	TTP OR ACTION3 - TTPs related content in relation to overall content	TTP OR ACTION3 - Views of TTP content	TTP OR ACTION3 - Engagement with TTP content	TTP OR ACTION4 - TTPs related content in relation to overall content	TTP OR ACTION4 - Views of TTP content	TTP OR ACTION4 - Engagement with TTP content	TTP OR ACTION5 - TTPs related content in relation to overall content	TTP OR ACTION5 - Views of TTP content	TTP OR ACTION5 - Engagement with TTP content	TTP OR ACTION6 - TTPs related content in relation to overall content	TTP OR ACTION6 - Views of TTP content	TTP OR ACTION6 - Engagement with TTP content	TTP OR ACTION7 - TTPs related content in relation to overall content	TTP OR ACTION7 - Views of TTP content	TTP OR ACTION7 - Engagement with TTP content	TTP OR ACTION8 - TTPs related content in relation to overall content	TTP OR ACTION8 - Views of TTP content	TTP OR ACTION8 - Engagement with TTP content	TTP OR ACTION9 - TTPs related content in relation to overall content	TTP OR ACTION9 - Views of TTP content	TTP OR ACTION9 - Engagement with TTP content	TTP OR ACTION10 - TTPs related content in relation to overall content	TTP OR ACTION10 - Views of TTP content	TTP OR ACTION10 - Engagement with TTP content	TTP OR ACTION11 - TTPs related content in relation to overall content	TTP OR ACTION11 - Views of TTP content	TTP OR ACTION11 - Engagement with TTP content	TTP OR ACTION12 - TTPs related content in relation to overall content	TTP OR ACTION12 - Views of TTP content	TTP OR ACTION12 - Engagement with TTP content
Austria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Belgium	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Croatia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cyprus	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Czech Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Denmark	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Estonia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Finland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
France	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Germany	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Greece	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hungary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ireland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Italy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Latvia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lithuania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Malta	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Poland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Portugal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Romania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Slovenia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Spain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sweden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Iceland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Norway	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Measure 14.3

Relevant Signatories will convene via the Permanent Task-force to agree upon and publish a list and terminology of TTPs employed by malicious actors, which should be updated on an annual basis.

QRE 14.3.1

Signatories will report on the list of TTPs agreed in the Permanent Task-force within 6 months of the signing of the Code and will update this list at least every year. They will also report about the common baseline elements, objectives and benchmarks for the policies and measures.

Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.

The final list of TTPs agreed within the Permanent Task-force in H2 2022 was used by Signatories as part of their reports from then on, as intended. The Permanent Task-force will continue to examine and update the list as necessary in light of the state of the art.

Commitment 15

Relevant Signatories that develop or operate AI systems and that disseminate AI-generated and manipulated content through their services (e.g. deepfakes) commit to take into consideration the transparency obligations and the list of manipulative practices prohibited under the proposal for Artificial Intelligence Act.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 15.1 Measure 15.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 15.1

Relevant signatories will establish or confirm their policies in place for countering prohibited manipulative practices for AI systems that generate or manipulate content, such as warning users and proactively detect such content.

QRE 15.1.1

In line with EU and national legislation, Relevant Signatories will report on their policies in place for countering prohibited manipulative practices for AI systems that generate or manipulate content.

Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.

The Google Search Manipulated Media Policy prohibits audio, video, or image content that has been manipulated to deceive, defraud, or mislead by means of creating a representation of actions or events that verifiably did not take place. This includes if such content would cause a reasonable person to have a fundamentally different understanding or impression, such that it might cause significant harm to groups or individuals, or significantly undermine participation or trust in electoral or civic processes.

Measure 15.2

Relevant Signatories will establish or confirm their policies in place to ensure that the algorithms used for detection, moderation and sanctioning of impermissible conduct and content on their services are trustworthy, respect the rights of end-users and do not constitute prohibited manipulative practices impermissibly distorting their behaviour in line with Union and Member States legislation.

QRE 15.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on their policies and actions to ensure that the algorithms used for detection, moderation and sanctioning of impermissible conduct and content on their services are trustworthy, respect the rights of end-users and do not constitute prohibited manipulative practices in line with Union and Member States legislation.

Google Search has published guidance on AI-generated content. This guidance explains how AI and automation can be a useful tool to create helpful content. However, if AI is used for the primary purpose of manipulating search rankings, that is a violation of Google Search’s long-standing policy against spammy automatically-generated content.

Improved AI systems can help bolster spam fighting capabilities and even help combat known loss patterns. Google Search introduced a system to better identify queries seeking explicit content, so Google Search can better avoid shocking or offending users not looking for that information, and ultimately make the Google Search experience safer for everyone.

Commitment 16

Relevant Signatories commit to operate channels of exchange between their relevant teams in order to proactively share information about cross-platform influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerge on their respective services, with the aim of preventing dissemination and resurgence on other services, in full compliance with privacy legislation and with due consideration for security and human rights risks.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 16.1

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Search & YouTube
Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) published its Q1 2025, and Q2 2025 Quarterly Bulletin, which provides updates around coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google’s platforms.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 16.1

Relevant Signatories will share relevant information about cross-platform information manipulation, foreign interference in information space and incidents that emerge on their respective services for instance via a dedicated sub-group of the permanent Task-force or via existing fora for exchanging such information.

QRE 16.1.1

Relevant Signatories will disclose the fora they use for information sharing as well as information about learnings derived from this sharing.

Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.

Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) and Trust & Safety Teams work to monitor malicious actors around the globe, disable their accounts, and remove the content that they post, including but not limited to coordinated information operations and other operations that may affect EEA Member States.

One of TAG’s missions is to understand and disrupt coordinated information operations threat actors. TAG’s work enables Google teams to make enforcement decisions backed by rigorous analysis. TAG’s investigations do not focus on making judgements about the content on Google platforms, but rather examining technical signals, heuristics, and behavioural patterns to make an assessment that activity is coordinated inauthentic behaviour.

TAG regularly publishes its TAG Bulletin, updated quarterly here, which provides updates around coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google’s platforms, as well as additional periodic blog posts. TAG also engages with other platform Signatories to receive and, when strictly necessary for security purposes, share information related to threat actor activity – in compliance with applicable laws. To learn more, refer to SLI 16.1.1.

See Google’s disclosure policies about handling security vulnerabilities for developers and security professionals.

SLI 16.1.1

Number of actions taken as a result of the collaboration and information sharing between signatories. Where they have such information, they will specify which Member States that were affected (including information about the content being detected and acted upon due to this collaboration).

Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) posts a quarterly Bulletin, which includes disclosure of coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google’s products and services, as well as additional periodic blog posts. In the Bulletin, TAG often notes when findings are similar to or supported by those reported by other platforms.

YouTube
The publicly available H1 2025 TAG Bulletins (1 January 2025 - 30 June 2025) show 34,177 YouTube channels across 52 separate actions were involved in Coordinated Influence Operation Campaigns. Industry partners supported 4 of those separate actions by providing leads. The TAG Bulletin and periodic blog posts are Google’s, including YouTube’s, primary public source of information on coordinated influence operations and TTP-related issues.

As reported in the Bulletin, some channels YouTube took action on were part of campaigns that uploaded content in some EEA languages, specifically: Romanian (80 channels), German (77 channels), Polish (68 channels), French (51 channels), Spanish (34 channels), Italian (16 channels), and Greek (4 channels). Certain campaigns may have uploaded content in multiple languages, or in other countries outside of the EEA region utilising EEA languages. Please note that there may be many languages for any one coordinated influence campaign and that the presence of content in an EEA Member State language does not necessarily entail a particular focus on that Member State. For more information, please see the TAG Bulletin.

The EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation Rapid Response System (RRS) is a collaborative initiative involving both non-platform and platform Signatories of the Code of Conduct to provide a means for cooperation and communication between them for a period of time ahead, during and after the election period.

The RRS allows non-platform Signatories of the Code of Conduct to report time-sensitive content or accounts that they deem may present serious or systemic concerns to the integrity of the electoral process, and enables discussion with the platform Signatories in light of their respective policies.

The disclosures below also include reporting through the RRS of allegedly illegal content. Although the Article 16 Digital Services Act (DSA) mechanism should be used by non-platform Signatories to report allegedly illegal content, Google reviews such notifications, too, as part of the RRS, provided the non-platform Signatory has already used the Article 16 DSA mechanism to submit them and shares the appropriate notification reference with Google through the RRS.

Search

Germany - No notifications were received through RRS.
Poland - One notification was received through RRS. 252 URLs were flagged as allegedly illegal content, of which 213 URLs were removed.
Portugal - No notifications were received through RRS.
Romania - No notifications were received through RRS.

YouTube

Germany - Two notifications were received through RRS. Two videos were flagged of which one was removed and one was found to be non-violative of policies.
Poland - Two notifications were received through RRS. One video was flagged and found to be non-violative of policies. One channel was flagged and found to be non-violative of policies.
Portugal - No notifications were received through RRS.
Romania - No notifications were received through RRS.

Empowering Users

Commitment 17

In light of the European Commission's initiatives in the area of media literacy, including the new Digital Education Action Plan, Relevant Signatories commit to continue and strengthen their efforts in the area of media literacy and critical thinking, also with the aim to include vulnerable groups.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 17.1 Measure 17.2 Measure 17.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 17.1

Relevant Signatories will design and implement or continue to maintain tools to improve media literacy and critical thinking, for instance by empowering users with context on the content visible on services or with guidance on how to evaluate online content.

QRE 17.1.1

Relevant Signatories will outline the tools they develop or maintain that are relevant to this commitment and report on their deployment in each Member State.

Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.

Google Search aims to connect users with high-quality information, and help users understand and evaluate that information. Google Search has deeply invested in both information quality and information literacy. Some ways in which Google Search does this include:

‘About This Result’: Next to most results on Google Search, there is a menu icon that users can tap to learn more about the result or feature and where the information is coming from. With this additional context, users can make a more informed decision about the sites they want to visit and what results will be most useful for them. When available, users will see a description of the website from Wikipedia, which provides free, reliable information about tens of millions of sites on the web. If a website does not have a Wikipedia description, Google Search will show additional context that may be available, such as when Google Search first indexed the site. Users will also be able to quickly see if their connection to the site is secure based on its use of the HTTPS protocol, which encrypts all data between the website and the browser they are using, to help them stay safe as they browse the web. More information on the ‘About This Result’ feature can be found here, and here.
- The ‘More About This Page’ link within the ‘About This Result’ feature provides additional insights about sources and topics users find on Google Search. When a user taps the three dots on any search result, they will be able to learn more about the page. Users can:
  - See more information about the source: Users will be able to read what a site says about itself in its own words, when that information is available.
  - Find what others on the web have said about a site: Reading what others on the web have written about a site can help users better evaluate sources.
  - Learn more about the topic: In the ‘About the topic’ section, users can find information about the same topic from other sources.
- Additional information can be found in the Google Search blog post here.

‘About This Image’: With added insights in ‘About This Image’, users will know if an image may have been generated with Google’s AI tools when they come across it in Search or Chrome. All images generated with Imagen 2 in Google’s consumer products are marked by SynthID, a tool developed by Google DeepMind that adds a digital watermark directly into the pixels of images generated. SynthID watermarks are imperceptible to the human eye but detectable for identification. ‘About This Image’ tool is available in more than 40 languages around the world, including English, French, German, Hindi, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Portuguese, Spanish and Vietnamese.
- Google Search has also conducted extensive adversarial testing and red teaming to identify and mitigate potential harmful and problematic content. Google Search is also applying filters to avoid generating images of named people.
- More information on the ‘About This Image’ feature can be found here.

Content Advisory Notices: Helpful notices for users that highlight when information is scarce or when interest is travelling faster than facts. These are specifically designed to address data voids which include queries for which either content is limited or nonexistent or when a topic is rapidly evolving and reliable information is not yet available for that topic.

SLI 17.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report, at the Member State level, on metrics pertinent to assessing the effects of the tools described in the qualitative reporting element for Measure 17.1, which will include: the total count of impressions of the tool; and information on the interactions/engagement with the tool.

(1) Impression proportion estimate of content advisories for low relevance results in H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025), broken down by EEA Member State;

(2) Impression proportion estimate of content advisories for rapidly changing results in H1 2025, broken down by EEA Member State;

Note metrics 1 and 2 are estimated proportions; metric 1 represents the number of content advisories for low relevance results out of all queries over the reporting period; metric 2 follows the same logic but is for content advisories for rapidly changing results.

(3) Number of times the ‘More About This Page’ feature was viewed in H1 2025, broken down by EEA Member State;

(4) Number of times the ‘Source’ section of the ‘About This Result’ panel was viewed in H1 2025, broken down by EEA Member State;

(5) Number of times the 'Your Search and this result' section of the ‘About This Result’ panel was viewed in H1 2025, broken down by EEA Member State.

Country	Impression proportion estimate of content advisories for low relevance results (%)	Impression proportion estimate of content advisories for rapidly changing results (%)	Number of times the 'More About This Page' feature was viewed	Number of times the 'Source' section of the 'About This Result' panel was viewed	Number of times the 'Your Search and this result' section of the 'About This Result' panel was viewed
Austria	0.109%	0.00173%	559,648	10,595,132	10,312,776
Belgium	0.113%	0.00094%	751,892	12,692,068	12,390,968
Bulgaria	0.138%	0.00055%	469,972	5,907,616	5,702,776
Croatia	0.141%	0.00070%	329,544	5,236,660	4,924,932
Cyprus	0.178%	0.00125%	107,668	1,172,260	1,142,124
Czech Republic	0.111%	0.00066%	760,664	9,846,284	9,673,916
Denmark	0.103%	0.00184%	343,212	6,067,760	5,969,640
Estonia	0.178%	0.00201%	91,720	1,498,140	1,477,272
Finland	0.116%	0.00175%	367,616	7,642,084	7,507,412
France	0.088%	0.00078%	4,862,860	82,663,676	79,663,736
Germany	0.113%	0.00185%	5,400,416	101,763,324	98,227,356
Greece	0.160%	0.00051%	796,392	11,283,288	10,742,560
Hungary	0.127%	0.00052%	618,180	8,365,604	8,113,340
Ireland	0.122%	0.00179%	484,276	7,712,380	7,392,148
Italy	0.156%	0.00065%	4,749,996	84,481,308	79,533,468
Latvia	0.195%	0.00196%	125,016	1,629,840	1,598,232
Lithuania	0.175%	0.00113%	185,580	2,728,196	2,673,144
Luxembourg	0.147%	0.00173%	37,584	704,220	688,296
Malta	0.179%	0.00181%	46,404	654,492	638,028
Netherlands	0.110%	0.00105%	1,491,312	24,564,280	23,830,508
Poland	0.080%	0.00040%	2,476,700	49,084,352	47,822,796
Portugal	0.097%	0.00103%	810,384	11,777,648	11,413,412
Romania	0.111%	0.00057%	982,724	12,451,072	12,008,332
Slovakia	0.149%	0.00054%	347,696	4,688,868	4,578,192
Slovenia	0.193%	0.00073%	141,960	2,348,816	2,278,504
Spain	0.086%	0.00109%	4,562,252	61,229,376	58,729,760
Sweden	0.093%	0.00190%	658,320	12,917,312	12,686,580
Iceland	0.158%	0.00263%	14,244	359,072	352,420
Liechtenstein	0.158%	0.00224%	2,420	38,972	38,204
Norway	0.079%	0.00159%	462,756	5,923,932	5,829,708
Total EU	0.111%	0.00105%	32,559,988	541,706,056	521,720,208
Total EEA	0.111%	0.00106%	33,039,408	548,028,032	527,940,540

Measure 17.2

Relevant Signatories will develop, promote and/or support or continue to run activities to improve media literacy and critical thinking such as campaigns to raise awareness about Disinformation, as well as the TTPs that are being used by malicious actors, among the general public across the European Union, also considering the involvement of vulnerable communities.

QRE 17.2.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the activities they launch or support and the Member States they target and reach. Relevant signatories will further report on actions taken to promote the campaigns to their user base per Member States targeted.

Grants
In H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025), Google supported a number of organisations that seek to help build a safer online world. This includes:

A $103,220 grant to GLOBSEC, which is a platform that combines prebunking techniques, AI content recognition, and personalised learning to educate users on civic topics.

A $102,640 grant to the Social Incubator nonprofit organisation, an AI-powered civic education platform that offers a suite of tools, including interactive chatbots, personalized learning paths, gamified content, and comprehensive digital literacy training.

A $102,640 grant to Parlons Démocratie, which helps teachers deliver better civic education through a professionally designed massive open online course (MOOC) combined with an AI-powered chatbot that provides personalised, real-time support.

A $103,060 grant to CyberPeace Institute to support European civil society organisations (CSO) to combat cyber attacks and disinformation by using AI for actionable insights and collective intelligence.

Search
To raise awareness of its features and build literacy across society, Google Search works with information literacy experts to help design tools in a way that allows users to feel confident and in control of the information they consume and the choices they make.

In addition, Google, in partnership with Public Libraries 2030, launched Super Searchers in 2022. The ongoing program has trained thousands of library staff in community and school libraries in the EU to increase the search and information literacy skills of tens of thousands of library patrons.

YouTube
YouTube remains committed to supporting efforts that deepen users’ collective understanding of misinformation. To empower users to think critically and use YouTube’s products safely and responsibly, YouTube invests in media literacy campaigns to improve users’ experiences on YouTube. In 2022, YouTube launched ‘Hit Pause’, a global media literacy campaign, which is live in all EEA Member States and the campaign has run in 40+ additional countries around the world, including all official EU languages.

The program seeks to teach viewers critical media literacy skills via engaging and educational public service announcements (PSAs) via YouTube home feed and pre-roll ads, and on a dedicated YouTube channel. The YouTube channel hosts videos from the YouTube Trust & Safety team that explain how YouTube protects the YouTube community from misinformation and other harmful content, as well as additional campaign content that provides members of the YouTube community with the opportunity to increase critical thinking skills around identifying different manipulation tactics used to spread misinformation – from using emotional language to cherry picking information.

EEA Member State coverage of 'Hit Pause' media literacy impressions can be found in SLI 17.2.1.

SLI 17.2.1

Relevant Signatories report on number of media literacy and awareness raising activities organised and or participated in and will share quantitative information pertinent to show the effects of the campaigns they build or support at the Member State level.

In H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025), as part of the Super Searchers Program, 666 librarians were trained across the 17 training sessions held in Europe.

Country	Nr of media literacy/ awareness raising activities organised/ participated in	Reach of campaigns	Nr of participants	Nr of interactions with online assets	Nr of participants (etc)
Austria	0	0	0	0	0
Belgium	0	0	0	0	0
Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0
Croatia	0	0	0	0	0
Cyprus	0	0	0	0	0
Czech Republic	0	0	0	0	0
Denmark	0	0	0	0	0
Estonia	0	0	0	0	0
Finland	0	0	0	0	0
France	0	0	0	0	0
Germany	0	0	0	0	0
Greece	0	0	0	0	0
Hungary	0	0	0	0	0
Ireland	0	0	0	0	0
Italy	0	0	0	0	0
Latvia	0	0	0	0	0
Lithuania	0	0	0	0	0
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0
Malta	0	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0
Poland	0	0	0	0	0
Portugal	0	0	0	0	0
Romania	0	0	0	0	0
Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0
Slovenia	0	0	0	0	0
Spain	0	0	0	0	0
Sweden	0	0	0	0	0
Iceland	0	0	0	0	0
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	0
Norway	0	0	0	0	0

Measure 17.3

For both of the above Measures, and in order to build on the expertise of media literacy experts in the design, implementation, and impact measurement of tools, relevant Signatories will partner or consult with media literacy experts in the EU, including for instance the Commission's Media Literacy Expert Group, ERGA's Media Literacy Action Group, EDMO, its country-specific branches, or relevant Member State universities or organisations that have relevant expertise.

QRE 17.3.1

Relevant Signatories will describe how they involved and partnered with media literacy experts for the purposes of all Measures in this Commitment.

See response to QRE 17.2.1.

Commitment 18

Relevant Signatories commit to minimise the risks of viral propagation of Disinformation by adopting safe design practices as they develop their systems, policies, and features.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 18.2 Measure 18.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 18.2

Relevant Signatories will develop and enforce publicly documented, proportionate policies to limit the spread of harmful false or misleading information (as depends on the service, such as prohibiting, downranking, or not recommending harmful false or misleading information, adapted to the severity of the impacts and with due regard to freedom of expression and information); and take action on webpages or actors that persistently violate these policies.

QRE 18.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the policies or terms of service that are relevant to Measure 18.2 and on their approach towards persistent violations of these policies.

Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.

Google Search has the following policies which complement the Content Policies outlined in QRE 14.1.1:

Medical Content Policy: This policy prohibits content that contradicts or runs contrary to scientific or medical consensus and evidence-based best practices.

Misleading Content Policy: This policy states that Search features and News prohibits preview content that misleads users to engage with it by promising details which are not reflected in the underlying content.

These policies also provide users with information on how to report specific types of content that violate those policies. Google Search removes content for policy violations based on user reports as well as through its internal content moderation processes. More extensive policies are deployed for Search features, and can be found at the Content Policies Help Centre.

In addition, Google Search removes content that has been determined to be unlawful under applicable law, in response to a notification from a third party, such as a user or an authority. Examples include material in relation to which Google Search has received a valid ‘right to be forgotten request’ or material in relation to which Google Search has received a valid court order. Google Search measures the number of court and government Legal Removal requests biannually (across all products), and publishes this information in transparency reports.

SLI 18.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on actions taken in response to violations of policies relevant to Measure 18.2, at the Member State level. The metrics shall include: Total number of violations and Meaningful metrics to measure the impact of these actions (such as their impact on the visibility of or the engagement with content that was actioned upon).

See response to SLI 14.2.1.

Country	Total no of violations	Metric 1: indicating the impact of the action taken	Metric 2: indicating the impact of the action taken	Metric 3: indicating the impact of the action taken
Austria	0	0	0	0
Belgium	0	0	0	0
Bulgaria	0	0	0	0
Croatia	0	0	0	0
Cyprus	0	0	0	0
Czech Republic	0	0	0	0
Denmark	0	0	0	0
Estonia	0	0	0	0
Finland	0	0	0	0
France	0	0	0	0
Germany	0	0	0	0
Greece	0	0	0	0
Hungary	0	0	0	0
Ireland	0	0	0	0
Italy	0	0	0	0
Latvia	0	0	0	0
Lithuania	0	0	0	0
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0
Malta	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	0	0	0	0
Poland	0	0	0	0
Portugal	0	0	0	0
Romania	0	0	0	0
Slovakia	0	0	0	0
Slovenia	0	0	0	0
Spain	0	0	0	0
Sweden	0	0	0	0
Iceland	0	0	0	0
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0
Norway	0	0	0	0

Measure 18.3

Relevant Signatories will invest and/or participate in research efforts on the spread of harmful Disinformation online and related safe design practices, will make findings available to the public or report on those to the Code's taskforce. They will disclose and discuss findings within the permanent Task-force, and explain how they intend to use these findings to improve existing safe design practices and features or develop new ones.

QRE 18.3.1

Relevant Signatories will describe research efforts, both in-house and in partnership with third-party organisations, on the spread of harmful Disinformation online and relevant safe design practices, as well as actions or changes as a result of this research. Relevant Signatories will include where possible information on financial investments in said research. Wherever possible, they will make their findings available to the general public.

Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.

Google, including YouTube, works with stakeholders across the technology sector, government, and civil society to set good policies, remain abreast of emerging challenges, and establish, share, and learn from industry best practices and research.

Described below are examples that demonstrate Google’s, including YouTube, commitment to these actions:

Jigsaw-led Research

Jigsaw is a unit within Google that explores threats to open societies and builds technology that inspires scalable solutions. Jigsaw began conducting research on 'information interventions' more than 10 years ago. Jigsaw has since contributed research and technology on ways to make people more resilient to disinformation. Their research efforts are based on behavioural science and ethnographic studies that examine when people might be vulnerable to specific messages and how to provide helpful information when people need it most. These interventions provide a methodology for proactively addressing a range of threats to people online, as a complement to approaches that focus on removing or downranking material online.

An example of a notable research effort by Jigsaw run on and with YouTube is:

Accuracy Prompts (APs): APs remind users to think about accuracy. The prompts work by serving users bite-sized digital literacy tips at a moment when it might matter. Lab studies conducted across 16 countries with over 30,000 participants, suggest that APs increase engagement with accurate information and decrease engagement with less accurate information.

Commitment 19

Relevant Signatories using recommender systems commit to make them transparent to the recipients regarding the main criteria and parameters used for prioritising or deprioritising information, and provide options to users about recommender systems, and make available information on those options.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 19.1 Measure 19.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 19.1

Relevant Signatories will make available to their users, including through the Transparency Centre and in their terms and conditions, in a clear, accessible and easily comprehensible manner, information outlining the main parameters their recommender systems employ.

QRE 19.1.1

Relevant Signatories will provide details of the policies and measures put in place to implement the above-mentioned measures accessible to EU users, especially by publishing information outlining the main parameters their recommender systems employ in this regard. This information should also be included in the Transparency Centre.

Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.

Google Search’s ranking systems sort through hundreds of billions of web pages and other content in the Search index to present the most relevant, useful results in a fraction of a second. Main parameters that help determine which results are returned for a user’s query include:

Meaning of user’s query: To return relevant results, Google Search first needs to establish the intent behind a user’s query. Google Search builds language models to decipher how the words that a user enters into the search box match up to the most useful content available.
Relevance of content: Next, Google Search systems analyse the content to assess whether it contains information that might be relevant to what the user is looking for. The most basic signal that information is relevant is when content contains the same keywords as the user’s search query.
Quality of content: Google Search systems prioritise content that seems most helpful by identifying signals that can help determine which content demonstrates expertise, high-quality, and trustworthiness. For example, one of several factors that Google Search uses to help determine this is by understanding if other prominent websites link or refer to the content. Aggregated feedback from the Google Search quality evaluation process is used to further refine how Google Search systems discern the quality of information.
Usability: Google Search systems also consider the usability of content. When all things are relatively equal, content that people will find more accessible may perform better.
Context and settings: Information such as user location, past Google Search history, and Search settings all help Google Search ensure user results are what is most useful and relevant at that moment. Google Search uses the user’s country and location to deliver content relevant to their area. For instance, if a user in Chicago searches ‘football’, Google Search will likely show the user results about American football and the Chicago Bears first. Whereas if the user searches ‘football’ in London, Google will show results about soccer and the Premier League. Google Search settings are also an important indicator of which results a user is likely to find useful, such as if they set a preferred language or opted in to SafeSearch (a tool that helps filter out explicit results). Google Search also includes features that personalise results based on the activity in their Google account. The user can control what Google Search activity is used to improve their experience, including adjusting what data is saved to their Google account at myaccount.google.com. To disable Google Search personalisation based on activity in a user’s account, the user can turn off personal results in Search. Users can also prevent activity being stored to the user’s account or delete particular history items in Web & App Activity. Google Search systems are designed to match a user’s interests, but they are not designed to infer sensitive characteristics like race, religion or political party.

The How Search Works website explains the ins and outs of Google Search. The following links provide additional information about helping people and businesses learn how Search works and how results are automatically generated.

Measure 19.2

Relevant Signatories will provide options for the recipients of the service to select and to modify at any time their preferred options for relevant recommender systems, including giving users transparency about those options.

SLI 19.2.1

Relevant Signatories will provide aggregated information on effective user settings, such as the number of times users have actively engaged with these settings within the reporting period or over a sample representative timeframe, and clearly denote shifts in configuration patterns.

Number of views for each unique combination of a user and their device on the personal results control in H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025), specifically within the context of Search Personalisation, broken down by EEA Member State.

Country	Number of views for each unique combination of a user and their device on the personal results control
Austria	249,011
Belgium	364,212
Bulgaria	165,655
Croatia	140,045
Cyprus	32,030
Czech Republic	294,091
Denmark	115,231
Estonia	34,729
Finland	182,382
France	2,279,998
Germany	2,477,120
Greece	303,362
Hungary	240,766
Ireland	169,237
Italy	2,376,666
Latvia	57,753
Lithuania	80,374
Luxembourg	15,308
Malta	12,375
Netherlands	593,291
Poland	1,373,105
Portugal	288,409
Romania	461,778
Slovakia	136,890
Slovenia	55,262
Spain	1,853,395
Sweden	253,458
Iceland	5649
Liechtenstein	546
Norway	114,171
Total EU	14,605,933
Total EEA	14,726,299

Commitment 22

Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with tools to help them make more informed decisions when they encounter online information that may be false or misleading, and to facilitate user access to tools and information to assess the trustworthiness of information sources, such as indicators of trustworthiness for informed online navigation, particularly relating to societal issues or debates of general interest.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 22.7

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 22.7

Relevant Signatories will design and apply products and features (e.g. information panels, banners, pop-ups, maps and prompts, trustworthiness indicators) that lead users to authoritative sources on topics of particular public and societal interest or in crisis situations.

QRE 22.7.1

Relevant Signatories will outline the products and features they deploy across their services and will specify whether those are available across Member States.

Google Search deploys the following features:

‘SOS Alerts’: Structured content that appears on a Google Search page, including high-quality help links and local relevant information when a crisis strikes. The alerts aim to make emergency information more accessible during a crisis. Google brings together relevant and high-quality content from the web, media, and Google products, and then highlights that information across Google products such as Google Search and Google Maps. See Help Centre for more information.

Search raises authoritative election-related information to be more discoverable to users, such as features that tell users how to register to vote, how to vote in an upcoming election, and the current state of the ballot results for an ongoing election.

SLI 22.7.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the reach and/or user interactions with the products or features, at the Member State level, via the metrics of impressions and interactions (clicks, click-through rates (as relevant to the tools and services in question) and shares (as relevant to the tools and services in question).

Number of views/impressions on the following Google Search features in H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025), for EEA Member States:

Crisis Response (e.g. ‘SOS Alerts’, ‘Public Alerts’).

In H1 2025, the following number of views/impressions were made on the Google Search features below:

130,453,844 views/impressions on Crisis Response alerts (e.g. ‘SOS Alerts’, ‘Public Alerts’).

Country	Impressions	Clicks	CTR	Shares
Austria	0	0	0	0
Belgium	0	0	0	0
Bulgaria	0	0	0	0
Croatia	0	0	0	0
Cyprus	0	0	0	0
Czech Republic	0	0	0	0
Denmark	0	0	0	0
Estonia	0	0	0	0
Finland	0	0	0	0
France	0	0	0	0
Germany	0	0	0	0
Greece	0	0	0	0
Hungary	0	0	0	0
Ireland	0	0	0	0
Italy	0	0	0	0
Latvia	0	0	0	0
Lithuania	0	0	0	0
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0
Malta	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	0	0	0	0
Poland	0	0	0	0
Portugal	0	0	0	0
Romania	0	0	0	0
Slovakia	0	0	0	0
Slovenia	0	0	0	0
Spain	0	0	0	0
Sweden	0	0	0	0
Iceland	0	0	0	0
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0
Norway	0	0	0	0

Commitment 23

Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with the functionality to flag harmful false and/or misleading information that violates Signatories policies or terms of service.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 23.1 Measure 23.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 23.1

Relevant Signatories will develop or continue to make available on all their services and in all Member States languages in which their services are provided a user-friendly functionality for users to flag harmful false and/or misleading information that violates Signatories' policies or terms of service. The functionality should lead to appropriate, proportionate and consistent follow-up actions, in full respect of the freedom of expression.

QRE 23.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the availability of flagging systems for their policies related to harmful false and/or misleading information across EU Member States and specify the different steps that are required to trigger the systems.

Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.

Google Search aims to make the process of submitting removal requests as easy as possible, and has built reporting tools, which allow users in all EU Member States to report potentially violative content for review under Search’s Content Policies and Community Guidelines for user generated content. The Report Content On Google tool, for example, guides users to the right reporting form to provide the necessary information for the legal or policy issue they seek to flag.

Google Search has reporting tools for Search features, such as knowledge panels and featured snippets. For overall Search Results, users can flag content via the three dots in Search features and 10 blue links. Using the Send Feedback option in ‘About This Result’, users can then send feedback about the result, describing the issue and attaching a screenshot.

Measure 23.2

Relevant Signatories will take the necessary measures to ensure that this functionality is duly protected from human or machine-based abuse (e.g., the tactic of 'mass-flagging' to silence other voices).

QRE 23.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the general measures they take to ensure the integrity of their reporting and appeals systems, while steering clear of disclosing information that would help would-be abusers find and exploit vulnerabilities in their defences.

Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.

Google Search carefully scrutinises most removal complaints that arrive in Google Search systems. Removal requests are handled according to the product area, issue type, and region, by a global team of front-line reviewers and Policy Leads who have expertise in a range of product areas, issue types (such as defamation or copyright infringement), local laws, and languages. Removal requests are processed in accordance with the mission of complying with the law and Google’s policies while maximising access to information and preserving user expression.

For most classes of requests, trained reviewers manually assess the removals. In some cases, such as copyright takedowns, Google Search deploys automation to speed the processing of high-volume complaints. To avoid abuse in this process, Google Search relies upon:

1) Limitations on who may submit high volumes of requests through flows like the Trusted Copyright Removals Program, ensuring that participants in this program are organisations with bona fide copyright interests unlikely to abuse their rights to suppress unrelated content;

2) Legal protections, such as those found in the Digital Services Act, or the possibility for Google or webmasters to file suit against submitters of bad-faith copyright complaints;

3) Handling counter-notifications from affected webmasters;

4) Tracking patterns of abusive behaviour and adjusting Google Search automation to avoid automatically honouring abusive takedowns of a kind Google Search has become aware of.

Empowering Researchers

Commitment 26

Relevant Signatories commit to provide access, wherever safe and practicable, to continuous, real-time or near real-time, searchable stable access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated, or manifestly-made public data for research purposes on Disinformation through automated means such as APIs or other open and accessible technical solutions allowing the analysis of said data.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 26.1 Measure 26.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 26.1

Relevant Signatories will provide public access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated or manifestly-made public data pertinent to undertaking research on Disinformation on their services, such as engagement and impressions (views) of content hosted by their services, with reasonable safeguards to address risks of abuse (e.g. API policies prohibiting malicious or commercial uses).

QRE 26.1.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the tools and processes in place to provide public access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated and manifestly-made public data pertinent to undertaking research on Disinformation, as well as the safeguards in place to address risks of abuse.

Google Trends

Google Search and YouTube provide publicly available data via Google Trends, which provides access to a largely unfiltered sample of actual search requests made to Google Search and YouTube’s search function. It is anonymised (no one is personally identified), categorised (determined by the topic for a search query) and aggregated (grouped together). This allows Google Trends to display interest in a particular topic from around the globe or down to city-level geography. See Trends Help Centre for details.

Google Researcher Program

Eligible EU researchers can apply for access to publicly available data across some of Google’s products, including Search and YouTube, through the Google Researcher Program. Search and YouTube will provide eligible researchers (including non-academics that meet predefined eligibility criteria) with access to limited metadata scraping for public data. This program aims to enhance the public’s understanding of Google’s services and their impact. For additional details, see the Researcher Program landing page.

YouTube Researcher Program

The YouTube Researcher Program provides scaled, expanded access to global video metadata across the entire public YouTube corpus via a Data API for eligible academic researchers from around the world, who are affiliated with an accredited, higher-learning institution. Learn more about the data available in the YouTube API reference.

Transparency into paid content on YouTube

YouTube provides users a bespoke front end search page to access publicly available data containing organic content with paid product placements, sponsorships and endorsements as disclosed by creators. This is to enable users to understand that creators may receive goods or services in exchange for promotion. This search page complements YouTube’s existing process of displaying a disclosure message when creators disclose to YouTube that their content contains paid promotions. Learn more about adding paid product placements, sponsorships & endorsements here.

Users can also query the same set of results using the YouTube Data API. Use is subject to YouTube’s API Terms of Service.

QRE 26.1.2

Relevant Signatories will publish information related to data points available via Measure 25.1, as well as details regarding the technical protocols to be used to access these data points, in the relevant help centre. This information should also be reachable from the Transparency Centre. At minimum, this information will include definitions of the data points available, technical and methodological information about how they were created, and information about the representativeness of the data.

Google Trends

The information provided via Google Trends is a sample of all of Google Search and YouTube’s search activity. The 2 different samples of Google Trends data that can be accessed are:

Real-time data - a sample covering the last seven days;
Non real-time data - a separate sample from real-time data that goes as far back as 2004 and up to 72 hours before one’s search.

Only a sample of Google Search and YouTube searches are used in Google Trends (a publicly available research tool), because Google, including YouTube, handles billions of searches per day. Providing access to the entire data set would be too large to process quickly. By sampling data, Google can look at a dataset representative of all searches on Google, which includes YouTube, while finding insights that can be processed within minutes of an event happening in the real world. See Trends Help Centre for details.

Google Researcher Program

Approved researchers will receive permissions and access to public data for Search and YouTube in the following ways:

Search: Access to an API for limited scraping with a budget for quota;
YouTube: Permission for scraping limited to metadata.

For additional details, see the Researcher Program landing page.

YouTube Researcher Program

The YouTube Researcher Program provides scaled, expanded access to global video metadata across the entire public YouTube corpus via a Data API. The program allows eligible academic researchers around the world to independently analyse the data they collect, including generating new/derived metrics for their research. Information available via the Data API includes video title, description, views, likes, comments, channel metadata, search results, and other data.

Transparency into paid content on YouTube

The information provided via the bespoke front end search page allows users to view videos with active paid product placements, sponsorships, and endorsements that have been declared on YouTube.

Paid product placements
- Videos about a product or service because there is a connection between the creator and the maker of the product or service;
- Videos created for a company or business in exchange for compensation or free of charge products/services;
- Videos where that company or business’s brand, message, or product is included directly in the content and the company has given the creator money or free of charge products to make the video.
Endorsements - Videos created for an advertiser or marketer that contains a message that reflects the opinions, beliefs, or experiences of the creator.
Sponsorships - Videos that have been financed in whole or in part by a company, without integrating the brand, message, or product directly into the content. Sponsorships generally promote the brand, message, or product of the third party.

Definitions can be found on the YouTube Help Centre.

Additional data points are provided in SLI 26.1.1 and 26.2.1.

SLI 26.1.1

Relevant Signatories will provide quantitative information on the uptake of the tools and processes described in Measure 26.1, such as number of users.

(1) Number of Fact Check API tool requests from users in H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025), globally;

(2) Number of Fact Check Explorer tool users in H1 2025, broken down by EEA Member State (see table below);

(3) Number of users of the Google Trends online tool to research information relating to Google Search in H1 2025, broken down by EEA Member State (see table below).

(1) In H1 2025, the Fact Check Search API received approximately 130,558 requests from Google Search users, globally.

Country	Number of Fact Check Explorer tool users	Number of Google Trends users researching Google Search
Austria	750	278,583
Belgium	934	370,772
Bulgaria	605	663,503
Croatia	336	170,138
Cyprus	121	122,916
Czech Republic	581	372,473
Denmark	808	187,353
Estonia	98	72,304
Finland	501	118,561
France	5,184	1,492,305
Germany	5,606	3,155,044
Greece	691	937,455
Hungary	774	697,221
Ireland	806	6,105,469
Italy	3,764	2,970,023
Latvia	113	129,200
Lithuania	176	177,276
Luxembourg	101	20,970
Malta	48	25,992
Netherlands	2,180	620,348
Poland	2,235	1,126,389
Portugal	951	493,259
Romania	1004	688,936
Slovakia	291	186,217
Slovenia	178	91,818
Spain	6,859	2,815,292
Sweden	946	396,555
Iceland	68	434
Liechtenstein	2	820
Norway	1185	239,140
Total EU	36,641	24,486,372
Total EEA	37,896	24,726,766

Measure 26.3

Relevant Signatories will implement procedures for reporting the malfunctioning of access systems and for restoring access and repairing faulty functionalities in a reasonable time.

QRE 26.3.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the reporting procedures in place to comply with Measure 26.3 and provide information about their malfunction response procedure, as well as about malfunctions that would have prevented the use of the systems described above during the reporting period and how long it took to remediate them.

Google Trends

For Google Trends, users have an option to report an issue by taking a screenshot of the malfunction area and then submitting it for feedback via the Send Feedback option on the Google Trends page. Additionally, users can access the Trends Help Centre to troubleshoot any issues they may be experiencing.

Google Researcher Program

For the Google Researcher Program, the most up to date information is captured in the Program description on the Transparency Centre, and also on the Acceptable Use Policy page. Google Search has additional Help Centre support via their Search Researcher Result API guidelines.

YouTube Researcher Program

For the YouTube Researcher Program, there is support available via email. Researchers can contact YouTube, with questions and to report technical issues or other suspected faults, via a unique email alias, provided upon acceptance into the program. Questions are answered by YouTube’s Developer Support team and by other relevant internal parties as needed.

Google is not aware of any malfunctions during the reporting period that would have prevented access to these reporting systems.

Commitment 28

COOPERATION WITH RESEARCHERS Relevant Signatories commit to support good faith research into Disinformation that involves their services.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 28.1 Measure 28.2 Measure 28.3 Measure 28.4

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Search & YouTube

In May 2025, Google hosted a research workshop with over 30 attendees, in Tokyo, Japan adjacent to the Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI 2025).
In June 2025, Google announced the 3 areas of primary interest for this year's Google Academic Research Award (GARA). This cycle, the program will focus on Trust, Safety, Security, & Privacy Research.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 28.1

Relevant Signatories will ensure they have the appropriate human resources in place in order to facilitate research, and should set-up and maintain an open dialogue with researchers to keep track of the types of data that are likely to be in demand for research and to help researchers find relevant contact points in their organisations.

QRE 28.1.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the resources and processes they deploy to facilitate research and engage with the research community, including e.g. dedicated teams, tools, help centres, programs, or events.

Google has a longstanding commitment to transparency, and has led the way in transparency reporting of content removals and government requests for user data over the past decade plus.

Google and YouTube’s products, processes, and practices via the Lumen Database and Google Trends show some of the ways that Google provides tools to support not only researchers, but journalists and others, to understand more about Google.

Please refer to QRE 26.1.1, QRE 26.1.2, and QRE 26.3.1 for further information about Google Trends.

Google
Eligible EU researchers can apply for access to publicly available data across some of Google’s products, including Search and YouTube, through the Google Researcher Program. Search and YouTube will provide eligible researchers (including non-academics that meet predefined eligibility criteria) with access to limited metadata scraping for public data. This program aims to enhance the public’s understanding of Google’s services and their impact.

Google has teams that operate the Google Researcher Program. They manage the researcher application process and evaluate potential updates and developments for the Google Researcher Program. Additional information can be found on the Google Transparency Centre. Google Search has additional Help Centre support via their Search Researcher Result API guidelines.

Additionally, Google’s partnership with Lumen is an independent research project managed by the Berkman Klein Centre for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School. The Lumen database houses millions of content takedown requests that have been voluntarily shared by various companies, including Google. Its purpose is to facilitate academic and industry research concerning the availability of online content. As part of Google’s partnership with Lumen, information about the legal notices Google receives may be sent to the Lumen project for publication. Google informs users about its Lumen practices under the 'Transparency at our core' section of the Legal Removals Help Centre. Additional information on Lumen can be found here.

YouTube
The YouTube Researcher Program provides eligible academic researchers from around the world with scaled, expanded access to global video metadata across the entire public YouTube corpus via a Data API. Information available via the Data API includes video title, description, views, likes, comments, channel metadata, search results, and other data. (See YouTube API reference for more information).

YouTube has teams that operate the YouTube Researcher Program. They manage the researcher application process and provide technical support throughout the research project. They also evaluate potential updates and developments for the YouTube Researcher Program. Researchers can use any of the options below to obtain support:

YouTube provides a contact email alias to researchers who have been granted access to the program;
YouTube API Code Samples at GitHub.

Measure 28.2

Relevant Signatories will be transparent on the data types they currently make available to researchers across Europe.

QRE 28.2.1

Relevant Signatories will describe what data types European researchers can currently access via their APIs or via dedicated teams, tools, help centres, programs, or events.

See response to QRE 28.1.1

Measure 28.3

Relevant Signatories will not prohibit or discourage genuinely and demonstratively public interest good faith research into Disinformation on their platforms, and will not take adversarial action against researcher users or accounts that undertake or participate in good-faith research into Disinformation.

QRE 28.3.1

Relevant Signatories will collaborate with EDMO to run an annual consultation of European researchers to assess whether they have experienced adversarial actions or are otherwise prohibited or discouraged to run such research.

Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.

Google continues to engage constructively with the Code of Conduct’s Permanent Task-force and with the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO). As of the time of this report, no annual consultation has yet taken place, but Google stands ready to collaborate with EDMO to that end in 2025.

Additionally, refer to QRE 26.1.1 to learn more about how Google, including YouTube, provides opportunities for researchers on its platforms.

Measure 28.4

As part of the cooperation framework between the Signatories and the European research community, relevant Signatories will, with the assistance of the EDMO, make funds available for research on Disinformation, for researchers to independently manage and to define scientific priorities and transparent allocation procedures based on scientific merit.

QRE 28.4.1

Relevant Signatories will disclose the resources made available for the purposes of Measure 28.4 and procedures put in place to ensure the resources are independently managed.

In 2021, Google committed €25M to help launch the European Media & Information Fund (EMIF), of which €22.5M has been provided to date. Overall, 121 projects related to information quality have now received grants across 28 countries (including 26 EEA Member States).

The EMIF was established by the European University Institute and the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. The European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) agreed to play a scientific advisory role in the evaluation and selection of projects that will receive the fund’s support, but does not receive Google funding. Google has no role in the assessment of applications.

Crisis and Elections Response

Elections 2025

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories’ abilities to measure them].

Threats observed or anticipated

Overview

In elections and other democratic processes, people want access to high-quality information and a broad range of perspectives. High-quality information helps people make informed decisions when voting and counteracts abuse by bad actors. Consistent with its broader approach to elections around the world, during the various elections across the EU in H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025), Google was committed to supporting these democratic processes by surfacing high-quality information to voters, safeguarding its platforms from abuse and equipping campaigns with best-in-class security tools and training – with a strong focus on helping people navigate AI-generated content.

Mitigations in place

Across Google, various teams support democratic processes by connecting people to election information like practical tips on how to register to vote or providing high-quality information about candidates. In 2025, a number of key elections took place around the world and across the EU in particular. In H1 2025, voters cast their votes in Germany, Poland, Portugal and Romania. Google was committed to supporting these democratic processes by surfacing high-quality information to voters, safeguarding its platforms from abuse and equipping campaigns with the best-in-class security tools and training. Across its efforts, Google also has an increased focus on the role of artificial intelligence (AI) and the part it can play in the disinformation landscape — while also leveraging AI models to augment Google’s abuse-fighting efforts.

Safeguarding Google platforms and disrupting the spread of disinformation
To better secure its products and prevent abuse, Google continues to enhance its enforcement systems and to invest in Trust & Safety operations — including at its Google Safety Engineering Centre (GSEC) for Content Responsibility in Dublin, dedicated to online safety in Europe and around the world. Google also continues to partner with the wider ecosystem to combat disinformation.

Enforcing Google policies and using AI models to fight abuse at scale: Google has long-standing policies that inform how it approaches areas like manipulated media, hate and harassment, and incitement to violence — along with policies around demonstrably false claims that could undermine democratic processes, for example in YouTube’s Community Guidelines. To help enforce Google policies, Google’s AI models are enhancing its abuse-fighting efforts. With recent advances in Google’s Large Language Models (LLMs), Google is building faster and more adaptable enforcement systems that enable us to remain nimble and take action even more quickly when new threats emerge.
Working with the wider ecosystem: Since Google’s inaugural commitment of €25 million to help launch the European Media & Information Fund, an effort designed to strengthen media literacy and information quality across Europe, 121 projects have been funded across 28 countries so far.

Helping people navigate AI-generated content
Like any emerging technology, AI presents new opportunities as well as challenges. For example, generative AI makes it easier than ever to create new content, but it can also raise questions about trustworthiness of information. Google put in place a number of policies and other measures that have helped people navigate content that was AI-generated. Overall, harmful altered or synthetic political content did not appear to be widespread on Google’s platforms. Measures that helped mitigate that risk include:

Ads disclosures: Google expanded its Political Content Policies to require advertisers to disclose when their election ads include synthetic content that inauthentically depicts real or realistic-looking people or events. Google’s ads policies already prohibit the use of manipulated media to mislead people, like deep fakes or doctored content.
Content labels on YouTube: YouTube’s Misinformation Policies prohibit technically manipulated content that misleads users and could pose a serious risk of egregious harm — and YouTube requires creators to disclose when they have created realistic altered or synthetic content, and will display a label that indicates for people when the content they are watching is synthetic. For sensitive content, including election related content, that contains realistic altered or synthetic material, the label appears on the video itself and in the video description.
Provide users with additional context: 'About This Image' in Search helps people assess the credibility and context of images found online.
Industry collaboration: Google is a member of the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA) and standard, a cross-industry effort to help provide more transparency and context for people on AI-generated content.

Informing voters surfacing high-quality information
In the build-up to elections, people need useful, relevant and timely information to help them navigate the electoral process. Here are some of the ways Google makes it easy for people to find what they need, and which were deployed during elections that took place across the EU in 2025:

High-quality Information on YouTube: For news and information related to elections, YouTube’s systems prominently surface high-quality content, on the YouTube homepage, in search results and the ‘Up Next’ panel. YouTube also displays information panels at the top of search results and below videos to provide additional context. For example, YouTube may surface various election information panels above search results or on videos related to election candidates, parties or voting.
Ongoing transparency on Election Ads: All advertisers who wish to run election ads in the EU on Google’s platforms are required to go through a verification process and have an in-ad disclosure that clearly shows who paid for the ad. These ads are published in Google’s Political Ads Transparency Report, where anyone can look up information such as how much was spent and where it was shown. Google also limits how advertisers can target election ads. Google will stop serving political advertising in the EU before the EU’s Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising (TTPA) Regulation enters into force in October 2025.

Equipping campaigns and candidates with best-in-class security features and training
As elections come with increased cybersecurity risks, Google works hard to help high-risk users, such as campaigns and election officials, civil society and news sources, improve their security in light of existing and emerging threats, and to educate them on how to use Google’s products and services.

Security tools for campaign and election teams: Google offers free services like its Advanced Protection Program — Google’s strongest set of cyber protections — and Project Shield, which provides unlimited protection against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. Google also partners with Possible, The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and Deutschland sicher im Netz (DSIN) to scale account security training and to provide security tools including Titan Security Keys, which defend against phishing attacks and prevent bad actors from accessing users’ Google Accounts.
Tackling coordinated influence operations: Google’s Threat Intelligence Group helps identify, monitor and tackle emerging threats, ranging from coordinated influence operations to cyber espionage campaigns against high-risk entities. Google reports on actions taken in its quarterly bulletin, and meets regularly with government officials and others in the industry to share threat information and suspected election interference. Mandiant also helps organisations build holistic election security programs and harden their defences with comprehensive solutions, services and tools, including proactive exposure management, proactive intelligence threat hunts, cyber crisis communication services and threat intelligence tracking of information operations. A recent publication from the team gives an overview of the global election cybersecurity landscape, designed to help election organisations tackle a range of potential threats.

Google is committed to working with government, industry and civil society to protect the integrity of elections in the European Union — building on its commitments made in the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation.

Policies and Terms and Conditions

Outline any changes to your policies

Policy - 50.1.1

N/A

Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation) - 50.1.2

N/A

Rationale - 50.1.3

N/A

Integrity of Services

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 50.4.1

Search works quickly to remove content that violates its policies. Search policies are enforced globally.

Description of intervention - 50.4.2

See Commitment 14-15 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how Search’s policies are enforced globally, including during elections in the EU.

Indication of impact - 50.4.3

See Commitment 14-15 for metrics on these efforts.

Specific Action applied - 50.4.4

Google Search has published guidance on AI-generated content. This guidance explains how AI and automation can be a useful tool to create helpful content.

Description of intervention - 50.4.5

See Commitment 15 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how Search will approach responsible AI innovation, which may be applied to future elections.

Indication of impact - 50.4.6

See Commitment 15 for more details on these efforts.

Empowering Users

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 50.5.1

In 2025, Search will continue efforts to help people make informed decisions, and surface high-quality information to voters.

Description of intervention - 50.5.2

See Commitments 17-25 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report.

Indication of impact - 50.5.3

See Commitments 17-25 for metrics on these efforts.

Specific Action applied - 50.5.4

Users often see a Knowledge Panel on the Search Results page for searches about people and organisations—a box with an overview of key information (e.g. candidates and parties) to help them go deeper. See here for more information.

Description of intervention - 50.5.5

Search is committed to providing timely and high-quality information on Google Search to help voters understand, navigate, and participate in democratic processes. Through its products, Google Search hopes to connect users with the civic information that they need. Find more information here.

Indication of impact - 50.5.6

Google Search will continue to explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.

Empowering the Research Community

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 50.6.1

Search provides publicly available data via Google Trends.

Description of intervention - 50.6.2

See Commitments 26 and 28 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how Search provides publicly available data via Google Trends.

Indication of impact - 50.6.3

Please refer to SLI 26.1.1 for metrics on these efforts.

Crisis 2025

Threats observed or anticipated

War in Ukraine

Overview

The ongoing war in Ukraine has continued into 2025, and Google continues to help by providing cybersecurity and humanitarian assistance, and providing high-quality information to people in the region. The following list outlines the main threats observed by Google during this conflict:

Continued online services manipulation and coordinated influence operations;
Advertising and monetisation linked to state-backed Russia and Ukraine disinformation;
Threats to security and protection of digital infrastructure.

Israel-Gaza conflict

Overview

Following the Israel-Gaza conflict, Google has actively worked to support humanitarian and relief efforts, ensure platforms and partnerships are responsive to the current crisis, and counter the threat of disinformation. Google identified a few areas of focus for addressing the ongoing crisis:

Humanitarian and relief efforts;
Platforms and partnerships to protect our services from coordinated influence operations, hate speech, and graphic and terrorist content.

Mitigations in place

War in Ukraine

The following sections summarise Google’s main strategies and actions taken to mitigate the identified threats and react to the war in Ukraine.

1. Online services manipulation and malign influence operations

Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) is helping Ukraine by monitoring the threat landscape in Eastern Europe and disrupting coordinated influence operations from Russian threat actors.

2. Advertising and monetisation linked to Russia and Ukraine disinformation

In H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025), Google continued to pause the majority of commercial activities in Russia – including ads serving in Russia via Google demand and third-party bidding, ads on Google’s properties and networks globally for all Russian-based advertisers, AdSense ads on state-funded media sites, and monetisation features for YouTube viewers in Russia. Google paused ads containing content that exploits, dismisses, or condones the war. In addition, Google paused the ability of Russia-based publishers to monetise with AdSense, AdMob, and Ad Manager in August 2024. Free Google services such as Search, Gmail and YouTube are still operating in Russia. Google will continue to closely monitor developments.

3. Threats to security and protection of digital infrastructure

Google expanded eligibility for Project Shield, Google’s free protection against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, shortly after the war in Ukraine broke out. The expansion aimed to allow Ukrainian government websites and embassies worldwide to stay online and continue to offer their critical services. Since then, Google has continued to implement protections for users and track and disrupt cyber threats.

TAG has been tracking threat actors, both before and during the war, and sharing their findings publicly and with law enforcement. TAG’s findings have shown that government-backed actors from Russia, Belarus, China, Iran, and North Korea have been targeting Ukrainian and Eastern European government and defence officials, military organisations, politicians, nonprofit organisations, and journalists, while financially motivated bad actors have also used the war as a lure for malicious campaigns.

Google aims to continue to follow the following approach when responding to future crisis situations:

Elevate access to high-quality information across Google services;
Protect Google users from harmful disinformation;
Continue to monitor and disrupt cyber threats;
Explore ways to provide assistance to support the affected areas more broadly.

Future measures

Google will continue to monitor the situation and take additional action as needed.

Israel-Gaza conflict

Humanitarian and relief efforts

Google.org has provided more than $18 million to nonprofits providing relief to civilians affected in Israel and Gaza. This includes more than $11 million raised globally by Google employees with company match and $1 million in donated Search Ads to nonprofits so they can better connect with people in need and provide information to those looking to help. We also provided $6 million in Google.org grant funding, including $3 million provided to Natal, an apolitical nonprofit organisation focused on psychological treatment of victims of trauma. The remaining funds were provided to organisations focussed on humanitarian aid and relief Gaza, including $1 million to Save the Children, $1 million to Palestinian Red Crescent, $1 million to International Medical Corps.

Specifically, Google’s humanitarian and relief efforts with these organisations include:

Natal - Israel Trauma and Resiliency Centre: In the early days of the war, calls to Natal’s support hotline went from around 300 a day to 8,000 a day. With our funding, they were able to scale their support to patients by 450%, including multidisciplinary treatment and mental & psychosocial support to direct and indirect victims of trauma due to terror and war in Israel.
As of mid-April, the International Medical Corps has provided care to more than 433,000 civilians, delivered more than 5,400 babies, performed more than 11,800 surgeries and supplied safe drinking water to more than 302,000 people. We continue to care for some 800 patients per day, responding to mass-casualty events and performing an average of 15 surgeries per day.

Platforms and partnerships

As the conflict continues, Google is committed to tackling disinformation, hate speech, graphic content and terrorist content by continuing to find ways to provide support through its products. For example, Google has deployed language capabilities to support emergency efforts including emergency translations, and localising Google content to help users, businesses and nonprofit organisations. Google has also pledged to help its partners in these extraordinary circumstances. For example, when schools closed in October 2023, the Ministry of Education in Israel used Meet as their core teach-from-home platform and Google provided support. Google has been in touch with Gaza-based partners and participants in its Palestine Launchpad program, its digital skills and entrepreneurship program for Palestinians, to try to support those who have been significantly impacted by this crisis.

Policies and Terms and Conditions

Outline any changes to your policies

Policy - 51.1.1

War in Ukraine: N/A

Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation) - 51.1.2

War in Ukraine: N/A

Rationale - 51.1.3

War in Ukraine: N/A

Policy - 51.1.4

Israel-Gaza conflict: Enhanced enforcement of existing policies

Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation) - 51.1.5

Israel-Gaza conflict: While Google Search relied on existing policies to address the information challenges posed by the Hamas attacks and Israel’s response, Google Search gave special priority to reports of issues related to the crisis in recognition of the importance and urgency of the risks to human life.

Rationale - 51.1.6

Israel-Gaza conflict: No changes to Search policies and to Terms and Conditions were made as a result of the Israel-Gaza conflict. Google Search continues to enforce all Google Search policies, including the ones mentioned in this report.

Integrity of Services

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 51.4.1

War in Ukraine: Continued to enforce Spam and Webmaster Policies.

Description of intervention - 51.4.2

War in Ukraine: See more details about Google Search’s implementation of its Spam and Webmaster Policies in the response to QRE 14.1.2.

Indication of impact - 51.4.3

War in Ukraine: See overall spam metrics in SLI 14.2.1. Google Search is unable to provide spam metrics specific to this crisis event.

Specific Action applied - 51.4.4

Israel-Gaza conflict: Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) is closely monitoring relevant activity concerning the ongoing conflict in Israel and Gaza, focusing on the safety and security of users and the platforms that help them access and share important information.

Description of intervention - 51.4.5

Israel-Gaza conflict: See Commitment 16 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) and Trust & Safety Teams work to monitor malicious actors around the globe, disable their accounts, and remove the content that they post, including but not limited to coordinated information operations and other operations that may affect EEA Member States.

Indication of impact - 51.4.6

Israel-Gaza conflict: See Commitment 16 for metrics on these efforts.

Empowering Users

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 51.5.1

War in Ukraine: Limited recommendations globally for a number of Russian state-funded media outlets.

Enforced its Content Policies, including Misinformation Policies, which establish what types of content is not allowed on Google Search.

Description of intervention - 51.5.2

War in Ukraine: N/A

Indication of impact - 51.5.3

War in Ukraine: Under the Elections Rapid Response System for the elections in Poland, Google removed 213 URLs that were delisted under the EU sanctions on Russian state media in H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025).

Specific Action applied - 51.5.4

War in Ukraine: In efforts to help users find accurate and fact-checked information online, Google Search deployed ‘About This Image’ to English language users globally in October 2023, and was made available on Circle to Search and Google Lens starting in July 2024.

Description of intervention - 51.5.5

War in Ukraine: ‘About This Image’ enables users to check the credibility and context of an image or photo found online. This feature allows users to discover the image’s history, how other websites are using the image, and any metadata available. The tool is available in over 40 additional languages around the world, including English, French, German, Hindi, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Portuguese, Spanish and Vietnamese. It is also available on Circle to Search and Google Lens, giving users more ways to quickly get context on images that they see wherever they come across them.

Indication of impact - 51.5.6

War in Ukraine: Please refer to QRE 17.1.1 for more details on ‘About This Image’.

Specific Action applied - 51.5.7

War in Ukraine: Deploys features that enhance access to high-quality information on Search.

Description of intervention - 51.5.8

War in Ukraine: Globally, Google has surfaced features on Search to provide quick access to high-quality information, including highlighting news coverage from trusted sources and other helpful context about the invasion. See below for details on features in Ukraine.

Indication of impact - 51.5.9

War in Ukraine: Search reports metrics on the 'About This Result' & the 'More About This Page' features in SLI 17.1.1.

Specific Action applied - 51.5.10

War in Ukraine: Displays an ‘SOS Alert’ on Google Search in Ukraine and Eastern Europe and works with expert organisations to source helpful humanitarian information.

Description of intervention - 51.5.11

War in Ukraine: Google Search features an 'SOS Alert' in Ukraine that provides refugees with information in English, Russian, and Ukrainian. This includes links to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’s (UNHCR) Ukraine Help pages and hotline, safety tips from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and a link to the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry’s Foreign student emergency info hotline.

Google Search also launched an 'SOS Alert' in Poland that provides refugees with information in English, Polish, and Ukrainian, including links to the 'I Help Ukrainians Hub' created by the Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland and the 'Information for Ukrainian citizens' page hosted by the Polish Office for Foreigners.

Indication of impact - 51.5.12

War in Ukraine: See overall metrics in SLI 22.7.1.

Specific Action applied - 51.5.13

War in Ukraine: Displayed content advisories when results for a query are rapidly evolving, providing a message that lets users know the topic may still be developing.

Description of intervention - 51.5.14

War in Ukraine: This notice is particularly important during the crisis, given how quickly new search terms are developing. In such cases, it is helpful to alert users to the fact that a new search term or query is so new that high-quality information has not been published yet on the open web. Among other languages, these notices are launched in Bosnian, Bulgarian, Czech, Croatian, Estonian, Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish, Romanian, Russian, Serbian, Slovak, Slovenian, Serbian, and Ukrainian.

Indication of impact - 51.5.15

War in Ukraine: See SLI 17.1.1 for metrics on the impression proportion estimate of content advisories for rapidly changing results.

Specific Action applied - 51.5.16

War in Ukraine: To help the increasing number of refugees in the region, Google developed ways for businesses to flag if they are providing services to refugees.

Description of intervention - 51.5.17

War in Ukraine: Hotel owners in countries neighbouring Ukraine can indicate on their Business Profile whether they are offering free or discounted accommodations for refugees. Local businesses can post to their Business Profile on Search and Maps to offer various services and aid to refugees from Ukraine.

Indication of impact - 51.5.18

War in Ukraine: No applicable metrics to report at this time.

Specific Action applied - 51.5.19

Israel-Gaza conflict: In 2025, Search will continue efforts to help people make informed decisions, and surface high-quality and high-quality information to users.

Description of intervention - 51.5.20

Israel-Gaza conflict: See Commitments 17-25 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report.

Indication of impact - 51.5.21

Israel-Gaza conflict: See Commitments 17-25 for metrics on these efforts.

Empowering the Research Community

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 51.6.1

War in Ukraine: See more details about how Google Search provides access to researchers in the response to Commitment 26 and 28.

Description of intervention - 51.6.2

War in Ukraine: See more details about how Google Search provides access to researchers in the response to Commitment 26 and 28.

Indication of impact - 51.6.3

War in Ukraine: See more details about how Google Search provides access to researchers in the response to Commitment 26 and 28.

Specific Action applied - 51.6.4

Israel-Gaza conflict: Google established the Google Research Program in August 2023, which provides eligible EU researchers to apply for access to publicly available data across some of Google’s products, including Search and YouTube.

Description of intervention - 51.6.5

Israel-Gaza conflict: See Commitments 26 and 28 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how Google Search provides publicly available data via Google Trends, and provides eligible academic researchers access to global video metadata, which may be applied to the ongoing conflict in Israel and Gaza.

Indication of impact - 51.6.6

Israel-Gaza conflict: See Commitments 26 and 28 for metrics on these efforts.