TikTok

Report September 2026

Submitted
TikTok’s mission is to inspire creativity and bring joy. With more than 200 million people across Europe coming to TikTok every month, including 189 million in the EU, it’s natural for people to hold different opinions. That’s why we focus on a shared set of facts when it comes to issues that affect people’s safety. A safe, authentic, and trustworthy experience is essential to achieving our goals. Transparency plays a key role in building that trust, allowing online communities and society to assess how TikTok meets its regulatory obligations. As a signatory to the Code of Conduct on Disinformation (the Code), TikTok is committed to sharing clear insights into the actions we take.

TikTok takes disinformation extremely seriously. We are committed to preventing its spread, promoting authoritative information, and supporting media literacy initiatives that strengthen community resilience.

Our 2026 H1 report under the Code can be found below. 

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Commitment 17
In light of the European Commission's initiatives in the area of media literacy, including the new Digital Education Action Plan, Relevant Signatories commit to continue and strengthen their efforts in the area of media literacy and critical thinking, also with the aim to include vulnerable groups.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 17.1 Measure 17.2 Measure 17.3
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here
We have 14 ongoing media literacy and critical thinking skills campaigns in Europe (12 in EU/EEA—Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Netherlands, Poland and Portugal; 2 in wider European countries—Georgia and Moldova).
- We ran 14 temporary media literacy election integrity campaigns in advance of elections, some in collaboration with our fact-checking and media literacy partners:
- 14 in the EU
- Portugal (Presidential Election) - Polígrafo
- Aragon (Spain Regional Election)
- Baden-Württemberg and Rheinland-Pfalz (Germany State Elections) - Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
- Castile and Leon (Spain Regional Election)
- France (Municipal Elections) - Agence France-Presse (AFP)
- Netherlands (Municipal Elections)
- Slovenia (Parliamentary Election)
- Denmark (General Election)
- Hungary (Parliamentary Election)
- Bulgaria (Parliamentary Election)
- Andalusia (Spain Regional Election) - Newtral
- Cyprus (Parliamentary Election)
- Malta (General Election)
- New Caledonia (France Regional Election)
- Following the outbreak of Ebola in Sub-saharan Africa, we launched an in-app guide to provide users with guidance on verifying information using reliable sources. This guide was launched in Mayotte (France) where we linked to info.gouv.fr.
- Following the outbreak of Hantavirus, we launched an in-app guide and a video tag to provide users with guidance on verifying information using reliable sources. This guide was launched in all EU markets, where we linked to the World Health Organisation (WHO) and other government health advice websites (IT, DE, NL, FR).
- We continued to support mental well-being awareness and literacy and to combat misinformation with reliable content through the WHO's Fides network, a diverse community of trusted healthcare professionals and content creators in a number of countries, including France.
- We brought greater transparency about our systems and our integrity and authenticity efforts to our community by sharing regular insights and updates in our Global Elections Integrity Hub, including dedicated coverage of elections across Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. The Hub outlines our policies, product features, and moderation practices that help protect platform integrity during elections. Throughout this reporting period, we regularly updated the Hub with information on our safety efforts in markets with active elections, including Croatia, Germany, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland and Ireland.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
N/A
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
N/A
Measure 17.1
Relevant Signatories will design and implement or continue to maintain tools to improve media literacy and critical thinking, for instance by empowering users with context on the content visible on services or with guidance on how to evaluate online content.
QRE 17.1.1
Relevant Signatories will outline the tools they develop or maintain that are relevant to this commitment and report on their deployment in each Member State.
We continue to expand our in-app measures for front-end interventions that we outline below, which show users additional context on certain content (e.g., natural disasters and rapidly unfolding events) and redirect them to trusted information. We make these tools available in relevant EU languages, which includes 22 EU official languages (plus, for EEA users, Norwegian and Icelandic), as applicable.
We work with external experts to combat harmful misinformation. For example, we work with our global fact-checking partners, taking into account their feedback to continually identify new topics and consider which tools may be best suited for raising awareness around that topic.
We also deploy a combination of in-app user intervention tools on topical issues such as elections, Holocaust Education, and the War in Ukraine. These tools include:
- Video notice tags: An information bar at the bottom of a video which is automatically applied to a specific word or hashtag (or set of hashtags). The information bar is clickable and invites users to “Learn more about [the topic]”. Users will be directed to an in-app guide, or reliable third party resource, as appropriate.
- Search intervention: If users search for terms associated with a topic, they will be presented with a banner encouraging them to verify the facts and providing a link to a trusted source of information. Search interventions are not deployed for search terms that violate our Community Guidelines, which are actioned according to our policies.
TikTok Shop also provides educational resources for sellers and creators through TikTok Shop Academy and the Policy Centre. These resources provide information on platform policies, compliance requirements and responsible content practices relevant to TikTok Shop.
We have updated our methodology for this COCD report to include an additional Holocaust misinformation campaign in the data we provide below.

SLI 17.1.1
Relevant Signatories will report, at the Member State level, on metrics pertinent to assessing the effects of the tools described in the qualitative reporting element for Measure 17.1, which will include: the total count of impressions of the tool; and information on the interactions/engagement with the tool.
For full information please consult the PDF linked above.
Number of impressions of Video Notice Tag covered by Intervention (Holocaust Misinformation/Denial) Number of clicks of Video Notice Tag covered by Intervention (Holocaust Misinformation/Denial) Click Through Rate of Video Notice Tag covered by Intervention (Holocaust Misinformation/Denial) Number of impressions of Search interventions (Holocaust Misinformation/Denial) Number of clicks of Search interventions (Holocaust Misinformation/Denial) Click Through Rate of Search interventions (Holocaust Misinformation/Denial) Number of impressions of topic covered by video Intervention (Election) Number of clicks by video Intervention (Election) Click Through Rate by video Intervention (Election) Number of impressions of Search interventions (Election) Number of clicks of Search interventions (Election) Click Through Rate of Search interventions (Election)
Austria 6945549 6479 0.2% 866216 6479 0.7%
Belgium 4678337 6455 0.2% 847731 6455 0.8%
Bulgaria 1752413 3521 0.4% 461877 3521 0.8% 22719523 34796 0.15% 210252 989 0.5%
Croatia 2868651 4168 0.3% 425219 4168 1%
Cyprus 629559 905 0.3% 137288 905 0.7% 130980 278 0.21% 36528 173 0.5%
Czech Republic 5765230 3434 0.2% 561558 3434 0.6%
Denmark 3099745 2465 0.3% 391749 2465 0.6% 15825969 22143 0.14% 309385 2139 0.7%
Estonia 812547 827 0.2% 91227 827 0.9%
Finland 5084612 4947 0.3% 668526 4947 0.7%
France 2651762 24841 0.2% 4087849 24841 0.6%
Germany 69318976 34666 0.2% 5617788 34666 0.6%
Greece 4752972 9943 0.3% 1652885 9943 0.6%
Hungary 5801809 5835 0.3% 518803 5835 1.1% 142693830 169863 0.12% 7469203 27530 0.4%
Ireland 6082223 3330 0.2% 605633 3330 0.5%
Italy 3479548 18142 0.3% 3481247 18142 0.5%
Latvia 1088268 1076 0.3% 122713 1076 0.9%
Lithuania 1725812 2254 0.3% 306055 2254 0.7%
Luxembourg 369517 435 0.2% 53953 435 0.8%
Malta 358985 277 0.2% 35479 277 0.8% 7208871 5241 0.07% 51903 489 0.9%
Netherlands 16224082 13614 0.2% 2475438 13614 0.5%
Poland 44471692 20533 0.2% 3460694 20533 0.6%
Portugal 3630727 3243 0.3% 779606 3243 0.4% 1467705 2096 0.14% 1109063 3050 0.3%
Romania 7901518 9348 0.3% 1073109 9348 0.9%
Slovakia 3357329 2023 0.3% 252424 2023 0.8%
Slovenia 1398765 1436 0.2% 130858 1436 1.1% 6236637 8522 0.14% 219677 1358 0.6%
Spain 13997758 50136 0.2% 3367952 50136 1.5%
Sweden 8885363 7200 0.3% 1187509 7200 0.6%
Iceland 457096 346 0.2% 35346 346 1%
Liechtenstein 23171 11 0.2% 2521 11 0.4%
Norway 4316912 3295 0.3% 535322 3295 0.6%
Total EU 227133749 241533 0.2% 33661386 241533 0.7% 196283515 242939 0.12% 9406011 35728 0.38%
Total EEA 231930928 245185 0.2% 34234575 245185 0.7% 196283515 242939 0.12% 9406011 35728 0.38%