Advertising

Commitment 1

Relevant signatories participating in ad placements commit to defund the dissemination of disinformation, and improve the policies and systems which determine the eligibility of content to be monetised, the controls for monetisation and ad placement, and the data to report on the accuracy and effectiveness of controls and services around ad placements.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 1.1 Measure 1.2 Measure 1.3 Measure 1.4 Measure 1.5 Measure 1.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

• Continued to improve and enforce our five granular harmful misinformation ad policies in the EEA. As mentioned in our H2 2024 report, the policies cover:
  • Medical Misinformation
  • Dangerous Misinformation
  • Synthetic and Manipulated Media
  • Dangerous Conspiracy Theories 
  • Climate Disinformation 
• We continue to engage in the Task-force and its working groups and subgroups such as the working subgroup on Elections (Crisis Response).

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 1.1

Relevant Signatories involved in the selling of advertising, inclusive of media platforms, publishers and ad tech companies, will deploy, disclose, and enforce policies with the aims of: - first avoiding the publishing and carriage of harmful Disinformation to protect the integrity of advertising supported businesses - second taking meaningful enforcement and remediation steps to avoid the placement of advertising next to Disinformation content or on sources that repeatedly violate these policies; and - third adopting measures to enable the verification of the landing / destination pages of ads and origin of ad placement.

QRE 1.1.1

Signatories will disclose and outline the policies they develop, deploy, and enforce to meet the goals of Measure 1.1 and will link to relevant public pages in their help centres.

SLI 1.1.2

Please insert the relevant data

Country	Methodology of data measurement Euro value of ads demonetised
Austria	0
Belgium	0
Bulgaria	0
Croatia	0
Cyprus	0
Czech Republic	0
Denmark	0
Estonia	0
Finland	0
France	0
Germany	0
Greece	0
Hungary	0
Ireland	0
Italy	0
Latvia	0
Lithuania	0
Luxembourg	0
Malta	0
Netherlands	0
Poland	0
Portugal	0
Romania	0
Slovakia	0
Slovenia	0
Spain	0
Sweden	0
Iceland	0
Liechtenstein	0
Norway	0

Measure 1.2

Relevant Signatories responsible for the selling of advertising, inclusive of publishers, media platforms, and ad tech companies, will tighten eligibility requirements and content review processes for content monetisation and ad revenue share programmes on their services as necessary to effectively scrutinise parties and bar participation by actors who systematically post content or engage in behaviours which violate policies mentioned in Measure 1.1 that tackle Disinformation.

QRE 1.2.1

Signatories will outline their processes for reviewing, assessing, and augmenting their monetisation policies in order to scrutinise and bar participation by actors that systematically provide harmful Disinformation.

Measure 1.3

Relevant Signatories responsible for the selling of advertising, inclusive of publishers, media platforms, and ad tech companies, will take commercial and technically feasible steps, including support for relevant third-party approaches, to give advertising buyers transparency on the placement of their advertising.

QRE 1.3.1

Signatories will report on the controls and transparency they provide to advertising buyers with regards to the placement of their ads as it relates to Measure 1.3.

• TikTok Inventory Filter: This is our proprietary system, which enables advertisers to choose the profile of content they want their ads to run adjacent to. We expanded our Inventory Filter which is now available in 29 jurisdictions in the EEA and is embedded directly in TikTok Ads Manager, the main system through which advertisers purchase ads. We have expanded the functionality of this Inventory Filter in various EEA countries. More details can be found here. The Inventory Filter is informed by Industry Standards and policies, which include topics that may be susceptible to disinformation. Additionally, this enabled advertisers to:
  • Selectively exclude unwanted or misaligned videos that do not align with their brand safety requirements from appearing next to their ads through TikTok's Video Exclusion List solution.
  • Exclude specific profile pages from serving their Profile Feed ads through TikTok's Profile Feed Exclusion List.
• TikTok Pre-bid Brand Safety Solution by Integral Ad Science (“IAS”): Advertisers can filter content based on industry-standard frameworks with all levels of risk (available in France and Germany). Some misinformation content may be captured and filtered out by these industry standard categories, such as “Sensitive Social Issues”.

• Zefr: Through our partnership with Zefr, advertisers can obtain campaign insights into brand suitability and safety on the platform (now available in 29 countries in the EEA). Zefr aligns with the Industry Standards.
• IAS: Advertisers can measure brand safety, viewability, and invalid traffic on the platform with the IAS Signal platform (post campaign is available in 28 countries in the EEA). As with IAS’s pre-bid solution covered above, this aligns with the Industry Standards. 
• DoubleVerify: We are partnering with DoubleVerify to provide advertisers with media quality measurement for ads. DoubleVerify is working actively with us to expand its suite of brand suitability and media quality solutions on the platform. DoubleVerify is available in 27 EU countries.

Measure 1.4

Relevant Signatories responsible for the buying of advertising, inclusive of advertisers, and agencies, will place advertising through ad sellers that have taken effective, and transparent steps to avoid the placement of advertising next to Disinformation content or in places that repeatedly publish Disinformation.

QRE 1.4.1

Relevant Signatories that are responsible for the buying of advertising will describe their processes and procedures to ensure they place advertising through ad sellers that take the steps described in Measure 1.4.

Measure 1.5

Relevant Signatories involved in the reporting of monetisation activities inclusive of media platforms, ad networks, and ad verification companies will take the necessary steps to give industry-recognised relevant independent third-party auditors commercially appropriate and fair access to their services and data in order to: - First, confirm the accuracy of first party reporting relative to monetisation and Disinformation, seeking alignment with regular audits performed under the DSA. - Second, accreditation services should assess the effectiveness of media platforms' policy enforcement, including Disinformation policies.

QRE 1.5.1

Signatories that produce first party reporting will report on the access provided to independent third-party auditors as outlined in Measure 1.5 and will link to public reports and results from such auditors, such as MRC Content Level Brand Safety Accreditation, TAG Brand Safety certifications, or other similarly recognised industry accepted certifications.

QRE 1.5.2

Signatories that conduct independent accreditation via audits will disclose areas of their accreditation that have been updated to reflect needs in Measure 1.5.

Measure 1.6

Relevant Signatories will advance the development, improve the availability, and take practical steps to advance the use of brand safety tools and partnerships, with the following goals: - To the degree commercially viable, relevant Signatories will provide options to integrate information and analysis from source-raters, services that provide indicators of trustworthiness, fact-checkers, researchers or other relevant stakeholders providing information e.g., on the sources of Disinformation campaigns to help inform decisions on ad placement by ad buyers, namely advertisers and their agencies. - Advertisers, agencies, ad tech companies, and media platforms and publishers will take effective and reasonable steps to integrate the use of brand safety tools throughout the media planning, buying and reporting process, to avoid the placement of their advertising next to Disinformation content and/or in places or sources that repeatedly publish Disinformation. - Brand safety tool providers and rating services who categorise content and domains will provide reasonable transparency about the processes they use, insofar that they do not release commercially sensitive information or divulge trade secrets, and that they establish a mechanism for customer feedback and appeal.

QRE 1.6.1

Signatories that place ads will report on the options they provide for integration of information, indicators and analysis from source raters, services that provide indicators of trustworthiness, fact-checkers, researchers, or other relevant stakeholders providing information e.g. on the sources of Disinformation campaigns to help inform decisions on ad placement by buyers.

QRE 1.6.2

Signatories that purchase ads will outline the steps they have taken to integrate the use of brand safety tools in their advertising and media operations, disclosing what percentage of their media investment is protected by such services.

QRE 1.6.3

Signatories that provide brand safety tools will outline how they are ensuring transparency and appealability about their processes and outcomes.

QRE 1.6.4

Relevant Signatories that rate sources to determine if they persistently publish Disinformation shall provide reasonable information on the criteria under which websites are rated, make public the assessment of the relevant criteria relating to Disinformation, operate in an apolitical manner and give publishers the right to reply before ratings are published.

Commitment 2

Relevant Signatories participating in advertising commit to prevent the misuse of advertising systems to disseminate Disinformation in the form of advertising messages.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 2.1 Measure 2.2 Measure 2.3 Measure 2.4

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

• Continued to enforce and improve our five granular harmful misinformation ad policies in the EEA. As mentioned in our H2 2024 report, the policies cover:
  • Medical Misinformation
  • Dangerous Misinformation
  • Synthetic and Manipulated Media
  • Dangerous Conspiracy Theories 
  • Climate Misinformation
• Enabled advertisers to selectively exclude unwanted or misaligned videos that do not align with their brand safety requirements from appearing next to their ads through TikTok's Video Exclusion List solution.
• Enabled advertisers to exclude specific profile pages from serving their Profile Feed ads through TikTok's Profile Feed Exclusion List. Paid ads are subject to our strict ad policies, which specifically prohibit misleading, inauthentic, and deceptive behaviours. Ads are reviewed against these policies before being allowed on our platform. In order to improve our existing ad policies, we launched four more granular policies in the EEA in 2023 (covering Medical Misinformation, Dangerous Misinformation, Synthetic and Manipulated Media, and Dangerous Conspiracy Theories), which advertisers also need to comply with. In December 2024, we launched a fifth granular policy covering Climate Misinformation.
• We continue to engage in the Task-force and its working groups and subgroups such as the working subgroup on Elections (Crisis Response).

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 2.1

Relevant Signatories will develop, deploy, and enforce appropriate and tailored advertising policies that address the misuse of their advertising systems for propagating harmful Disinformation in advertising messages and in the promotion of content.

QRE 2.1.1

Signatories will disclose and outline the policies they develop, deploy, and enforce to meet the goals of Measure 2.1 and will link to relevant public pages in their help centres.

SLI 2.1.1

Signatories will report, quantitatively, on actions they took to enforce each of the policies mentioned in the qualitative part of this service level indicator, at the Member State or language level. This could include, for instance, actions to remove, to block, or to otherwise restrict harmful Disinformation in advertising messages and in the promotion of content.

Country	Number of ad removals under the political content ad policy	Number of ad removals under the five granular misinformation ad policies
Austria	1,634	11
Belgium	2,447	4
Bulgaria	880	9
Croatia	705	0
Cyprus	585	0
Czech Republic	859	0
Denmark	796	2
Estonia	307	0
Finland	1,033	2
France	16,026	46
Germany	18,041	72
Greece	2,420	20
Hungary	1,647	111
Ireland	1,263	8
Italy	8,150	27
Latvia	795	2
Lithuania	521	4
Luxembourg	250	1
Malta	0	0
Netherlands	3,028	30
Poland	5,699	19
Portugal	1,430	1
Romania	13,989	23
Slovakia	500	2
Slovenia	230	2
Spain	6,526	54
Sweden	1,659	8
Iceland	3	0
Lichtestein	0	0
Norway	1,071	3
EU Level	91,420	458
EEA Level	92,494	461

Measure 2.2

Relevant Signatories will develop tools, methods, or partnerships, which may include reference to independent information sources both public and proprietary (for instance partnerships with fact-checking or source rating organisations, or services providing indicators of trustworthiness, or proprietary methods developed internally) to identify content and sources as distributing harmful Disinformation, to identify and take action on ads and promoted content that violate advertising policies regarding Disinformation mentioned in Measure 2.1.

QRE 2.2.1

Signatories will describe the tools, methods, or partnerships they use to identify content and sources that contravene policies mentioned in Measure 2.1 - while being mindful of not disclosing information that'd make it easier for malicious actors to circumvent these tools, methods, or partnerships. Signatories will specify the independent information sources involved in these tools, methods, or partnerships.

• 
  Dangerous Misinformation
• Dangerous Conspiracy Theories
• Medical Misinformation
• Synthetic and Manipulated Media
• Climate Misinformation
  
  

Measure 2.3

Relevant Signatories will adapt their current ad verification and review systems as appropriate and commercially feasible, with the aim of preventing ads placed through or on their services that do not comply with their advertising policies in respect of Disinformation to be inclusive of advertising message, promoted content, and site landing page.

QRE 2.3.1

Signatories will describe the systems and procedures they use to ensure that ads placed through their services comply with their advertising policies as described in Measure 2.1.

• Dangerous Misinformation
• Dangerous Conspiracy Theories
• Medical Misinformation
• Synthetic and Manipulated Media
• Climate Misinformation

Measure 2.4

Relevant Signatories will provide relevant information to advertisers about which advertising policies have been violated when they reject or remove ads violating policies described in Measure 2.1 above or disable advertising accounts in application of these policies and clarify their procedures for appeal.

QRE 2.4.1

Signatories will describe how they provide information to advertisers about advertising policies they have violated and how advertisers can appeal these policies.

Commitment 3

Relevant Signatories involved in buying, selling and placing digital advertising commit to exchange best practices and strengthen cooperation with relevant players, expanding to organisations active in the online monetisation value chain, such as online e-payment services, e-commerce platforms and relevant crowd-funding/donation systems, with the aim to increase the effectiveness of scrutiny of ad placements on their own services.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 3.1 Measure 3.2 Measure 3.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 3.1

Relevant Signatories will cooperate with platforms, advertising supply chain players, source-rating services, services that provide indicators of trustworthiness, fact-checking organisations, advertisers and any other actors active in the online monetisation value chain, to facilitate the integration and flow of information, in particular information relevant for tackling purveyors of harmful Disinformation, in full respect of all relevant data protection rules and confidentiality agreements.

QRE 3.1.1

Signatories will outline how they work with others across industry and civil society to facilitate the flow of information that may be relevant for tackling purveyors of harmful Disinformation.

Measure 3.2

Relevant Signatories will exchange among themselves information on Disinformation trends and TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures), via the Code Task-force, GARM, IAB Europe, or other relevant fora. This will include sharing insights on new techniques or threats observed by Relevant Signatories, discussing case studies, and other means of improving capabilities and steps to help remove Disinformation across the advertising supply chain - potentially including real-time technical capabilities.

QRE 3.2.1

Signatories will report on their discussions within fora mentioned in Measure 3.2, being mindful of not disclosing information that is confidential and/or that may be used by malicious actors to circumvent the defences set by Signatories and others across the advertising supply chain. This could include, for instance, information about the fora Signatories engaged in; about the kinds of information they shared; and about the learnings they derived from these exchanges.

Measure 3.3

Relevant Signatories will integrate the work of or collaborate with relevant third-party organisations, such as independent source-rating services, services that provide indicators of trustworthiness, fact-checkers, researchers, or open-source investigators, in order to reduce monetisation of Disinformation and avoid the dissemination of advertising containing Disinformation.

QRE 3.3.1

Signatories will report on the collaborations and integrations relevant to their work with organisations mentioned.

Political Advertising

Commitment 4

Relevant Signatories commit to adopt a common definition of "political and issue advertising".

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 4.1

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Commitment 13

Relevant Signatories agree to engage in ongoing monitoring and research to understand and respond to risks related to Disinformation in political or issue advertising.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 13.1 Measure 13.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 13.1

Relevant Signatories agree to work individually and together through the Task-force to identify novel and evolving disinformation risks in the uses of political or issue advertising and discuss options for addressing those risks.

Integrity of Services

Commitment 14

In order to limit impermissible manipulative behaviours and practices across their services, Relevant Signatories commit to put in place or further bolster policies to address both misinformation and disinformation across their services, and to agree on a cross-service understanding of manipulative behaviours, actors and practices not permitted on their services. Such behaviours and practices include: The creation and use of fake accounts, account takeovers and bot-driven amplification, Hack-and-leak operations, Impersonation, Malicious deep fakes, The purchase of fake engagements, Non-transparent paid messages or promotion by influencers, The creation and use of accounts that participate in coordinated inauthentic behaviour, User conduct aimed at artificially amplifying the reach or perceived public support for disinformation.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 14.1 Measure 14.2 Measure 14.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

• Building on our AI-generated content label for creators, and implementation of C2PA Content Credentials, we completed our AIGC media literacy campaign series in Mexico and the UK. These campaigns in Brazil, Germany, France, Mexico and the UK, which ran across H2 2024 and H1 2025, were developed with guidance from expert organisations like Mediawise and WITNESS to teach our community how to spot and label AI generated content. They reached more than 90M users globally, including more than 27M in Mexico and 10M in the UK.
• Continued to join industry partners as a party to the “Tech Accord to Combat Deceptive Use of AI in 2024 Elections’ which is a joint commitment to combat the deceptive use of AI in elections. 
• Continued to participate in the working groups on the integrity of services and Generative AI.
• We have continued to enhance our ability to detect covert influence operations. To provide more regular and detailed updates about the covert influence operations we disrupt, we have a dedicated Transparency Report on covert influence operations, which is available in TikTok’s Transparency Centre. In this report, we include information about operations that we have previously removed and that have attempted to return to our platform with new accounts.
• We continue to update and refine our policies around Covert Influence Operations in order to stay agile to changing behaviours and tactics on the platform and to ensure more granular detail is enshrined in our policy rationales. 

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 14.1

Relevant Signatories will adopt, reinforce and implement clear policies regarding impermissible manipulative behaviours and practices on their services, based on the latest evidence on the conducts and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) employed by malicious actors, such as the AMITT Disinformation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Framework.

QRE 14.1.1

Relevant Signatories will list relevant policies and clarify how they relate to the threats mentioned above as well as to other Disinformation threats.

• Operating large networks of accounts controlled by a single entity, or through automation;
• Bulk distribution of a high volume of spam; and
• Manipulation of engagement signals to amplify the reach of certain content, or buying and selling followers, particularly for financial purposes

• Accounts that pose as another real person or entity without disclosing that they are a fan or parody account in the account name, such as using someone's name, biographical details, content, or image without disclosing it
• Presenting as a person or entity that does not exist (a fake persona) with a demonstrated intent to mislead others on the platform

• facilitate the trade or marketing of services that artificially increase engagement, such as selling followers or likes; or
• provide instructions on how to artificially increase engagement on TikTok.

• Our hack and leak policy, which aims to further reduce the harms inflicted by the unauthorised disclosure of hacked materials on the individuals, communities, and organisations that may be implicated or exposed by such disclosures.
• Our CIO policy addresses use of leaked documents to sway public opinion as part of a wider operation.
• Our Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC) policy captures materials that have been digitally altered without an appropriate disclosure.
• Our harmful misinformation policies combat conspiracy theories related to unfolding events and dangerous misinformation.
• Our Trade of Regulated Goods and Services policy prohibits the trading of hacked goods.

• The likeness of young people or realistic-appearing people under the age of 18.
• The likeness of adult private figures, if we become aware that it was used without their permission.
• Misleading AIGC or edited media that falsely show:
  • Content made to seem as if it comes from an authoritative source, such as a reputable news organisation.
  • A crisis event, such as a conflict or natural disaster
  • A public figure who is:
    • being degraded or harassed, or engaging in criminal or antisocial behaviour.
    • taking a position on a political issue, commercial product, or a matter of public importance (such as an election).
    • being politically endorsed or condemned by an individual or group.

QRE 14.1.2

Signatories will report on their proactive efforts to detect impermissible content, behaviours, TTPs and practices relevant to this commitment.

• prevent inauthentic accounts from being created based on malicious patterns; and
• remove registered accounts based on certain signals (i.e., uncommon behaviour on the platform).

• They are coordinating with each other. For example, they are operated by the same entity, share technical similarities like using the same devices, or work together to spread the same narrative.
• They are misleading our systems or users. For example, they are trying to conceal their actual location or use fake personas to pose as someone they're not.
• They are attempting to manipulate or corrupt public debate to impact the decision-making, beliefs, and opinions of a community. For example, they are attempting to shape discourse around an election or conflict.

Measure 14.2

Relevant Signatories will keep a detailed, up-to-date list of their publicly available policies that clarifies behaviours and practices that are prohibited on their services and will outline in their reports how their respective policies and their implementation address the above set of TTPs, threats and harms as well as other relevant threats.

QRE 14.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on actions taken to implement the policies they list in their reports and covering the range of TTPs identified/employed, at the Member State level.

Measure 14.3

Relevant Signatories will convene via the Permanent Task-force to agree upon and publish a list and terminology of TTPs employed by malicious actors, which should be updated on an annual basis.

QRE 14.3.1

Signatories will report on the list of TTPs agreed in the Permanent Task-force within 6 months of the signing of the Code and will update this list at least every year. They will also report about the common baseline elements, objectives and benchmarks for the policies and measures.

Commitment 15

Relevant Signatories that develop or operate AI systems and that disseminate AI-generated and manipulated content through their services (e.g. deepfakes) commit to take into consideration the transparency obligations and the list of manipulative practices prohibited under the proposal for Artificial Intelligence Act.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 15.1 Measure 15.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

• Building on our AI-generated content label for creators, and implementation of C2PA Content Credentials, we completed our AIGC media literacy campaign series in Mexico and the UK. These campaigns in Brazil, Germany, France, Mexico and the UK, which ran across H2 2024 and H1 2025, were developed with guidance from expert organisations like Mediawise and WITNESS to teach our community how to spot and label AI generated content. They reached more than 90M users globally, including more than 27M in Mexico and 10M in the UK.
• Continued to join industry partners as a party to the “Tech Accord to Combat Deceptive Use of AI in 2024 Elections’ which is a joint commitment to combat the deceptive use of AI in elections.
• We continue to participate in relevant working groups, such as the Generative AI working group, which commenced in September 2023.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 15.1

Relevant signatories will establish or confirm their policies in place for countering prohibited manipulative practices for AI systems that generate or manipulate content, such as warning users and proactively detect such content.

QRE 15.1.1

In line with EU and national legislation, Relevant Signatories will report on their policies in place for countering prohibited manipulative practices for AI systems that generate or manipulate content.

• AIGC that shows the likeness of young people or realistic-appearing people under the age of 18 that poses a risk of sexualisation, bullying or privacy concerns, including those related to personally identifiable information or likeness to private individuals. 
• AIGC that shows the likeness of adult private figures, if we become aware it was used without their permission.
• Misleading AIGC or edited media that falsely shows:
  • Content made to seem as if it comes from an authoritative source, such as a reputable news organisation
  • A crisis event, such as a conflict or natural disaster.
  • A public figure who is:
    • being degraded or harassed, or engaging in criminal or antisocial behaviour.
    • taking a position on a political issue, commercial product, or a matter of public importance (such as an election).
    • being politically endorsed or condemned by an individual or group.

Measure 15.2

Relevant Signatories will establish or confirm their policies in place to ensure that the algorithms used for detection, moderation and sanctioning of impermissible conduct and content on their services are trustworthy, respect the rights of end-users and do not constitute prohibited manipulative practices impermissibly distorting their behaviour in line with Union and Member States legislation.

QRE 15.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on their policies and actions to ensure that the algorithms used for detection, moderation and sanctioning of impermissible conduct and content on their services are trustworthy, respect the rights of end-users and do not constitute prohibited manipulative practices in line with Union and Member States legislation.

• We have in place internal guidelines and training to help ensure that the training and deployment of our AI systems comply with applicable data protection laws, as well as principles of fairness.
• We have instituted a compliance review process for new AI systems that meet certain thresholds, and are working to prioritise review of previously developed algorithms.

Commitment 16

Relevant Signatories commit to operate channels of exchange between their relevant teams in order to proactively share information about cross-platform influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerge on their respective services, with the aim of preventing dissemination and resurgence on other services, in full compliance with privacy legislation and with due consideration for security and human rights risks.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 16.1 Measure 16.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 16.1

Relevant Signatories will share relevant information about cross-platform information manipulation, foreign interference in information space and incidents that emerge on their respective services for instance via a dedicated sub-group of the permanent Task-force or via existing fora for exchanging such information.

QRE 16.1.1

Relevant Signatories will disclose the fora they use for information sharing as well as information about learnings derived from this sharing.

SLI 16.1.1

Number of actions taken as a result of the collaboration and information sharing between signatories. Where they have such information, they will specify which Member States that were affected (including information about the content being detected and acted upon due to this collaboration).

Measure 16.2

Relevant Signatories will pay specific attention to and share information on the tactical migration of known actors of misinformation, disinformation and information manipulation across different platforms as a way to circumvent moderation policies, engage different audiences or coordinate action on platforms with less scrutiny and policy bandwidth.

QRE 16.2.1

As a result of the collaboration and information sharing between them, Relevant Signatories will share qualitative examples and case studies of migration tactics employed and advertised by such actors on their platforms as observed by their moderation team and/or external partners from Academia or fact-checking organisations engaged in such monitoring.

Empowering Users

Commitment 17

In light of the European Commission's initiatives in the area of media literacy, including the new Digital Education Action Plan, Relevant Signatories commit to continue and strengthen their efforts in the area of media literacy and critical thinking, also with the aim to include vulnerable groups.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 17.1 Measure 17.2 Measure 17.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

• Rolled out three new ongoing general media literacy and critical thinking skills campaigns in the EU in collaboration with our fact-checking and media literacy partners:
  • Germany: Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
  • Romania: Funky Citizens, Digi Media, and Libertatea
  • Poland: Demagog, FakeNews.pl, Radio Zet, and Orientuj.sie

• We ran 9 temporary media literacy election integrity campaigns in advance of regional elections, most in collaboration with our fact-checking and media literacy partners:
  • 7 in the EU 
    • Croatia (local election): Faktograf
    • Croatia (presidential election): Faktograf
    • Germany: Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
    • Latvia: Lead Stories
    • Poland: Demagog.pl & FakeNews.pl
    • Portugal: Poligrafo
    • Romania: Funky Citizens 
  • 2 in wider European/regionally relevant countries 
    • Albania: Internews Kosova (Kallxo)
    • Greenland: Logically Facts
• During the reporting period, we ran 7 Election Speaker Series sessions, 3 in EU Member States and 4 in Albania, Belarus, Greenland, and Kosovo. 

1. Albania: Internews Kosova (Kallxo)
2. Belarus: Belarusian Investigative Center
3. Germany: Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
4. Greenland: Logically Facts
5. Kosovo: Internews Kosova (Kallxo)
6. Poland: Demagog
7. Portugal: Poligrafo

• Launched a revamped version of our Holocaust Education Campaign providing a dedicated hub within the app, in partnership with the World Jewish Congress and UNESCO with new videos from our partners designed to inform our community about the Holocaust. This includes first-hand witness accounts from Holocaust survivors, videos of users visiting Holocaust memorial sites, testimonials from curators sharing stories about Holocaust victims, and more. Our community can access the hub through TikTok searches related to the Holocaust and on relevant videos.
• Launched 2 new temporary search guides to provide users with guidance about interacting with sensitive content, and authoritative information sources, when events are unfolding rapidly.
  • Italy & Portugal: Pope Francis, Health Status, 14 Mar 2025 - 12 May 2025
  • Ireland & UK: Ballymena Riots, 13 Jun 2025 - 24 June 2025
• Launched a new temporary in-app natural disaster media literacy search guide for the Reunion Cyclone Garance between 4 March and 4 April 2025 and continued our temporary search guide for the Mayotte Cyclone until 14 Feb 2025. These search guides link to TikTok's Safety Center tragic events support guide and authoritative third party information about aid and relief support. 
• Continued our in-app interventions, including video tags, search interventions and in-app information centres, available in 23 official EU languages and Norwegian and Icelandic for EEA users, around elections, the Israel-Hamas Conflict, Climate Change, Holocaust Education, Mpox, and the War in Ukraine.
  
  

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 17.1

Relevant Signatories will design and implement or continue to maintain tools to improve media literacy and critical thinking, for instance by empowering users with context on the content visible on services or with guidance on how to evaluate online content.

QRE 17.1.1

Relevant Signatories will outline the tools they develop or maintain that are relevant to this commitment and report on their deployment in each Member State.

Measure 17.2

Relevant Signatories will develop, promote and/or support or continue to run activities to improve media literacy and critical thinking such as campaigns to raise awareness about Disinformation, as well as the TTPs that are being used by malicious actors, among the general public across the European Union, also considering the involvement of vulnerable communities.

QRE 17.2.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the activities they launch or support and the Member States they target and reach. Relevant signatories will further report on actions taken to promote the campaigns to their user base per Member States targeted.

• Croatia Presidential Election 2024: From 6 Dec 2024 - 14 Jan 2025, we launched an in-app Election Centre to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2024 Croatia presidential election. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation, which included videos created in partnership with the fact-checking organisation Faktograf.
• German Federal Election 20254: From 16 Dec 2024 - 3 Mar 2025, we launched an in-app Election Centre to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2025 German federal election. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation, which included videos created in partnership with the fact-checking organisation Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa).
• Greenland General Election 2025: From 18 Feb 2025 - 12 Mar 2025, we launched an in-app Search Guide and Details Page to provide users with up-to-date information about the Greenland general election. The page contained a section about following our Community Guidelines, with a link to our Danish fact-checking partner, Logically Facts for digital literacy resources.
• Finland Local & Municipal Elections 2025: From 4 Apr 2025 - 14 Apr 2025, we launched an in-app Search Guide and Details Page to provide users with up-to-date information about the Finnish elections and a link to a government website with election information. The page contained a section about following our Community Guidelines, with a link to the Finnish National Agency for Education (EDUFI) for digital literacy resources.
• Romania Presidential Election 2025: From 11 Apr 2025 - 23 May 2025, we launched an in-app Election Centre to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2025 Romanian elections. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation, which included videos created in partnership with the fact-checking organisation Funky Citizens and media agencies Digi Media and Libertatea.
• Albania General Election 2025: From 14 Apr 2025 - 12 May 2025, we launched an in-app Election Centre to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2025 Albanian elections. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation, which included videos created in partnership with our fact-checking partner Kallxo.
• Croatia Local Elections 2025: From 17 Apr 2025 - 5 Jun 2025, we launched an in-app Search Guide and Details Page to provide users with up-to-date information about the Croatian local election. The page contained a section about following our Community Guidelines, with a link to our Croatia fact-checking partner, Faktograf for digital literacy resources.
• Portugal Legislative Election 2025: From 18 Apr 2025 to 2 June 2025, (ongoing at date of publication), we launched an in-app Election Centre to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2025 Portuguese election. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation, which included videos created in partnership with our fact-checking partner Poligrafo.
• Poland Presidential Election 2025: From 18 Apr 2025 - 6 Jun 2025, we launched an in-app Election Centre to provide users with up-to-date information about the 2025 Polish election. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation, which included videos created in partnership with our fact-checking partner Demagog, fact checker FakeNews.pl, and media partners Radio Zet and Orientuj.sie.
• Latvia Local & Municipal Elections 2025: From 9 May 2025 (ongoing at date of publication), we launched an in-app Search Guide and Details Page to provide users with up-to-date information about the Latvian elections. The page contained a section about following our Community Guidelines, with a link to our Croatia fact-checking partner, Lead Stories for digital literacy resources.

1. Albania: Internews Kosova (Kallxo)
2. Belarus: Belarusian Investigative Center
3. Germany: dpa
4. Greenland: Logically Facts
5. Kosovo: Kallxo
6. Poland: Demagog.pl
7. Portugal: Poligrafo
   
   

• Germany: Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
• Romania: Funky Citizens, Digi Media, and Libertatea
• Poland: Demagog.pl, FakeNews.pl, Radio Zet, and Orientuj.sie
  
  

• Partnered with Lead Stories: Ukraine, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania.
• Partnered with fakenews.pl: Poland.
• Partnered with Correctiv: Germany, Austria.
  
  

• Our climate change search intervention tool is available in 23 official EU languages (plus Norwegian and Icelandic for EEA users). It redirects users looking for climate change-related content to authoritative information and encourages them to report any potential misinformation they see.
• As of August 2024, popular hashtags #ClimateChange, #SustainableLiving, and #ClimateAction have more than 1.2 million associated posts on TikTok, combined.

Measure 17.3

For both of the above Measures, and in order to build on the expertise of media literacy experts in the design, implementation, and impact measurement of tools, relevant Signatories will partner or consult with media literacy experts in the EU, including for instance the Commission's Media Literacy Expert Group, ERGA's Media Literacy Action Group, EDMO, its country-specific branches, or relevant Member State universities or organisations that have relevant expertise.

QRE 17.3.1

Relevant Signatories will describe how they involved and partnered with media literacy experts for the purposes of all Measures in this Commitment.

• Outside of our fact-checking program, we also collaborate with fact-checking organisations to develop a variety of media literacy campaigns. For example, during this reporting period, we worked with European fact-checkers on 9 temporary media literacy election integrity campaigns, in advance of regional elections, through our in-app Election Centers:
  • 7 in the EU
    • Croatia (local election): Faktograf
    • Croatia (presidential election): Faktograf
    • Germany: Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
    • Latvia: Lead Stories
    • Poland: Demagog & FakeNews.pl
    • Portugal: Poligrafo
    • Romania: Funky Citizens
  • 2 in wider European/regionally relevant countries
    • Albania: Internews Kosova (Kallxo)
    • Greenland: Logically Facts
• Election speaker series. To further promote election integrity, and inform our approach to elections, we invited suitably qualified local and regional external experts to share their insights and market expertise with our internal teams. Our recent Election Speaker Series heard presentations from the following organisations: 

1. Albania: Internews Kosova (Kallxo) Kallxo
2. Belarus: Belarusian Investigative Center
3. Germany: Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)DPA
4. Greenland: Logically Facts
5. Kosovo: Kallxo
6. Poland: Demagog
7. Portugal: Poligrafo

Commitment 18

Relevant Signatories commit to minimise the risks of viral propagation of Disinformation by adopting safe design practices as they develop their systems, policies, and features.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 18.1 Measure 18.2 Measure 18.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

• Continued to improve the accuracy of, and overall coverage provided by, our machine learning detection models. 
• Began testing large language models (LLMs) to further support proactive moderation at scale. Because LLMs can comprehend human language and perform highly specific, complex tasks, we are better able to moderate nuanced areas like misinformation by extracting specific misinformation "claims" from videos for moderators to assess directly or route to our fact-checking partners.
• Invested in training and development for our Trust and Safety team, including regular internal sessions dedicated to knowledge sharing and discussion about relevant issues and trends and attending external events to share their expertise and support continued professional learning. For example: 
• 
  In the lead-up to certain elections, we invite suitably qualified external local/regional experts, as part of our Election Speaker Series. Sharing their market expertise with our internal teams provides us with insights to better understand areas that could potentially amount to election manipulation, and informs us about our approach to the upcoming election. During the reporting period, we ran 7 Election Speaker Series sessions, 3 in EU Member States, and 4 in Albania, Belarus, Greenland, and Kosovo.
  • Albania: Internews Kosova (Kallxo)
  • Belarus: Belarusian Investigative Center
  • Germany: Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
  • Greenland: Logically Facts
  • Kosovo: Internews Kosova (Kallxo)
  • Poland: Demagog
  • Portugal: Poligrafo
• In June 2025, 14 members of our Trust & Safety team (including leaders of our fact-checking program) attended GlobalFact12. In addition to a breakout session on Footnotes, TikTok hosted a networking event with more than 80 people from our partner organizations, including staff from fact checking partners, media literacy organizations, and Safety Advisory Councils.
• TikTok teams and personnel also regularly participate in research-focused events. In H1 2025, we presented at the Political Tech Summit in Berlin (January), hosted Research Tools demos in Warsaw (April), Presented at GNET Annual Conference (May), hosted Research Tools demos in Prague (June), Presented at the Warsaw Women in Tech Summit (June), briefed a small group of Irish academic UCD (Dublin) researchers (June), and attended the ICWSM conference in Copenhagen (June). 
• Continued to participate in, and co-chair, the working group on Elections.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 18.1

Relevant Signatories will take measures to mitigate risks of their services fuelling the viral spread of harmful Disinformation, such as: recommender systems designed to improve the prominence of authoritative information and reduce the prominence of Disinformation based on clear and transparent methods and approaches for defining the criteria for authoritative information; other systemic approaches in the design of their products, policies, or processes, such as pre-testing.

QRE 18.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the risk mitigation systems, tools, procedures, or features deployed under Measure 18.1 and report on their deployment in each EU Member State.

QRE 18.1.2

Relevant Signatories will publish the main parameters of their recommender systems, both in their report and, once it is operational, on the Transparency Centre.

QRE 18.1.3

Relevant Signatories will outline how they design their products, policies, or processes, to reduce the impressions and engagement with Disinformation whether through recommender systems or through other systemic approaches, and/or to increase the visibility of authoritative information.

Measure 18.2

Relevant Signatories will develop and enforce publicly documented, proportionate policies to limit the spread of harmful false or misleading information (as depends on the service, such as prohibiting, downranking, or not recommending harmful false or misleading information, adapted to the severity of the impacts and with due regard to freedom of expression and information); and take action on webpages or actors that persistently violate these policies.

QRE 18.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the policies or terms of service that are relevant to Measure 18.2 and on their approach towards persistent violations of these policies.

• Misinformation 
  • Misinformation that poses a risk to public safety or may induce panic about a crisis event or emergency, including using historical footage of a previous attack as if it were current, or incorrectly claiming a basic necessity (such as food or water) is no longer available in a particular location.Health misinformation, such as misleading statements about vaccines, inaccurate medical advice that discourages people from getting appropriate medical care for a life-threatening disease, or other misinformation which may cause negative health effects on an individual's life
  • Climate change misinformation that undermines well-established scientific consensus, such as denying the existence of climate change or the factors that contribute to it.
  • Conspiracy theories that name and attack individual people.
  • Conspiracy theories that are violent or hateful, such as making a violent call to action, having links to previous violence, denying well-documented violent events, or causing prejudice towards a group with a protected attribute.

• Civic and Election Integrity
  • Election misinformation, including:
    • How, when, and where to vote or register to vote;
    • Eligibility requirements of voters to participate in an election, and the qualifications for candidates to run for office;
    • Laws, processes, and procedures that govern the organisation and implementation of elections and other civic processes, such as referendums, ballot propositions, or censuses;
    • Final results or outcome of an election.

• Edited Media and AI-Generated Content (AIGC)
  • The likeness of young people or realistic-appearing people under the age of 18.
  • The likeness of adult private figures, if we become aware it was used without their permission.
  • Misleading AIGC or edited media that falsely shows:
    • Content made to seem as if it comes from an authoritative source, such as a reputable news organisation;
    • A crisis event, such as a conflict or natural disaster.
  • A public figure who is:
    • being degraded or harassed, or engaging in criminal or antisocial behaviour;
    • taking a position on a political issue, commercial product, or a matter of public importance (such as an election);
    • being politically endorsed or condemned by an individual or group.
  • Fake Engagement
    • Facilitating the trade or marketing of services that artificially increase engagement, such as selling followers or likes.
    • Providing instructions on how to artificially increase engagement on TikTok.

• Misinformation 
  • Conspiracy theories that are unfounded and claim that certain events or situations are carried out by covert or powerful groups, such as "the government" or a "secret society"
  • Moderate harm health misinformation, such as an unproven recommendation for how to treat a minor illness
  • Repurposed media, such as showing a crowd at a music concert and suggesting it is a political protest
  • Misrepresenting authoritative sources, such as selectively referencing certain scientific data to support a conclusion that is counter to the findings of the study
  • Unverified claims related to an emergency or unfolding event
  • Potential high-harm misinformation while it is undergoing a fact-checking review

• Civic and Election Integrity
  • Unverified claims about an election, such as a premature claim that all ballots have been counted or tallied
  • Statements that significantly misrepresent authoritative civic information, such as a false claim about the text of a parliamentary bill

• Fake Engagement
  • Content that tricks or manipulates others as a way to increase gifts, or engagement metrics, such as "like-for-like" promises or other false incentives for engaging with content

Measure 18.3

Relevant Signatories will invest and/or participate in research efforts on the spread of harmful Disinformation online and related safe design practices, will make findings available to the public or report on those to the Code's taskforce. They will disclose and discuss findings within the permanent Task-force, and explain how they intend to use these findings to improve existing safe design practices and features or develop new ones.

QRE 18.3.1

Relevant Signatories will describe research efforts, both in-house and in partnership with third-party organisations, on the spread of harmful Disinformation online and relevant safe design practices, as well as actions or changes as a result of this research. Relevant Signatories will include where possible information on financial investments in said research. Wherever possible, they will make their findings available to the general public.

Commitment 19

Relevant Signatories using recommender systems commit to make them transparent to the recipients regarding the main criteria and parameters used for prioritising or deprioritising information, and provide options to users about recommender systems, and make available information on those options.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 19.1 Measure 19.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

• At TikTok, we strive to bring more transparency to how we protect our platform.  We continue to increase the reports we voluntarily publish, the depth of data we disclose, and the frequency with which we publish.
• In H1 2025, we published updates to our transparency reports, including:  
  • Community Guidelines Enforcement Report (January-March 2025)July-September 2024)
  • Covert Influence Operations Reports, where we shared information about the influence networks we disrupted from January-June 2025.
  • Platform Security Report (January-March 2025)
• We also worked to make it easier for people to independently study our data and platform. For example through: 
  • our Research Tools which empower over 900 research teams to independently study our platform.
  • adding additional functionality to the Research API, including a compliance API (launched in June) that improves the data refresh process for researchers, helping to ensure that efforts to comply with our Terms of Service (ToS) do not impede researchers' ability to efficiently access data from TikTok's Research API.
  • the downloadable data file in the Community Guidelines Enforcement Report offering access to aggregated data, including removal data by policy category, for the 50 markets with the highest volumes of removed content. 

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 19.1

Relevant Signatories will make available to their users, including through the Transparency Centre and in their terms and conditions, in a clear, accessible and easily comprehensible manner, information outlining the main parameters their recommender systems employ.

QRE 19.1.1

Relevant Signatories will provide details of the policies and measures put in place to implement the above-mentioned measures accessible to EU users, especially by publishing information outlining the main parameters their recommender systems employ in this regard. This information should also be included in the Transparency Centre.

• user interactions (e.g. content users like, share, comment on, and watch in full or skip, as well as accounts of followers that users follow back); 
• Content information (e.g. sounds, hashtags, number of views, and the country the content was published); and 
• User information  (e.g. device settings, language preferences, location, time zone and day, and device types). 
  
  

• Users can click on any video and select “not interested” to indicate that they do not want to see similar content.
• Users are able to automatically filter out specific words or hashtags from the content recommended to them(see here). 
• Users are able to refresh their For You feed if they no longer feel like recommendations are relevant to them or are too similar. When the For You feed is refreshed, users view a number of new videos which include popular videos (e.g., they have a high view count or a high like rate). Their interaction with these new videos will inform future recommendations.
• Users can also personalise their "For You" page through our new Manage Topics feature (June 2025). This allows users to adjust the frequency of content they see related to particular topics. The settings don't eliminate topics entirely but can influence how often they're recommended as peoples' interests evolve over time. It adds to the many ways people shape their feed every day - including liking or sharing videos, searching for topics, or simply watching videos for longer.
• As part of our obligations under the DSA (Article 38), we introduced non-personalized feeds on our platform, which provide our European users with an alternative to recommender systems. They are able to turn off personalisation so that feeds show non-personalised content. For example, the For You feed will instead show popular videos in their regions and internationally. See here.
  
  
  

Measure 19.2

Relevant Signatories will provide options for the recipients of the service to select and to modify at any time their preferred options for relevant recommender systems, including giving users transparency about those options.

SLI 19.2.1

Relevant Signatories will provide aggregated information on effective user settings, such as the number of times users have actively engaged with these settings within the reporting period or over a sample representative timeframe, and clearly denote shifts in configuration patterns.

Country	Number of users that filtered hashtags and keywords	Number of users that clicked on "not interested"	Number of times for algo reset	Number of Videos tagged with AIGC label
Austria	71,042	952,721	60,429	216,782
Belgium	109,999	1,428,998	109,438	310,518
Bulgaria	61,967	838,603	50,767	325,280
Croatia	36,204	396,069	25,456	62,728
Cyprus	15,655	199,425	17,429	105,231
Czech Republic	63,390	811,437	77,494	248,842
Denmark	47,704	585,499	32,565	103,602
Estonia	17,219	162,805	13,428	27,463
Finland	64,531	641,392	59,140	151,632
France	621,904	8,623,045	621,611	2,631,307
Germany	714,270	8,678,005	708,174	2,923,297
Greece	95,344	1,267,887	87,742	289,830
Hungary	60,520	1,056,004	34,031	242,598
Ireland	77,782	894,686	71,318	85,518
Italy	407,290	6,719,765	305,942	1,606,752
Latvia	25,337	298,797	29,270	73,324
Lithuania	31,173	339,592	27,527	74,036
Luxembourg	6,249	83,357	5,752	36,563
Malta	6,356	79,651	7,349	21,483
Netherlands	225,595	2,327,551	188,048	440,107
Poland	277,460	3,572,508	201,086	789,871
Portugal	97,779	1,208,681	73,846	354,910
Romania	149,926	2,827,115	268,322	685,318
Slovakia	26,822	363,060	16,471	112,814
Slovenia	13,155	174,113	17,172	26,794
Spain	475,525	7,262,327	430,715	1,837,668
Sweden	112,446	1,467,000	141,965	324,255
Iceland	6,330	60,021	3,572	9,200
Liechtenstein	180	3,636	295	211
Norway	65,219	733,515	53,304	118,623
Total EU	3,912,644	53,260,093	3,682,487	14,108,523
Total EEA	3,984,373	54,057,265	3,739,658	14,236,557

Commitment 21

Relevant Signatories commit to strengthen their efforts to better equip users to identify Disinformation. In particular, in order to enable users to navigate services in an informed way, Relevant Signatories commit to facilitate, across all Member States languages in which their services are provided, user access to tools for assessing the factual accuracy of sources through fact-checks from fact-checking organisations that have flagged potential Disinformation, as well as warning labels from other authoritative sources.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 21.1 Measure 21.2 Measure 21.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

• We ran 9 temporary media literacy election integrity campaigns in advance of regional elections, most in collaboration with our fact-checking and media literacy partners:
  • 7 in the EU
    • Croatia (local election): Faktograf
    • Croatia (presidential election): Faktograf
    • Germany: Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
    • Latvia: Lead Stories
    • Poland: Demagog & FakeNews.pl
    • Portugal: Poligrafo
    • Romania: Funky Citizens
  • 2 in wider European/regionally relevant countries
    • Albania: Internews Kosova (Kallxo)
    • Greenland: Logically Fact
• Continued our temporary in-app natural disaster media literacy search guide for the Mayotte Cyclone until 14 Feb 2025, and launched a new search guide for the Reunion Cyclone Garance between 4 March and 4 April 2025. These search guides link to TikTok's Safety Center tragic events support guide and authoritative third party information about aid and relief support. 
• Continued our in-app interventions, including video tags, search interventions and in-app information centres, available in 23 official EU languages and Norwegian and Icelandic for EEA users, around the elections, the Israel-Hamas Conflict, Climate Change, Holocaust Education, Mpox, and the War in Ukraine.
• We partner with fact checkers to assess the accuracy of content. Sometimes, our fact-checking partners  determine that content cannot be confirmed or checks are inconclusive (especially during unfolding events). Where our fact-checking partners provide us with a rating that demonstrates the claim cannot yet be verified, we may use our unverified content label to inform viewers via a banner that a video contains unverified content, in an effort to raise user awareness about content credibility.
• Building on our new AI-generated content label for creators, and implementation of C2PA Content Credentials, we launched a number of media literacy campaigns with guidance from expert organisations like Mediawise and WITNESS, including in Brazil, Germany, France, Mexico and the UK, that teach our community how to spot and label AI-generated content. They reached more than 90M users globally, including more than 27M in Mexico and 10M in the UK.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 21.1

Relevant Signatories will further develop and apply policies, features, or programs across Member States and EU languages to help users benefit from the context and insights provided by independent fact-checkers or authoritative sources, for instance by means of labels, such as labels indicating fact-checker ratings, notices to users who try to share or previously shared the rated content, information panels, or by acting upon content notified by fact-checkers that violate their policies.

QRE 21.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the policies, features, or programs they deploy to meet this Measure and on their availability across Member States.

1. Agence France-Presse (AFP)
2. dpa Deutsche Presse-Agentur
3. Demagog
4. Facta
5. Fact Check Georgia
6. Faktograf
7. Internews Kosova
8. Lead Stories
9. Newtral
10. Poligrafo
11. Reuters
12. Teyit

• Enforcement of misinformation policies. Our fact-checking partners play a critical role in helping us enforce our misinformation policies, which aim to promote a trustworthy and authentic experience for our users. We consider context and fact-checking to be key to consistently and accurately enforcing these policies, so, while we use machine learning models to help detect potential misinformation, we have our misinformation moderators assess, confirm, and take action on harmful misinformation. As part of this process, our moderators can access a repository of previously fact-checked claims and they are able to provide content to our expert fact checking partners for further evaluation. Where fact-checking partners advise that content is false, our moderators take measures to assess and remove it from our platform. Our response to QRE 31.1.1 provides further insight into the way in which fact-checking partners  are involved in this process.
• Unverified content labelling. As mentioned above, we partner with fact checkers to assess the accuracy of content. Sometimes, our fact-checking partners  determine that content cannot be confirmed or checks are inconclusive (especially during unfolding events). Where our fact-checking partners provide us with a rating that demonstrates the claim cannot yet be verified, we may use our unverified content label to inform viewers via a banner that a video contains unverified content, in an effort to raise user awareness about content credibility. In these circumstances, the content creator is also notified that their video was flagged as unsubstantiated content and the video will become ineligible for recommendation in the For You feed.

• In-app tools related to specific topics:
  • Election integrity. We have launched campaigns in advance of several major elections aimed at educating the public about the voting process which encourage users to fact-check information with our fact-checking partners. For example, the election integrity campaign we rolled out in advance of France legislative elections in June 2024 included a search intervention and in-app Election Centre. The centre contained a section about spotting misinformation, which included videos created in partnership with fact-checking organisation Agence France-Presse (AFP). In total, during the reporting period, we ran 14 temporary media literacy election integrity campaigns in advance of regional elections. 
  • Climate Change. We launched a search intervention which redirects users seeking out climate change-related content to authoritative information. We worked with the UN to provide the authoritative information. 
  • Natural disasters: Launched a new temporary in-app natural disaster media literacy search guide for the Reunion Cyclone Garance between 4 March and 4 April 2025 and continued our temporary search guide for the Mayotte Cyclone until 14 Feb 2025. These search guides link to TikTok's Safety Center tragic events support guide and authoritative third party information about aid and relief support. 
• User awareness of our fact-checking partnerships and labels. We have created pages on our Safety Center & Transparency Center to raise users’ awareness about our fact-checking program and labels and to support the work of our fact-checking partners. 

SLI 21.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report through meaningful metrics on actions taken under Measure 21.1, at the Member State level. At the minimum, the metrics will include: total impressions of fact-checks; ratio of impressions of fact-checks to original impressions of the fact-checked content–or if these are not pertinent to the implementation of fact-checking on their services, other equally pertinent metrics and an explanation of why those are more adequate.

Country	% video removals under Misinformation policy	% proactive video removals under Misinformation policy	% video removals before any views under Misinformation policy	% video removals within 24h under Misinformation policy	% video removals under Civic and Election Integrity policy	% proactive video removals under Civic and Election Integrity policy	% video removals before any views under Civic and Election Integrity policy	% video removals within 24h under Civic and Election Integrity policy	% video removals under Synthetic Media policy	% proactive video removals under Synthetic Media policy	% video removals before any views under Synthetic Media policy	% video removals within 24h under Synthetic Media policy	Share cancel rate (%) following the unverified content label share warning pop-up (users who do not share the video after seeing the pop up)
Austria	18.55%	98.56%	80.73%	84.72%	6.53%	99.06%	93.18%	92.13%	4.01%	96.75%	43.59%	45.30%	26.41%
Belgium	28.82%	98.73%	77.11%	83.00%	8.79%	99.57%	95.91%	95.66%	5.17%	96.82%	19.68%	16.64%	37.10%
Bulgaria	45.82%	97.98%	55.05%	84.53%	5.05%	99.73%	97.04%	97.84%	3.55%	99.23%	22.61%	24.14%	35.71%
Croatia	25.45%	97.78%	72.32%	86.06%	4.83%	96.81%	87.23%	91.49%	5.60%	93.58%	22.02%	40.37%	26.38%
Cyprus	24.09%	97.28%	72.11%	80.27%	5.30%	97.94%	88.66%	87.63%	8.47%	96.77%	30.32%	28.39%	34.36%
Czech Republic	38.46%	98.26%	55.52%	94.22%	6.14%	99.70%	97.27%	97.73%	3.31%	94.94%	37.64%	57.58%	28.55%
Denmark	16.32%	98.90%	74.19%	86.90%	6.69%	99.81%	98.27%	98.07%	4.26%	96.37%	30.21%	50.15%	31.84%
Estonia	2.12%	98.69%	63.61%	80.00%	0.25%	100.00%	97.22%	97.22%	0.62%	98.88%	59.55%	68.54%	30.33%
Finland	27.42%	94.45%	70.50%	91.43%	5.78%	99.81%	95.94%	98.84%	1.59%	97.89%	27.46%	41.55%	33.60%
France	25.23%	99.10%	84.59%	91.27%	3.99%	99.52%	95.00%	95.77%	2.98%	96.16%	22.30%	23.12%	37.30%
Germany	27.90%	98.10%	79.18%	90.84%	9.17%	98.25%	89.13%	91.11%	3.18%	93.75%	35.63%	44.09%	26.78%
Greece	23.99%	98.97%	73.88%	89.04%	8.93%	99.91%	96.18%	98.70%	5.02%	96.45%	17.75%	27.78%	30.79%
Hungary	2.84%	97.39%	74.59%	92.61%	2.44%	99.06%	89.01%	99.48%	0.24%	90.53%	32.63%	31.58%	32.45%
Ireland	27.15%	97.54%	73.16%	80.88%	6.80%	99.30%	77.17%	98.04%	2.38%	98.00%	30.00%	30.00%	29.28%
Italy	28.38%	98.55%	78.93%	84.12%	9.76%	99.42%	94.08%	92.75%	3.62%	96.61%	20.04%	13.75%	36.90%
Latvia	17.22%	97.82%	83.01%	91.26%	2.59%	100.00%	95.16%	95.16%	9.53%	98.25%	64.04%	78.95%	33.33%
Lithuania	20.17%	99.19%	80.97%	87.04%	2.08%	98.04%	96.08%	96.08%	6.86%	97.02%	59.52%	66.67%	29.57%
Luxembourg	25.02%	89.36%	69.17%	92.11%	2.62%	100.00%	87.72%	87.72%	1.70%	91.89%	27.03%	27.03%	28.85%
Malta	50.81%	90.08%	70.63%	94.44%	2.82%	100.00%	89.29%	89.29%	3.13%	100.00%	9.68%	25.81%	39.10%
Netherlands	25.49%	99.16%	81.22%	87.35%	4.96%	99.04%	97.04%	97.12%	3.92%	95.85%	22.27%	33.60%	29.46%
Poland	37.85%	98.77%	65.49%	93.13%	3.86%	97.34%	85.94%	84.66%	1.46%	94.35%	39.69%	46.26%	30.81%
Portugal	27.48%	98.57%	84.09%	91.37%	8.42%	98.13%	92.28%	94.85%	6.52%	99.40%	25.68%	18.28%	28.31%
Romania	44.26%	96.03%	67.42%	86.84%	12.41%	94.39%	80.65%	71.79%	4.59%	95.44%	32.38%	25.04%	35.42%
Slovakia	62.64%	94.27%	67.80%	95.33%	1.01%	100.00%	92.45%	92.45%	2.14%	97.35%	49.56%	69.03%	28.82%
Slovenia	32.84%	93.76%	77.23%	98.71%	0.34%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	3.13%	97.67%	77.91%	78.29%	25.24%
Spain	30.23%	99.46%	87.87%	90.63%	5.09%	99.31%	92.75%	89.88%	3.73%	97.03%	21.44%	20.00%	34.09%
Sweden	15.83%	98.65%	78.99%	82.53%	6.94%	99.67%	96.92%	96.84%	3.17%	97.63%	19.13%	21.86%	31.25%
Iceland	8.01%	98.63%	89.04%	90.41%	1.10%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	1.54%	100.00%	28.57%	71.43%	22.73%
Liechtenstein	8.00%	100.00%	66.67%	66.67%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	11.76%
Norway	16.73%	98.33%	69.09%	87.01%	4.98%	98.78%	93.41%	94.39%	3.30%	95.96%	24.26%	43.01%	32.93%
Total EU	27.42%	98.11%	76.94%	89.47%	6.64%	98.29%	90.43%	90.17%	3.20%	95.84%	28.85%	31.14%	30.95%
Total EEA	27.28%	98.11%	76.90%	89.45%	6.62%	98.30%	90.46%	90.21%	3.20%	95.84%	28.80%	31.30%	30.95%

Commitment 23

Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with the functionality to flag harmful false and/or misleading information that violates Signatories policies or terms of service.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 23.1 Measure 23.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

• In line with our DSA requirements, we continued to provide a dedicated reporting channel, and appeals process for users who disagree with the outcome, for our community in the European Union to ‘Report Illegal Content,’ enabling users to alert us to content they believe breaches the law.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 23.1

Relevant Signatories will develop or continue to make available on all their services and in all Member States languages in which their services are provided a user-friendly functionality for users to flag harmful false and/or misleading information that violates Signatories' policies or terms of service. The functionality should lead to appropriate, proportionate and consistent follow-up actions, in full respect of the freedom of expression.

QRE 23.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the availability of flagging systems for their policies related to harmful false and/or misleading information across EU Member States and specify the different steps that are required to trigger the systems.

• By ‘long-pressing’ (e.g., clicking for 3 seconds) on the video content and selecting the “Report” option. 
• By selecting the “Share” button available on the right-hand side of the video content and then selecting the “Report” option.

Measure 23.2

Relevant Signatories will take the necessary measures to ensure that this functionality is duly protected from human or machine-based abuse (e.g., the tactic of 'mass-flagging' to silence other voices).

QRE 23.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the general measures they take to ensure the integrity of their reporting and appeals systems, while steering clear of disclosing information that would help would-be abusers find and exploit vulnerabilities in their defences.

Commitment 24

Relevant Signatories commit to inform users whose content or accounts has been subject to enforcement actions (content/accounts labelled, demoted or otherwise enforced on) taken on the basis of violation of policies relevant to this section (as outlined in Measure 18.2), and provide them with the possibility to appeal against the enforcement action at issue and to handle complaints in a timely, diligent, transparent, and objective manner and to reverse the action without undue delay where the complaint is deemed to be founded.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 24.1

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 24.1

Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with information on why particular content or accounts have been labelled, demoted, or otherwise enforced on, on the basis of violation of policies relevant to this section, as well as the basis for such enforcement action, and the possibility for them to appeal through a transparent mechanism.

QRE 24.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the availability of their notification and appeals systems across Member States and languages and provide details on the steps of the appeals procedure.

• removal or otherwise restriction of access to their content;
• a ban of the account;
• restriction of their access to a feature (such as LIVE); or
• restriction of their ability to monetise. 

SLI 24.1.1

Relevant Signatories provide information on the number and nature of enforcement actions for policies described in response to Measure 18.2, the numbers of such actions that were subsequently appealed, the results of these appeals, information, and to the extent possible metrics, providing insight into the duration or effectiveness of processing of appeals process, and publish this information on the Transparency Centre.

Country	Number of Appeals of videos removed for violation of misinformation policy	Number of overturns of appeals for violation of misinformation policy	Appeal success rate of videos removed for violation of misinformation policy	Number of Appeals of videos removed for violation of Civic and Election Integrity policy	Number of overturns of appeals for violation of Civic and Election Integrity policy	Appeal success rate of videos removed for violation of Civic and Election Integrity policy	Number of Appeals of videos removed for violation of Synthetic and Manipulated Media	Number of overturns of appeals for violation of Synthetic and Manipulated Media	Appeal success rate of videos removed for violation of Synthetic and Manipulated Media
Austria	609	422	69.30%	160	124	77.50%	27	24	88.90%
Belgium	809	674	83.30%	246	196	79.70%	55	48	87.30%
Bulgaria	582	283	48.60%	58	46	79.30%	21	21	100.00%
Croatia	91	55	60.40%	14	11	78.60%	7	2	28.60%
Cyprus	92	59	64.10%	20	15	75.00%	17	11	64.70%
Czech Republic	1,453	468	32.20%	162	137	84.60%	72	39	54.20%
Denmark	311	226	72.70%	102	84	82.40%	40	32	80.00%
Estonia	84	49	58.30%	15	10	66.70%	8	7	87.50%
Finland	207	139	67.10%	72	58	80.60%	27	21	77.80%
France	6,935	6,296	90.80%	709	639	90.10%	421	396	94.10%
Germany	12,837	8,939	69.60%	2,844	2,327	81.80%	716	542	75.70%
Greece	705	425	60.30%	173	139	80.30%	55	37	67.30%
Hungary	228	131	57.50%	133	102	76.70%	6	4	66.70%
Ireland	948	765	80.70%	108	97	89.80%	36	32	88.90%
Italy	4,266	3,523	82.60%	1,188	1,048	88.20%	143	132	92.30%
Latvia	110	77	70.00%	20	13	65.00%	42	19	45.20%
Lithuania	101	84	83.20%	16	15	93.80%	22	14	63.60%
Luxembourg	35	29	82.90%	9	7	77.80%	5	3	60.00%
Malta	28	24	85.70%	0	0	0.00%	0	0	0.00%
Netherlands	1,732	1,441	83.20%	290	236	81.40%	92	77	83.70%
Poland	5,004	2,065	41.30%	423	332	78.50%	126	87	69.00%
Portugal	600	393	65.50%	154	129	83.80%	18	14	77.80%
Romania	5,175	1,539	29.70%	1,066	855	80.20%	158	78	49.40%
Slovakia	569	140	24.60%	20	17	85.00%	27	19	70.40%
Slovenia	96	48	50.00%	7	6	85.70%	12	10	83.30%
Spain	3,231	2,844	88.00%	464	416	89.70%	143	130	90.90%
Sweden	658	550	83.60%	231	176	76.20%	48	40	83.30%
Iceland	13	11	84.60%	4	4	100.00%	2	2	100.00%
Liechtenstein	2	2	100.00%	0	0	0.00%	0	0	0.00%
Norway	278	228	82.00%	80	68	85.00%	32	28	87.50%
Total EU	47,496	31,688	66.70%	8,704	7,235	83.10%	2,344	1,839	78.50%
Total EEA	47,789	31,929	66.80%	8,788	7,307	83.10%	2,378	1,869	78.60%

Empowering Researchers

Commitment 26

Relevant Signatories commit to provide access, wherever safe and practicable, to continuous, real-time or near real-time, searchable stable access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated, or manifestly-made public data for research purposes on Disinformation through automated means such as APIs or other open and accessible technical solutions allowing the analysis of said data.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 26.1 Measure 26.2 Measure 26.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

• Supported new independent research through TikTok’s Research Tools (Research API and VCE). 
• Further enriched the data available to include more information on stickers and effects (January) and video tags (April) and reached full parity in data available across the API and VCE (May).
• Added additional functionality to the Research API, including a compliance API (launched in June) that improves the data refresh process for researchers, helping to ensure that efforts to comply with our Terms of Service (ToS) do not impede researchers' ability to efficiently access data from TikTok's Research API.
• Continued to make the Commercial Content API available in Europe to bring transparency to paid advertising, advertisers and other commercial content on TikTok.
• Continued to offer our Commercial Content Library, a publicly searchable EU ads database with information about paid ads and ad metadata, such as the advertising creative, dates the ad was active for, the main parameters used for targeting (e.g. age, gender), the number of people who were served the ad.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 26.1

Relevant Signatories will provide public access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated or manifestly-made public data pertinent to undertaking research on Disinformation on their services, such as engagement and impressions (views) of content hosted by their services, with reasonable safeguards to address risks of abuse (e.g. API policies prohibiting malicious or commercial uses).

QRE 26.1.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the tools and processes in place to provide public access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated and manifestly-made public data pertinent to undertaking research on Disinformation, as well as the safeguards in place to address risks of abuse.

• COPD Transparency Reports, as part of our commitments to the Code, we publish a transparency report every six months to provide granular data for EU/EEA countries about our efforts to combat online misinformation. 
• Our TikTok Community Guidelines Enforcement Reports, providing proactive quarterly insights into the volume and nature of content and accounts removed from our platform for violating our Community Guidelines, Terms of Service or Advertising Policies since 2019.
• DSA Transparency Reports, building on our proactive approach to transparency in our quarterly TikTok Community Guidelines Enforcement Reports and our obligations under the Digital Services Act (“DSA”), we publish a transparency report every six months to provide granular data for EU countries about our content moderation activities.
• We publish monthly Covert Influence Operations Reports, providing more frequent and granular detail about the covert influence operations we have disrupted.   
• In H1 2025, we launched a new Global Elections Integrity Hub, including dedicated coverage of elections across Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. The Hub outlines our policies, product features, and moderation practices that help protect platform integrity during elections. Throughout this reporting period, we regularly updated the Hub with information on our safety efforts in markets with active elections, including Croatia, Kosovo, Germany, Romania, Portugal, and Poland.
  
  

QRE 26.1.2

Relevant Signatories will publish information related to data points available via Measure 25.1, as well as details regarding the technical protocols to be used to access these data points, in the relevant help centre. This information should also be reachable from the Transparency Centre. At minimum, this information will include definitions of the data points available, technical and methodological information about how they were created, and information about the representativeness of the data.

SLI 26.1.1

Relevant Signatories will provide quantitative information on the uptake of the tools and processes described in Measure 26.1, such as number of users.

• 173 applications to access TikTok’s Research Tools (Research API and VCE) from researchers in the EU and EEA.
• 74 applications to access the TikTok Commercial Content API.

Country	Number of applications received for Researcher API	Number of applications accepted for Researcher API	Number of applications rejected for Researcher API	Number of applications received for TikTok Commercial Content Library content library	Number of applications accepted for TikTok Commercial Content Library content library	Number of applications rejected for TikTok Commercial Content Library content library
Austria	6	6	4	1	1	0
Belgium	2	1	0	1	1	0
Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0	0
Croatia	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cyprus	0	0	0	0	0	0
Czech Republic	5	3	1	2	2	0
Denmark	5	5	2	1	1	0
Estonia	0	0	0	0	0	0
Finland	2	1	0	0	0	0
France	16	11	11	24	19	3
Germany	48	50	21	11	10	1
Greece	1	2	0	2	2	0
Hungary	0	0	0	2	1	0
Ireland	3	1	3	1	0	1
Italy	21	16	6	1	1	0
Latvia	0	0	0	3	3	0
Lithuania	0	0	0	0	0	0
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0	0
Malta	0	0	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	13	9	12	3	2	0
Poland	4	3	1	4	4	0
Portugal	0	0	0	3	3	0
Romania	4	3	3	2	2	0
Slovakia	1	0	0	2	1	1
Slovenia	2	1	1	1	1	0
Spain	32	12	18	7	5	2
Sweden	6	5	2	3	3	0
Iceland	0	0	0	0	0	0
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	0	0
Norway	2	2	1	0	0	0
Total EU	171	129	86	74	62	8
Total EEA	173	131	87	74	62	8

Measure 26.2

Relevant Signatories will provide real-time or near real-time, machine-readable access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated or manifestly-made public data on their service for research purposes, such as accounts belonging to public figures such as elected official, news outlets and government accounts subject to an application process which is not overly cumbersome.

QRE 26.2.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the tools and processes in place to provide real-time or near real-time access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated and manifestly-made public data for research purposes as described in Measure 26.2.

1. Test Stage: Query the data using TikTok's query software development kit (SDK). The VCE will return random sample data based on your query, limited to 5,000 records per day.
2. Execution Stage: Submit a script to execute against all public data. TikTok provides a powerful search capability that allows data to be paginated in increments of up to 100,000 records. TikTok will review the results file to make sure the output is aggregated.

QRE 26.2.2

Relevant Signatories will describe the scope of manifestly-made public data as applicable to their services.

QRE 26.2.3

Relevant Signatories will describe the application process in place to in order to gain the access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated and manifestly-made public data described in Measure 26.2.

Commitment 27

Relevant Signatories commit to provide vetted researchers with access to data necessary to undertake research on Disinformation by developing, funding, and cooperating with an independent, third-party body that can vet researchers and research proposals.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 27.1 Measure 27.2 Measure 27.3 Measure 27.4

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Commitment 28

COOPERATION WITH RESEARCHERS Relevant Signatories commit to support good faith research into Disinformation that involves their services.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 28.1 Measure 28.2 Measure 28.3 Measure 28.4

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

• Supported new independent research through TikTok’s Research Tools (Research API and VCE).
• Enriched the data available to include more information on stickers and effects (January) and video tags (April) and reached full parity in data available across the API and VCE (May).
• Added additional functionality to the Research API, including a compliance API (launched in June) that improves the data refresh process for researchers, helping to ensure that efforts to comply with our Terms of Service (ToS) does not impede researchers' ability to efficiently access data from TikTok's Research API.
• Continued to make the Commercial Content API available in Europe to bring transparency to paid advertising, advertisers and other commercial content on TikTok.
• Continued to offer our Commercial Content Library, a publicly searchable EU ads database with information about paid ads and ad metadata, such as the advertising creative, dates the ad was active for, the main parameters used for targeting (e.g. age, gender), the number of people who were served the ad.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 28.1

Relevant Signatories will ensure they have the appropriate human resources in place in order to facilitate research, and should set-up and maintain an open dialogue with researchers to keep track of the types of data that are likely to be in demand for research and to help researchers find relevant contact points in their organisations.

QRE 28.1.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the resources and processes they deploy to facilitate research and engage with the research community, including e.g. dedicated teams, tools, help centres, programs, or events.

1. Albania: Internews Kosova (Kallxo)
2. Belarus: Belarusian Investigative Center
3. Germany: Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
4. Greenland: Logically Facts
5. Kosovo: Internews Kosova (Kallxo)
6. Poland: Demagog
7. Portugal: Poligrafo
   
   

Measure 28.2

Relevant Signatories will be transparent on the data types they currently make available to researchers across Europe.

QRE 28.2.1

Relevant Signatories will describe what data types European researchers can currently access via their APIs or via dedicated teams, tools, help centres, programs, or events.

• Public account data, such as user profiles, followers and following lists, liked videos, pinned videos and reposted videos.
• Public content data, such as comments, captions, subtitles, and number of comments, shares and likes that a video receives.
• Through the VCE, qualifying not-for-profit researchers in the EU can access and analyse TikTok's public data, including public U18 data, in a secure environment that is subject to strict security controls. 

Measure 28.3

Relevant Signatories will not prohibit or discourage genuinely and demonstratively public interest good faith research into Disinformation on their platforms, and will not take adversarial action against researcher users or accounts that undertake or participate in good-faith research into Disinformation.

QRE 28.3.1

Relevant Signatories will collaborate with EDMO to run an annual consultation of European researchers to assess whether they have experienced adversarial actions or are otherwise prohibited or discouraged to run such research.

Empowering fact-checkers

Commitment 30

Relevant Signatories commit to establish a framework for transparent, structured, open, financially sustainable, and non-discriminatory cooperation between them and the EU fact-checking community regarding resources and support made available to fact-checkers.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 30.1 Measure 30.2 Measure 30.3 Measure 30.4

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

• Updated fact checking agreements to include the requirement that fackfact checking partners provide regular pro-active Insights Reports about general misinformation trends observed on our platform and across the industry generally, including new/changing industry or market trends, events or topics that generate particular misinformation or disinformation.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 30.1

Relevant Signatories will set up agreements between them and independent fact-checking organisations (as defined in whereas (e)) to achieve fact-checking coverage in all Member States. These agreements should meet high ethical and professional standards and be based on transparent, open, consistent and non-discriminatory conditions and will ensure the independence of fact-checkers.

QRE 30.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on and explain the nature of their agreements with fact-checking organisations; their expected results; relevant quantitative information (for instance: contents fact-checked, increased coverage, changes in integration of fact-checking as depends on the agreements and to be further discussed within the Task-force); and such as relevant common standards and conditions for these agreements.

• The service the fact-checking partner will provide, namely, that their team of fact checkers review, assess and rate video content uploaded to their fact-checking queue, and will provide regular pro-active Insights Reports about general misinformation trends observed on our platform and across the industry generally, including new/changing industry or market trends, events or topics that generate particular misinformation or disinformation. 
• The expected results e.g., the fact-checkers advise on whether the content may be or contain misinformation and rate it using our classification categories. 
• An option to receive pro-actively flagging of potential harmful misinformation from our partners.
• The languages in which they will provide fact-checking services.
• The ability to request temporary coverage regarding additional languages or support on ad hoc additional projects.
• All other key terms including the applicable term and fees and payment arrangements.

QRE 30.1.2

Relevant Signatories will list the fact-checking organisations they have agreements with (unless a fact-checking organisation opposes such disclosure on the basis of a reasonable fear of retribution or violence).

1. Agence France-Presse (AFP)
2. Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
3. Demagog
4. Facta
5. Geofacts
6. Faktograf
7. Internews Kosova (Kallxo)
8. Lead Stories
9. Newtral
10. Poligrafo
11. Reuters
12. Teyit

• 7 in the EU
  • Croatia (local election): Faktograf
  • Croatia (presidential election): Faktograf
  • Germany: Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
  • Latvia: Lead Stories
  • Poland: Demagog & FakeNews.pl
  • Portugal: Poligrafo
  • Romania: Funky Citizens
• 2 in wider European/regionally relevant countries
  • Albania: Internews Kosova (Kallxo)
  • Greenland: Logically Facts
    
    

• Germany: Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
• Romania: Funky Citizens, Digi Media, and Libertatea
• Poland: Demagog, FakeNews.pl, Radio Zet, and Orientuj.sie
  
  

QRE 30.1.3

Relevant Signatories will report on resources allocated where relevant in each of their services to achieve fact-checking coverage in each Member State and to support fact-checking organisations' work to combat Disinformation online at the Member State level.

• Fact-checking repository. We have built a repository of previously fact-checked claims to help misinformation moderators make swift and accurate decisions.
• Insights reports. Our fact-checking partners provide regular reports identifying general misinformation trends observed on our platform and across the industry generally, including new/changing industry or market trends, events or topics that generated particular misinformation or disinformation.  
• Proactive detection by our fact-checking partners. Our fact-checking partners are authorised to proactively identify content that may constitute harmful misinformation on our platform and suggest prominent misinformation that is circulating online that may benefit from verification. 

• Election Speaker Series. To further promote election integrity, and inform our approach to country-level EU and regionally relevant elections, we invited suitably qualified local and regional external experts to share their insights and market expertise with our internal teams. Our recent Election Speaker Series heard presentations from the following organisations:
  • Albania: Internews Kosova (Kallxo)
  • Belarus: Belarusian Investigative Center
  • Germany: Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa)
  • Greenland: Logically Facts
  • Kosovo: Internews Kosova (Kallxo)
  • Poland: Demagog
  • Portugal: Poligrafo
    
    

• Vision-based: Computer vision models can identify objects that violate our Community Guidelines—like weapons or hate symbols.
• Audio-based: Audio clips are reviewed for violations of our Community Guidelines, supported by a dedicated audio bank and "classifiers" that help us detect audios that are similar or modified to previous violations.
• Text-based: Detection models review written content like comments or hashtags, using foundational keyword lists to find variations of violative text. "Natural language processing"—a type of Artificial Intelligence (AI) that can interpret the context surrounding content—helps us identify violations that are context-dependent, such as words that can be used in a hateful way but may not violate our policies by themselves. We also work with various external experts, like our fact-checking partners, to inform our keyword lists.
• Similarity-based: "Similarity detection systems" enable us to not only catch identical or highly similar versions of violative content, but other types of content that share key contextual similarities and may require additional review.
• Activity-based: Technologies that look at how accounts are being operated help us disrupt deceptive activities like bot accounts, spam, or attempts to artificially inflate engagement through fake likes or follow attempts.
• LLM-based: We're starting to use a kind of AI called "large language learning models" to scale and improve content moderation. LLMs can comprehend human language and perform highly specific, complex tasks. This can make it possible to moderate content with a higher degree of precision, consistency and speed than human moderation.
• Multi-modal LLM-based: "Multi-modal LLMs" can also perform complex, highly specific tasks related to other types of content, such as visual content. For example, we can use this technology to make misinformation moderation easier by extracting specific misinformation "claims" from videos for moderators to assess directly or route to our fact-checking partners.
• Content Credentials: We launched the ability to read Content Credentials that attach metadata to content, which we can use to automatically label AI-generated content that originated on other major platforms.
  
  

SLI 30.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on Member States and languages covered by agreements with the fact-checking organisations, including the total number of agreements with fact-checking organisations, per language and, where relevant, per service.

Country	Member States and languages covered by agreements with the fact-checking organisations
Austria	Fact-checking coverage implemented
Belgium	Fact-checking coverage implemented
Bulgaria	Fact-checking coverage implemented
Croatia	Fact-checking coverage implemented
Cyprus	Fact-checking coverage implemented
Czech Republic	Fact-checking coverage implemented
Denmark	Fact-checking coverage implemented
Estonia	Fact-checking coverage implemented
Finland	Fact-checking coverage implemented
France	Fact-checking coverage implemented
Germany	Fact-checking coverage implemented
Greece	Fact-checking coverage implemented
Hungary	Fact-checking coverage implemented
Ireland	Fact-checking coverage implemented
Italy	Fact-checking coverage implemented
Latvia	Fact-checking coverage implemented
Lithuania	Fact-checking coverage implemented
Luxembourg	Fact-checking coverage implemented
Malta	No permanent fact-checking coverage. We can, and have, put in place temporary agreements with fact-checking partners to provide additional EU language coverage during high risk events like elections or an unfolding crisis. Meanwhile, our fact-checking repository and other initiatives benefit all European users and ensure the overall integrity of our platform.
Netherlands	Fact-checking coverage implemented
Poland	Fact-checking coverage implemented
Portugal	Fact-checking coverage implemented
Romania	Fact-checking coverage implemented
Slovakia	Fact-checking coverage implemented
Slovenia	Fact-checking coverage implemented
Spain	Fact-checking coverage implemented
Sweden	Fact-checking coverage implemented
Iceland	No permanent fact-checking coverage. We can, and have, put in place temporary agreements with fact-checking partners to provide additional EU language coverage during high risk events like elections or an unfolding crisis. Meanwhile, our fact-checking repository and other initiatives benefit all European users and ensure the overall integrity of our platform.
Liechtenstein	Fact-checking coverage implemented
Norway	Fact-checking coverage implemented

Measure 30.2

Relevant Signatories will provide fair financial contributions to the independent European fact-checking organisations for their work to combat Disinformation on their services. Those financial contributions could be in the form of individual agreements, of agreements with multiple fact-checkers or with an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations that has the mandate to conclude said agreements.

QRE 30.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on actions taken and general criteria used to ensure the fair financial contributions to the fact-checkers for the work done, on criteria used in those agreements to guarantee high ethical and professional standards, independence of the fact-checking organisations, as well as conditions of transparency, openness, consistency and non-discrimination.

QRE 30.2.2

Relevant Signatories will engage in, and report on, regular reviews with their fact-checking partner organisations to review the nature and effectiveness of the Signatory's fact-checking programme.

QRE 30.2.3

European fact-checking organisations will, directly (as Signatories to the Code) or indirectly (e.g. via polling by EDMO or an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations) report on the fairness of the individual compensations provided to them via these agreements.

Measure 30.3

Relevant Signatories will contribute to cross-border cooperation between fact-checkers.

QRE 30.3.1

Relevant Signatories will report on actions taken to facilitate their cross-border collaboration with and between fact-checkers, including examples of fact-checks, languages, or Member States where such cooperation was facilitated.

Measure 30.4

To develop the Measures above, relevant Signatories will consult EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations.

QRE 30.4.1

Relevant Signatories will report, ex ante on plans to involve, and ex post on actions taken to involve, EDMO and the elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations, including on the development of the framework of cooperation described in Measures 30.3 and 30.4.

Commitment 31

Relevant Signatories commit to integrate, showcase, or otherwise consistently use fact-checkers' work in their platforms' services, processes, and contents; with full coverage of all Member States and languages.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 31.1 and 31.2 Measure 31.3 Measure 31.4

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

• Expanded our fact-checking repository to ensure our teams and systems leverage the full scope of insights our fact-checking partners submitted to TikTok (regardless of the original language of the relevant content).
• Conducted feedback sessions with our partners to further enhance the efficiency of the fact-checking program.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Commitment 32

Relevant Signatories commit to provide fact-checkers with prompt, and whenever possible automated, access to information that is pertinent to help them to maximise the quality and impact of fact-checking, as defined in a framework to be designed in coordination with EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 32.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 32.3

Relevant Signatories will regularly exchange information between themselves and the fact-checking community, to strengthen their cooperation.

QRE 32.3.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the channels of communications and the exchanges conducted to strengthen their cooperation - including success of and satisfaction with the information, interface, and other tools referred to in Measures 32.1 and 32.2 - and any conclusions drawn from such exchanges.

Permanent Task-Force

Commitment 37

Signatories commit to participate in the permanent Task-force. The Task-force includes the Signatories of the Code and representatives from EDMO and ERGA. It is chaired by the European Commission, and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Task-force can also invite relevant experts as observers to support its work. Decisions of the Task-force are made by consensus.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 37.1 Measure 37.2 Measure 37.3 Measure 37.4 Measure 37.5 Measure 37.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 37.6

Signatories agree to notify the rest of the Task-force when a Commitment or Measure would benefit from changes over time as their practices and approaches evolve, in view of technological, societal, market, and legislative developments. Having discussed the changes required, the Relevant Signatories will update their subscription document accordingly and report on the changes in their next report.

QRE 37.6.1

Signatories will describe how they engage in the work of the Task-force in the reporting period, including the sub-groups they engaged with.

Monitoring of the Code

Commitment 38

The Signatories commit to dedicate adequate financial and human resources and put in place appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of their commitments under the Code.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 38.1

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 38.1

Relevant Signatories will outline the teams and internal processes they have in place, per service, to comply with the Code in order to achieve full coverage across the Member States and the languages of the EU.

QRE 38.1.1

Relevant Signatories will outline the teams and internal processes they have in place, per service, to comply with the Code in order to achieve full coverage across the Member States and the languages of the EU.

Commitment 39

Signatories commit to provide to the European Commission, within 1 month after the end of the implementation period (6 months after this Code’s signature) the baseline reports as set out in the Preamble.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Crisis and Elections Response

Elections 2025

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories’ abilities to measure them].

Threats observed or anticipated

• Content removals: We proactively removed more than 3,300 pieces of election-related content in Poland for violating our policies on synthetic and manipulated media, misinformation, and civic and election integrity.
• Covert influence disruption: We removed three new domestic CIO networks (totaling 77 accounts and 36,419 followers) that were identified as specifically targeting a Polish audience for manipulating election discourse using fake news accounts and personas. More information relating to network disruptions is published on our dedicated Covert Influence Operations Reports. 

• We removed more than 862,000 pieces of content for violating our Community Guidelines, which includes our policies on civic and election integrity and misinformation.
• We also removed 712 accounts for impersonating German election candidates and elected officials.
• We proactively prevented +24 million fake likes and +18.9 million fake follow requests. We also blocked +293,000 spam accounts from being created.
• We also removed +700,000 fake accounts, +17 million fake likes, and +5.7 million fake followers.
  
  

• Between May 12 and May 25, we removed more than 300 pieces of content for violating our policies on civic and election integrity, misinformation and AI generated content. We removed more than 94% of it before anyone told us about it.
• Between May 12 and 25, we proactively prevented more than 1,800,000 fake likes and more than 671,000 fake follow requests, and blocked more than 5,400 spam accounts from being created in Portugal. We also removed more than 5,400 fake accounts, more than 880,000 fake likes, and more than 154,000 fake followers.
• Between May 15 - May 29, we also removed 28 accounts for impersonating Portuguese election candidates and elected officials.
  
  

• Covert influence disruption: TikTok reported removing two new domestic covert networks totaling 87 accounts and 33,296 followers)in April 2025  for manipulating election discourse using fake news accounts and personas. More information relating to the network disruptions is published on our dedicated Covert Influence Operations transparency page. 
• Content removals: We removed over 13,100 pieces of election-related content in Romania for violating our policies on misinformation, civic integrity, and synthetic media - over 93% were taken down before any user report.
• We received 57 submissions through the COCD Rapid Response System in relation to the Romanian Presidential Election, which were rapidly addressed. Actions included banning or geo-blocking of accounts and content removals for violation of Community Guidelines.
  
  

1. Directing people to trusted sources

1. External engagement at the national and EU levels

Mitigations in place

Policies and Terms and Conditions

Outline any changes to your policies

Policy - 50.1.1

Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation) - 50.1.2

Scrutiny of Ads Placements

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 50.2.1

Description of intervention - 50.2.2

Political Advertising

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 50.3.1

Description of intervention - 50.3.2

Indication of impact - 50.3.3

Integrity of Services

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 50.4.1

Description of intervention - 50.4.2

• 
  Removed accounts in network: 16
• Followers of Network: 14,743
  
  

• Removed accounts in network: 12
• Followers of Network: 10,252
  
  

• Removed accounts in network: 49
• Followers of Network: 11,424
  
  

Indication of impact - 50.4.3

1. A network of 40 accounts operated from Germany and targeted a German audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify content supporting the political party "Alternative for Germany (AfD).” A large proportion of the network's accounts were found to use the word "news" or "nachricht" in their handle or nickname.
2. A network of 17 accounts operated from Germany and targeted a German audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to promote the "Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW)" Party within the context of the 2025 German federal elections. The network was found to alternate between posting apolitical and political content in order to drive engagement.
3. A network of 14 accounts operated from Germany and targeting a German audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to promote the political party "Alternative for Germany (AfD)”. The accounts used Smurf avatars and were observed to rebrand their accounts and alternate content in order to gain engagement.
   
   

• We assess that this network targeted a Portuguese audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to promote the Socialist Party and undermine the Social Democratic Party, within the context of the 2025 Portuguese election. This network masked its operating location through advanced operational security.
  
  

• We proactively prevented more than 21.5 million fake likes and 8.09+ million fake follow requests, and we blocked 38,000 spam accounts from being created in Romania. We also removed: 
• 48,300 fake accounts
• 8.2+ million fake likes
• 1.83+ million fake followers
• From 1 September 2024 to 26 May 2025, we prevented more than 120 million fake likes and more than 53 million fake follow requests, and we blocked more than 707,670 spam accounts from being created in Romania. We also removed: over 2,000 accounts impersonating Romanian Government, Politician, or Political Party Accounts, 379,324 fake accounts, 28.9+ million fake likes and 15.6+ million fake followers.

• A network of 27 accounts that had 9,474 cumulative followers as at the date of removal, operating from Romania that attempted to target Romanian audiences in order to amplify certain narratives, attempting to manipulate Romanian elections discourse. The network was found to create accounts with generic handles and avatars which it presented as news accounts.
• A network of 60 accounts that had 23,822 cumulative followers as at the date of removal, operating from Romania that attempted to target Romanian audiences in order to amplify certain narratives, attempting to manipulate Romanian elections discourse. The network was found to create fictitious personas in order to post comments and content aligned with its strategic goal.
• More information relating to the above detailed network disruptions is published on our dedicated Covert Influence Operations transparency page.
  
  
  

Specific Action applied - 50.4.4

Description of intervention - 50.4.5

• Content made to seem as if it comes from an authoritative source, such as a reputable news organisation,
• A crisis event, such as a conflict or natural disaster,
• A public figure who is:
  • being degraded or harassed, or engaging in criminal or anti-social behaviour
  • taking a position on a political issue, commercial product, or a matter of public importance (such as an elections)
  • being politically endorsed or condemned by an individual or group.
    
    

Indication of impact - 50.4.6

Empowering Users

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 50.5.1

Description of intervention - 50.5.2

Indication of impact - 50.5.3

Specific Action applied - 50.5.4

Description of intervention - 50.5.5

Indication of impact - 50.5.6

Description of intervention - 50.5.8

Indication of impact - 50.5.9

Empowering the Research Community

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 50.6.1

Description of intervention - 50.6.2

Indication of impact - 50.6.3

Empowering the Fact-Checking Community

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 50.7.1

Description of intervention - 50.7.2

Indication of impact - 50.7.3

Crisis 2025

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories’ abilities to measure them].

Threats observed or anticipated

War of Aggression by Russia on Ukraine

Israel-Hamas Conflict

Mitigations in place

War of Aggression by Russia on Ukraine

Israel-Hamas Conflict

Policies and Terms and Conditions

Outline any changes to your policies

Policy - 51.1.1

Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation) - 51.1.2

Rationale - 51.1.3

Policy - 51.1.4

Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation) - 51.1.5

Rationale - 51.1.6

Political Advertising

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 51.3.1

Description of intervention - 51.3.2

Indication of impact - 51.3.3

Specific Action applied - 51.3.4

Description of intervention - 51.3.5

Indication of impact - 51.3.6

Integrity of Services

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 51.4.1

Description of intervention - 51.4.2

Indication of impact - 51.4.3

Specific Action applied - 51.4.4

Description of intervention - 51.4.5

• The likeness of young people or realistic-appearing people under the age of 18 that poses a risk of sexualization, bullying, or privacy concerns, including those related to personally identifiable information or likeness to private individuals
• The likeness of adult private figures, if we become aware it was used without their permission
• Misleading AIGC or edited media that falsely shows:
  • Content made to seem as if it comes from an authoritative source, such as a reputable news organisation
  • A crisis event, such as a conflict or natural disaster
  • A public figure who is:
    • being degraded or harassed, or engaging in criminal or antisocial behaviour
    • taking a position on a political issue, commercial product, or a matter of public importance (such as an elections)
    • being politically endorsed or condemned by an individual or group

• Content made to seem as if it comes from an authoritative source, such as a reputable news organisation,
• A crisis event, such as a conflict or natural disaster,
• A public figure who is:
  • being degraded or harassed, or engaging in criminal or anti-social behavior
  • taking a position on a political issue, commercial product, or a matter of public importance (such as an election)
  • spreading misinformation about matters of public importance

Indication of impact - 51.4.6

Specific Action applied - 51.4.7

Description of intervention - 51.4.8

Indication of impact - 51.4.9

• Number of videos removed because of violation of misinformation policy with a proxy related to the War in Ukraine - 3,405
• Number of videos not recommended because of violation of misinformation policy with a proxy (only focusing on RU/UA) - 5,299
• Number of proactive removals of videos removed because of violation of misinformation policy with a proxy related to the War in Ukraine - 3,110

• Number of videos removed because of violation of misinformation policy with a proxy (IL/Hamas) -  7,589
• Number of videos not recommended because of violation of misinformation policy with a proxy (IL/Hamas) - 14,103
• Number of proactive removals of videos removed because of violation of misinformation policy with a proxy (IL/Hamas): 7,177

Description of intervention - 51.4.11

Indication of impact - 51.4.12

Description of intervention - 51.4.17

Empowering Users

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 51.5.1

Description of intervention - 51.5.2

Indication of impact - 51.5.3

Specific Action applied - 51.5.4

Description of intervention - 51.5.5

• Prohibiting state-affiliated media accounts attempting to engage in foreign influence campaigns from advertising outside of the country with which they are primarily affiliated; including in the EU
• Investing in our detection capabilities of state-affiliated media accounts; AND
  
  

Indication of impact - 51.5.6

• Number of videos tagged with the state affiliated media label for Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine - 13,847
• Number of impressions of the state-affiliated media label for Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine - 100,813,065

Specific Action applied - 51.5.7

Description of intervention - 51.5.8

Indication of impact - 51.5.9

• Total Number of impressions of the search intervention - 30,442,000
• Total Number of clicks on the search intervention - 155,726
• Click through rate of the search intervention - 0.51%
  
  

Specific Action applied - 51.5.10

Description of intervention - 51.5.11

Indication of impact - 51.5.12

Empowering the Research Community

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 51.6.1

Description of intervention - 51.6.2

Indication of impact - 51.6.3

Empowering the Fact-Checking Community

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 51.7.1

Description of intervention - 51.7.2

Indication of impact - 51.7.3

Specific Action applied - 51.7.4

Description of intervention - 51.7.5

Indication of impact - 51.7.6

• Number of fact-checked videos with a proxy related to the War in Ukraine - 881
• Number of videos removed as a result of a fact-checking assessment with words related to the War in Ukraine - 144
• Number of videos not recommended in the For Your Feed as a result of a fact-checking assessment with words related to the War in Ukraine - 323

• Proactive insight reports that flag new and evolving claims they’re seeing across the internet. This helps us detect harmful misinformation and anticipate misinformation trends on our platform.
• Collaborating with our fact-checking partners to receive advance warning of emerging misinformation narratives has facilitated proactive responses against high-harm trends and has helped to ensure that our moderation teams have up-to-date guidance.
• A repository of previously fact-checked claims to help misinformation moderators make swift and accurate decisions. 
  
  

• Number of fact checked tasks related to IL/Hamas - 1,913
• Number of videos removed as a result of a fact checking assessment with words related to IL/Hamas - 242
• Number of videos demoted (NR) as a result of a fact checking assessment with words related to IL/Hamas - 323

Specific Action applied - 51.7.7

Description of intervention - 51.7.8

Indication of impact - 51.7.9