Code of Practice on Disinformation Report of Microsoft for the period 1 January – 30 June 2023

Table of Contents

Executive Summary

Microsoft is pleased to file this report on our compliance with the commitments of the strengthened 2022 EU Code of Practice on Disinformation. At Microsoft, we have been committed to instilling trust and security across our products and services, and across the broader web, as outlined in our 2019 report on the first iteration of the Code of Practice. We continue to recognise that fighting disinformation is a key element to creating a trustworthy and safe online environment and continue to increase our efforts to counter these threats. We also recognize that there is not a one-size-fits-all approach to this work, and instead there needs to be a whole-of-society strategy that recognizes that not all services or platforms are the same and that different measures may be more effective than others in improving the information environment for our users.

Microsoft recognizes that since the last report was filed, there has been a growing focus on artificial intelligence (AI) and a growing interest in understanding how AI could affect the spread of disinformation. While AI certainly poses challenges in the information integrity space, we also see many opportunities for AI to assist and streamline defenders' work in detecting and assessing influence operations. To be clear, challenges include improved efficiency of content creation and dissemination, as malicious actors will be able to create high-quality inauthentic content quickly and cost-efficiently, which will require Microsoft to evolve and respond to changing tactics. However, Microsoft is fully committed to utilizing best in class tools and technology to help mitigate the risks of its services being used to further disinformation, sharing information transparently with the AI community, regulators, and broader society, serving as a leader in AI research, and publicizing what we are proactively detecting in this space.

Microsoft is taking a cross product whole of company approach to ensure the responsible implementation of AI. This starts with our responsible AI principles. Building on those principles in June of 2022 Microsoft released our Responsible AI standard v.2 and Information Integrity Principles to help set baseline standards and guidance across product teams. Recognizing that there is an important role for government, academia and civil society to play in the responsible deployment of AI, we also created a roadmap for the governance of AI across the world as well as creating a vision for the responsible advancement of AI, both inside Microsoft and throughout the world, including specifically in Europe. For more information on Microsoft's commitment to Responsible AI and ongoing internal and external efforts, we encourage you to review our Responsible AI hub, which offers a range of information, tools, and resources related to the ethical and responsible use of AI technologies. It includes detailed information about Microsoft's internal Responsible AI processes and tools which can be used to responsibly develop and deploy AI products.

Additionally, we will continue to build upon these approaches to Responsible AI. For example, recognizing both the enormous potential for generative and other forms of AI to transform the world of work in positive ways and the potential risks AI presents in that context, LinkedIn recently published its framework of Responsible AI Principles, which is inspired by and aligned with Microsoft's Responsible AI Principles. LinkedIn provides more details on these principles in our response to Commitment 15, including how we've put these principles into practice with respect to three recently launched Generative AI products.

Microsoft is developing tools, including Project Providence with Truepic, and multistakeholder partnerships, such as the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA), to combat the rise of manipulated or AI created media. Project Providence is a proof-of-concept mobile app that collects images and video with authentication information embedded. This could assist any organization or person to document events, places, or objects anywhere in the world and provides proof that images were unaltered and authentic. Microsoft is a founding member of C2PA, alongside Adobe, Intel, Truepic, Twitter, the BBC, and other tech and media companies.

Additionally, Microsoft recently formed two new partnerships to strengthen the company's capacity and understanding of global threats to disinformation: first, with EFE Verifica (EFE), to track false narratives spreading in Spain, Latin America, and Spanish speaking populations; and second, with Reporters Sans Frontières (RSF), to use their Journalism Trust

Initiative (JTI) dataset in Microsoft products. These partnerships are part of a larger effort to empower Microsoft users to better understand the information they consume across our platforms and products.

Microsoft is going beyond efforts to simply combat disinformation by helping users become more educated on information sources and potential disinformation through media literacy and digital education. Media literacy campaigns are not designed to tell individuals what to believe or how to think; rather, they are about equipping people to think critically and make informed decisions about what information they consume. Microsoft recently provided Charles University in Czechia and Verifee complementary Azure credits to make their cyber-skilling work public and accessible to hundreds of high school students. Further, in 2022, Microsoft increased the investment in our Information Literacy Program, partnering with leading news and media literacy nonprofits, including the News Literacy Project, a collaboration led by The Trust Project on the Trust Indicators and Verified, to develop campaigns built on industry research and best practices. Microsoft provided funding for the research and development of the campaigns as well as threat intelligence insights, technical expertise, and in-kind ad space on Microsoft platforms to promote the programs. Microsoft recently supported the work of Minecraft game developers in their efforts to launch a game, exploring core media literacy concepts within the Minecraft Education world and the work of the Microsoft Education team to launch a free app in Microsoft Teams that helps educators and students to form effective queries and identify reliable resources. Finally, Microsoft has been in ongoing conversations with several fact-checking organizations to expand our fact-checking capability to further meet our commitments under the Code of Practice and explore innovative ways to integrate trustworthiness signals and fact-checks into our evolving technology platforms.

Microsoft has subscribed to the Code of Practice with the following services:

- Microsoft Advertising is our proprietary advertising platform, which serves the vast majority of ads displayed on Bing Search and provides advertising to most other Microsoft services that display ads, as well as many third-party services. Microsoft Advertising works both with advertisers, who provide it with advertising content, and publishers, such as Bing Search, who display these advertisements on their services. Microsoft Advertising employs a distinct set of policies and enforcement measures with respect to each of these two categories of business partners to prevent the spread of disinformation through advertising.

- Bing Search is an online search engine with the primary objective of connecting users to the most relevant search results from the web. Users come to Bing with a specific research topic in mind and expect Bing to provide links to the most relevant and authoritative third-party websites on the Internet that are responsive to their search terms. Therefore, addressing misinformation or disinformation in organic search results often requires a different approach than may be appropriate for other types of online services, as over-moderation of content in search could have a significant negative impact on the right to access information, freedom of expression, and media plurality. Therefore, Bing must carefully balance these competing fundamental rights and interests as it works to ensure that its algorithms return the most high-quality content available that is relevant to the user's queries, working to avoid causing harm to users without unduly limiting their ability to access answers to the questions they seek. In some cases, different features may require different interventions based on functionality and user expectations. While Bing's remediation efforts may on occasion involve removal of content from search results (where legal or policy considerations warrant removal), in many cases, Bing has found that actions such as targeted ranking interventions, or additional digital literacy features such as Answers pointing to high authority sources, trustworthiness signals, or content provenance indicators, are more effective. Bing regularly reviews the efficacy of its measures to identify additional areas for improvement and works with internal and external subject matter experts in key policy areas to identify new threat vectors or improved mechanisms to help prevent users from being unexpectedly exposed to harmful content in search results that they did not expressly seek to find. Bing's new generative AI features, the purpose of which is to provide a next-generation search experience for users to find the web content they are seeking more efficiently, including through more sophisticated questions and interactions with the service, is built on longstanding safety systems in search, supplemented by additional protections for new risks related to AI like conversational drift, hallucinations, and jailbreaking. Bing has partnered

closely with Microsoft's Responsible AI team to proactively address these harms and has been transparent about its approach in The New Bing: Our approach to Responsible AI. Bing continues to evolve these features based on user and external stakeholder feedback.

- LinkedIn is a real identity online social networking service for professionals to connect and interact with other professionals, grow their professional network and brand, and seek career development opportunities. LinkedIn is part of its members' professional identity and has a specific purpose. Activity on the platform and content members share can be seen by current and future employers, colleagues, potential business partners and recruitment firms, among others. Given this audience, members by and large tend to limit their activity to professional areas of interest and expect the content they see to be professional in nature. LinkedIn is committed to keeping its platform safe, trusted, and professional and respects the laws that apply to its services. On joining LinkedIn, members agree to abide by LinkedIn's User Agreement and its Professional Community Policies, which expressly forbid members from posting information that is false or misleading.

As a company, we have made significant progress in the past six months to empower users to better understand the information they consume across our platforms and products. Over the course of the next six months, we'll continue to make this information transparent and public. Specifically, we will focus on the following areas:

- Further de-funding the mechanisms nation-states are using to push their narratives and propaganda and regularly evaluating and improving user and advertiser policies as needed.

- Meet the voluntary commitments we have made for the responsible advancement of AI technology. These include deploying new state-of-the-art provenance tools to help the public identify AI-generated audio-visual content and understand its provenance.

- Ensuring Microsoft and LinkedIn products are developed consistent with Microsoft's Responsible AI Standards and LinkedIn's Responsible AI Principles, as relevant, and that risks associated with AI systems are mitigated to provide safe, trustworthy, and ethical experiences for users and, further, ensuring that our information integrity principles are integrated into AI systems included in Microsoft products.

- Continuing to proactively expose and share information about cross-platform foreign influence operations and actioning such intelligence appropriately through defensive search and other techniques. This includes expansion of the trusted third parties Microsoft uses to inform its work detecting and disrupting these influence operations. This also includes adding trusted third parties in additional languages, ensuring global coverage for our information integrity work.

- Strengthening our efforts and expanding our funding in the areas of media literacy and critical thinking, aiming to include vulnerable groups and having greater language access.

- Providing users with additional tools and functionality to help understand the trustworthiness of the sites or domains they are visiting and empowering them to make informed decisions about those sources.

- Supporting good faith research into disinformation and broader disinformation trends and tactics.

- Continue to share learnings pertaining to generative AI as products and services evolve and new threats or TTPs emerge. In addition, Microsoft will continue to regularly evaluate, implement, and share best practices for addressing disinformation trends and TTPs as we navigate the technological changes posed by the malicious use of AI.
- Develop new partnerships for expanded fact-checking coverage in the EU and continue to explore further ways to help users evaluate content on our services.

- Enhance existing research tooling to provide enhanced data reporting and continue to deliver relevant data and research to support research into the spread of disinformation.

Unless stated otherwise, data provided under this report covers a reporting period of 1 January 2023 to 30 June 2023 ("Reporting Period").

Subscription per Service overview

Commitments	Measures	LinkedIn	Microsoft Advertising	Bing Search	Microsoft Corporation
II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements					
1	Measure 1.1	⊠	⊠	☐	☐
	Measure 1.2	⊠	⊠	☐	☐
	Measure 1.3	⊠	⊠	☐	☐
	Measure 1.4	⊠	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 1.5	⊠	⊠	☐	☐
	Measure 1.6	⊠	⊠	☐	☐
2	Measure 2.1	⊠	⊠	☐	☐
	Measure 2.2	⊠	⊠	☐	☐
	Measure 2.3	⊠	⊠	☐	☐
	Measure 2.4	⊠	⊠	☐	☐
3	Measure 3.1	⊠	⊠	☐	☐
	Measure 3.2	⊠	⊠	☐	☐
	Measure 3.3	⊠	⊠	☐	☐
III. Political Advertising					
4	Measure 4.1	⊠	⊠	☐	☐
	Measure 4.2	⊠	⊠	☐	☐
5	Measure 5.1	⊠	⊠	☐	☐
6	Measure 6.1	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 6.2	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 6.3	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 6.4	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 6.5	☐	☐	☐	☐
7	Measure 7.1	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 7.2	☐	☐	☐	☐

	Measure 7.3	☒	☒	☐	☐
	Measure 7.4	☐	☐	☐	☐
8	Measure 8.1	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 8.2	☐	☐	☐	☐
9	Measure 9.1	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 9.2	☐	☐	☐	☐
10	Measure 10.1	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 10.2	☐	☐	☐	☐
11	Measure 11.1	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 11.2	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 11.3	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 11.4	☐	☐	☐	☐
12	Measure 12.1	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 12.2	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 12.3	☐	☐	☐	☐
13	Measure 13.1	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 13.2	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 13.3	☐	☐	☐	☐
IV. Integrity of Services					
14	Measure 14.1	☒	☐	☒	☐
	Measure 14.2	☒	☐	☒	☐
	Measure 14.3	☒	☐	☒	☐
15	Measure 15.1	☒	☐	☒	☐
	Measure 15.2	☒	☐	☒	☐
16	Measure 16.1	☒	☐	☒	☐
	Measure 16.2	☒	☐	☐	☐
V. Empowering Users					
17	Measure 17.1	☒	☐	☒	☐
	Measure 17.2	☒	☐	☒	☐
	Measure 17.3	☒	☐	☒	☐

18	Measure 18.1	☒	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 18.2	☒	☐	☒	☐
	Measure 18.3	☒	☐	☒	☐
19	Measure 19.1	☒	☐	☒	☐
	Measure 19.2	☒	☐	☒	☐
20	Measure 20.1	☒	☐	☒	☐
	Measure 20.2	☒	☐	☒	☐
21	Measure 21.1	☒	☐	☒	☐
	Measure 21.2	☒	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 21.3	☒	☐	☒	☐
22	Measure 22.1	☒	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 22.2	☒	☐	☒	☐
	Measure 22.3	☒	☐	☒	☐
	Measure 22.4	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 22.5	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 22.6	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 22.7	☒	☐	☒	☐
23	Measure 23.1	☒	☐	☒	☐
	Measure 23.2	☒	☐	☒	☐
24	Measure 24.1	☒	☐	☐	☐
25	Measure 25.1	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 25.2	☐	☐	☐	☐
VI. Empowering the Research Community					
26	Measure 26.1	☒	☐	☒	☐
	Measure 26.2	☒	☐	☒	☐
	Measure 26.3	☒	☐	☒	☐
27	Measure 27.1	☒	☐	☒	☐
	Measure 27.2	☒	☐	☒	☐
	Measure 27.3	☒	☐	☒	☐
	Measure 27.4	☒	☐	☒	☐

28	Measure 28.1	☒	☐	☒	☐
	Measure 28.2	☒	☐	☒	☐
	Measure 28.3	☒	☐	☒	☐
	Measure 28.4	☒	☐	☒	☐
29	Measure 29.1	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 29.2	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 29.3	☐	☐	☐	☐
VII. Empowering the Fact-checking Community					
30	Measure 30.1	☒	☐	☒	☐
	Measure 30.2	☒	☐	☒	☐
	Measure 30.3	☒	☐	☒	☐
	Measure 30.4	☒	☐	☒	☐
31	Measure 31.1	☒	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 31.2	☒	☐	☒	☐
	Measure 31.3	☒	☐	☒	☐
	Measure 31.4	☒	☐	☒	☐
32	Measure 32.1	☒	☐	☒	☐
	Measure 32.2	☒	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 32.3	☒	☐	☒	☐
33	Measure 33.1	☐	☐	☐	☐
VIII. Transparency Centre					
34	Measure 34.1	☐	☐	☐	☒
	Measure 34.2	☐	☐	☐	☒
	Measure 34.3	☐	☐	☐	☒
	Measure 34.4	☐	☐	☐	☒
	Measure 34.5	☐	☐	☐	☒
35	Measure 35.1	☐	☐	☐	☒
	Measure 35.2	☐	☐	☐	☒
	Measure 35.3	☐	☐	☐	☒
	Measure 35.4	☐	☐	☐	☒

	Measure 35.5	☐	☐	☐	☒
	Measure 35.6	☐	☐	☐	☒
36	Measure 36.1	☐	☐	☐	☒
	Measure 36.2	☐	☐	☐	☒
	Measure 36.3	☐	☐	☐	☒
IX. Permanent Task-Force					
37	Measure 37.1	☐	☐	☐	☒
	Measure 37.2	☐	☐	☐	☒
	Measure 37.3	☐	☐	☐	☒
	Measure 37.4	☐	☐	☐	☒
	Measure 37.5	☐	☐	☐	☒
	Measure 37.6	☐	☐	☐	☒
X. Monitoring of the Code					
38	-	☐	☐	☐	☒
39	-	☐	☐	☐	☒
40	Measure 40.1	☐	☐	☐	☒
	Measure 40.2	☐	☐	☐	☒
	Measure 40.3	☐	☐	☐	☒
	Measure 40.4	☐	☐	☐	☒
	Measure 40.5	☐	☐	☐	☒
	Measure 40.6	☐	☐	☐	☒
41	Measure 41.1	☐	☐	☐	☒
	Measure 41.2	☐	☐	☐	☒
	Measure 41.3	☐	☐	☐	☒
42	-	☐	☐	☐	☒
43	-	☐	☐	☐	☒
44	-	☐	☐	☐	☒

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements

Commitments 1 - 3

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements

Commitment 1

Relevant signatories participating in ad placements commit to defund the dissemination of disinformation, and improve the policies and systems which determine the eligibility of content to be monetised, the controls for monetisation and ad placement, and the data to report on the accuracy and effectiveness of controls and services around ad placements

	C.1	M 1.1	M 1.2	M 1.3	M 1.4	M 1.5	M 1.6
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	LinkedIn Microsoft Advertising	LinkedIn Microsoft Advertising	LinkedIn Microsoft Advertising	LinkedIn Microsoft Advertising	LinkedIn	LinkedIn Microsoft Advertising	LinkedIn Microsoft Advertising

	LinkedIn	Microsoft Advertising
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New Implementation Measures As outlined below, LinkedIn: - has implemented and enforces policies concerning misinformation and disinformation. - provides information and tools to give advertisers transparency and control regarding the placement of their advertising. - has integrated brand safety tools and services.	New Implementation Measures Microsoft Advertising implemented the following measures: - Developed automated detection mechanisms to enforce its new policies on Information Integrity, including developing new logic in the system to prevent receiving requests to show ads on web domains that may violate our Disinformation policies. - Created automated data reporting functionalities to meet the Code's reporting compliance efforts.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures LinkedIn plans to continue to assess its policies and services and to update them as warranted.	Planned Implementation Measures - Iterate on its automated detection mechanisms. - Assess implications to its current accreditations.

Measure 1.1	LinkedIn	Microsoft Advertising
QRE 1.1.1	LinkedIn prohibits misinformation and disinformation on its platform, whether in the form of organic content or in the form of advertising content. LinkedIn's Professional Community Policies, which apply to all content on LinkedIn's platform, expressly prohibit false and misleading content, including misinformation and disinformation. LinkedIn provides specific examples of false and misleading content that violates its policy via a Help Center article on False or Misleading Content. LinkedIn's Advertising Policies incorporate the Professional Community Policy provision, and similarly prohibit misinformation and disinformation. In addition, LinkedIn's Advertising Policies also prohibit fraudulent and deceptive ads, and require that claims in an ad have factual support: o **Fraud and Deception:** Ads must not be fraudulent or deceptive. Your product or service must accurately match the content of your ad. Any claims in your ad must have factual support. Do not make deceptive or inaccurate claims about competitive products or services. Do not imply you or your product are affiliated with or endorsed by others without their permission. Do not advertise prices or offers that are inaccurate - any advertised discount, offer or price must be easily discoverable from the link in your ad. Of note, unlike some other platforms, LinkedIn does not allow members to monetise or run ads against their content, nor does it offer an ad revenue share program. Thus, members publishing disinformation on LinkedIn are not able to monetise that disinformation or collect advertising revenue via	Microsoft Advertising prohibits misinformation and disinformation on its network. As reported in QRE 1.2.1, Microsoft Advertising works with selected, trustworthy publishing partners and requires these partners to abide by strict brand safety-oriented policies to avoid providing revenue streams to websites engaging in misleading, deceptive, harmful, or insensitive behaviours. Additionally, in December 2022, Microsoft Advertising rolled out revised network-wide policies to avoid the publishing and carriage of harmful Disinformation and the placement of advertising next to Disinformation content. Such policies prohibit ads or sites that contain or lead to Disinformation. To enforce this policy, "We may use a combination of internal signals and trusted third-party data or information sources to reject, block, or take down ads or sites that contain disinformation or send traffic to pages containing disinformation. We may block at the domain level landing pages or sites that violate this policy." Please see here for our main policy page.

	LinkedIn. LinkedIn has instead reported the number of ads it restricted on its platform during the period.			
SLI 1.1.1 – Numbers by actions enforcing policies above (specify if at page and/or domain level)	Methodology of data measurement: The table below reports metrics concerning ads LinkedIn restricted under the misinformation policies in QRE 1.1.1. The metrics include: (1) the number of ads LinkedIn restricted under the misinformation policies in QRE 1.1.1 between 1 January - 30 June 2023, broken out by EEA Member State; (2) the number of impressions those ads received before they were restricted. The metrics are assigned to EEA Member State based on the primary country targeting of the ad. In total, 7 ads were restricted between 1 January - 30 June 2023. The ads did not receive any impressions before they were restricted. The following factors may contribute to the number of ads reported by LinkedIn being low: - LinkedIn is primarily a business-to-business advertising platform – that is, businesses marketing their products and services to other businesses and members in a professional capacity. - Because of the business-to-business nature of LinkedIn's advertising platform, ads on LinkedIn may cost more than ads in other settings, impacting the ads run on LinkedIn.		Methodology of data measurement: Microsoft Advertising assesses the impact of its actions by reporting on the individual ads that we prevented from serving on web properties participating in the Microsoft Advertising network (i.e., "publisher sites" that use the Microsoft Advertising services to display ads on their properties), and the number web domains that we blocked from participating in our ad network. - "Impression" represents the number of individual advertisements that we prevented from serving on a publisher site in a Member State. This means that we proactively blocked ads before they may show to a consumer. Please see SLI 1.1.2 for the Euro value of ads demonetised associated with this impression data. - "Domain" represents the number of web domains which received at least one ad impression in a Member State. Since Microsoft Advertising blocks domains across all regions (meaning, we don't break down the blocks at the individual country level because we apply the same globally), we are reporting on the overall number across all Member States for the current reporting period. The reporting period is January 1, 2023 to June 30, 2023.	
	The number of ads LinkedIn restricted under its misinformation policies in QRE 2.1.1 between 1 January – 30 June 2023	The number of impressions the ads received before they were restricted.	Impression	Domain
Level	Ads	Impressions	Impression	Domain
Member States				
Austria	0	0	45,703	
Belgium	0	0	41,501	
Bulgaria	0	0	0	
Croatia	0	0	0	
Cyprus	0	0	1,145	
Czech Republic	0	0	3,911	

16

Denmark	1	0	31,197	
Estonia	0	0	312	
Finland	0	0	5,993	
France	0	0	53,510	
Germany	2	0	649,884	
Greece	0	0	0	
Hungary	0	0	0	
Ireland	0	0	53,557	
Italy	1	0	488,393	
Latvia	0	0	0	
Lithuania	0	0	26	
Luxembourg	0	0	1,470	
Malta	0	0	0	
Netherlands	0	0	91,624	
Poland	0	0	1,173	
Portugal	0	0	14,025	
Romania	0	0	1,756	
Slovakia	0	0	0	
Slovenia	0	0	0	
Spain	3	0	25,120	
Sweden	0	0	44,055	
Iceland	0	0	0	
Liechtenstein	0	0	113	
Norway	0	0	19,753	
Total EU	**7**	**0**	**1,554,355**	
Total EEA	**7**	**0**	**1,574,221**	**1,007**

This additional Service Level Indicator provides an estimated financial value of the actions taken by Signatories to demonetise disinformation sources (under SLI 1.1.1). It is based on media metrics available to Signatories (query/bid1 or impression2) and applying an agreed-upon conversion factor provided by a third party designated by the Task-force of the Code (Ebiquity plc.).		
SLI 1.1.2 - Preventing the flow of legitimate advertising investment to sites or content that are designated as disinformation	Methodology of data measurement: Following the methodology developed by the Task-force Subgroup on Ad Scrutiny, this SLI considers the impressions to ads or sources that were blocked and applies an agreed-upon conversion factor to those impressions. As reported above, LinkedIn restricted 7 ads between 1 January – 30 June 2023 under its misinformation policies in QRE 1.1.1. The ads did not receive any impressions before they were restricted. Because there were no impressions, the estimated Euro value under the methodology is zero.	Methodology of data measurement: Following the methodology developed by the Task-force Subgroup on Ad Scrutiny, this SLI considers the impressions of ads or sources that were blocked and applies an agreed-upon conversion factor to those impressions. It should be noted, however, that Microsoft Advertising is a "pay per click" (PPC) ad network. This means that advertisers are charged following a click on the ad, and not based on the number of impressions served. We therefore calculated the approximate financial value in the table by using the "blended CPM" value provided by Ebiquity plc. and the following equation: (Impressions/1000) x BlendedCPM; where CPM means "Cost Per Mille." As described above, Microsoft Advertising prevents serving any ads on web domains that spread disinformation. Such proactive measures block all ad traffic upfront (i.e., we act at the earliest point of identification, which could mean prior to an impression being served), which brings the monetization on those web properties down to zero. Please see SLI 1.1.1 for the associated number of advertisements that we proactively prevented from showing to a consumer. As described above, Microsoft Advertising continues to iterate on its proactive mechanisms to prevent potentially infringing content from serving to consumers, which will be reflected in future reports. The reporting period is January 1, 2023 to June 30, 2023.

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[1] Request placed between a seller and buyer of advertising that can detail amongst other things website, specific content, targeting data inclusive of audience or content.

[2] Comprehensive calculation of the number of people who have been reached by a piece of media content by passive exposure (viewing a piece of content) or active engagement (visiting a destination).

	Euro value of ads demonetised	Euro value of ads demonetised
Member States		
Austria	0	€ 137.11
Belgium	0	€ 103.75
Bulgaria	0	0
Croatia	0	0
Cyprus	0	€ 3.44
Czech Republic	0	€ 11.73
Denmark	0	€ 233.98
Estonia	0	€ 0.94
Finland	0	€ 32.96
France	0	€ 133.78
Germany	0	€ 2,599.54
Greece	0	0
Hungary	0	0
Ireland	0	€ 133.89
Italy	0	€ 488.39
Latvia	0	0
Lithuania	0	€ 0.08
Luxembourg	0	€ 3.68
Malta	0	0
Netherlands	0	€ 366.50
Poland	0	€ 1.76
Portugal	0	€ 21.04
Romania	0	€ 4.39
Slovakia	0	0
Slovenia	0	0
Spain	0	€ 75.36
Sweden	0	€ 308.39
Iceland	0	0
Liechtenstein	0	€ 0.34
Norway	0	€ 217.28
Total EU	**0**	**€ 4,660.71**
Total EEA	**0**	**€ 4,878.33**

Measure 1.2	LinkedIn	Microsoft Advertising
QRE 1.2.1	LinkedIn does not offer an ad revenue share program and does not allow third-parties to monetise content they post to LinkedIn by running ads against it. LinkedIn displays ads in two environments: (1) on the LinkedIn platform, which accounts for the vast majority of ads; and (2) on the LinkedIn Audience Network, which allows LinkedIn advertisers to extend their reach to professionals on a curated network of twenty-five-hundred third-party publishers selected by LinkedIn (for example, Nasdaq.com, CNN.com, Vogue.com, Realtor.com, Science.org). With respect to the first category – ads displayed on the LinkedIn platform – as noted in response to QRE 1.1.1, unlike other platforms, LinkedIn does not offer a content monetisation or an ad revenue share program. Thus, no member content is monetised or demonetised, and there is no ability for a member publishing disinformation to collect any advertising revenue share from LinkedIn. With respect to the second category – ads displayed on the LinkedIn Audience Network – LinkedIn takes a number of steps to help ensure LinkedIn advertisers' ads appear in a trusted environment and that publishers that systematically provide harmful disinformation are not included in the LinkedIn Audience Network. o First, the LinkedIn Audience Network is a curated network of third-party sites and apps selected by LinkedIn. LinkedIn does not allow any blog, application, or website to join the LinkedIn Audience Network and display ads; rather, LinkedIn selects the publishers that are included in the network. o Second, LinkedIn has integrated with partners, such as Integral Ad Science and DoubleVerify, to help monitor the quality and brand safety of the publishers in the LinkedIn Audience Network and filter out publisher inventory that falls short of standards, such as GARM's brand safety floor. o Third, LinkedIn regularly reviews the publishers included in the LinkedIn Audience Network to ensure they meet LinkedIn standards and are serving LinkedIn advertisers.	Microsoft Advertising works with selected, trustworthy publishing partners and requires these partners to abide by strict brand safety-oriented policies to avoid providing revenue streams to websites engaging in misleading, deceptive, harmful, or insensitive behaviors. These publishers also benefit from the set of measures identified above that Microsoft Advertising takes with regard to advertisers, which ensures that these partners receive high-integrity, non-deceptive ads from the Microsoft Advertising platform. Microsoft Advertising's policies with respect to these publishers include a comprehensive list of prohibited content that ads cannot serve against. Prohibited content includes, but is not limited to, Disinformation, sensitive political content (e.g., extreme, aggressive, or misleading interpretations of news, events, or individuals), unmoderated user-generated content, and unsavory content (such as content disparaging individuals or organisations). Publishers are required to maintain a list of prohibited terms and provide us with information on their content management practices where applicable. In addition to content requirements, publishers are required to abide by restrictions against engaging in business practices that are harmful to users (e.g., distributing malware). Microsoft Advertising reviews publisher properties and domains for policy compliance, including compliance with restrictions on prohibited content. In this review, Microsoft Advertising also considers feedback from its advertisers to help ensure a safe environment for the delivery of their advertisements, and maintains a review process to investigate related advertiser complaints. Publishers are promptly notified of properties or domains that violate Microsoft Advertising's policies; such properties and domains are not approved by Microsoft for live ad traffic. If a property or domain is already live, and later found in violation of Microsoft Advertising's policies, it is removed from the network until the publisher remedies the issue. As stated in our newly revised policies, "We may use a combination of internal signals and trusted third-party data or information sources to reject, block, or take down ads or sites that contain disinformation or send traffic to pages containing disinformation."

	To date, LinkedIn has periodically removed publishers from the LinkedIn Audience Network, but has not had to remove any publisher as a result of publishing disinformation.	Specific to Disinformation, Microsoft Advertising partner with Information Integrity experts, such as NewsGuard and GDI, as source and references of Disinformation domains. Microsoft Advertising is actively blocking domains that these sources deem as Disinformation.
SLI 1.2.1	Methodology of data measurement: As stated in response to QRE 1.2.1, LinkedIn does not allow third parties to monetise content they post to LinkedIn by running ads against it and has not had to remove any publisher from the LinkedIn Audience Network for publishing disinformation. Accordingly, the metrics for this SLI for the period 1 January – 30 June 2023 are zero.	Methodology of data measurement As reported in SLI 1.1.1, since Microsoft Advertising blocks domains globally, not at the Member State level, we are providing the global aggregate number of 1,007 domains barred for the current reporting period. Microsoft Advertising did not bar any accounts during the relevant reporting period. This is because we take actions by blocking web domains across the entire network, irrespective of which ad account may be promoting them. Microsoft Advertising did not roll out any new policies in the reporting period. Therefore, the relevant "nr. of policy reviews" is zero. As described in the January 2023 Baseline report, in December 2022, Microsoft Advertising rolled out revised network-wide policies to avoid the publishing and carriage of harmful Disinformation and the placement of advertising next to Disinformation content. We created a process to validate and tune the enforcement of that new policy during the first half of calendar year 2023. Therefore, we marked "nr. of update to policies" as one.

	Nr of policy reviews	Nr of update to policies	Nr of accounts barred	Nr of domains barred	Nr of policy reviews	Nr of update to policies	Nr of accounts barred	Nr of domains barred
Member States								
Global					1	0	0	1,007
Total EU	-	-	-	-				
Total EEA	-	-	-	-				

Measure 1.3	**LinkedIn**	**Microsoft Advertising**
QRE 1.3.1	LinkedIn provides a range of information and tools to give advertisers transparency and control regarding the placement of their advertising. For example, for ads on the LinkedIn platform, LinkedIn publishes a Feed Brand Safety score for advertisers and the public. The Feed Brand Safety score measures the number of ad impressions on the LinkedIn platform that appeared adjacent to – that is, immediately above or below within the LinkedIn feed – content removed for violating LinkedIn's Professional Community Policies, including disinformation. From July through December 2022, the Feed Brand Safety score was 99%+ safe. More information about LinkedIn's Feed Brand Safety Score is available here. In addition, LinkedIn publishes for advertisers and the public a semi-annual transparency report, which discloses the amount of violating member content, including misinformation, that LinkedIn removed from the platform during the period. For the period from 1 July to 31 December 2022, for example, LinkedIn removed 137,988 pieces of misinformation from the platform. LinkedIn's most recent transparency report is available here. For ads on the LinkedIn Audience Network, as discussed in QRE 1.2.1, LinkedIn provides tools to assist advertisers in controlling where their ads appear within the network. For example, advertisers can set up category-level blocking based on the Interactive Advertising Bureau's (IAB) publisher category taxonomy to prevent their ads from running on certain types of publishers within the network. Similarly, advertisers can review the list of publishers within the network and create custom allow lists and block lists to ensure their ads are placed on apps and sites that meet an advertiser's specific standards.	Microsoft Advertising provides its customers with campaign reporting and functionalities to monitor and control ad placement across the Microsoft Advertising network. Such transparency controls are generally available via the campaign User Interface (UI) and through customer support. Transparency controls include: - Ad delivery reports at the domain level: data reports show the website/domain where the ads are served. - Site exclusions: ability to exclude certain websites/domains from the ad campaigns to prevent ads from serving on such websites. - Negative keywords exclusions: ability to exclude certain keywords from the ad campaigns to prevent ads from serving against search queries containing such keywords. - Syndication Publisher Network Opt-Out: ability to prevent any ad delivery on the extended publisher network. In which case, all ads will serve on owned and operated properties
Measure 1.4	**LinkedIn**	**Microsoft Advertising**
QRE 1.4.1	This Measure is not relevant or pertinent for LinkedIn as it does not buy advertising on behalf of others, inclusive of advertisers, and agencies.	This measure is not relevant or pertinent to Microsoft Advertising as it does not buy advertising, inclusive of advertisers, and agencies.
Measure 1.5	**LinkedIn**	**Microsoft Advertising**
QRE 1.5.1	As indicated in response to QRE 1.2.1, LinkedIn does not offer a content monetisation or an ad revenue share program. Thus, no member content is monetised or demonetised, and there is no ability for a	This measure is not relevant or pertinent to Microsoft Advertising, as it does not produce first party reporting. Please see QRE 1.5.2 for the relevant actions.

	member publishing disinformation on LinkedIn to collect advertising revenue share. As a result, LinkedIn has not undertaken independent third-party audits relative to monetisation and disinformation.	
QRE 1.5.2	Not applicable.	Microsoft Advertising undergoes yearly Media Rating Council (MRC) accreditations via third-party audit. The MRC accreditation certifies Microsoft Advertising's click measurement systems adheres to the industry standards for counting ad clicks and the processes supporting this technology are accurate. Here is the Microsoft Advertising's MRC accreditation letter. This article provides a summary of the click measurement processes and methods Microsoft Advertising employs to measure and count clicks. For additional information, please visit the IAB/MRC click measurement guidelines. Microsoft Adverting undergoes yearly audit by the Network Advertising Initiative (NAI) as part of the annual member's compliance review process.
Measure 1.6	**LinkedIn**	**Microsoft Advertising**
QRE 1.6.1	LinkedIn has integrated a number of brand safety tools and services to help advertisers understand and control the placement of their advertising, and help avoid the placement of advertising next to disinformation content and/or in places or sources that repeatedly publish disinformation. First, it's worth noting that LinkedIn endeavors to limit the disinformation that may appear on its platform in the first place. As set out in response to QREs 17.1.1 / 18.1.3 / 18.2.1 / 23.2.1, LinkedIn has implemented automated and manual systems and processes to detect and remove content that violates our policies, including disinformation, and to take action on violative content when it's reported to us. Further, LinkedIn limits and controls the publishers that are included in the LinkedIn Audience Network, discussed in response to QRE 1.2.1. Second, LinkedIn has partnered with third parties, such as Integral Ad Science and DoubleVerify, to evaluate and filter advertising inventory on LinkedIn Audience Network publisher sites that falls short of standards, such as GARM's brand safety floor. These partners help evaluate and filter third-party publisher advertising inventory before a bid is placed, and decrease instances when an ad may run on an unsafe or low-quality page.	As described in QRE 1.2.1, Microsoft Advertising partner with Information Integrity experts, such as NewsGuard and GDI, as source and references of Disinformation domains. Microsoft Advertising is actively blocking domains that these sources deem as Disinformation. Please see QRE 1.3.1 for transparency and control functionalities.

	In addition, LinkedIn has implemented a Brand Safety Hub within LinkedIn Campaign Manager. As part of the hub, advertisers can control what publisher apps and sites their ads appear on within the LinkedIn Audience Network. For example, advertisers can create custom block lists and allow lists of publisher sites within the LinkedIn Audience Network that meet an advertiser's specific standards. Similarly, advertisers can apply third-party brand safety tools to their campaigns, including IAB publisher categories and DoubleVerify brand suitability profiles.	
QRE 1.6.2	This QRE is not relevant or pertinent for LinkedIn as it does not buy advertising on behalf of others, inclusive of advertisers, and agencies.	This QRE is not relevant or pertinent as Microsoft Advertising does not buy advertising.
QRE 1.6.3	This QRE is not relevant or pertinent as LinkedIn is not a brand safety tool provider.	This QRE is not relevant or pertinent as Microsoft Advertising is not a brand safety tool provider.
QRE 1.6.4	This QRE is not relevant or pertinent as LinkedIn is not a ratings service.	This QRE is not relevant or pertinent as Microsoft Advertising is not a ratings service.
SLI 1.6.1	Methodology of data measurement: Not applicable.	Methodology of data measurement: N/A

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements					
Commitment 2					
Relevant Signatories participating in advertising commit to prevent the misuse of advertising systems to disseminate Disinformation in the form of advertising messages.					
	C.2	**M 2.1**	**M 2.2**	**M 2.3**	**M 2.4**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**LinkedIn Microsoft Advertising**	**LinkedIn Microsoft Advertising**	**LinkedIn Microsoft Advertising**	**LinkedIn Microsoft Advertising**	**LinkedIn Microsoft Advertising**

	LinkedIn	**Microsoft Advertising**
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New Implementation Measures	New Implementation Measures

	As outlined below, LinkedIn: - has implemented and enforces policies concerning misinformation and disinformation. - partners with others to facilitate the flow of information to tackle purveyors of disinformation. - has implemented systems and procedures to help ensure ads on LinkedIn comply with its Advertising Policies. - provides information to advertisers when ads are restricted about the policies at issue.	Microsoft Advertising implemented the following measures: - Developed automated detection mechanisms to enforce its new policies on Information Integrity, including early development of new automated classifiers to detect possible infringing content. - Created automated data reporting functionalities to meet the Code's reporting compliance efforts.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures LinkedIn plans to continue to assess its policies and services and to update them as warranted.	Planned Implementation Measures Iterating on its automated detection mechanisms, including new automated classifiers to detect misleading claims relating to false information and consumer scams, such as financial scams, unsupported pricing claims and sensationalized ads, and misleading celebrity endorsements.

Measure 2.1	LinkedIn	Microsoft Advertising
QRE 2.1.1	As noted in response to QRE 1.1.1, LinkedIn prohibits misinformation and disinformation on its platform, whether in the form of organic content or in the form of advertising content. LinkedIn's Professional Community	As described in QRE 2.2.1, Microsoft Advertising employs a set of policies that prohibit advertising content that is misleading, deceptive, fraudulent, or harmful, including misinformation and disinformation.

	Policies, which apply to all content on the platform, expressly prohibit false and misleading content, including misinformation and disinformation. LinkedIn provides specific examples of false and misleading content that violates its policy via a Help Center article on False or Misleading Content. LinkedIn's Advertising Policies incorporate the Professional Community Policy provision, and similarly prohibit misinformation and disinformation. In addition, LinkedIn's Advertising Policies separately prohibit fraudulent and deceptive ads, and require that claims in an ad have factual support: - **Fraud and Deception**: Ads must not be fraudulent or deceptive. Your product or service must accurately match the content of your ad. Any claims in your ad must have factual support. Do not make deceptive or inaccurate claims about competitive products or services. Do not imply you or your product are affiliated with or endorsed by others without their permission. Do not advertise prices or offers that are inaccurate – any advertised discount, offer or price must be easily discoverable from the link in your ad.	In December 2022, Microsoft Advertising rolled out revised network-wide policies to avoid the publishing and carriage of harmful Disinformation and the placement of advertising next to Disinformation content. Such policies prohibit ads or sites that contain or lead to Disinformation. To enforce this policy, "We may use a combination of internal signals and trusted third-party data or information sources to reject, block, or take down ads or sites that contain disinformation or send traffic to pages containing disinformation. We may block at the domain level landing pages or sites that violate this policy." Please see here for our main policy page.
SLI 2.1.1 – Numbers by actions enforcing policies above	Methodology of data measurement: The table below reports the number of ads LinkedIn restricted under the misinformation policies in QRE 2.1.1 above between 1 January – 30 June 2023, broken out by EEA Member State. The metrics are assigned to EEA Member State based on the primary country targeting of the ad. In total, 7 ads were restricted between 1 January – 30 June 2023. The following factors may contribute to the number of ads reported by LinkedIn being low: - LinkedIn is primarily a business-to-business advertising platform - that is, businesses marketing their products and services to other businesses and members in a professional capacity.	Methodology of data measurement: Microsoft Advertising assess the impact of its actions by reporting on the ads that were loaded in the Microsoft Advertising campaign system but that we blocked from being displayed across our network, and estimating the number of individual ad impressions that such ads would have generated (i.e., ads that would have been served to consumers). "Unique Ads" are the individual advertisements (or ad creatives) loaded in the Microsoft Advertising campaign system that we blocked. "Blocked Impressions" means the individual ad impressions that such Unique Ads would have generated if not blocked. "Unique Domains" means the web domain or URLs that the Unique Ads would have directed customers to. For example, if Advertiser A loads 10 ads in the campaign system promoting two websites associated with disinformation that would have been displayed

	- Because of the business-to-business nature of LinkedIn's advertising platform, ads on LinkedIn may cost more than ads placed in other settings, impacting the ads run on LinkedIn.	100 times, Microsoft Advertising will report 10 Unique Ads, 100 Blocked Impressions, and two Unique Domains. In practice, however, no consumer ever see any of these ads. "Account suspension" means suspending access to the Microsoft Advertising services to advertisers who willingly or repeatedly violate our terms or policies prohibiting phishing, malware, or payment Instrument fraud. Suspended customers cannot serve ads until they redress the violation. The reporting period is January 1, 2023 to June 30, 2023.Due to system upgrade in furtherance of the compliance obligations under the Code, Microsoft Advertising was only able to pull actual data for May and June 2023, which we averaged for the reminder of the reporting period.			
	The number of ads LinkedIn restricted under the misinformation policies in QRE 2.1.1 between 1 January - 30 June 2023	Unique Ads	Blocked Impressions	Unique Domains	Account suspension
Member States					
Austria	0	95,886	577,632	12	319
Belgium	0	166,017	2,046,558	15	911
Bulgaria	0	2,352	4,926	3	186
Croatia	0	2,817	5,031	3	33
Cyprus	0	58,962	341,019	3	154
Czech Republic	0	39,972	140,190	3	169
Denmark	1	91,314	675,297	6	326
Estonia	0	348	1,578	3	1,006
Finland	0	62,448	263,886	6	198
France	0	231,114	10,861,221	21	2,588
Germany	2	541,353	46,222,182	21	2,831
Greece	0	4,617	9,945	3	138
Hungary	0	54,846	282,093	3	186
Ireland	0	244,845	4,572,747	15	253
Italy	1	197,724	2,707,080	18	1,212
Latvia	0	29,544	67,206	3	152
Lithuania	0	27,516	100,353	3	107
Luxembourg	0	32,601	101,895	6	48
Malta	0	47,028	237,012	3	72
Netherlands	0	246,060	5,269,290	15	972
Poland	0	16,575	53,415	3	512
Portugal	0	90,900	644,199	6	146

Romania	0	86,898	481,617	3	475
Slovakia	0	34,158	106,869	3	58
Slovenia	0	18,123	57,795	3	43
Spain	3	268,356	22,262,196	12	1,423
Sweden	0	136,512	1,512,999	12	267
Iceland	0	1,827	2,865	3	16
Liechtenstein	0	3,108	11,418	3	3
Norway	0	102,069	754,629	6	226
Total EU	**7**	**2,828,886**	**99,606,231**	**207**	**14,785**
Total EEA	**7**	**2,935,890**	**100,375,143**	**219**	**15,030**

Measure 2.2	LinkedIn	Microsoft Advertising
QRE 2.2.1	LinkedIn works with numerous partners to facilitate the flow of information to tackle purveyors of disinformation, including disinformation spread by state-sponsored and institutional actors. LinkedIn maintains an internal Trust and Safety team composed of threat investigators and intelligence personnel to address disinformation. This team works with various other internal teams, including our Artificial Intelligence modeling team, to develop leads into threat actor campaigns. The leads are then manually verified, and confirmed TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) and IOCs (Indicators of Compromise) relating to threat actors are shared with other external stakeholders, including, for example, industry peers. Any associated disinformation content is verified by our internal or external fact-checkers as needed and coordinated inauthentic behaviours (CIBs) are also removed by our Trust and Safety team. LinkedIn, along with its parent company, Microsoft, is heavily involved in threat exchanges. These threat exchanges take various forms, such as: 1) regular discussion amongst industry peers to discuss high-level trends and campaigns; and, 2) one-on-one engagement with individual peer companies to discuss TTPs and IOCs. This exchange of information leads to a better understanding of the incentives of sophisticated and well-funded threat actors and	Microsoft Advertising employs dedicated operational support and engineering resources to enforce its advertising policies detailed below, combining automated and manual enforcement methods to prevent or take down advertisements that violate its policies. Every ad loaded into the Microsoft Advertising system is subject to these enforcement methods, which leverage machine-learning techniques, automated screening, the expertise of its operations team, and dedicated user safety experts. In addition, Microsoft Advertising conducts a manual review of all advertisements flagged to its customer support team and removes advertisements that violate its policies. As stated in our newly revised policies on Disinformation, "We may use a combination of internal signals and trusted third-party data or information sources to reject, block, or take down ads or sites that contain disinformation or send traffic to pages containing disinformation." Microsoft Advertising partner with Information Integrity experts, such as NewsGuard and GDI, as source and references of Disinformation domains. Microsoft Advertising is actively blocking domains that these sources deem as spreading Disinformation. In addition to the newly rollout policy on Disinformation, Microsoft Advertising's Misleading Content Policies prohibit advertising content that is misleading, deceptive, fraudulent, or that can be harmful to users, including advertisements that contain unsubstantiated claims, or that falsely claim or imply endorsements or affiliations with third party products, services, governmental entities, or organisations. Microsoft Advertising also has a set of Relevance and Quality

	how they evolve their TTPs to achieve those goals, which assists us in their identification and removal. LinkedIn always stands ready to receive and investigate any leads we receive from peers and other external stakeholders. In addition to one-on-one engagement with peers, we also consume intelligence from vendors and investigate any TTPs and IOCs made available in peer disclosures. In turn, we also regularly release information about policy-violating content on our platform in publicly available transparency reports and blog posts.	Policies to manage the relevancy and quality of the advertisements that it serves through its advertising network. These policies deter advertisers from luring users onto sites using questionable or misleading tactics (e.g., by prohibiting advertisements that lead users to sites that misrepresent the origin or intent of their content).
Measure 2.3	**LinkedIn**	**Microsoft Advertising**
QRE 2.3.1	All advertising that runs on LinkedIn's platform is subject to LinkedIn's Advertising Policies. LinkedIn has implemented both automated and manual systems to help ensure that advertising on the platform complies with its Advertising Policies, and that ads that do not comply with its policies are removed. When an advertiser submits an advertising campaign, the campaign is evaluated by LinkedIn automated systems. If those systems determine a campaign may violate LinkedIn's policies, the campaign is forwarded to LinkedIn's advertising review team for manual review. The advertising review team is trained in LinkedIn's Advertising Policies and dedicated to advertising review. LinkedIn also employs a dedicated team of trainers, who not only support the onboarding of new ad reviewers, but also provide ongoing educational opportunities for reviewers. LinkedIn similarly employs quality assurance analysts, who provide one-on-one coaching, as well as regular monthly forums to discuss reviewers' most frequent challenges. For complex issues, reviewers have direct access to global advertising policy managers through regular office hours and dedicated escalation pathways. LinkedIn members may also report ads that they believe violate LinkedIn's advertising policies, and when members report ads LinkedIn's advertising review team reviews them. To report an ad,	Please see QRE 2.2.1. Microsoft Advertising blocks sites or domains that our Information Integrity expert partners deem as spreading Disinformation. Microsoft Advertising also rejects all ads associated with such domains and instructs its publishing partners to block ads from showing on such domains.

	members can click on the three-dot icon in the upper right-hand corner of every ad and select the "Hide or report this ad" option. Members are then directed to select a reporting reason, with "Misinformation" provided as a reporting option.	
SLI 2.3.1	Methodology of data measurement: The table below reports metrics concerning ads LinkedIn restricted under the misinformation policies in QRE 2.1.1. The metrics include: (1) the number of ads LinkedIn restricted under the misinformation policies in QRE 2.1.1 between 1 January - 30 June 2023, broken out by EEA Member State; (2) the number of impressions those ads received before they were restricted. The metrics are assigned to EEA Member States based on the primary country targeting of the ad. In total, 7 ads were restricted between 1 January - 30 June 2023. The ads did not receive any impressions before they were restricted. The following factors may contribute to the number of ads reported by LinkedIn being lower than other platforms: - LinkedIn is primarily a business-to-business advertising platform -- that is, businesses marketing their products and services to other businesses and members in a professional capacity. - Because of the business-to-business nature of LinkedIn's advertising platform, ads on LinkedIn may cost more than ads on other platforms, impacting the ads run on LinkedIn. - The size of LinkedIn's advertising business, and the number of ads run on LinkedIn, may be smaller than other platforms.	Methodology of data measurement: Microsoft Advertising removed ads after the ads were shown to consumers during the relevant reporting period. The low figures are due to the proactive nature of our actions, since we block most disinformation content before it shows to consumers. Please see SLI 2.1.1 (Unique Ads) for the number of ads prohibited. The reporting period is January 1, 2023 to June 30, 2023.

	The number of ads LinkedIn restricted under the misinformation policies in QRE 2.1.1 between 1 January - 30 June 2023	The number of impressions the ads received before they were restricted	Nr of ads removed (as well as reach of ads before they were successfully removed)	Nr of ads prohibited (same as Unique Ads in SLI 2.1.1)
Member States				
Austria	0	0	1	95,886
Belgium	0	0	0	166,017
Bulgaria	0	0	0	2,352

Croatia	0	0	2	2,817
Cyprus	0	0	0	58,962
Czech Republic	0	0	2	39,972
Denmark	1	0	1	91,314
Estonia	0	0	0	348
Finland	0	0	1	62,448
France	0	0	2	231,114
Germany	2	0	2	541,353
Greece	0	0	0	4,617
Hungary	0	0	0	54,846
Ireland	0	0	2	244,845
Italy	1	0	3	197,724
Latvia	0	0	0	29,544
Lithuania	0	0	0	27,516
Luxembourg	0	0	0	32,601
Malta	0	0	0	47,028
Netherlands	0	0	1	246,060
Poland	0	0	0	16,575
Portugal	0	0	0	90,900
Romania	0	0	0	86,898
Slovakia	0	0	0	34,158
Slovenia	0	0	0	18,123
Spain	3	0	0	268,356
Sweden	0	0	1	136,512
Iceland	0	0	0	1,827
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	3,108
Norway	0	0	1	102,069
Total EU	**7**	**0**	**18**	**2,828,886**
Total EEA	**7**	**0**	**19**	**2,935,890**

Measure 2.4	LinkedIn	Microsoft Advertising
QRE 2.4.1	When LinkedIn rejects or restricts an ad for violation of its policies, as described in QRE 2.3.1, LinkedIn sends the advertiser an email notification. The email notification outlines the rejection reason and advertising policy that the ad has violated.	Microsoft Advertising notifies its advertisers customers of policy violations through the following: - Prompts in the campaign User Interface (UI) - Email notifications (for example, for account suspension) - Notifications from the assigned Account representatives, as applicable

	The notification also provides advertisers instructions regarding how they can address the violation, including by revising the ad in LinkedIn Campaign Manager to address the violations, or by contacting their sales representative or LinkedIn customer support if they require clarification or believe there has been a mistake. Because advertisers can address rejections a number of ways – by revising and resubmitting the advertisement, by creating a new advertisement that complies with LinkedIn's policies, or by contacting their LinkedIn sales representative or customer support – LinkedIn does not report "appeal" and "appeal grant" metrics for ad rejections. LinkedIn has provided metrics on the number of ad restrictions as part of SLI 2.3.1 above.		Advertisers may appeal an editorial decision through the conflict-resolution process described here: How do I challenge a disapproval? (microsoft.com)	
SLI 2.4.1	Methodology of data measurement: LinkedIn does not report "appeal" and "appeal grant" metrics for ad rejections as outlined in our response to QRE 2.4.1. LinkedIn has provided metrics on the number of ad restrictions as part of SLI 2.3.1 above.		Methodology of data measurement: Microsoft Advertising tracks appeals (at advertising creative and keyword level) in the aggregate and not at the Member State level due to the nature of its services. We are providing the aggregate global value of 3,619 total appeals during the relevant reporting period. The reporting period is January 1, 2023 to June 30, 2023.	
	Nr of appeals	Proportion of appeals that led to a change of the initial decision	Nr of appeals	Proportion of appeals that led to a change of the initial decision
Global	N/A		3,619	3,548

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements

Commitment 3
Relevant Signatories involved in buying, selling and placing digital advertising commit to exchange best practices and strengthen cooperation with relevant players, expanding to organisations active in the online monetisation value chain, such as online e-payment services, e-commerce platforms and relevant crowd-funding/donation systems, with the aim to increase the effectiveness of scrutiny of ad placements on their own services.

	C.3	M 3.1	M 3.2	M 3.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**LinkedIn** **Microsoft** **Advertising**	**LinkedIn** **Microsoft Advertising**	**LinkedIn** **Microsoft Advertising**	**LinkedIn** **Microsoft Advertising**

	LinkedIn	Microsoft Advertising
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g., changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New Implementation Measures Not applicable	New Implementation Measures N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures Not applicable	Planned Implementation Measures N/A

Measure 3.1	LinkedIn	Microsoft Advertising
QRE 3.1.1	As discussed as part of QRE 2.2.1, LinkedIn works with numerous partners to facilitate the flow of information to tackle purveyors of disinformation, including disinformation spread by state-sponsored and institutional actors. LinkedIn maintains an internal Trust and Safety team composed of threat investigators and intelligence personnel to address disinformation. This team works with various other internal teams, including our Artificial Intelligence modeling team, to develop leads into threat actor campaigns. The leads are then manually verified, and confirmed TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) and IOCs (Indicators of Compromise) relating to threat actors are shared with other external stakeholders, including, for example, industry peers. Any associated disinformation content is verified by our internal or external fact-checkers as needed and coordinated inauthentic behaviours (CIBs) are also removed by our Trust and Safety team. LinkedIn, along with its parent company, Microsoft, is heavily involved in threat exchanges. These threat exchanges take various forms, such as: 1) regular discussion amongst industry peers to discuss high-level trends and campaigns; and, 2) one-on-one engagement with individual peer companies to discuss TTPs and IOCs. This exchange	Microsoft Advertising partners with Information Integrity experts as source and references of Disinformation domains. Microsoft Advertising is a member and an active participant in several trade groups, including the IAB and EDAA. As part of the broader Microsoft engagements, Microsoft Advertising participates in threat exchange discussions with industry peers and trusted third parties which increase the effectiveness of our enforcement actions.

	of information leads to a better understanding of the incentives of sophisticated and well-funded threat actors and how they evolve their TTPs to achieve those goals, which assists us in their identification and removal. LinkedIn always stands ready to receive and investigate any leads we receive from peers and other external stakeholders. In addition to one-on-one engagement with peers, we also consume intelligence from vendors and investigate any TTPs and IOCs made available in peer disclosures. In turn, we also regularly release information about policy-violating content on our platform in publicly-available transparency reports and blog posts.	
Measure 3.2	**LinkedIn**	**Microsoft Advertising**
QRE 3.2.1	Please see the response to QRE 3.1.1. In addition, LinkedIn is a member of and participates in GARM.	Please see the response to QRE 3.1.1.
Measure 3.3	**LinkedIn**	**Microsoft Advertising**
QRE 3.3.1	Please see the response to QRE 3.1.1. In addition, as discussed in response to QRE 1.6.1, LinkedIn partners with companies including Integral Ad Science and DoubleVerify to help evaluate and filter advertising inventory on LinkedIn Audience Network publisher sites that falls short of standards, such as GARM's brand safety floor.	Please see the response to QRE 3.1.1.

III. Political Advertising
Commitments 4 - 13

III. Political Advertising			
Commitment 4 Relevant Signatories commit to adopt a common definition of "political and issue advertising".			
	C.4	**M 4.1**	**M 4.2**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**LinkedIn** **Microsoft Advertising**	**LinkedIn** **Microsoft Advertising**	**LinkedIn** **Microsoft Advertising**

	LinkedIn	**Microsoft Advertising**
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New Implementation Measures Not applicable.	New Implementation Measures N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures Pending a political agreement on the Regulation on Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising, LinkedIn, as part of Microsoft, will contribute to discussions on the definition of political advertising in the upcoming workstreams on Political Advertising, to be organized in the context of the Task-force.	Planned Implementation Measures Pending a political agreement on the Regulation on Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising, Microsoft Advertising, as part of Microsoft, will contribute to discussions on the definition of political advertising in the upcoming workstreams on Political Advertising, to be organized in the context of the Task-force.

Measure 4.1	**LinkedIn**	**Microsoft Advertising**
Measure 4.2	**LinkedIn**	**Microsoft Advertising**
QRE 4.1.1 (for measures 4.1 and 4.2)	LinkedIn's Advertising Policies do not allow political advertising, and LinkedIn has not allowed political advertising since 2018. Among other things, LinkedIn Advertising policies prohibit "ads advocating for or against a particular candidate, party, or ballot proposition or otherwise intended to influence an election outcome" and "ads fundraising for or by political candidates, parties, political action committees or similar organisations, or ballot propositions." In addition, LinkedIn's Advertising Policies prohibit certain types of advertisements that might be considered issue based. For example, "ads exploiting a sensitive political issue even if the advertiser has no explicit political agenda" are also prohibited.	Microsoft Advertising policies prohibit ads for election-related content, political candidates, parties, ballot measures and political fundraising globally; similarly, ads aimed at fundraising for political candidates, parties, political action committees ("PACs"), and ballot measures also are barred. All Microsoft and third-party services that rely on Microsoft Advertising to serve advertisements on their platforms benefit from these robust, and robustly enforced, set of policies. Furthermore, Microsoft prohibits political advertising across Microsoft media properties and platforms. Microsoft Advertising's policies also prohibit certain types of advertisements that might be considered issue-based. More specifically, "advertising that exploits political agendas, sensitive political issues or uses 'hot button' political issues or names of prominent politicians is not allowed regardless of whether the advertiser has a political agenda," and "advertising that exploits sensitive political or religious issues for commercial gain, or promote extreme political or extreme religious agendas or any known associations with hate, criminal or terrorist activities" is also prohibited. See here: Political content - Microsoft Advertising
QRE 4.1.2 (for measures 4.1 and 4.2)	Microsoft looks forward to participating in upcoming workstreams on Political Advertising, to be organized in the context of the Task-force.	Microsoft looks forward to participating in upcoming workstreams on Political Advertising, to be organized in the context of the Task-force.

III. Political Advertising			
Commitment 5			
Relevant Signatories commit to apply a consistent approach across political and issue advertising on their services and to clearly indicate in their advertising policies the extent to which such advertising is permitted or prohibited on their services.			
	C.5		**M 5.1**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**LinkedIn** **Microsoft Advertising**		**LinkedIn** **Microsoft Advertising**

	LinkedIn	**Microsoft Advertising**
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New Implementation Measures The current implementation measures employed by LinkedIn meet this commitment.	New Implementation Measures The current implementation measures employed by Microsoft Advertising suffice to meet this commitment.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures Not applicable as LinkedIn currently prohibits all political advertising, as outlined under QRE 5.1.1.	Planned Implementation Measures Not applicable as Microsoft Advertising currently prohibits all political advertising, as outlined under QRE 5.1.1.

Measure 5.1	**LinkedIn**	**Microsoft Advertising**
QRE 5.1.1	LinkedIn's Advertising Policies do not allow political advertising, and LinkedIn has not allowed political advertising since 2018.	Microsoft Advertising policies prohibit ads for election-related content, political candidates, parties, ballot measures and political fundraising globally; similarly, ads aimed at fundraising for political candidates, parties,

	Among other things, LinkedIn Advertising policies prohibit "ads advocating for or against a particular candidate, party, or ballot proposition or otherwise intended to influence an election outcome" and "ads fundraising for or by political candidates, parties, political action committees or similar organisations, or ballot propositions." In addition, LinkedIn's Advertising Policies prohibit certain types of advertisements that might be considered issue based. For example, "ads exploiting a sensitive political issue even if the advertiser has no explicit political agenda" are also prohibited.	political action committees ("PACs"), and ballot measures also are barred. All Microsoft and third-party services that rely on Microsoft Advertising to serve advertisements on their platforms benefit from these robust, and robustly enforced, set of policies. Furthermore, Microsoft prohibits political advertising across Microsoft media properties and platforms. Microsoft Advertising's policies also prohibit certain types of advertisements that might be considered issue-based. More specifically, "advertising that exploits political agendas, sensitive political issues or uses 'hot button' political issues or names of prominent politicians is not allowed regardless of whether the advertiser has a political agenda," and "advertising that exploits sensitive political or religious issues for commercial gain, or promote extreme political or extreme religious agendas or any known associations with hate, criminal or terrorist activities" is also prohibited.

III. Political Advertising						
Commitment 6 Relevant Signatories commit to make political or issue ads clearly labelled and distinguishable as paid-for content in a way that allows users to understand that the content displayed contains political or issue advertising						
	C.6	M 6.1	M 6.2	M 6.3	M 6.4	M 6.5
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Commitment 6 is not relevant or pertinent for LinkedIn and Microsoft Advertising as they do not allow political or issue-based advertising as set out in more detail under measure 5.1.	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

	III. Political Advertising				
	Commitment 7 Relevant Signatories commit to put proportionate and appropriate identity verification systems in place for sponsors and providers of advertising services acting on behalf of sponsors placing political or issue ads. Relevant signatories will make sure that labelling and user-facing transparency requirements are met before allowing placement of such ads.				
	C.7	**M 7.1**	**M 7.2**	**M 7.3**	**M 7.4**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**LinkedIn** **Microsoft Advertising**	N/A	N/A	**LinkedIn** **Microsoft Advertising**	N/A

	LinkedIn	**Microsoft Advertising**
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New Implementation Measures Not applicable	New Implementation Measures N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures Not applicable	Planned Implementation Measures N/A

Measure 7.3	**LinkedIn**	**Microsoft Advertising**
QRE 7.3.1	As set out in QRE 5.1.1, LinkedIn's Advertising Policies prohibit political advertising. Before submitting a campaign, customers must agree that their ad complies with LinkedIn's policies. As detailed in QRE 2.3.1, LinkedIn has implemented both automated and manual systems to help ensure that advertising on the platform complies with its Advertising Policies, and that ads that do not comply with its policies are removed. These enforcement systems apply equally to prohibited political advertising, as well as other violations of LinkedIn's Advertising Policies.	As set out in QRE 5.1.1, Microsoft Advertising prohibits ads for election-related content, political candidates, parties, ballot measures and political fundraising globally; similarly, ads aimed at fundraising for political candidates, parties, political action committees ("PACs"), and ballot measures also are barred. All Microsoft and third-party services that rely on Microsoft Advertising to serve advertisements on their platforms benefit from these robust, and robustly enforced, set of policies. Microsoft Advertising's policies also prohibit certain types of advertisements that might be considered issue-based. More specifically, "advertising that

	In addition to LinkedIn's preemptive enforcement, LinkedIn members may also report ads that they believe violate LinkedIn's advertising policies, and when members report ads LinkedIn's advertising review team reviews them. To report an ad, members can click on the three-dot icon in the upper right-hand corner of every ad and select the "Hide or report this ad" option.	exploits political agendas, sensitive political issues or uses 'hot button' political issues or names of prominent politicians is not allowed regardless of whether the advertiser has a political agenda," and "advertising that exploits sensitive political or religious issues for commercial gain, or promote extreme political or extreme religious agendas or any known associations with hate, criminal or terrorist activities" is also prohibited. In addition, to comply with local laws in Canada and France, Microsoft Advertising has prohibited advertising content related to debates of general interest linked to an electoral campaign in those jurisdictions. See here: Political content - Microsoft Advertising
QRE 7.3.2	As set out in QRE 5.1.1, LinkedIn's Advertising Policies prohibit political advertising. Ads that do not comply with LinkedIn's Advertising Policies are removed.	Microsoft Advertising does not offer its advertising services to customers or partners that may promote political content. For example, a political party would be made aware by our customer support team that it cannot run political ads campaigns through our ad network. Microsoft Advertising employs dedicated operational support and engineering resources to enforce restrictions on political advertising using a combination of proactive and reactive mechanisms. On the proactive side, Microsoft Advertising has implemented several processes designed to identify and block political ads from showing across its advertising network, including restrictions on certain terms and from certain domains. For example, we compile a list of terms comprised of known political parties, candidates, and ballot measures and block any ads that may be otherwise shown on a search engine search for such terms. On the reactive side, if Microsoft Advertising becomes aware that an ad suspected of violating its policies is being served to our publishers—for instance, because a user flagged that ad to our customer support team—the offending ad is promptly reviewed and, if it violates our policies, taken down. Users can report advertising which may be in violation of the Microsoft Advertising policies through the publisher-specific reporting form or via this form: Low quality ad submission & escalation - Microsoft Advertising The above actions apply across all the websites that use Microsoft Advertising to serve ads on their properties, whether owned and operated by Microsoft (like Bing) or third-party websites.

III. Political Advertising		
Commitment 8		
Relevant Signatories commit to provide transparency information to users about the political or issue ads they see on their service.		
C.8	**M 8.1**	**M 8.2**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Commitment 8 is not relevant or pertinent for LinkedIn and Microsoft Advertising as they do not allow political or issue-based advertising as set out in more detail under measure 5.1.	N/A	N/A

III. Political Advertising		
Commitment 9		
Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with clear, comprehensible, comprehensive information about why they are seeing a political or issue ad.		
C.9	**M 9.1**	**M 9.2**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Commitment 9 is not relevant or pertinent for LinkedIn and Microsoft Advertising as they do not allow political or issue-based advertising as set out in more detail under measure 5.1.	N/A	N/A

III. Political Advertising		
Commitment 10		
Relevant Signatories commit to maintain repositories of political or issue advertising and ensure their currentness, completeness, usability and quality, such that they contain all political and issue advertising served, along with the necessary information to comply with their legal obligations and with transparency commitments under this Code.		
C.10	**M 10.1**	**M 10.2**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Commitment 10 is not relevant or pertinent for LinkedIn and Microsoft Advertising as they do not allow political or issue-based advertising as set out in more detail under measure 5.1.	N/A	N/A

III. Political Advertising					
Commitment 11					
Relevant Signatories commit to provide application programming interfaces (APIs) or other interfaces enabling users and researchers to perform customised searches within their ad repositories of political or issue advertising and to include a set of minimum functionalities as well as a set of minimum search criteria for the application of APIs or other interfaces."					
	C.11	**M 11.1**	**M 11.2**	**M 11.3**	**M 11.4**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Commitment 11 is not relevant or pertinent for LinkedIn and Microsoft Advertising as they do not allow political or issue-based advertising as set out in more detail under measure 5.1.	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

III. Political Advertising				
Commitment 12				
Relevant Signatories commit to increase oversight of political and issue advertising and constructively assist, as appropriate, in the creation, implementation and improvement of political or issue advertising policies and practices.				
	C.12	**M 12.1**	**M 12.2**	**M 12.3**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Commitment 12 is not relevant or pertinent for LinkedIn and Microsoft Advertising as they do not allow political or issue-based advertising as set out in more detail under measure 5.1.	N/A	N/A	N/A

III. Political Advertising				
Commitment 13				
Relevant Signatories agree to engage in ongoing monitoring and research to understand and respond to risks related to Disinformation in political or issue advertising.				
	C.13	**M 13.1**	**M 13.2**	**M 13.3**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Commitment 13 is not relevant or pertinent for LinkedIn and Microsoft Advertising as they do not allow political or issue-based advertising as set out in more detail under measure 5.1.	N/A	N/A	N/A

IV. Integrity of Services

Commitments 14 - 16

IV. Integrity of Services

Commitment 14

In order to limit impermissible manipulative behaviours and practices across their services, Relevant Signatories commit to put in place or further bolster policies to address both misinformation and disinformation across their services, and to agree on a cross-service understanding of manipulative behaviours, actors and practices not permitted on their services. Such behaviours and practices, which should periodically be reviewed in light with the latest evidence on the conducts and TTPs employed by malicious actors, such as the AMITT Disinformation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Framework, include:

The following TTPs pertain to the creation of assets for the purpose of a disinformation campaign, and to ways to make these assets seem credible:
- 1. Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts)
- 2. Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, up votes, comments)
- 3. Use of fake followers or subscribers
- 4. Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains
- 5. Account hijacking or impersonation

The following TTPs pertain to the dissemination of content created in the context of a disinformation campaign, which may or may not include some forms of targeting or attempting to silence opposing views. Relevant TTPs include:
- 6. Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g. via personalized advertising, location spoofing or obfuscation)
- 7. Deploy deceptive manipulated media (e.g. "deep fakes", "cheap fakes"…)
- 8. Use "hack and leak" operation (which may or may not include doctored content)
- 9. Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers)
- 10. Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers
- 11. Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers
- 12. Coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts

	C.14	M 14.1	M 14.2	M 14.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	LinkedIn Bing Search	LinkedIn Bing Search	LinkedIn Bing Search	LinkedIn Bing Search

	LinkedIn	Bing Search
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New Implementation Measures Not applicable	New Implementation Measures In connection with the launch of new Bing generative AI services, Bing published supplemental Terms of Use and a Code of Conduct and has implemented a number of safeguards to help address TTPs that could potentially be used on these new generative AI search experiences, including red-team testing, enhanced reporting, and the use of additional classifiers and metaprompt interventions.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures Not applicable	Planned Implementation Measures Bing is regularly reviewing and evaluating policies and practices related to the new Bing generative AI services and may adjust and update policies as needed. Bing's existing programs are already designed to address these issues, but Bing regularly evaluates the efficacy of its measures and endeavors to improve and work to respond quickly to new threats or issues as they arise.

Measure 14.1	LinkedIn	Bing Search
QRE 14.1.1	LinkedIn's User Agreement (in particular section 8 *LinkedIn "Dos and Don'ts"*) and our Professional Community Policies --which are accepted by every member when joining LinkedIn--detail the impermissible manipulative behaviours and practices that are prohibited on our platform. Fake accounts, misinformation, and inauthentic content are not allowed, and we take active steps to remove it from our platform. LinkedIn provides additional specific examples of false and misleading content that violates its policy via a Help Center article on False or Misleading Content.	Bing Search is an online search engine, the primary purpose of which is to provide a searchable index of webpages available on the internet to help users find the content they are looking for. Bing Search does not host the content or control the operation, content, or design of indexed websites. Users come to Bing Search with a specific research topic in mind and expect Bing to provide links to the most relevant and authoritative third-party websites on the Internet that are responsive to their search terms. Bing Search does not allow users to post and share content or otherwise enable content to go "viral" through user-to-user exchanges of information on Bing. As such, addressing misinformation in organic search results often requires a different approach than may be appropriate for other types of online services. The majority of the TTPs (namely, TTPs 1-9 and 11-12) are more pertinent to social media or account-driven services in that they specifically relate to user accounts, subscribers/followers, inauthentic coordination, influencers, or targeting users of a service, account hijacking, etc., and thus are not relevant to search engines. The highest potential for abuse in web search arises under TTP 10, which involves "use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as by exploiting data voids, spam tactics, or keyword stuffing." Therefore, relevant Bing Search policies and practices that help combat manipulative behaviors primarily address TTP Number 10. Although, as a search engine, Bing lacks control over third party accounts and websites, Bing's ranking algorithms, spam policies, and other safeguards described below can also address and mitigate the risks arising from malicious websites that use other TTPs attempting to manipulate our search engine rankings. For example, pages employing social media schemes (e.g., fake followers – TTP 3), using inauthentic domains (TTP 4), or keyword stuffing (TTP 9) are considered abusive practices that are addressed in Bing's ranking system and Webmaster Guidelines. As noted above, Bing's primary mechanism for combatting manipulative behaviors in search results is via its ranking algorithms and systems designed to identify and combat attempts to abuse search engine optimization techniques (i.e., spam). Bing Search describes the main parameters of its ranking systems in depth in How Bing Delivers Search Results. Abusive

| | | techniques and examples of prohibited SEO activities are described in more detail in the [Bing Webmaster Guidelines.](#) These pages provide a deeper, more detailed understanding of how Bing search algorithms work that cannot be fully detailed here given the space limitations of this report and complexity of how search engines rank websites.

As described in these documents, Bing's ranking algorithms are designed to identify and prioritize the highest quality, most authoritative content available online that is relevant to the user's query, and by preventing abusive search engine optimization techniques (spam).

One of the key ranking techniques Bing uses to prevent low quality or misinformative websites from returning high in search results is through the "quality and credibility" score. Determining the quality and credibility (QC) of a website includes evaluating the clarity of purpose of the site, its usability, and presentation. QC also consists of an evaluation of the page's "authority", which includes factors such as:
■ Reputation: What types of other websites link to the site? A well-known news site is considered to have a higher reputation than a brand-new blog.
■ Level of discourse: Is the purpose of the content solely to cause harm to individuals or groups of people? For example, a site that promotes violence or resorts to name-calling or bullying will be considered to have a low level of discourse, and therefore lower authority, than a balanced news article.
■ Level of distortion: How well does the site differentiate fact from opinion? A site that is clearly labeled as satire or parody will have more authority than one that tries to obscure its intent.
■ Origination and transparency of the ownership: Is the site reporting first-hand information, or does it summarize or republish content from others? If the site doesn't publish original content, do they attribute the source? A first-hand account published on a personal blog could have more authority than unsourced content.

In addition to its ranking algorithms, Bing Search's general abuse/spam policies prohibit certain practices intended to manipulate or deceive the Bing Search algorithms. These policies include prohibitions intended to address the TTPs employed by malicious actors in the spread of disinformation. |

Pursuant to the Webmaster Guidelines, Bing may take action on websites employing spam tactics (such as social media schemes, keyword stuffing, malicious behavior, cloaking, link schemes, or misleading structured data markups) or that otherwise violate the Webmaster Guidelines, including by applying ranking penalties (such as demoting a website) or delisting a website from the index.

Note that it is not feasible to distinguish between general spam tactics and spam tactics employed by malicious actors specifically for the purpose of spreading disinformation. Therefore, Bing Search has not presented data on the amount of spam detected and actioned under its policies since these figures are indicative of actions taken toward spam overall and presently cannot be used to provide an accurate assessment of whether it pertains to spam used in connection with disinformation campaigns or spam used for another purpose (e.g., phishing).

In February 2023, Microsoft launched new Bing generative AI features, including an AI-enhanced web search experience that allows users to quickly and easily obtain answers to their queries through a chat experience that is "grounded" in high authority web search results ("Bing Chat"). In these new features Bing combines its traditional search functionality, including the fresh and comprehensive Bing index and its ranking algorithms and safety systems, with the capabilities of large language models, so that users can ask more complex and nuanced questions and engage in more natural conversations on search topics. Users can also use Bing Chat to generate creative content, such as code, poems, jokes, stories, and, with Bing Image Creator ("Image Creator"), create images. Chat answers are "grounded" in search results and are displayed clearly to the user giving them the opportunity to dive deeper by visiting the third-party site that the answer is derived from. Bing Chat's primary functionality is, like traditional Bing search, to provide users with links to third party content responsive to their search queries. As such, the ranking algorithms and spam/abuse policies described above continue to be Bing's primary defense against manipulation and abuse, supplemented by interventions designed specifically to address manipulation in generative AI features (e.g., "jailbreaking"). More information on how Bing integrated its search functionality into a natural language experience powered by large language models is detailed in Building the New Bing. Additional information on how Bing approached

		responsible AI in these new features is available in [The New Bing: our Approach to Responsible AI](#).

Users still cannot post or share content directly on the Bing service, even in Bing Chat or Image Creator, and thus TTP 10 is still the most relevant TTP to Bing generative AI search experiences.

While Bing Chat does not create new ways for users to share content on the platform, Bing recognizes that content generated on the Bing service could potentially be used to spread misinformation on other services. While Bing does not have the ability to monitor third party platforms for publication of content created through Bing's services, Bing has implemented safeguards to help to minimize the risk that bad actors can use Bing generative AI experiences to create mis/disinformation. In connection with these new experiences (which are discussed in more detail below at QRE 14.1.2), Bing published the [Bing Conversational Experiences and Image Creator Terms](#) ("Supplemental Terms"). The Supplemental Terms primarily address TTP Nos. 10 and 7 and advise users on what constitutes prohibited conduct and content, including attempts to create or spread misinformation or fraudulent images using the Bing platform. The Supplemental Terms prohibit users from "engag[ing] in activity that is fraudulent, false, or misleading" and "attempt[ing] to create or share content that could mislead or deceive others, including for example creation of disinformation, content enabling fraud, or deceptive impersonation." Users that violate the Supplemental Terms and its Code of Conduct may be suspended from the service. In addition, as outlined in the "Content Moderation" section of the Supplemental Terms, Bing may block certain text prompts that violate the Code of Conduct or that are likely to lead to creation of material that violates the Code of Conduct and prevents generation of text or images that are likely to run afoul of the Code of Conduct. The Supplemental Terms also provide that repeated attempts to produce prohibited content or other violations of the Code of Conduct may result in service or account suspension.

For further information as to how Bing Search implements these policies and responds to TTPs, also see QRE 14.1.2. |

| QRE 14.1.2 | LinkedIn works with numerous partners to facilitate the flow of information to tackle purveyors of disinformation, including disinformation spread by state-sponsored and institutional actors.

LinkedIn maintains an internal Trust and Safety team composed of threat investigators and intelligence personnel to address disinformation. This team works with various other internal teams, including our Artificial Intelligence modeling team, to develop leads into threat actor campaigns. The leads are then manually verified, and confirmed TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) and IOCs (Indicators of Compromise) relating to threat actors are shared with other external stakeholders, including, for example, industry peers. Any associated disinformation content is verified by our internal or external fact-checkers as needed, and coordinated inauthentic behaviours (CIBs) are also removed by our Trust and Safety team.

LinkedIn, along with its parent company, Microsoft, is heavily involved in threat exchanges. These threat exchanges take various forms, such as: 1) regular discussion amongst industry peers to discuss high-level trends and campaigns; and, 2) one-on-one engagement with individual peer companies to discuss TTPs and IOCs. This exchange of information leads to a better understanding of the incentives of sophisticated and well-funded threat actors and how they evolve their TTPs to achieve those goals, which assists us in their identification and removal.

LinkedIn always stands ready to receive and investigate any leads we receive from peers and other external stakeholders. In addition to one-on-one engagement with peers, we also consume intelligence from vendors and investigate any TTPs and IOCs made available in peer disclosures. In turn, we also regularly release information about policy-violating content on our platform in publicly available transparency reports and blog posts, including for example How We're Protecting Members From Fake Profiles, Automated Fake Account Detection, and An Update on How We Keep Members Safe. The LinkedIn Community Report also describes actions we take on content that violates our Professional Community Policies and User Agreement. It is published twice per year and covers the global | As discussed under QRE 14.1.1, TTP No. 10 tends to be the primary mechanism for manipulation and abuse in the context of search engines and is addressed through Bing's ranking systems and abuse policies (for both traditional search and generative AI features).

Blocking content in organic search results based solely on the truth or falsity of the content can raise significant concerns relating to fundamental rights of freedom of expression and the freedom to receive and impart information. Instead of blocking access to content to address these TTPs, Bing Search focuses on ranking its organic search results so that trusted, authoritative news and information appears first, and provides tools to help its users evaluate the trustworthiness of certain sites and ensure they are not misled or harmed by the content that appears in search results.

During the Reporting Period, Bing Search has taken actions to promote high authority, high quality content and thereby reduce the impact of misinformation appearing in Bing Search results. This includes Bing Search's continued improvement of its ranking algorithms to ensure that the most authoritative, relevant content is returned at the top of search results, regular review and actioning of disinformation threat intelligence, partnership with fact-checking and media literacy organizations, contributing to and supporting the research community, and implementation and enforcement of clear policies concerning the use of manipulative tactics on Bing Search, among other initiatives described elsewhere in this report.

Although the Bing Search algorithm endeavors to prioritize relevance, quality, and credibility in all scenarios, in some cases Bing Search identifies a threat that undermines the efficacy of its algorithms. While we typically do not remove such content entirely from our index, we apply algorithmic interventions so that users without a clear intent to find such information are protected from accidentally being presented with harmful or misleading information. When this happens, Bing Search employs "defensive search" strategies and interventions to counteract threats and TTPs in accordance with its trustworthy search principles (which are discussed in further detail in the "Our Approach to Search" overview of How Bing Delivers Search. "Defensive search interventions" may include algorithmic interventions (such as quality and credibility boosts or demotions of a website), restricting autosuggest or related search terms to avoid directing users to problematic |

detection of fake accounts, spam and scams, content violations and copyright infringements. The most recent reporting period covered 1 July to 31 December 2022.

queries, and manual interventions for individual reported issues or broader areas more prone to misinformation or disinformation (e.g., elections, pharmaceutical drugs, or COVID-19). Bing actively monitors manipulation trends in identified high risk areas and deploys mitigation methods as needed to ensure users are provided with high quality, high authority search results.

In addition to defensive search, Bing Search regularly monitors for violations of its Webmaster Guidelines, including attempts to manipulate the Bing Search algorithm through prohibited practices such as cloaking, link spamming, keyword stuffing, and phishing. Bing Search dedicates meaningful resources to maintaining the integrity of the platform, promoting high authority, relevant results, and reducing spam (including spam aimed at distributing low authority information and manipulative content). Bing Search utilizes a combination of human intervention and AI-driven analysis to regularly review, detect, and address spam tactics occurring on Bing Search. When Bing Search detects websites deploying manipulative techniques or engaging in spam tactics, those websites may incur ranking penalties or be removed from the Bing Search index altogether.

Microsoft also works to identify and track nation-state information operations targeting democracies across the world and works with trusted third-party partners, including NewsGuard, Global Democracy Index (GDI), and Spanish-language news agency EFE, to provide early indicators of narratives, hashtags, or information operations that can be leveraged to inform early detection and defensive search strategies. Through Microsoft's Democracy Forward team and the Microsoft Threat Assessment Center (MTAC), Microsoft also offers mediums for election authorities, including in the EU and EEA Member States, to have lines of communication with Microsoft to identify possible foreign information operations targeting elections.

The above measures also apply to Bing's generative AI experiences. Responses provided in Bing's chat feature are "grounded" in search results, which are based on the same ranking algorithms and moderation infrastructure that are used by Bing's traditional web search, and as such benefit from Bing's longstanding safety infrastructure described above.

Nonetheless, Bing recognizes that generative AI technology may also raise new risks and possibilities of harm that are not present in traditional web search. As a result, Bing supplemented its existing threat identification and mitigation processes with additional risk assessment and mitigation processes based on Microsoft's Responsible AI program.

Microsoft's Responsible AI program is designed to identify potential harms, measure their propensity to occur, and build mitigations to address them. Guided by our Responsible AI Standard, we sought to identify, measure, and mitigate potential harms and misuse of new Bing generative AI experiences while securing the transformative and beneficial uses that the new experience provides. In particular, Bing has implemented additional filtering and classifiers to prevent chat responses from returning what Bing considers "low authority" content as part of an answer and to help address impermissible content, behaviours, and other TTPs (namely TTP 7) that could potentially be used to create or spread misinformation.

Below are several examples of our iterative approach to identify, measure, and mitigate potential harms, including the spread of misinformation. Additional information, which is updated regularly, can be found in The New Bing: Our approach to responsible AI.

- **Grounded Results.** Bing Chat is grounded in web search results. This means that we center the response provided to a user's query on high-ranking content from the web, and we provide links to websites so that users can learn more and evaluate the credibility and information presented by reviewing the source material. Bing works to ensure that it provides high quality responses to search queries by prioritizing web content that is high in quality and credibility, and freshness. We describe Bing's approach to ranking, including an overview of the main parameters of ranking, in more detail in How Bing Delivers Search Results.

- **Significant pre-launch testing.** Before launching Bing Chat or Image Creator, Microsoft conducted extensive "red team" testing. A multidisciplinary team of experts conducted numerous rounds of testing to evaluate how well the system responded when pressed to produce harmful responses, surface potential avenues for misuse, and identify capabilities and limitations. This testing informed our understanding of risks, helped us

better understand how the system could be exploited by adversarial actors, and contributed to early mitigation strategies for Bing Chat and Image Creator. Non-adversarial stress-testers also extensively evaluated new Bing features for shortcomings and vulnerabilities. Post-release, Bing's AI experiences are integrated into the Bing engineering organization's existing production measurement and testing infrastructure. For example, red team testers from different regions and backgrounds continuously and systematically attempt to compromise the system, and their findings are used to expand the datasets that Bing uses for improving the system.

- Preview period, phased release via waitlist. Microsoft intentionally limited the number of people with access at the initial launch of these new features in order to mitigate emerging issues before broader release. Although Bing removed the waitlist requirement in May 2023, Bing continues to make changes to the Bing Chat and Image Creator regularly to improve product performance, update existing mitigations, and implement new mitigations in response to our learnings based on real-world usage of the product.

- **Classifiers and Metaprompting Interventions:** Bing has created special mitigations in the form of "classifiers" and "metaprompting" to help reduce the risk of certain harms and misuse of Bing Chat and Bing Image Creator since large language models (LLMs) can potentially generate problematic content. *Classifiers* classify text to flag different types of potentially harmful content in search queries, chat prompts, or generated responses. Bing uses AI-based classifiers and content filters, which apply to all search results and relevant features; it also designed additional prompt classifiers and content filters specifically to address possible harms raised by new generative AI features such as Bing Chat and Bing Image Creator. Flags lead to potential mitigations, such as not returning generated content to the user, diverting the user to a different topic, or redirecting the user to traditional search. *Metaprompting* involves giving instructions to the model to guide its behavior, including so that the system behaves in accordance with Microsoft's AI Principles and user expectations.

- **Image Creator Provenance Tools.** Microsoft also makes it clear that Bing Image Creator's images are generated by AI and includes a Bing icon in the bottom left corner of each image to indicate that the image was created

		using Bing Image Creator. Providing clear indications of image provenance helps reduce the risk of deepfakes (TTP No. 7) and helps users identify when an image was generated with the assistance of Image Creator. As content provenance technology continues to improve, Bing anticipates making additional improvements to this feature in the future. - **Expanded and Prominent Reporting Functionality.** Bing's generative AI experiences build on existing Bing tools that allow users to submit feedback and report their concerns, which are then reviewed by Microsoft's operations teams. Bing has made it easy for users to report problematic content they encounter while using generative AI features in Bing by including a "Feedback" portal on the footer of every Bing page, with direct links to its "Report a Concern" tool. Bing's operational processes have also expanded to accommodate the features within the new Bing experience, for example, by updating the Report a Concern process to include bespoke reporting forms for generative AI experiences. - **Operations and incident response.** We also use Bing's ongoing monitoring and operational processes to address when Bing Chat or Image Creator receives signals or receives a report indicating possible misuse or violations of the Terms of Use or Code of Conduct. - **Cooperation with Industry Partners.** The third-party content that grounds Bing Chat's answers relies on the same ranking algorithms and defensive interventions that power traditional search, including reliance on signals of page authority that Bing receives from its third party partners, such as GDI, NewsGuard (a signatory to the Code), and fact-checks using the ClaimReview protocol. For example, Bing Chat uses NewsGuard trustworthiness ratings as one of the indicators of trustworthiness of websites to help users access relevant, reliable, and high-authority content in Bing Chat. More information about NewsGuard integrations with Bing's new generative experiences is available at "How Microsoft Uses NewsGuard to Support its Trusted, Transparent Technology - NewsGuard." Our approach to identifying, measuring, and mitigating harms will continue to evolve as we learn more, and we are already making improvements based on feedback gathered during the preview period. See also response to QRE 14.1.1.

Measure 14.2	LinkedIn	Bing Search
QRE 14.2.1	LinkedIn's Professional Community Policies prohibit misinformation and misinformation is removed from the LinkedIn platform. Where LinkedIn removes such content pursuant to our false and misleading content policies, LinkedIn notifies members of the action taken. Members that repeatedly post misinformation are permanently restricted. State-sponsored attempts to post misinformation, if any, are removed. Further, LinkedIn's professional focus shapes the type of content we see on platform. People tend to say things differently when their colleagues and employer are watching. Accordingly, our members don't tend to use LinkedIn to engage in the mass dissemination of misinformation, and bad actors generally need to create fake accounts to peddle misinformation. To ensure their content reaches a large audience, bad actors need to either connect with real members or post content that real members will like—both of which are hard to achieve on LinkedIn given our professional focus. The mass dissemination of false information, as well as artificial traffic and engagement, therefore, requires the mass creation of fake accounts, which we have various defences to prevent and limit. To evolve to the ever-changing threat landscape, our team continually invests in new technologies for combating inauthentic behaviour on the platform. We are investing in artificial intelligence technologies such as advanced network algorithms that detect communities of fake accounts through similarities in their content and behaviour, computer vision and natural language processing algorithms for detecting AI-generated elements in fake profiles, anomaly detection of risky behaviours, and deep learning models for detecting sequences of activity that are associated with abusive automation. As noted in our most recent global Transparency Report, between July and December, LinkedIn blocked or removed approximately 58.1 million fake accounts,. Our automated defenses	The Webmaster Guidelines – and related defensive search and spam interventions – are global policies that are enforced globally by Bing Search, including in EU Member States. Websites that appear in Bing search results (in traditional search or in generative AI chat) are not hosted by Bing Search and, as such, Bing Search has limited information about the hosting location of these third-party websites. When addressing spam activity, Bing Search takes action at the global level (including for new Bing AI features) to benefit Bing Search users in all countries, which necessarily include EU Member States. Bing Search's defensive search interventions are also applied at a global level (encompassing all EU member states) and automatically applied to queries searched in all EU languages. Metrics on defensive search interventions are provided in SLI 14.2.1. See also responses to QRE 14.1.1-2.

blocked 87.4% of the fake accounts we stopped during that period, with the remaining 12.6% stopped by our manual investigations and restrictions. 99.6% of the fake accounts were stopped proactively, before a member report.

LinkedIn also acts vigilantly to maintain the integrity of all accounts and to ward off bot and false account activity (including "deep fakes"). LinkedIn enforces the policies in its User Agreement prohibiting the use of "bots or other automated methods to access the Services, add or download contacts, send or redirect messages" through:

- Having a dedicated Anti-Abuse team to create the tools to enforce this prohibition
- Using automated systems detect and block automated activity
- Imposing hard limits on certain categories of activity commonly engaged in by bad actors
- Detecting whether members have installed known prohibited automation software
- Conducting manual investigation and restriction of accounts engaged in automated activity
- Partnering with the broader Microsoft organisation to develop technological solutions for protecting content provenance and identification of deep fakes
- Investing in and using AI to detect coordinated inauthentic activity and communities of fake accounts through similarities in their content and behaviour
- Using third party fact checking sites during the human content review process when suspected deepfakes are flagged or found on the platform
- "Hashing" known instances of deepfake content, which can be used to find copies of the same content on our platform

LinkedIn has reported available metrics at SLI 14.2.1 in respect of the following TTPs:

	– TTP 1: Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts) – TTP 2: Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, up votes, comments) – TTP 3: Use of fake followers or subscribers – TTP 4: Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains LinkedIn has also reported metrics for SLI 14.2.2 in respect of TTP 1 and TTP 4. LinkedIn has focused its efforts on TTPs 1-4 because, as a real-identity professional network, the harm on LinkedIn is conducted through fake accounts. Our real members know that the content they post is viewed by their colleagues, managers, and potential business partners, and therefore they do not knowingly post misinformation. With respect to the remaining TTPs, LinkedIn is unable to reasonably ascertain the intent or provenance of such content. As discussed above, disinformation is not prevalent on LinkedIn due to the professional context of the platform. Distribution of such content through fake accounts is further hampered due to the need to create connections between the fake account and the real member. In the rare instances that such misinformation is spread through fake accounts, due to the adversarial nature of this activity, publicly disclosing details regarding the threat actor's TTPs would hurt our ability to fight against this activity. For example, reporting that vulnerable recipients were not targeted may incentivize the targeting of such recipients. LinkedIn has and will continue to evaluate what additional metrics it could potentially include in future reporting in light of how LinkedIn's services function and are used.	

LinkedIn										
SLI 14.2.1 – SLI 14.2.4										
TTP 1	The table below addresses TTP 1: "Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts)." SLI 14.2.1 reports the number of fake accounts that LinkedIn prevented from being created or restricted between 1 January - 30 June 2023, broken out by EEA Member State. The fake accounts reported are attributed to EEA Member States based on the IP address used during registration of the account. 'Number of instances of identified TTPs' and 'Number of actions taken by type' are identical given LinkedIn blocked the registration attempt or restricted the account in all instances. SLI 14.2.2. reports the number of EEA accounts that connected to or followed the fake accounts in SLI 14.2.1 between 1 January – 30 June, 2023. For example, the 79,401 fake accounts reported for Austria had a total of 8,043 EEA accounts connect to or follow them between 1 January and 30 June, 2023. Whether an account qualifies as an EEA account is based on the IP address used during registration of the account. Please note that the metrics provided below are total numbers and do not imply that these fake accounts were engaging in posting misinformation or disinformation. We have not reported metrics associated with this TTP where, for example, there is no meaningful metric to report (e.g., metrics for after the TTP in question, given LinkedIn removes detected misinformation and fake accounts from our platform) or LinkedIn does not have a reasonable means to compute the requested metrics.									
	SLI 14.2.1		**SLI 14.2.2**	**SLI 14.2.3**			**SLI 14.2.4**			
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs The number of fake accounts LinkedIn prevented or restricted between 1 January – 30 June 2023	Nr of actions taken by type The number of fake accounts LinkedIn prevented or restricted between 1 January – 30 June 2023	Views/ impressions before action The number of EEA accounts that connected to or followed the fake accounts between 1 January – 30 June 2023.	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Member States										
Austria	79,401	79,401	5,292							
Belgium	85,189	85,189	9,793							

Bulgaria	117,651	117,651	5,546						
Croatia	42,091	42,091	2,435						
Cyprus	14,945	14,945	2,134						
Czech Republic	606,570	606,570	7,882						
Denmark	96,644	96,644	5,755						
Estonia	23,971	23,971	985						
Finland	43,752	43,752	3,202						
France	1,258,234	1,258,234	134,848						
Germany	898,221	898,221	72,820						
Greece	78,557	78,557	4,917						
Hungary	56,644	56,644	2,051						
Ireland	52,729	52,729	5,429						
Italy	443,082	443,082	57,829						
Latvia	37,864	37,864	1,193						
Lithuania	82,560	82,560	2,840						
Luxembourg	10,064	10,064	963						
Malta	11,926	11,926	527						
Netherlands	435,863	435,863	30,731						
Poland	535,408	535,408	26,576						
Portugal	109,924	109,924	15,259						
Romania	909,630	909,630	9,124						
Slovakia	23,164	23,164	1,365						
Slovenia	29,502	29,502	1,050						
Spain	514,060	514,060	48,141						
Sweden	114,982	114,982	7,993						
Iceland	20,521	20,521	536						
Liechtenstein	448	448	63						
Norway	88,195	88,195	3,195						
Total EU	**6,712,628**	**6,712,628**	**466,680**						
Total EEA	**6,821,792**	**6,821,792**	**470,474**						

| TTP 2 | The table below addresses TTP 2: "Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, up votes, comments)." The table reports the number of fake accounts reported in TTP 1 SLI 14.2.1 that reacted to, commented on, or shared (collectively, "engaged with") a feed post between 1 January – 30 June 2023.

The numbers of fake accounts reported below are a subset of the fake accounts reported in TTP 1 SLI 14.2.1 that engaged with a feed post between 1 January - 30 June 2023. For example, of the 79,401 fake accounts that LinkedIn prevented from being created or restricted between 1 January – 30 2023 in Austria (as reported in TTP 1 SLI 14.2.1), 1,718 of those accounts engaged with a feed post between 1 January – 30 June 2023.

Please note that the metrics provided below are total numbers and do not imply that these fake accounts were engaging in posting misinformation or disinformation.

We have not reported metrics associated with this TTP where, for example, there is no meaningful metric to report (e.g., metrics for after the TTP in question, given LinkedIn removes detected misinformation and fake accounts from our platform) or LinkedIn does not have a reasonable means to compute the requested metrics. |

	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs

The number of fake accounts reported in TTP 1 SLI 14.1.1 that engaged with a feed post between 1 January – 30 June 2023 | Nr of actions taken by type | Views/ impressions before action | Interaction/ engagement before action | Views/ impressions after action | Interaction/ engagement after action | Penetration and impact on genuine users | Trends on targeted audiences | Trends on narratives used | TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service | Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service) | Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service) |
Member States												
Austria	1,718											
Belgium	2,172											
Bulgaria	1,482											

Croatia	520											
Cyprus	852											
Czech Republic	3,330											
Denmark	1,232											
Estonia	248											
Finland	836											
France	28,227											
Germany	23,049											
Greece	1,168											
Hungary	515											
Ireland	1,442											
Italy	21,803											
Latvia	299											
Lithuania	918											
Luxembourg	206											
Malta	106											
Netherlands	9,552											
Poland	12,775											
Portugal	4,229											
Romania	1,737											
Slovakia	334											
Slovenia	160											
Spain	16,808											
Sweden	1,990											
Iceland	76											
Liechtenstein	12											
Norway	761											
Total EU	**137,708**											
Total EEA	**138,557**											

TTP 3	The table below addresses TTP 3: "Use of fake followers or subscribers." The table reports the number of fake accounts reported in TTP 1 SLI 14.2.1 that followed a LinkedIn profile or page between 1 January – 30 June 2023. The numbers of fake accounts reported below are a subset of the fake accounts reported in TTP 1 SLI 14.2.1 that followed a LinkedIn profile or page between 1 January – 30 June 2023. For example, of the 79,401 fake accounts that LinkedIn prevented from being created or restricted between 1 January – 30 June 2023 in Austria (as reported in TTP 1 SLI 14.2.1), 14,721 of those accounts followed a LinkedIn profile or page between 1 January – 30 June 2023 (as reported below). Please note that the metrics provided below are total numbers and do not imply that these fake accounts were engaging in posting misinformation or disinformation We have not reported metrics associated with this TTP where, for example, there is no meaningful metric to report (e.g., metrics for after the TTP in question, given LinkedIn removes detected misinformation and fake accounts from our platform) or LinkedIn does not have a reasonable means to compute the requested metrics.											
	SLI 14.2.1		**SLI 14.2.2**				**SLI 14.2.3**			**SLI 14.2.4**		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs The number of fake accounts reported in TTP 1 SLI 14.1.1 that followed a LinkedIn profile or page between 1 January – 30 June 2023	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction / engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction / engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction / engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction /engagement on the service)
Member States												
Austria	14,721											

Belgium	10,110											
Bulgaria	27,760											
Croatia	4,080											
Cyprus	3,951											
Czech Republic	20,923											
Denmark	7,208											
Estonia	3,732											
Finland	5,370											
France	163,561											
Germany	141,924											
Greece	6,976											
Hungary	4,901											
Ireland	6,716											
Italy	103,775											
Latvia	2,567											
Lithuania	9,727											
Luxembourg	1,247											
Malta	684											
Netherlands	67,960											
Poland	97,325											
Portugal	19,793											
Romania	19,421											
Slovakia	2,756											
Slovenia	1,470											
Spain	73,429											
Sweden	13,133											
Iceland	398											
Liechtenstein	64											
Norway	3,637											
Total EU	**835,220**											
Total EEA	**839,319**											

| TTP 4 | The table below addresses TTP 4: "Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, I, or domains." SLI 14.2.1 reports the number of LinkedIn pages or groups that the fake accounts reported in TTP 1 SLI 14.2.1 created between 1 January – 30 June 2023.

The numbers of LinkedIn pages or groups created reported below are based on the population of fake accounts reported in TTP 1 SLI 14.2.1. For example, the 79,401 fake accounts that LinkedIn prevented from being created or restricted between 1 January – 30 December 2023 in Austria (as reported in TTP 1 SLI 14.2.1) created 32 LinkedIn pages or groups between 1 January – 30 June 2023 (as reported below).

SLI 14.2.2 reports the number of accounts in the EEA that joined or followed the pages or groups reported in TTP 4 SLI 14.2.1 between 1 January – 30 June 2023. For example, the 32 pages and groups reported for Austria in TTP4 SLI 14.2.1 had a total of 494 EEA accounts join or follow between 1 January – 30 June 2023. Whether an account qualifies as an EEA account is based on the IP address used during registration of the account.

Please note that the metrics provided below are total numbers and do not imply that these fake accounts were engaging in posting misinformation or disinformation.

We have not reported metrics associated with this TTP where, for example, there is no meaningful metric to report (e.g., metrics for after the TTP in question, given LinkedIn removes detected misinformation and fake accounts from our platform) or LinkedIn does not have a reasonable means to compute the requested metrics. |

	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2					SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs The number of LinkedIn pages or groups created between 1 January – 30 June 2023 by the fake accounts reported in	Nr of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action The number of accounts in the EEA that joined or followed the pages and groups reported in TTP 4 SLI 14.2.1 between 1	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction /engagement on the service)

	TTP 1 SLI 14.1.1.		January – 30 June, 2023									
Member States												
Austria	32		494									
Belgium	48		1,114									
Bulgaria	48		237									
Croatia	15		209									
Cyprus	12		207									
Czech Republic	49		349									
Denmark	25		282									
Estonia	8		65									
Finland	25		102									
France	651		10,975									
Germany	362		2,742									
Greece	53		2,106									
Hungary	18		186									
Ireland	37		525									
Italy	282		4,301									
Latvia	9		34									
Lithuania	15		98									
Luxembourg	10		145									
Malta	8		144									
Netherlands	197		2,816									
Poland	138		2,002									
Portugal	73		4,116									
Romania	69		563									
Slovakia	10		80									
Slovenia	5		73									
Spain	405		17,849									
Sweden	47		372									
Iceland	3		30									

Liechtenstein	0		2
Norway	15		176
Total EU	**2,651**		**52,186**
Total EEA	**2,669**		**52,394**

TTP 5	LinkedIn notes that per the Integrity of Services Sub-Group, SLI 14.2.1 is Theoretically fit for purpose, SLI 14.2.2 is not fit for purpose, SLI 14.2.3 is Optional/ Alternative and SLI 14.2.4 is Partially fit for purpose. However, LinkedIn has not reported metrics associated with this TTP 5 (Account hijacking or impersonation) for the reasons explained in our response to QRE 14.2.1.

TTP 6	LinkedIn notes that per the Integrity of Services Sub-Group, SLI 14.2.1 is Theoretically fit for purpose, SLI 14.2.2 is not fit for purpose, SLI 14.2.3 is Optional/ Alternative and SLI 14.2.4 is Partially fit for purpose. However, LinkedIn has not reported metrics associated with this TTP 6 (Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g. via personalized advertising, location spoofing or obfuscation)) for the reasons explained in our response to QRE 14.2.1.

TTP 7	LinkedIn notes that per the Integrity of Services Sub-Group, SLI 14.2.1, SLI 14.2.2 and SLI 14.2.4 are Theoretically fit for purpose and SLI 14.2.3 is Optional/ Alternative. However, LinkedIn has not reported metrics associated with this TTP 7 (Deploy deceptive manipulated media ("deep fakes", "cheap fakes"…)) for the reasons explained in our response to QRE 14.2.1.

TTP 8	LinkedIn notes that per the Integrity of Services Sub-Group, SLI 14.2.1 is Theoretically fit for purpose, SLI 14.2.2 is Not fit for purpose, SLI 14.2.3 is Optional/ Alternative and SLI 14.2.4 is Partially fit for purpose. However, LinkedIn has not reported metrics associated with this TTP 8 (Use "hack and leak" operation (which may or may not include doctored content)) for the reasons explained in our response to QRE 14.2.1.

TTP 9	LinkedIn notes that per the Integrity of Services Sub-Group, SLI 14.2.1 is Theoretically fit for purpose, SLI 14.2.2 is not fit for purpose, SLI 14.2.3 is Optional/ Alternative and SLI 14.2.4 is Partially fit for purpose. However, LinkedIn has not reported metrics associated with this TTP 9 (Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers)) for the reasons explained in our response to QRE 14.2.1.

TTP 10	LinkedIn notes that per the Integrity of Services Sub-Group, SLI 14.2.1 is Theoretically fit for purpose, SLI 14.2.2 is not fit for purpose, SLI 14.2.3 is Optional/ Alternative and SLI 14.2.4 is Partially fit for purpose. However, LinkedIn has not reported metrics associated with this TTP 10 (Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers) for the reasons explained in our response to QRE 14.2.1.

TTP 11	LinkedIn notes that per the Integrity of Services Sub-Group, SLI 14.2.1, SLI 14.2.2 and SLI 14.2.4 are Theoretically fit for purpose, and SLI 14.2.3 is Optional/ Alternative. However, LinkedIn has not reported metrics associated with this TTP 11 (Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers) for the reasons explained in our response to QRE 14.2.1. LinkedIn also notes that where members share content in an exchange for value (including monetary payment, endorsements, free products or services, or other benefit), they must label the post as a brand partnership and comply with our Advertising Policies and applicable local laws. This Help Center article provides details on how to label a post as a brand partnership.

TTP 12	LinkedIn notes that per the Integrity of Services Sub-Group, SLI 14.2.1 is Theoretically fit for purpose, SLI 14.2.2 is not fit for purpose, SLI 14.2.3 is Optional/ Alternative and SLI 14.2.4 is Partially fit for purpose. However, LinkedIn has not reported metrics associated with this TTP 12 (Coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts) for the reasons explained in our response to QRE 14.2.1.

Bing Search	
SLI 14.2.1 – SLI 14.2.4	
TTP 10	This Section addresses TTP No. 10 ("Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers"), which is the TTP primarily applicable to Bing Search (including generative AI search experiences). For SLI 14.1.2 – In response to this SLI, Bing Search is providing global data on defensive search interventions employed to counteract threats and TTPs on the Bing platform. This response includes the following data categories: • **"New DSI"** reflects the net new number of queries treated with defensive search interventions during the Reporting Period (across all of Bing) since the preceding reporting period. Although Member State reporting is requested, because Bing Search takes defensive search actions globally (rather than on a per country basis), each defensive search action would necessarily be implemented in an EU member state, and it is not feasible to provide Member State reporting for globally actioned measures. • **"AutoSuggest DSI"** reflects the number of search query suggestions that were suppressed for queries entered by users in the EEA (including traditional web search and Bing Chat) during the Reporting Period. • **"Bing Chat DSI"** reflects the total number of user queries Bing applied defensive search interventions to within Bing Chat during the Reporting Period. In simple terms, this reflects the number of user queries in Bing Chat where responses (i.e., chat output) to the queries were treated with defensive search interventions. Although Member State reporting is requested, because Bing Search takes defensive search actions globally (rather

than on a per country basis), each defensive search action would necessarily be implemented in an EU member state, and it is not feasible to provide Member State reporting for globally actioned measures.

For SLI 14.2.2 – Bing cannot provide data on interaction or engagement, as Bing does not allow users to "like" or "share" content within Bing and this SLI metric appears oriented to social or sharing platforms. Bing also cannot provide "before and after" data due to the preventative nature of search interventions and query-driven nature of web search. Nonetheless, below Bing Search has provided user impressions for queries that were treated with "defensive search" interventions across all of Bing Search (inclusive of traditional web search and Bing Chat) during the Reporting Period.

- **"Unique Queries DSI"** reflects the total number of unique queries searched by users in the EEA that were treated with defensive search interventions during the Reporting Period.
- "**DSI Query Impressions"** reflects the number of impressions for unique queries treated with defensive search interventions that appeared to users in the EEA during the Reporting Period.
- Please note that because Bing Chat launched as a limited preview in early Spring 2023, only data for impressions for Bing Chat from April 2023 to June 2023 is included. However, the data is inclusive of the full Reporting Period with respect to defensive search interventions employed for traditional web search on Bing.

For SLI 14.2.3 – This SLI is not applicable to search engines, as Bing Search is not an online platform that allows for user hosted content or public sharing of user generated content with other users. User accounts in the manner contemplated under this provision are not available in search (i.e. registered user accounts are not capable of amplifying creating or amplifying content as one may through a social media network).

For SLI 14.2.4 – This SLI is also not applicable to search engines for the above reasons

	SLI 14.2.1			SLI 14.2.2		
	Nr of actions taken by type **New DSI**	Nr of actions taken by type **Autosuggest DSI**	Nr of actions taken by type **Bing Chat DSI**	**Unique Queries DSI**	**DSI Query Impressions**	Interaction/ engagement before action **N/A**
Member States						
Austria		479,847		77,078	1,234,003	
Belgium		786,633		93,344	1,206,344	
Bulgaria		2,293		195	490	
Croatia		1,266		60	143	
Cyprus		533		63	102	
Czech Republic		6,039		355	719	
Denmark		247,415		23,616	344,399	
Estonia		712		73	118	
Finland		188,861		19,389	233,330	

France		3,313,198		239,889	20,609,990	
Germany		4,916,370		401,572	13,380,487	
Greece		2,616		141	622	
Hungary		3,852		222	422	
Ireland		224,884		59,226	622,875	
Italy		1,761,178		105,119	3,312,891	
Latvia		863		98	150	
Lithuania		887		118	167	
Luxembourg		395		38	49	
Malta		213		96	138	
Netherlands		1,125,570		102,428	1,654,230	
Poland		928,609		85,056	2,035,150	
Portugal		349,928		46,902	814,907	
Romania		3,655		258	716	
Slovakia		1,679		121	233	
Slovenia		553		42	76	
Spain		1,473,163		138,087	10,159,352	
Sweden		545,113		58,259	810,042	
Iceland		1,617		19	22	
Liechtenstein		18		3	3	
Norway		559,312		37,337	451,592	
Total EU		**16,366,325**		**1,451,845**	**56,422,145**	
Total EEA		**16,927,272**		**1,489,204**	**56,873,762**	
Total Global	**619,700**		**7.167M**			

Measure 14.3	LinkedIn	Bing Search
QRE 14.3.1	The relevant Taskforce Subgroup has considered the list of TTPs adopted in the second half of 2022 (and reported on in Microsoft's Baseline Report published in February 2023) as being fit for purpose for the current reporting cycle. LinkedIn reiterates the need for flexibility amongst different types of services to address TTPs that are most relevant to their platforms. The list can be consulted below:	The relevant Taskforce Subgroup has considered the list of TTPs adopted in the second half of 2022 (and reported on in Microsoft's Baseline Report published in February 2023) as being fit for purpose for the current reporting cycle. The list can be consulted below.

The following TTPs pertain to the creation of assets for the purpose of a disinformation campaign, and to ways to make these assets seem credible: • 1. Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts) • 2. Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, up votes, comments) • 3. Use of fake followers or subscribers • 4. Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains • 5. Account hijacking or impersonation The following TTPs pertain to the dissemination of content created in the context of a disinformation campaign, which may or may not include some forms of targeting or attempting to silence opposing views. Relevant TTPs include: • 6. Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g. via personalized advertising, location spoofing or obfuscation) • 7. Deploy deceptive manipulated media (e.g. "deep fakes", "cheap fakes"…) • 8. Use "hack and leak" operation (which may or may not include doctored content) • 9. Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers) • 10. Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers • 11. Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers • 12. Coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts Further, as noted above, the relevant Taskforce Subgroup has considered whether the SLIs for each of these TTPs are fit for purpose and classified each SLI as either Theoretically fit for purpose, Not fit for purpose, Partially fit for purpose or Optional /Alternative.	However, as noted in QRE 14.1.1 and 14.1.2, many of these TTPs are inapplicable to or irrelevant to search engines. Bing reiterates the need for flexibility amongst different types of services signatories to address TTPs that are most relevant to their platforms. The following TTPs pertain to the creation of assets for the purpose of a disinformation campaign, and to ways to make these assets seem credible: • 1. Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts) • 2. Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, up votes, comments) • 3. Use of fake followers or subscribers • 4. Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains • 5. Account hijacking or impersonation The following TTPs pertain to the dissemination of content created in the context of a disinformation campaign, which may or may not include some forms of targeting or attempting to silence opposing views. Relevant TTPs include: • 6. Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g. via personalized advertising, location spoofing or obfuscation) • 7. Deploy deceptive manipulated media (e.g. "deep fakes", "cheap fakes"…) • 8. Use "hack and leak" operation (which may or may not include doctored content) • 9. Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers) • 10. Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers • 11. Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers • 12. Coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts

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IV. Integrity of Services			
Commitment 15 Relevant Signatories that develop or operate AI systems and that disseminate AI-generated and manipulated content through their services (e.g. deep fakes) commit to take into consideration the transparency obligations and the list of manipulative practices prohibited under the proposal for Artificial Intelligence Act.			
	C.15	**M 15.1**	**M 15.2**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**

	LinkedIn	Bing Search
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New Implementation Measures LinkedIn published its Responsible AI Principles that we use to guide our AI work, and which are aligned with Microsoft's leadership in Responsible AI. Additionally, we published how we've put these principles into practice with respect to three recently launched Generative AI products – Collaborative Articles, Profile Writing Suggestions, and AI-powered job descriptions (note that AI-powered job descriptions are currently only available in the U.S.). LinkedIn augmented its existing cross-disciplinary privacy, security, and safety review process for new products and initiatives, with	New Implementation Measures In connection with the launch of new Bing generative AI services, Bing published Supplemental Terms and a Code of Conduct and has implemented a number of safeguards to help proactively address, prevent and mitigate harms arising from potential misuse of these generative AI search experiences, including red-team testing, enhanced reporting, and the use of classifiers and metaprompt interventions. With respect to Bing Image Creator, Bing has implemented improved watermarking and content provenance measures, which are discussed further below.

	additional considerations to evaluate and address risks associated with generative AI, such as algorithmic bias.	
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures LinkedIn will continue to assess its policies and services and to update them as warranted.	Planned Implementation Measures Bing is regularly reviewing and evaluating its policies and practices related to existing and new Bing features and adjusts and updates policies as needed. Bing's existing programs are already designed to address these issues, but Bing regularly evaluates the efficacy of its measures and endeavors to improve and work to respond quickly to new threats or issues as they arise.

Measure 15.1	LinkedIn	Bing Search
QRE 15.1.1	During the reporting period, LinkedIn launched a number of products and features that disseminate, and enable LinkedIn members to disseminate, AI-generated content. To mitigate the potential safety risks posed by such features, LinkedIn has augmented existing policies and procedures to ensure that our AI systems, including such new features are consistent with LinkedIn's Responsible AI Principles and applicable law. 1. Privacy and Security – LinkedIn has an existing process for assessing the privacy and security of new products and initiatives, which has been augmented to recognize particular risks arising from the use of generative AI. With respect to generative AI, additional considerations include being thoughtful about the personal data used in prompt engineering (e.g., Collaborative Articles are focused on professional knowledge topics and not on individuals) and ensuring that	Since its last report, Bing has launched Bing Chat and Bing Image Creator, AI-enhanced web search experiences (see further detail at QREs 14.1.1 and 14.1.2.). Microsoft takes its commitment to responsible AI seriously. In addition to the safeguards noted earlier in this report and discussed thoroughly at The new Bing: Our approach to Responsible AI, Microsoft has a robust Responsible AI program and has implemented a number of measures and policies to help counter attempts to manipulate AI systems that generate content. New Bing generative AI experiences, including Bing Chat and Image Creator, have been developed in line with Microsoft's AI Principles, Microsoft's Responsible AI Standard, and in partnership with responsible AI experts

members maintain full control of their profiles (e.g., Profile Writing Suggestions are not added to a member's profile without that member reviewing and editing it for themselves).

2. Safety – LinkedIn has an existing process for assessing the safety of new products and initiatives, that has been augmented to recognize particular risks with generative AI. New features are carefully ramped to members and rate limits are introduced to reduce the likelihood of abuse. Limiting access allows us to watch for issues that may arise. We aim to proactively identify how prompts could be misused to then mitigate potential abuse (e.g., for Collaborative Articles we assessed prompts in terms of both what to write about and how to write them, which enables us to avoid outputs that could contain problematic content). We engage in proactive content moderation (all AI generated content is held to the same professional bar as other content on the LinkedIn platform), through applying content moderation filters to both the member inputs for prompts and the output. We also engage in reactive content moderation, through provision of member tools to report policy-violating issues with the content. Additional features have been added to these tools that address generative AI-specific issues such as 'hallucinations.'

3. Fairness and Inclusion – LinkedIn has a cross functional team that designs policy and process to proactively mitigate the risk that AI tools, including generative AI tools, perpetuate societal biases or facilitate discrimination. To promote fairness and inclusion, we target two key areas - content subject and communities. With respect to content subjects, prompts are engineered to reduce the risk of biased content, blocklists are leveraged to replace harmful terms with neutral terms, and member feedback is monitored to learn and improve. With respect to communities, in addition to a focus on problematic content like stereotypes, we are working to expand the member communities that are served by our generative AI tools.   Additionally, LinkedIn continues to invest in methodologies and techniques to more broadly ensure algorithmic fairness.

4. Transparency – LinkedIn is committed to being transparent with members. With respect to generative AI products and features, our goal is to educate members about the technology and our

across the company, including Microsoft's Office of Responsible AI, our engineering teams, Microsoft Research, and the AI Ethics and Effects in Engineering and Research (AETHER) committee. All Microsoft processes, programs, or tools utilizing AI, including Bing Search, must adhere to Microsoft's Responsible AI Standard and undertake "Impact Assessments" to help ensure responsible use of AI-influenced algorithms and processes for any new product features.   More details are located at Microsoft's Responsible AI hub.

In addition to the measures noted at QREs 14.1.1.2 and 14.1.2 (including significant pre-launch testing, launching via a limited preview period and phased release, the use of classifiers and metaprompting, defensive search interventions, enhanced reporting functionality, and increased operations and incident response), Microsoft has incorporated the following safeguards and policies for countering prohibited manipulative practices for AI systems.

To help facilitate safe use of Bing's generative AI experiences, Bing published updated terms of use (including a user Code of Conduct) and implemented other mechanisms to help prevent and address misuse of the platforms. The Supplemental Terms prohibit users from "engag[ing] in activity that is fraudulent, false, or misleading" and "attempt[ing] to create or share content that could mislead or deceive others, including for example creation of disinformation, content enabling fraud, or deceptive impersonation." Users that violate the Supplemental Terms and Code of Conduct may be suspended from the service. In addition, as outlined in the "Content Moderation" section of the Supplemental Terms, Bing may block certain text prompts that violate the Code of Conduct or that are likely to lead to creation of material that violates the Code of Conduct. Repeated attempts to produce prohibited content or other violations of the Code of Conduct may result in service or account suspension. In addition, Bing maintains social listening pipelines where insights and user feedback (including efforts to "jailbreak" Bing systems) on Bing's generative AI features are collected from the open Internet. These insights and user feedback are manually reviewed by humans, analyzed daily, and shared across Bing's product team and with product leadership to identify new areas of concern and implement additional mitigations as needed. Bing also

use of it such that they can make their own decisions about how to engage with it. For example, with Collaborative Articles we identify the use of AI in the relevant UI and we provide additional detail in a linked Help Center article.

5. Accountability – In addition to the privacy, security, and safety processes discussed above, for AI tools we have additional assessments of training data and model cards so we can more appropriately assess risks and develop mitigations for the AI models that support our AI products and initiatives.

has set up a robust user reporting and appeal process to review and respond to user concerns of harmful or misleading content.

These new Bing features also provide several touchpoints for meaningful AI disclosures, where users are notified that they are interacting with an AI system and are presented with opportunities to learn more about these features and generative AI, such as through The New Bing: Our Approach to Responsible AI and educational FAQs and blog posts. Empowering users with this knowledge can help them avoid over-relying on AI and learn about the system's strengths and limitations. For example, the Bing home page displays the below disclosure to users:

Bing is powered by AI, so surprises and mistakes are possible. Please share feedback so we can improve! Terms | Privacy

In addition to the measures discussed above, Bing has worked to deliver an experience that encourages responsible use of Image Creator and to limit the generation of harmful or unsafe images. When Bing Image Creator's system detects that a potentially harmful image could be generated by a prompt, it blocks the prompt and warns the user. Microsoft also makes it clear that Bing Image Creator's images are generated by AI, and we include a Bing icon in the bottom left corner of each image to indicate that the image was created using Bing Image Creator.

Microsoft's responsible AI systems will continue to improve, and Microsoft regularly incorporates user and third-party feedback reported via Bing Feedback, its Report a Concern form or through other means. Microsoft also encourages users to take care in the prompts they submit and usage of images they generate through Image Creator, and all uses of generated outputs must comply with the Terms of Use and Code of Conduct. Users that repeatedly violate Bing's terms of use or code of conduct can be suspended or permanently revoked from the service.

See also Microsoft's involvement in the Partnership on AI, discussed at QRE 20.1.1, and QRE 14.2.1

Measure 15.2	LinkedIn	Bing Search
QRE 15.2.1	With respect to the algorithms used for detection, moderation, and sanctioning of impermissible conduct and content, please see: - QRE 15.1.1 (policies for countering prohibited manipulative practices in AI systems); - QRE 18.1.3 (design of recommender systems and related AI); - QRE 18.2.1 (policies and procedures to limit spread of harmful false or misleading information); - QRE 22.2.1 (actions taken to assist members in identifying trustworthy content); and - QRE 23.2.1 (actions taken to ensure integrity of reporting and appeals process).	As a search engine, Bing Search operates very differently from social media websites and other online platforms that host content. Bing Search does not host user-generated content and does not use algorithms to detect, moderate or sanction user-provided content except for limited circumstances outside the scope of this Code of Practice (e.g., the use of PhotoDNA software to detect and report child sexually explicit imagery uploaded to visual search). As to third party websites indexed by Bing Search, Bing Search does not use algorithms to detect, monitor or sanction such websites, except for limited circumstances outside the scope of this Code of Practice (e.g., the use of PhotoDNA software to detect and report child sexually explicit imagery). Bing users have many legitimate reasons for seeking out content in search that may be harmful or offensive in other contexts, and so Bing Search works to provide as comprehensive and useful of a collection of results as possible and does not proactively intervene to limit access to legal content. In some limited cases Bing Search may take action to remove or limit access to third party links where quality, safety, user demand, relevant laws, and/or public policy concerns exist, but these interventions are reactive; Bing generally does not engage in proactive algorithmic interventions to remove content. Bing's generative AI features include additional enhanced safety features such as classifiers, filters, and a bespoke metaprompt that further limit the likelihood of harmful content appearing in generative AI features. Bing has engaged in extensive responsible AI reviews regarding generative AI features in order to ensure outputs are not biased or discriminatory. It has also implemented additional filtering and classifiers to prevent chat responses from returning what Bing considers "low authority" content as part of an answer and to help address impermissible content and behaviors. Bing is also continually working to ensure that its generative features do not over-block outputs so that users are able to access the information they seek and measures and monitors conversation metrics to improve the interventions to balance the harm prevention and provide users with useful information. Lastly, Bing has endeavored to provide transparency about how it designed and tested its generative AI features with responsible AI in mind via blog posts, FAQs, presentations, and overview documentation such as The New Bing: Our Approach To Responsible AI.

IV. Integrity of Services			
Commitment 16 Relevant Signatories commit to operate channels of exchange between their relevant teams in order to proactively share information about cross-platform influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerge on their respective services, with the aim of preventing dissemination and resurgence on other services, in full compliance with privacy legislation and with due consideration for security and human rights risks.			
	C.16	**M 16.1**	**M 16.2**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**	**LinkedIn**

	LinkedIn	Bing Search
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New Implementation Measures Not applicable	New Implementation Measures Not applicable
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures We look forward to continuing to work on this commitment with the other signatories as we develop further cross platform information sharing.	Planned Implementation Measures We look forward to continuing to work on this commitment with the other signatories as we develop further cross platform information sharing.

Measure 16.1	LinkedIn	Bing Search
QRE 16.1.1	LinkedIn, through Microsoft, is an active participant in and contributor to the Task-force's Crisis Response subgroup, in which it proactively provides analysis and data, related to influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerges	Bing Search, through Microsoft, is an active participant in and contributor to the Task-force's Crisis Response subgroup, in which it proactively provides analysis and data related to influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerges on

on its service. Microsoft's internal threat detection and research teams, including Microsoft Threat Analysis Center (MTAC), Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC), Microsoft Research (MSR), and AI For Good, collect and analyse data on actors of disinformation, misinformation and information manipulation across platforms.

Moreover, LinkedIn works with numerous partners to facilitate the flow of information to tackle purveyors of disinformation, including disinformation spread by state-sponsored and institutional actors.

LinkedIn maintains an internal Trust and Safety team composed of threat investigators and intelligence personnel to address disinformation. This team works with various other internal teams, including our Artificial Intelligence modelling team, to develop leads into threat actor campaigns. The leads are then manually verified, and confirmed TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) and IOCs (Indicators of Compromise) relating to threat actors are shared with other external stakeholders, including, for example, industry peers. Any associated disinformation content is verified by our internal or external fact-checkers as needed, and coordinated inauthentic behaviours (CIBs) are also removed by our Threat Prevention and Defense team.

LinkedIn, along with its parent company, Microsoft, is heavily involved in threat exchanges. These threat exchanges take various forms, such as: 1) regular discussion amongst industry peers to discuss high-level trends and campaigns; and, 2) one-on-one engagement with individual peer companies to discuss TTPs and IOCs. This exchange of information leads to a better understanding of the incentives of sophisticated and well-funded threat actors and how they evolve their TTPs to achieve those goals, which assists us in their identification and removal.

LinkedIn always stands ready to receive and investigate any leads we receive from peers and other external stakeholders. In addition to one-on-one engagement with peers, we also consume intelligence from vendors and investigate any TTPs and IOCs made available in peer disclosures. In turn, we also regularly release information about policy-violating content on our platform in publicly-available transparency reports and blog posts.

its service. Microsoft's internal threat detection and research teams, including Microsoft Threat Analysis Center (MTAC), Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC), Microsoft Research (MSR), and AI For Good, collect and analyse data on actors of disinformation, misinformation and information manipulation across platforms. These teams work with external organisations and companies to share and ingest data that help support Microsoft product and service teams effectively respond to issues and threats.

Microsoft also works to identify and track nation-state information operations targeting democracies across the world and works with trusted third-party partners, including NewsGuard, Global Democracy Index (GDI), and Spanish-language news agency EFE, to provide early indicators of narratives, hashtags, or information operations that can be leveraged to inform early detection and defensive search strategies for Bing. Through Microsoft's Democracy Forward team and MTAC, Microsoft also offers mediums for election authorities, including in the EEA member states, to have lines of communication with Microsoft to identify possible foreign information operations targeting elections.

See also QRE 14.1.2.

SLI 16.1.1 – Numbers of actions as a result of information sharing	We look forward to providing reports in future reporting periods to discuss progress under this measure.			See SLI 14.1.2 for defensive search interventions data, which is based in part on information and threat intelligence gathered through information sharing with third parties, as well as the internal Microsoft and Bing resources noted in QREs 16.1.1 and 14.1.2. Given the multipronged approach Microsoft and Bing take to monitoring and actioning influence operations and sources of misinformation and disinformation and the multiple internal and external sources relied upon, it is challenging to provide precise reporting on whether an incidence of single information sharing results in a corresponding defensive search intervention or other action.		
	Nr of actions taken (total)	Type of detected content	Other relevant metrics	Nr of actions taken (total)	Type of detected content	Other relevant metrics
Measure 16.2	**LinkedIn**			This Measure is not relevant or pertinent to Microsoft Bing because this service does not have users who can share content across services.		
QRE 16.2.1	We look forward to working on this commitment with the other signatories as we develop further cross-platform information sharing.					

V. Empowering Users
Commitments 17 - 25

V. Empowering Users				
Commitment 17 In light of the European Commission's initiatives in the area of media literacy, including the new Digital Education Action Plan, Relevant Signatories commit to continue and strengthen their efforts in the area of media literacy and critical thinking, also with the aim to include vulnerable groups.				
	C.17	**M 17.1**	**M 17.2**	**M 17.3**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**

	LinkedIn	**Bing Search**
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New Implementation Measures Microsoft has strengthened its partnerships with three third-party organisations, the News Literacy Project, a collaboration led by The Trust Project on the Trust Indicators, and Verified, to fund media literacy campaigns. Microsoft also provided pro-bono advertising space across Microsoft surfaces to disseminate the literacy campaigns and helped garner thousands of signups for participation in News Literacy Project programming.	New Implementation Measures In connection with the launch of Bing Chat and Bing Image Creator, Bing Search created various controls and user tools for users to customize their experience and has posted user-facing FAQs and blog posts to help educate users about generative AI tools.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures Microsoft will expand its efforts to fund and promote media literacy campaigns into more EEA markets and languages. Microsoft will also focus on additional media literacy programs that include greater language access and inclusion throughout 2023 and into 2024.	Planned Implementation Measures Bing Search is regularly reviewing and evaluating its user tools, policies, and practices related to existing and new Bing generative AI features and adjusts and updates policies as needed. While Bing's existing programs are already designed to address these issues, Bing regularly evaluates the efficacy of its measures and endeavors to improve and work to respond quickly to new threats or issues as they arise. In addition, Microsoft will expand its efforts to fund and promote media literacy campaigns into more EEA markets and languages. Microsoft will also focus on additional media literacy programs that include greater language access and inclusion throughout 2023 and into 2024.

Measure 17.1	**LinkedIn**	**Bing Search**
QRE 17.1.1	As the world around us changes, LinkedIn continues to evolve and adapt our systems and practices for combating misinformation and other inauthentic behaviour on our platform, including to respond to the unique challenges presented by world events. LinkedIn's Professional Community Policies, which all members agree to abide by on joining LinkedIn, prohibit misinformation. As described in more detail in our response to QRE 18.1.1, LinkedIn uses a combination of	Bing Search offers a number of tools to help users understand the context and trustworthiness of search results. Even in circumstances where a user is expressly seeking low authority content (or if there is a data void so little to no high authority content exists for a query), Bing Search provides tools to users that can help improve their digital literacy and avoid harms resulting from engaging with misleading or inaccurate content. For example: - Bing Search often includes answers or public service announcements at the top of search results pointing users to high

automated and manual activity to keep content that violates our policies off of LinkedIn.

LinkedIn also aims to educate its members about civic discourse, electoral processes, and public security through its global team of news editors. These editors provide each member with relevant, timely information sourced from credible news sources that educate LinkedIn members about facts and news events, including global elections, and its content moderation teams closely monitor associated conversations in a number of languages.

In addition to broader measures, LinkedIn has taken special care to counter low authority information in relation to the COVID-19 crisis and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine, as detailed below and further in the Crisis Reporting appendices. Some examples of steps we have taken to tackle disinformation in connection with unfolding world events include the following:

- In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, LinkedIn editors created and promoted trusted content. LinkedIn introduced the following measures:
- Promote content from most credible organisations and experts, such as the World Health Organization
- During the early years of the pandemic, any member that undertook a simple search of the term "coronavirus" was redirected to a link "*Know the facts about coronavirus*", which appears first in the list of search results. By clicking on this link, members are directed to LinkedIn's own official page on the coronavirus with information and broadcasts from verified sources, primarily from the World Health Organization. The storylines on this page are available in 8 languages across 54 countries.
- Launched a 'Special Report: Coronavirus' box above 'Today's News and Views' with story lines relevant to COVID-19 and including updates from the World Health Organization and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

authority information on a searched topic or warnings on particular URLs known to contain harmful information (such as unaccredited online pharmacies and sites containing malware).
- Where circumstances warrant (such as public health crises or major elections), Bing Search may provide information hubs for users to easily access a centralized repository of high authority information.
- Microsoft also partners with NewsGuard to help users evaluate the quality of the news they encounter online. NewsGuard has created trust ratings for 7,500+ news and information sites, which are compiled into a "Nutrition Label" and corresponding Red/Green Reliability Rating to help users understand the reliability of news sources. Within the EU, NewsGuard is currently available in France, Germany, and Italy with plans for future expansion.
- Microsoft offers NewsGuard as a free plug-in for the Microsoft Edge web browser (it is also available for other browsers including Chrome and Firefox), and users of the Edge mobile application on both iOS and Android can enable NewsGuard ratings in their app settings. For users with the NewsGuard plug-in, Bing Search results include NewsGuard Reliability ratings that lead to a pop-up screen with more site information, an example of which is shown below.

- LinkedIn's team of editors cover the most recent developments of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, ranging from the economic impact to major military events that are taking place.

We also work to identify and remove misinformation and inauthentic behaviour from our platform. As we continue to improve, we are committed to helping our members make informed decisions about content they find on LinkedIn, so we work with Microsoft to provide tools that assist our members in identifying trustworthy, relevant, authentic, and diverse content.

LinkedIn's Professional Community Policies clearly detail the objectionable and harmful content that is not allowed on LinkedIn. Misinformation and inauthentic content is not allowed, and our automated defenses take proactive steps to remove them. LinkedIn's blog provides information regarding our efforts, including How We're Protecting Members From Fake Profiles, Automated Fake Account Detection, and An Update on How We Keep Members Safe.

LinkedIn members can report content that violates our Professional Community Policies, including misinformation and inauthentic content. Our Trust and Safety teams work every day to identify and restrict such activity, and if reported content violates the Professional Community Policies, it will be actioned in accordance with our polices.

LinkedIn members can identify misinformation and inauthentic behaviour by utilising the News Literacy Project, The Trust Project and Verified, all of which develop information literacy campaigns built on industry research and best practices. The News Literacy Project campaign developed a quiz that tests a person's ability to identify why the information they are seeing is false and inaccurate in less than five minutes. The Trust Project campaign developed the research-backed 8 Trust Indicators, which aim to improve consumers ability to identify reliable, ethical journalism. Finally, Verified delivers lifesaving information and fact-based advice to build digital literacy that helps communities protect themselves from misinformation. LinkedIn has also published an article in our Help Center compiling these useful resources on misinformation and inauthentic behaviour.

- Bing Search also provides information to Microsoft Edge users about the content of the websites they are browsing to via the Bing-powered Discover pane, including third party information about the website's provenance and, where available, the site's reliability rating from NewsGuard. A screenshot depicting a News Guard reliability rating from the Discover panel in Edge is shown below for the French newspaper Le Monde's official website.

- Bing Search's Page Insights feature also helps direct users to authoritative resources and information. The feature, which appears as a light bulb image next to search results, provides users with additional information about the site and its contents from third party information sites such as Wikipedia. An example is shown below.

- Bing Search Intelligent Answers also provides users with informative panels and direct answers to certain search queries, and is now available in 100 languages. For example, the below Intelligent Answer provides a response to the question "is earth getting warmer" derived from six high authority sources.

- Bing Search's "Fact Check" feature, which is discussed further at QRE 21.1.1, also helps users find fact checking information and warns users with red "flags" when fact-checked claims or content appearing in search results has been determined to be false or unfounded by third-party fact checkers.
- Bing Search's "Knowledge Cards" feature gives users a single view of authoritative information on a specific topic. An example is shown below (Knowledge Card is displayed the right half of the page).

- Bing Search provides users with public service announcements (PSAs). PSAs are user messages that appear as answer boxes at the top of a list of search results for certain triggering queries, providing information on potential risks associated with that query. PSAs are triggered by queries on specific topics, such as child pornography, attempts to purchase illegal pharmaceuticals, suicide, etc. An example of PSAs is shown below.

In addition to the features available for core search experiences, Bing Chat also provides user features to help empower users to tailor their new Bing experiences to their needs and helps inform users of the uses and limitations of generative AI-driven search experiences, such as by reminding users that they are interacting with a generative-AI system and that mistakes can occur (see below):

The new Bing FAQs and similar explanatory documents like blog posts and The New Bing: Our Approach to Responsible AI also help to educate users on the nature of AI-driven search experiences and informs users of uses, safeguards, and limitations of this emerging technology.

For example, the FAQ answer to "Are Bing's AI-generated responses always factual?" explains: "Bing aims to base all its responses on reliable sources - but AI can make mistakes, and third-party content on the internet may not always be accurate or reliable. Bing will sometimes misrepresent the information it finds, and you may see responses that sound convincing but are incomplete, inaccurate, or inappropriate. Use your own judgment and double check the facts before making decisions or taking action based on Bing's responses."

| **SLI 17.1.1 - actions enforcing policies above** | The table below reports the number of visitors to LinkedIn's Help Center article compiling useful resources on misinformation during the period 24 January (when the article was published) to 30 June 2023 . | Methodology of data measurement:

 NewsGuard Impressions ("NGI") – Represents the number of times the NewsGuard tool was rendered in the Edge browser discover pane to EU users |

	Total count of the tool's impressions	Interactions/ engagement with the tool	Other relevant metrics Number of visitors	Total count of the tool's impressions **NGI**	Interactions / engage-ment with the tool **KC**	Total count of the tool's impressions **TH**	Total count of the tool's impressions **PSA**	Other relevant metrics **NGED**
Member States								
Austria			0	8,030	135.890M	342	9,380	15
Belgium			0	8,100	212.382M	646	17,040	6
Bulgaria			0	1,592	37.616M	134	1,300	1
Croatia			0	1,084	24.619M	68	1,420	0
Cyprus			0	732	11.300M	32	300	0
Czech Republic			0	6,669	117.069M	303	4,080	3
Denmark			2	3,675	70.730M	549	2,960	4
Estonia			1	592	12.909M	77	380	1
Finland			0	3,088	71.512M	376	2,440	11
France			97	42,223	1.262B	1,632	54,100	87
Germany			87	93,500	1.447B	3,985	69,400	50
Greece			0	4,804	54.780M	168	2,380	0
Hungary			26	4,551	56.198M	189	2,340	4

The top-right cell (spanning the description area) contains:

during the Reporting Period. Bing has also provided data on the global figure.

Knowledge Cards ("KC)" – Represents viewership of Knowledge Cards (of all types/topics) during the Reporting Period

Transparency Hub Viewership ("TH") – Represents the total views of the Microsoft Transparency Report Hub during the Reporting Period.

Public Service Announcement ("PSA") – Represents views of public service announcement panels (of all types/topics) rendered in Bing to EU users during the Reporting Period.

NewsGuard Extension Downloads ("NGED") – Reflects total downloads of the NewsGuard extension by Edge users in the EU

Ireland			0	3,737	117.008M	447	44,040	1
Italy			20	23,765	698.398M	826	27,220	86
Latvia			0	456	14.868M	43	840	1
Lithuania			0	789	23.814M	81	1,840	1
Luxembourg			0	519	10.827M	63	440	1
Malta			0	216	9.973M	15	660	0
Netherlands			39	14,086	318.297M	2,053	30,040	9
Poland			92	21,073	417.431M	688	20,420	6
Portugal			0	7,231	137.277M	221	5,120	1
Romania			3	3,812	75.552M	250	4,000	6
Slovakia			0	1,228	32.859M	122	1,780	1
Slovenia			0	770	15.983M	42	920	1
Spain			100	21,575	753.723M	947	30,820	6
Sweden			4	6,896	160.018M	801	14,820	6
Iceland			0	303	5.865M	22	600	1
Liechtenstein			0	68	632.100K	5	20	0
Norway			16	4,265	81.592M	557	5,240	1
Total EU			**471**	**284,793**	**6.300B**	**15,100**	**350,480**	**308**
Total EEA			**487**	**289,429**	**6.388B**	**15,684**	**356,340**	**310**

Measure 17.2	LinkedIn	Bing Search
QRE 17.2.1	Microsoft has worked with three organisations to develop and promote media literacy campaigns, including Verified, the News Literacy Project, and a collaboration led by The Trust Project on the Trust Indicators. Verified is a global communication initiative launched by Purpose and the United Nations to distribute trusted, accurate information and change media consumption practices to reduce the spread of misinformation online. We also worked with Purpose on a narrative report about information resilience in young Spanish-speaking communities. Microsoft also recently promoted a video course from another partner, the News Literacy Project of Ukraine, called "Media Literacy in Wartime: How	Microsoft works with leading media and information literacy partners globally to support the development and promotion of media literacy campaigns. Since its last report, Microsoft has undertaken two new partnerships to strengthen the company's capacity and ability to combat information operations globally. Microsoft works with EFE to use their EFE Verifica to identify, track and expose emerging information operations spreading across Spanish-speaking communities around the world and Reporters Sans Frontières (RSF) to use their Journalism Trust Initiative (JTI) dataset to

	to Avoid Manipulation?" and exceeded 15,000 people signed up to participate, including many teachers. For the next reporting period, Microsoft will continue to work with existing and new partners to create, disseminate, and, where available, report on expanded literacy campaigns in EEA markets, including in additional EEA languages. Please also see response to QRE 17.1.1.					proactively promote trusted sources of news around the world that follow transparent and accepted journalistic practices. Microsoft has worked with three organisations to develop and promote media literacy campaigns, including Verified, the News Literacy Project, and a collaboration led by The Trust Project on the Trust Indicators. Verified is a global communication initiative launched by Purpose and the United Nations to distribute trusted, accurate information and change media consumption practices to reduce the spread of misinformation online. We also worked with Purpose on a narrative report about information resilience in young Spanish-speaking communities. Microsoft also recently promoted a video course from another partner, the News Literacy Project of Ukraine, called "Media Literacy in Wartime: How to Avoid Manipulation?" and exceeded 15,000 people signed up to participate, including many teachers. Moreover, Microsoft recently provided Charles University in Czechia and Verifee complementary Azure credits to make their cyber-skilling work public and accessible to hundreds of high school students. Search Coach is a free app in Microsoft Teams that helps educators and students to form effective queries and identify reliable resources. It is designed to teach information literacy skills in a safe, secure, and ad-free environment. Search Coach is available throughout the EU. For the next reporting period, Microsoft will continue to work with existing and new partners to create, disseminate, and where available, report on expanded literacy campaigns in additional EEA markets, including in additional EEA languages. Please also see QRE 17.1.1				
SLI 17.2.1 - actions enforcing policies above	Methodology of data measurement:					Methodology of data measurement:				
	Nr of media literacy/ awareness raising activities organised/ participated in	Reach of campaigns	Nr of participants	Nr of interactions with online assets	Nr of participants (etc)	Nr of media literacy/ awareness raising activities organised/ participated in	Reach of campaigns	Nr of participants	Nr of interactions with online assets	Nr of participants (etc)
						3				

Measure 17.3	LinkedIn	Bing Search
QRE 17.3.1	Microsoft has worked with three organisations to develop and promote media literacy campaigns, including Verified, the News Literacy Project, and a collaboration led by The Trust Project on the Trust Indicators. Verified is a global communication initiative launched by Purpose and the United Nations to distribute trusted, accurate information and change media consumption practices to reduce the spread of misinformation online. We also worked with Purpose on a narrative report about information resilience in young Spanish-speaking communities. Microsoft also recently promoted a video course from another partner, the News Literacy Project of Ukraine, called "Media Literacy in Wartime: How to Avoid Manipulation?" and exceeded 15,000 people signed up to participate, including many teachers. For the next reporting period, Microsoft will continue to work with existing and new partners to create, disseminate, and report on expanded literacy campaigns in EEA markets, including in additional EEA languages. Please also see response to QRE 17.1.1.	Microsoft has worked with three organisations to develop and promote media literacy campaigns, including Verified, the News Literacy Project, and a collaboration led by The Trust Project on the Trust Indicators. Verified is a global communication initiative launched by Purpose and the United Nations to distribute trusted, accurate information and change media consumption practices to reduce the spread of misinformation online. We also worked with Purpose on a narrative report about information resilience in young Spanish-speaking communities. Microsoft also recently promoted a video course from another partner, the News Literacy Project of Ukraine, called "Media Literacy in Wartime: How to Avoid Manipulation?" and exceeded 15,000 people signed up to participate, including many teachers. For the next reporting period, Microsoft will continue to work with existing and new partners to create, disseminate, and report on expanded literacy campaigns in EEA markets, including in additional EEA languages.

V. Empowering Users				
Commitment 18				
Relevant Signatories commit to minimise the risks of viral propagation of Disinformation by adopting safe design practices as they develop their systems, policies, and features.				
	C.18	M 18.1	M 18.2	M 18.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	LinkedIn Bing Search	LinkedIn	LinkedIn Bing Search	LinkedIn Bing Search

	LinkedIn	Bing Search
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New Implementation Measures Published the LinkedIn Responsible AI Principles	New Implementation Measures In connection with the launch of Bing Chat and Bing Image Creator, Bing published supplemental terms and has implemented a number of safeguards and safe design considerations to help proactively address, prevent and mitigate harms arising from potential misuse of these generative AI search experiences, including viral propagation of content. However, these Bing features do not allow users to post or share content within Bing. Microsoft also released new research in partnership with Princeton University and through Microsoft's internal research bodies, Microsoft Research and AI for Good.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures Not applicable	Planned Implementation Measures Bing is regularly reviewing and evaluating its policies and practices related to existing and Bing Chat features and adjusts and updates

		policies as needed. Bing continues to explore additional potential research opportunities and partnerships related to the spread of harmful misinformation and/or disinformation.

Measure 18.1	**LinkedIn**	This measure is not relevant or pertinent to Bing Search as search engines do not fuel virality of disinformation via users sharing content.
QRE 18.1.1	Outline relevant actions [suggested character limit: 2000 characters] With respect to AI design, please see QRE 18.1.3 With respect to additional tools, procedures, or features, please see: • QRE 17.1.1 (editorial practices to provide members with trustworthy news); • QRE 18.2.1 (policies and procedures to limit spread of harmful false or misleading information); • QRE 21.1.1 (action taken when information is identified as misinformation); • QRE 22.1.1 (features and systems related to fake and inauthentic profiles); • QRE 22.2.1 (actions taken to assist members identify trustworthy content); • QRE 23.2.1 (actions taken to ensure integrity of reporting and appeals process).	
QRE 18.1.2	The main parameters of the LinkedIn feed recommender systems are as follows: - **Identity**: We seek to contextualise content based on who a member is by looking at their profile, for example: Who are you? Where do you work? What are your skills? Who are your connections? Where is your profile location? - **Content**: We aim to match appropriate content to each member by evaluating, for example: How many times was the feed update viewed? How many times was it reacted to? What is the content about? How old is it? Is the update sharing knowledge or professional advice? What language	

	is it written in? Is the conversation constructive and professional? Will engagement on the update lead to future high-quality content? What companies, people, or topics are mentioned in the update? - **Member Activity**: Finally, we look at how a member engages with content and examine, for example: What have you reacted to and shared in the past? Who do you interact with most frequently or recently? Where do you spend the most time in your feed? Which hashtags, people or companies do you follow? What types of topics are you interested in? What other members follow you? What actions have other members taken on your posts? How long has it been since the foregoing actions took place?	
QRE 18.1.3	At LinkedIn, our guiding principle is "Members First." It ensures we honour our responsibility to protect our members and maintain their trust in every decision we make, and puts their interests first. A key area where we apply this value in engineering is within our design process. We call this "responsible design," which means that everything we build is intended to work as part of a unified system that delivers the best member experience, provides the right protections for our members and customers, and mitigates any unintended consequences in our products. One of the core pillars of "responsible design" is "responsible AI," which follows the LinkedIn Responsible AI Principles, which are inspired by and aligned with Microsoft's Responsible AI Principles. The LinkedIn Responsible AI Principles are to advance economic opportunity, uphold trust, promote fairness and inclusion, provide transparency, and embrace accountability. In addition to the LinkedIn Responsible AI Principles, responsible AI is also about intent and impact. "Intent" involves evaluating training data, designing systems, and reviewing model performance before the model is ever deployed to production to make sure that our principles are reflected at every step in the process. It includes actively changing our products and algorithms to empower every member. "Impact" covers detecting and monitoring the ways that people interact with products and features after they are deployed. We do this by measuring whether they provide significant value and empower	

individuals to reach their goals. Intent and impact are a cyclical process of refinement that go hand-in-hand towards the broader goal of responsible design.

With respect to safety, we seek to keep content that violates our Professional Community Policies off of LinkedIn. This is done through a combination of automated and manual activity. Our first layer of protection is using AI to proactively filter out bad content and deliver relevant experiences for our members. We use content (like certain key words or images) that has previously been identified as violating our content policies to help inform our AI models so that we can better identify and restrict similar content from being posted in the future. The second layer of protection uses AI to flag content that is likely to be violative for human review. This occurs when the algorithm is not confident enough to warrant automatic removal. The third layer is member led, where members report content and then our team of reviewers evaluates the content and removes it if it is found to be in violation of our policies.

Quantifying the above process to monitor how many content violations are successfully prevented and how much is still left on the platform is another important task that our Data Science team prioritises, such that we can continuously refine our processes to improve detection and prevention of violative content.

Please also see:
- QRE 17.1.1 (editorial practices to provide members with trustworthy news);
- QRE 18.2.1 (policies and procedures to limit spread of harmful false or misleading information);
- QRE 21.1.1 (action taken when information is identified as misinformation);
- QRE 22.1.1 (features and systems related to fake and inauthentic profiles);
- QRE 22.2.1 (actions taken to assist members identify trustworthy content);

	• QRE 23.2.1 (actions taken to ensure integrity of reporting and appeals process).							
SLI 18.1.1 - actions proving effectiveness of measures and policies	We continue to explore opportunities to effectively report on the measures outlined in QRE 18.1 in future reporting periods.							
	Reduction of prevalence of disinformation	Reduction of views/ impressions of disinformation	Increase in visibility of authoritative information	Other relevant metrics				

Measure 18.2	**LinkedIn**	**Bing Search**
QRE 18.2.1	LinkedIn is an online professional network. On LinkedIn, the world's professionals come together to find jobs, stay informed, learn new skills, and build productive relationships. The content that our members share becomes part of their professional identity and can be seen by their boss, colleagues, and potential business partners. Accordingly, the content on LinkedIn is professional in nature. To help keep LinkedIn safe, trusted, and professional, our Professional Community Policies clearly detail the range of objectionable and harmful content that is not allowed on LinkedIn. Fake accounts, misinformation, and inauthentic content are not allowed, and we take active steps to remove it from our platform. LinkedIn removes "specific claims, presented as fact, that are demonstrably false or substantially misleading and likely to cause harm."This approach applies globally and is used for purposes of content moderation and for publicly reporting figures on misinformation. Specific examples of what might constitute misinformation can be found here in our Help Center. As part of our User Agreement, our Professional Community Policies are accepted by every member when joining LinkedIn and are easily available to every member. LinkedIn creates value and preserves trust by fostering a safe, trusted, and professional platform, while honouring members' professional	Unlike social media services, for which this Commitment appears primarily oriented, search engines do not typically cause or facilitate the viral propagation of disinformation, as they do not allow users to post or share content directly on the service. Please see How Bing delivers search results and Microsoft Bing Webmaster Guidelines for an overview of how Bing Search designs its algorithms to deliver high authority and highly relevant content while minimizing the negative impact of spam and less credible information sources. Bing Search's ranking algorithms and related policies are intended to address deceptive tactics intended to manipulate the algorithms and are discussed in more detail at QREs 14.1.1 and 14.1.2. Bing Search features such as Answers, Page Insights, NewsGuard ratings, and ClaimReview fact checks, which are discussed at QRE 17.1.1. and 21.1.1, as well as the other features and policies discussed throughout this report further help minimize the risk of viral propagation of misinformation through Bing Search. Bing's suggestions features offer possible search queries to users to facilitate a more efficient search experience. While search suggestions are not directly tied to virality of content, since these suggestions are in part based on prior search terms, Bing Search undertakes measures to help ensure it does not inadvertently lead users to misleading or other harmful content through suggestions. Specifically, Bing Search uses a combination of proactive and reactive algorithmic and manual interventions to prevent the display of search suggestions that could lead to low authority content.

expression and speech. LinkedIn enables healthy on-platform conversations by facilitating the removal of misinformation that threatens its members' safety. And when content doesn't conclusively violate LinkedIn policies, LinkedIn gives the speaker the benefit of the doubt and favours speech (i.e., leaves the content up on platform).

Additionally, as described in greater detail below, human review plays a significant role in our content moderation process. Additionally, Members who post content and members who report content can appeal our content moderation decisions.

Our content policies are clear and we apply them equally for all members. Within our Professional Community Policies we provide granular information and examples on what is and what is not allowed on LinkedIn.

Furthermore, LinkedIn has automated defences to identify and prevent abuse, including inauthentic behaviour, such as spam, phishing and scams, duplicate accounts, fake accounts, and misinformation. Our Trust and Safety teams work every day to identify and restrict inauthentic activity. We're regularly rolling out scalable technologies like machine learning models to keep our platform safe.

As inauthentic behaviour gets more sophisticated, we're improving our detection. Here are some of the latest actions we've taken on fake profiles to help keep our members safe while engaging in our community.

Bing Search also provides a tool for users to provide feedback on suggestions they encounter. The feedback tool is shown below.

Clicking "Feedback on these suggestions" allows users to provide specific feedback on individual suggestions on the below bases:

In Bing's generative AI experiences, there is no risk of viral spread of generated content on Bing because Bing does not allow users to directly post or otherwise share content from Bing Chat/Image Creator on the Bing platform. However, Bing Search has taken steps to prevent the service from being used to create misinformation that might be shared on other platforms through a multipronged approach to mitigations that helps prevent users from creating misinformative content on Bing. This system includes terms of use and a code of conduct, classifiers, filters, a bespoke metaprompt, and robust reporting mechanisms designed to mitigate the risk of potential misuse of the platform. Bing's Supplemental Terms and Code of Conduct governing usage of Bing Chat and Image Creator prohibit users from using the service to generate fraudulent or misleading information, including the creation of disinformation. Bing's ranking and relevance systems for search, which are an essential component to answering user questions in Bing Chat, work to ensure that high authority content is returned first in search results in traditional search and in chat. Where

97

					Bing's systems flag that a user's prompt or generated output may result in low authority or misleading information, the system will take steps to mitigate that possible harm through solutions such as not returning generated content to the user, diverting the user to a different topic, or redirecting the user to traditional search. Users who encounter problematic content can report concerns via Feedback or Report a Concern.			
SLI 18.2.1 - actions taken in response to policy violations	Methodology of data measurement: The table below reports metrics concerning content LinkedIn removed from its platform as Misinformation, pursuant to the policy outlined in QRE 18.2.1 above. The metrics include: – the number of pieces of content removed as Misinformation between 1 January - 30 June 2023, broken out by EEA Member State; – the number of those content removals that were appealed by the content author; – the number of those appeals that were granted; – the median time from appeal-to-appeal decision for those appeals. The metrics are assigned to EEA Member State based on the self-reported profile location of the content author.				Methodology of data measurement: Bing Search does not have data relevant to this SLI. Users come to Bing Search with a specific research topic in mind and expect Bing Search to provide links to the most relevant and authoritative third-party websites on the Internet that are responsive to their search terms. Bing Search does not have a news feed for users of user content, allow users to post and share content within Bing, or otherwise enable content to go "viral" on Bing. See response to SLI 14.2.1 for relevant metrics.			
	The number of pieces of content removed as Misinformation between 1 January – 30 June 2023	The number of removals that were appealed by the content author	The number of appeals that were granted	The median time from appeal-to-appeal decision in hours	Total no of violations	Metric 1: indicating the impact of the action taken	Metric 2: indicating the impact of the action taken	Metric 3: indicating the impact of the action taken
Member States								
Austria	314	9	3	23.6 hours				
Belgium	715	6	1					
Bulgaria	130	0	0					
Croatia	82	0	0					
Cyprus	36	0	0					
Czech Republic	70	1	0					

Denmark	312	2	0					
Estonia	27	1	0					
Finland	76	1	0					
France	9,012	21	4					
Germany	2,516	27	2					
Greece	155	1	0					
Hungary	61	1	0					
Ireland	187	3	0					
Italy	4,534	6	0					
Latvia	28	0	0					
Lithuania	43	1	0					
Luxembourg	194	1	0					
Malta	22	0	0					
Netherlands	3,203	26	1					
Poland	241	3	0					
Portugal	438	2	1					
Romania	300	1	0					
Slovakia	35	0	0					
Slovenia	27	0	0					
Spain	1,090	4	0					
Sweden	357	1	0					
Iceland	4	0	0					
Liechtenstein	5	1	0					
Norway	113	1	0					
Total EU	24,205	118	12		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Total EEA	24,327	**120**	12		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Measure 18.3	LinkedIn	Bing Search
QRE 18.3.1	Through the acquisition of Miburo in July 2022, Microsoft now has an internal research team — the Microsoft Threat Analysis Center (MTAC) — that conducts research on information influence	Bing Search regularly reviews and considers safe design practices and research and conducts user studies as part of its product and new feature development processes. Bing Search employees have actively partnered with Microsoft

operations and publishes both internal and public reports on its findings across world regions.

Microsoft also funds and works with Carnegie Foundation and Princeton University on the creation of hub for researchers to access data from social media companies to improve the identification and tracking of information operations.

Research and third-party research organizations to contribute to novel research concerning safe design practices and disinformation.

Microsoft Research and Microsoft's AI for Good Lab have undertaken numerous research projects that address or can be used in understanding online misinformation and disinformation. New research projects undertaken or published during this Reporting Period include:

- Drawing upon learnings derived in the COVID-19 public health crisis, in March 2023 Microsoft Research published "Powering an AI Chatbot with Expert Sourcing to Support Credible Information Access." As part of this research, researchers presented an expert-sourcing framework and created an AI chatbot to serve as a credible and easy-to-access information portal for individuals during the COVID-19 pandemic. The chatbot was created by a team of over 150 scientists and health professionals around the world, deployed in the real world and answered thousands of user questions about COVID-19. The research evaluated the chatbot from two key stakeholders' perspectives, expert volunteers and information seekers. It shares key lessons learned and discusses design implications for building expert-sourced and AI-powered information portals, along with the risks and opportunities of misinformation mitigation and beyond.
- Researchers from Microsoft Research published "Comparing Traditional and LLM-based Search for Consumer Choice: A Randomized Experiment", which utilizes a mix of telemetry data (e.g., Bing search logs) and online laboratory experiments. This is just the first in a series of forthcoming papers designed to better understand the various ways in which users accomplish tasks with Microsoft productivity tools and how social science can help guide solutions that can help harness the tools more efficiently. By way of example, this research can address best practices for conveying nuances and limitations of large language models and tools like Bing Chat, by educating users on the risks of hallucinations and importance of checking sources.

During the Reporting Period, Microsoft entered an agreement with Princeton University to research misinformation trends online. Microsoft is also undertaking research in partnership with Princeton University to measure the change in misinformation consumption on a popular video platform following

platform policy changes. Microsoft's partnership with Princeton University has already resulted in the following research output during the Reporting Period:

- In January 2023, the AI for Good Research Lab and the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project at Princeton University released a preprint of "Navigating the Web of Misinformation: A Framework for Misinformation Domain Detection Using Browser Traffic". This research used Microsoft Bing and Edge data – along with third party data from NewsGuard and other misinformation monitoring organizations – to develop a proposed framework for the detection of misinformation domains. Microsoft's work offers a practical solution for identifying misinformation domains with high precision rates, which can have significant implications for combating the spread of fake news and propaganda. This paper is under consideration for a peer-reviewed publication by *IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security*.

- In June 2023, the AI for Good Lab at Microsoft and the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project at Princeton University released a preprint of a research paper "Using Website Referrals to Identify Misinformation Rabbit Holes – Microsoft Research" to examine whether the URL referral structure of websites leads users into "rabbit holes" of misinformation. This research, which will be published in the *Behaviour & Information Technology* journal, helps examine tactics used by misinformation sites and how monetary incentives can create misinformation "rabbit holes" that keep users in a misinformation loop.

- The AI for Good Lab at Microsoft and the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project at Princeton University completed a paper "Engagement with Unreliable Sites from Web Search Driven by User Preferences, Not Search Engine Algorithms," which discusses user behavior indicating that users actively seek out information they want to see, even misinformation, rather than search engines directing them towards misinformation.

Through the acquisition of Miburo in July 2022, Microsoft maintains an internal research team—now named the Microsoft Threat Analysis Center (MTAC)—that conducts research on information influence operations and publishes both

	internal and public reports on its findings. MTAC maintains global hubs and conducts intelligence analysis in over 13 languages. Additionally, Microsoft funds and works with external organizations, the Global Disinformation Index, NewsGuard, EFE, and the Alliance for Securing Democracy, to ingest data and research that they conduct into Microsoft products, including Bing Search and LinkedIn. Microsoft also currently funds and works with Carnegie Foundation on the creation of hub for researchers to access data from social media companies to improve the identification and tracking of information operations. Bing Search looks forward to continued opportunities to contribute to and collaborate with the research community on future research and is in active discussions with third party organizations and the research community on best practices and mitigations for core web search and new generative AI experiences.

V. Empowering Users

Commitment 19

Relevant Signatories using recommender systems commit to make them transparent to the recipients regarding the main criteria and parameters used for prioritising or deprioritising information, and provide options to users about recommender systems, and make available information on those options.

	C.19	M 19.1	M 19.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**

	LinkedIn	**Bing Search**
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New Implementation Measures A new setting was introduced to enable Members to change their default Feed sort option from a	New Implementation Measures In connection with the launch of Bing Chat and Bing Image Creator, Bing published an updated version

	feed based, in part, on profiling, to a chronologically sorted feed. Note that in August 2023, LinkedIn launched in the EU (1) a revised and expanded experience to enable Members to change how their Feed experience is presented to them. The choice is presented in the Feed and also points members to the setting referenced above where members can change the default sort of their Feed; and (2) a new experience to enable Members to change how their Jobs experience is presented to them. Members can now turn off personalized job recommendations in the Jobs Search and Jobs Home tabs.	of "How Bing Delivers Search Results" for users to better understand how our search engine delivers the search results and content presented to users.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures Not applicable	Planned Implementation Measures Bing regularly updates its policies and terms and conditions to account for product changes, user feedback, and evolving legal considerations.

Measure 19.1	LinkedIn	Bing Search
QRE 19.1.1	LinkedIn has published a variety of articles to explain to users how our recommender systems work, including: "Mythbusting the Feed: How the Algorithm Works"; "Mythbusting the Feed: Helping our members better understand LinkedIn"; "Keeping your feed relevant and productive"; LinkedIn Safety Series: Using AI to Protect Member Data; "Guide: Features to Help You	Bing's search engine ranking algorithms are not a traditional "recommender system" in that Bing Search provides content to users as a result of their express request, rather than content pushed to users who did not expressly request it. However, the main parameters of Bing Search's ranking algorithms are published in the "How Bing Ranks Search Results" section of How Bing

	Control Your Feed and Conversations"; Our approach to building transparent and explainable AI systems. During the prior reporting period LinkedIn collated and expanded upon existing resources to further explain the main parameters of LinkedIn recommender systems and options provided to users to influence and control these recommender systems. Additionally, LinkedIn addresses automated processing and relevancy in the LinkedIn User Agreement and it includes a link to the above referenced Help Centre article at the end of Section 3.6 of the LinkedIn User Agreement. In May 2023, LinkedIn launched a new setting for members to control the default for how their LinkedIn feed is presented to them. Members can now change their preferred feed view from "most relevant first" to "most recent first". "Most relevant first" means that LinkedIn will use data from the member's profile and LinkedIn activity data to rank feed content based on the member's interests. "Most recent first" means that LinkedIn will not use the member's profile and LinkedIn activity data to rank feed content and will instead show content in reverse chronological order. Although outside of the reporting period, in August 2023, LinkedIn launched two new experiences in the EU. Some detail is included below and we look forward to providing further detail in the next reporting period. (1) LinkedIn launched a revised and expanded experience to enable Members to change how their Feed experience is presented to them. The choice is presented in the Feed (on desktop, mobile app, and mobile web) and it also points members to the setting referenced above where members can change the default sort of their Feed. Members can learn more about this experience and the setting in our Help Centre. (2) LinkedIn launched a new experience to enable Members to change how their Jobs experience is presented to them. By default LinkedIn uses a Member's title, location, skills, activity and other data to provide personalized jobs to that Member in the jobs home tab and jobs search experience.	Delivers Search, which is available to Bing Search users in the EU. Bing's ranking algorithms apply equally to traditional search results and Bing's generative AI features. More information about how Bing Search moderates its generative AI platforms to prevent users from being presented with harmful information is available in The new Bing: Our approach to Responsible AI. Bing Search also provides information on how it ranks and returns search suggestions in the Enhanced Search Experiences section of How Bing Delivers Search Results. Please also see QREs 14.1.1, and 22.2.1.
Measure 19.2	**LinkedIn**	**Bing Search**
SLI 19.2.1 – user settings	Methodology of data measurement:	Methodology of data measurement:

	Members that do not wish to have their LinkedIn feed experience sorted by relevance can elect to have their LinkedIn feed sorted chronologically using the "Sort by" functionality above the feed. This functionality only controls the current session and will revert to the "relevant" feed experience when the member next visits LinkedIn. In addition to the above functionality, a new setting was introduced to Members to enable them to change the default of how their LinkedIn feed experience is sorted. The tables below report: Table A: (1) the number of EEA members who used the feed "Sort by" functionality between 1 January - 30 June 2023; and (2) the number of times those members used the feed "Sort by" functionality between 1 January - 30 June 2023; Table B: (1) the number of EEA members who used the "preferred feed view" setting between 6 May - 30 June 2023; and (2) the number of times those members used the "preferred feed view" setting between 6 May - 30 June 2023 (6 May 2023 is when the setting was first made publicly available to members). The metrics are assigned to EEA Member State based on the self-reported profile location of the member.	Bing Search allows users to turn off search suggestions (including auto-suggest and related search suggestions) ("AS/RS") in its user setting page, as shown below: Search suggestions ☑ See search suggestions as you type Bing is currently building out expanded data retention and reporting functionalities. The amount of users in the EU and EEA that adjusted the search setting to disable search suggestions will be provided in forthcoming reports. In the Bing image and video experiences, users can turn off personalized search suggestions through the Settings pane. Bing anticipates providing reporting on utilization of this new measure in forthcoming reports. Users may also access, view, and delete their previous search queries in their Microsoft Account Privacy dashboard or clear their search history in Bing Search settings, which in turn will remove that content from any personalized search suggestions. Users who are Microsoft Account users may also add or remove a topic from their Ad interests through the Microsoft Account Settings page at account.microsoft.com/privacy/ad-settings ("**Ad Interest**"). Figures on the amount of users that have globally added or removed Ad Interests are below. This information cannot be provided at an EU member state level and therefore the below Ad Interest figures represent global numbers.

	Table A: No of times users actively engaged with the feed "Sort by" functionality		Table B; No of times users actively engaged with the "preferred feed view" setting		
Data	Number of EEA members who used the feed "Sort by" functionality between 1 Jan – 30 June 2023	Number of times the members used the feed "Sort by" functionality between 1 Jan – 30 June 2023	Number of EEA members who used the "preferred feed view" setting between 6 May – 30 June 2023	Number of times the members used the "preferred feed view" setting between 6 May – 30 June 2023	No of times users actively engaged with these settings Ad Interest
Member States					
Austria	12,553	192,651	620	769	

Belgium	24,553	461,238	812	992	
Bulgaria	3,077	78,444	164	201	
Croatia	2,609	57,076	156	224	
Cyprus	8,293	134,603	77	107	
Czech Republic	22,736	444,927	367	434	
Denmark	1,726	29,807	664	852	
Estonia	16,206	399,296	104	127	
Finland	150,811	2,409,188	611	898	
France	127,960	2,001,580	6377	8397	
Germany	7,535	153,486	6562	7792	
Greece	3,938	62,089	304	421	
Hungary	16,505	318,984	190	219	
Ireland	55,121	972,333	718	909	
Italy	1,467	26,823	2046	2635	
Latvia	2,667	49,058	78	98	
Lithuania	2,444	49,867	108	132	
Luxembourg	1,213	22,972	136	187	
Malta	88,968	1,771,029	37	42	
Netherlands	32,319	613,017	4076	5149	
Poland	19,974	338,675	1144	1405	
Portugal	1,499	22,294	779	978	
Romania	5,442	99,276	377	461	
Slovakia	2,519	37,682	129	174	
Slovenia	1,616	26,580	70	81	
Spain	69,239	1,090,598	2561	3219	
Sweden	25,409	455,927	1295	1605	
Iceland	335	3,215	10	12	
Liechtenstein	225	4,716	6	6	
Norway	9,528	123,376	337	434	
Total EU	**708,399**	**12,319,500**	**30,562**	**38,508**	
Total EEA	**718,487**	**12,450,807**	**30,915**	**38,960**	
Global					**529,289**

V. Empowering Users			
Commitment 20			
Relevant Signatories commit to empower users with tools to assess the provenance and edit history or authenticity or accuracy of digital content.			
	C.20	**M 20.1**	**M 20.2**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**

	LinkedIn	Bing Search
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New Implementation Measures Not applicable	New Implementation Measures Microsoft has implemented the use of content provenance on its AI image generation platform, Image Creator. This means that all AI generated images using Bing Image Creator will have content provenance indicators present.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures Not applicable	Planned Implementation Measures As part of Microsoft's voluntary commitments to the White House outlined here: Microsoft-Voluntary-Commitments-July-21-2023.pdf Microsoft has committed to deploying state-of-the-art provenance tools to help the public identify AI-generated audio-visual

		content and understand its provenance. Bing also plans to improve provenance tools for Bing Image Creator.

Measure 20.1	**LinkedIn**	**Bing Search**
QRE 20.1.1	Microsoft is a founding and active member of the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA) and is currently a co-chair. In January 2022, the C2PA released version 1.0 of its technical specification for digital provenance. Microsoft is also partnering with Truepic to develop a prototype provenance mobile application, Project Providence. This prototype application provides a proof of concept for safe, flexible, and easy to use capture, storage and viewing of authenticated visual media anywhere in the world. Project Providence is currently in a proof-of-concept phase for limited use cases, including to support documentation of cultural heritage destruction and recovery activities in Ukraine. Further, Microsoft has partnered with NewsGuard to provide a free plug-in for the Microsoft Edge web browser (also available for other browsers including Chrome and Firefox), as well as an opt-in news rating feature for the Edge mobile application on both iOS and Android. This empowers Edge users to benefit from the comprehensive analysis done by NewsGuard and to better identify the most reliable news and information sites. LinkedIn users are also able to benefit from NewsGuard via this plug-in. This plug-in enables LinkedIn users to benefit from NewsGuard's reliability rating, where available, when browsing news posts from news and information sites rated by NewsGuard.	Microsoft and key members of the Bing Search team are involved in the Partnership on AI ("PAI") to identify possible countermeasures against deepfakes and has participated in the drafting and refinement of PAI's proposed Synthetic Media Code of Conduct. The proposed Code of Conduct provides guidelines for the ethical and responsible development, creation, and sharing of synthetic media (such as AI-generated artwork). Microsoft is also a founding and active member of the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA) alongside Adobe, Intel, Truepic, X, the BBC, and other tech and media companies and is currently a co-chair. In January 2022, the C2PA released version 1.0 of its technical specification for digital provenance. Microsoft is furthermore partnering with TruePic to develop a prototype provenance mobile application, Project Providence. This prototype application will provide a proof of concept for safe, flexible, and easy to use capture, storage and viewing of authenticated visual media anywhere in the world. Project Providence is an interoperable image authentication platform that collects images and video with authentication information embedded. This could assist any organization or person to document events, places, or objects anywhere in the world and provide proof that images were unaltered and authentic. Project Providence is currently in a proof-of-concept phase for limited use cases, including to support documentation of cultural heritage destruction and recovery activities in Ukraine. . Microsoft is developing such tools, including Project Providence with Truepic, and multistakeholder partnerships, such as the Coalition for Content

		Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA), to combat the rise of manipulated or AI created media. In addition, images generated by Bing Image Creator include a modified Bing icon in the bottom left corner of each image to indicate that the image was generated by AI.
Measure 20.2	**LinkedIn**	**Bing Search**
QRE 20.2.1	Microsoft is a founding member of the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA). The C2PA Coalition aims to address the prevalence of disinformation, misinformation, and online content fraud through developing technical standards for certifying the source and history or provenance of media content. Standards are still in development, as member organisations work together to develop content provenance specifications for common asset types and formats to enable publishers, creators, and consumers to trace the origin and evolution of a piece of media, including images, videos, audio, and documents. These technical specifications include defining what information is associated with each type of asset, how that information is presented and stored, and how evidence of tampering can be identified. Microsoft has also developed Project Origin, which aims to create a measure of accountability for media to reduce the spread of disinformation through synthetic media. This technology helps certify the source of the content, like a watermark, which will expose if alterations have been made which can lead to manipulation and disinformation. • Project Origin gives publishers and consumers a tool to identify when media has been altered from the original source • While it is ultimately up to viewers to believe in the accuracy or truth of a publisher, knowing if media has been tampered with gives us more power to determine what we can trust • As part of the publication process, tools will register media items by creating a digital fingerprint	Microsoft is a founding member of the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA), and Bing Search leadership regularly participates in discussions related to the development of provenance tools. The C2PA Coalition aims to address the prevalence of disinformation, misinformation, and online content fraud through developing technical standards for certifying the source and history or provenance of media content. Standards are still in development, as member organisations work together to develop content provenance specifications for common asset types and formats to enable publishers, creators, and consumers to trace the origin and evolution of a piece of media, including images, videos, audio, and documents. These technical specifications will include defining what information is associated with each type of asset, how that information is presented and stored, and how evidence of tampering can be identified. Bing Search is continuing to evaluate possible standards and provenance tools that may be feasible for search engines. Microsoft has also developed Project Origin, which aims to create a measure of accountability for media to reduce the spread of disinformation through synthetic media. This technology helps provide evidence of the source of the content, like a watermark, which can help identify if alterations have been made. • Project Origin gives publishers and consumers a tool to identify when media has been altered from the original source • While it is ultimately up to viewers to believe in the accuracy or truth of a publisher, knowing if media has been tampered with gives us more power to determine what we can trust • As part of the publication process, tools will register media items by creating a digital fingerprint

	• In return, content creator will receive a certification of authentication, which will be stored in a tamper-proof distributed ledger with no single controlling entity • The certification can be embedded into a piece of media before distribution When a user consumes a piece of media, the web browser or dedicated application will automatically compare the embedded digital fingerprint of the file being viewed with the original stored in the distributed ledger. Based on that comparison, it will display a clear indicator of authentication, allowing users to understand if what they are viewing is as published or has been tampered with.	• In return, the content creator will receive a certification of authentication, which will be stored in a tamper-proof distributed ledger with no single controlling entity • The certification can be embedded into a piece of media before distribution When a user consumes a piece of media, the web browser or dedicated application will automatically compare the embedded digital fingerprint of the file being viewed with the original stored in the distributed ledger. Based on that comparison, it will display a clear indicator of authentication, allowing users to understand if what they are viewing is as published or has been tampered with.

V. Empowering Users

Commitment 21

Relevant Signatories commit to strengthen their efforts to better equip users to identify Disinformation. In particular, in order to enable users to navigate services in an informed way, Relevant Signatories commit to facilitate, across all Member States languages in which their services are provided, user access to tools for assessing the factual accuracy of sources through fact-checks from fact-checking organisations that have flagged potential Disinformation, as well as warning labels from other authoritative sources.

	C.21	M 21.1	M 21.2	M 21.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	LinkedIn Bing Search	LinkedIn Bing Search	LinkedIn	LinkedIn Bing Search

	LinkedIn	Bing Search
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New Implementation Measures Not applicable	New Implementation Measures Bing has been in active, productive conversations with fact-checking organizations to discuss possible means of expanding fact-checking coverage in the EU and the most

		impactful means of doing so. Bing hopes to have additional updates in its next report.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures Not applicable	Planned Implementation Measures Bing is working to secure agreements with additional fact checking organizations and has been in active dialogue with multiple fact checking organizations.

Measure 21.1	LinkedIn	Bing Search
QRE 21.1.1	As detailed above in QRE1.1.1 and 17.1.1, LinkedIn prohibits misinformation and disinformation on its platform, whether in the form of organic content or in the form of advertising content. LinkedIn's Professional Community Policies, which apply to all content on LinkedIn's platform, expressly prohibit the sharing of false or misleading content, including misinformation and disinformation. Where content is identified as misinformation (whether as a result of a report or proactively detected), we do not label it, rather it is removed from LinkedIn. This includes situations where LinkedIn personnel leverage the conclusions of fact checkers to determine whether the content at issue violates LinkedIn's Professional Community Policies. Further, Microsoft has partnered with NewsGuard to provide a free plug-in for the Microsoft Edge web browser (also available for other browsers including Chrome and Firefox), as well as an opt-in news rating feature for the Edge mobile application on both iOS and Android. This empowers Edge users to benefit from the	Bing Search provides tools to help users determine the reliability of content displayed in Bing search results through its "Fact Check" feature. Bing Search's Fact Check feature offers users credible ways to assess the reliability of content displayed in its search results by providing fact-check flags and warnings on certain search results and by directing users to fact-checking articles. ClaimReview functions as a tagging system that individual fact-checking organizations or media can use to identify their articles for search engines and social media platforms. Since 2017, Bing Search has ingested content from the public ClaimReview protocol made available through Schema.org and displayed fact check tags within search results for websites that have incorporated ClaimReview tags. Content tagged with a ClaimReview tag is "read" by Bing Search's search engine crawlers when ingesting websites for their index and is used by Bing Search to help promote and/or highlight fact-checked content in search results. See additional information at Bing adds Fact Check label in SERP to support the ClaimReview markup	Webmaster Blog. Bing Search also utilizes ClaimReview and fact check data feeds from the from DataCommons.org.

	comprehensive analysis done by NewsGuard and to better identify the most reliable news and information sites. LinkedIn users are also able to benefit from NewsGuard via this plug in. This plug-in enables LinkedIn users to benefit from NewsGuard's reliability rating, where available, when browsing news posts from news and information sites rated by NewsGuard. Please also see our response to QRE 17.1.1 which details how our internal team of experienced news editors provides trustworthy news about current events from verified sources and other steps we take to tackle disinformation.	As noted above, Bing's new generative AI features are primarily an extension of web search that is designed to combine the power of Bing search with a new natural language interface that allows users to get to the answers they are looking for more efficiently. Bing's generative AI features also can help inspire a user's creativity via the generation of new text or images; these features are subject to Bing's robust safety classifiers (which are informed by data shared by information integrity partners and other authority signals) to prevent the creation of low authority materials or disinformation. As Bing prohibits the creation of misleading content, and Bing does not allow users to publish or share content created by the system on the platform, in-product fact checks are not relevant to Bing's generative AI features. For more information on other media literacy tools in Bing Search, please see QRE 17.1.1.
SLI 21.1.1 - actions taken under measure 21.1	Methodology of data measurement: As detailed in our response to 21.1.1, LinkedIn removes content that violates our Professional Community Policies (including misinformation) and does not deploy labelling or warning systems. Accordingly, the metrics for this SLI for the period 1 January - 30 June 2023 are zero.	Methodology of data measurement: Bing Search uses the open schema.org ClaimReview protocol, and fact check articles incorporating ClaimReview tags are ingested in the Bing index. Bing cannot feasibly assess the location of the website or its operator for the purposes of this metric. Therefore, when calculating the location of fact checked content for the purposes of SLI, Bing has compiled the data as follows: **"FCURL"** represents the number of distinct URLs containing a ClaimReview tag (i.e. fact-check content) that appeared on the first page of Bing search results for any number of users located in the EU Member States and EEA. FCI" represents number of times the above-mentioned URLs appeared on the first page of Bing search results to a user located in EU Member States and the EEA. Bing cannot provide data on the ratio of impressions of fact-checks to original impressions of fact-checked content, as Bing ingests websites with "fact check" tags and thus there is no ratio to assess. Bing also cannot reasonably quantify the "reach" of labels or fact checks available on its search index beyond what is provided below, as the appearance of fact checks depends entirely on each user's unique search query.

	Total impressions of fact-checks	Ratio of impressions of fact-checks to original impressions of fact-checked content	Reach of labels/ fact-checkers and other authoritative sources	Other pertinent metric	Total impressions of fact-checks **(FCI)**	Ratio of impressions of fact-checks to original impressions of fact-checked content	Reach of labels/ fact-checkers and other authoritative sources **(FCURLs)**	Other pertinent metrics
Member States								
Austria					967		202	
Belgium					739		259	
Bulgaria					0		0	
Croatia					0		0	
Cyprus					0		0	
Czech Republic					0		0	
Denmark					425		128	
Estonia					0		0	
Finland					165		66	
France					2,085		402	
Germany					10,306		672	
Greece					0		0	
Hungary					1		1	
Ireland					974		287	
Italy					1,264		325	
Latvia					0		0	
Lithuania					0		0	
Luxembourg					0		0	
Malta					0		0	
Netherlands					1,502		436	
Poland					755		232	
Portugal					1,279		335	
Romania					0		0	
Slovakia					0		0	
Slovenia					0		0	
Spain					2,266		412	
Sweden					778		241	

Iceland					0		0	
Liechtenstein					0		0	
Norway					575		186	
Total EU					**23,506**		**3,998**	
Total EEA					**24,081**		**4,184**	

SLI 21.1.2 - actions taken under measure 21.1	Methodology of data measurement: As detailed in response to QRE 21.1.1, LinkedIn removes content that violates our Professional Community Policies (including misinformation) and does not deploy labelling or warning systems. Accordingly, the metrics for this SLI for the period 1 January – 30 June 2023 are zero.			Methodology of data measurement: Metrics concerning "user interactions" and "labelling of content" are not applicable to Bing, as it is a search engine. Bing does not apply fact-check labels to websites; rather websites must embed a ClaimReview tag in order for Bing to ingest and display fact-check tags for a website within search results. Bing cannot quantify the number of articles published by independent fact-checkers that are available on the Bing Search index. See SLI 21.1.1.		
	Nr of articles published by independent fact-checkers	Nr of labels applied to content, such as on the basis of such articles	Meaningful metrics such as the impact of 21.1. measures on user interactions with, or user re-shares of, content fact-checked as false or misleading	Nr of articles published by independent fact-checkers	Nr of labels applied to content, such as on the basis of such articles	Meaningful metrics such as the impact of 21.1. measures on user interactions with, or user re-shares of, content fact-checked as false or misleading

Measure 21.2	**LinkedIn**	This Measure is not relevant or pertinent to Bing Search as it does not host the content and cannot assess the extent to which content or indexed landing pages has reached its users.
QRE 21.2.1	LinkedIn has to date not undertaken and/or supported separate research and testing on the potential efficacy of warnings or updates targeted to users that have interacted with content that was later actioned upon for violation of our Professional Community Policies.	

	Given LinkedIn currently removes, rather than labels, content that violates our policy on false and misleading content, LinkedIn may be unable to provide meaningful context to users as to the specific content that they had viewed which was later actioned. To the extent others have conducted such research and/or testing, we are happy to discuss findings within the relevant Task-force Subgroups in view of identifying relevant follow-up actions.	
Measure 21.3	**LinkedIn**	**Bing Search**
QRE 21.3.1	As detailed in response to QRE 21.1.1, LinkedIn removes content that violates our Professional Community Policies (including misinformation) and does not deploy labelling or warning systems.	Bing Search regularly consults research and evidence, including from internal Microsoft research and data science teams, related to safe design practices, labeling, and user experience and considers such research as part of its product design and testing. Bing Search also conducts internal research and user studies for product features, such as by analyzing impressions, engagement, or clicks of various features. Bing Search also has a "feedback" button easily accessible from any page of Bing. Bing Search reviews and may make improvements based on user feedback. Bing Search also regularly consults with third party organizations to hear feedback about product design and related safety considerations. As to fact check labels in particular, Bing Search participated in the W3C organization that helped to design and promote Schema.org and ClaimReview, and regularly meets with stakeholders to discuss common issues, including whether updates to these common schemas are necessary. In new Bing generative AI experiences, Bing has worked closely with Microsoft's Responsible AI team to develop labeling and warning systems that ensure users are informed that AI-powered answers are not always accurate and to encourage users to consult the source links provided to verify accuracy. Microsoft's Responsible AI team is staffed by a cross-disciplinary team of experts in AI, who consult regularly with external experts in the field to ensure our labels and warnings are designed in accordance with best practices.

V. Empowering Users								
Commitment 22								
Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with tools to help them make more informed decisions when they encounter online information that may be false or misleading, and to facilitate user access to tools and information to assess the trustworthiness of information sources, such as indicators of trustworthiness for informed online navigation, particularly relating to societal issues or debates of general interest.								
	C.22		**M 22.1**	**M 22.2**	**M 22.3**	**M 22.4**	**M 22.5**	**M 22.6**	**M 22.7**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**		**LinkedIn**	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**				**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**

	LinkedIn	**Bing Search**
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New Implementation Measures Not applicable	New Implementation Measures In connection with the launch of Bing Chat, Bing ensured that trustworthiness features, including NewsGuard ratings and fingerprints, are integrated into Bing Chat architecture and shown to users that have the NewsGuard plug in. In addition, Microsoft has added additional data from EFE focused on information operations targeting Spanish language audiences.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures Not applicable.	Planned Implementation Measures Bing regularly evaluates opportunities to improve its product and educate users on the trustworthiness and limitations of AI. In the next six months Microsoft plans to implement additional data from RSF using their Journalism Trust Index data.

Measure 22.1	**LinkedIn**	This Measure is not relevant or pertinent to Bing Search as it does not allow users to share content. However, Bing will, where appropriate, provide users with information on the availability of credibility extensions for the Microsoft Edge browser, such as the extension currently offered by NewsGuard, and provide, in appropriate cases, links to access those extensions. Bing will continue to explore whether and how other indicators of trustworthiness may be useful to users in the context of search.
QRE 22.1.1	Microsoft has partnered with NewsGuard to provide a free plug-in for the Microsoft Edge web browser (also available for other browsers including Chrome and Firefox), as well as an opt-in news rating feature for the Edge mobile application on both iOS and Android. This empowers Edge users to benefit from the comprehensive analysis done by NewsGuard and to better identify the most reliable news and information sites. LinkedIn users are also able to benefit from NewsGuard via this plug in. This plug-in enables LinkedIn users to benefit from NewsGuard's reliability rating, where available, when browsing news posts from news and information sites rated by NewsGuard. Further, in October 2022, LinkedIn began rolling out a new "About this profile" feature that shows users when a profile was created and last updated, along with whether the member has verified a phone number and/or work email associated with their account. The introduction of this feature is part of our ongoing commitment to keep LinkedIn a trusted professional community, through which we are (1) rolling out new features and systems to help members make	

	more informed decisions about members with whom they interact, and (2) enhancing our automated systems that keep inauthentic profiles and activity off our platform. Whether a member is deciding to accept an invitation, learning more about a business opportunity, or exchanging contact information, we want them to be empowered to make decisions using additional signals about the authenticity of accounts.	
SLI 22.1.1 - actions enforcing policies above	Methodology of data measurement: The table below reports metrics concerning EEA member use of the "About this profile" feature described above in QRE 22.1.1. The metrics include: (1) the number of members who used the "About this profile" feature between 1 January - 30 June 2023; and (2) the aggregate number of times those members used the feature between 1 January - 30 June 2023. The metrics are assigned to EEA Member State based on the self-reported profile location of the member.	
	Percentage of users that have enabled the trustworthiness indicator The number of members who used the "About this profile" feature between 1 January – 30 June 2023	The aggregate number of times those members used the feature between 1 January – 30 June 2023	
Member States		
Austria	43,529	65,476
Belgium	84,380	120,069
Bulgaria	18,839	29,347
Croatia	12,681	18,914
Cyprus	38,457	56,667
Czech Republic	63,680	88,682
Denmark	5,943	9,150
Estonia	29,918	48,631
Finland	642,114	922,491
France	426,648	639,208

Germany	37,533	55,289
Greece	22,912	32,466
Hungary	58,651	87,918
Ireland	338,482	497,184
Italy	6,367	9,260
Latvia	13,767	19,953
Lithuania	10,564	15,813
Luxembourg	5,988	8,549
Malta	246,166	345,766
Netherlands	148,216	218,382
Poland	106,869	162,943
Portugal	8,183	12,863
Romania	58,782	90,561
Slovakia	10,736	15,935
Slovenia	5,343	7,306
Spain	284,571	419,471
Sweden	96,261	136,176
Iceland	1,103	1,464
Liechtenstein	637	911
Norway	29,633	40,330
Total EU	**2,825,580**	**4,134,470**
Total EEA	**2,856,953**	**4,177,175**

Measure 22.2	**LinkedIn**	**Bing Search**
QRE 22.2.1	LinkedIn does not prioritise any new sources in our feed, but in crisis situations, (e.g., Covid-19 or Ukraine), we will use search banners to point members to reputable sources of information (e.g., when members searched for COVID, we pointed members to "trusted storylines" where we provided trustworthy information about those topics, including links to global health organisations) (please also see QRE 17.1.1).	Bing Search utilizes a variety of signals – including trustworthiness indicators from trusted third parties such as NewsGuard – as one of several means to help determine the authority score of a given website and rank it accordingly in search results. Bing Search also relies upon trustworthiness signals to help ensure that its recommender systems, such as auto-suggest and related search, direct users

LinkedIn's focus, in addition to pointing members to trustworthy content, has been to prohibit members from sharing harmful content on the platform. As a real identity online professional networking platform, content posted by members is seen by that member's colleagues, employer, and potential business partners. Consequently, members do not tend to post reputationally harmful content like misinformation, and such content does not gain traction on LinkedIn for the same reasons. Nonetheless, where misinformation is removed from LinkedIn, it is ineligible to be included in our recommender systems.

to high authority, trustworthy results and do not inadvertently suggest problematic or misleading content.

Microsoft's NewsGuard partnership provides users with trustworthiness signals to better evaluate the quality of the news they encounter online. NewsGuard has created trust ratings for 7,500+ news and information sites, which are compiled into a "Nutrition Label" and corresponding Red/Green Reliability Rating to help users understand the reliability of news sources. Within the EU, NewsGuard is currently available in France, Austria, Germany, and Italy with plans for future expansion. NewsGuard ratings and fingerprints cover the news and information sources that account for 95%+ of online engagement with news in those countries. Microsoft offers NewsGuard as a free plug-in for the Microsoft Edge web browser (it is also available for other browsers including Chrome and Firefox), and users of the Edge mobile application on both iOS and Android can enable NewsGuard ratings in their app settings. For users with the NewsGuard plug-in, Bing Search results (both in traditional web search and Bing Chat) include NewsGuard Reliability ratings that lead to a pop-up screen with more site information.

Microsoft also recently announced two new partnerships to strengthen the company's capacity and understanding of global threats to disinformation: first, with EFE Verifica (EFE), to track false narratives spreading in Spain and Latin America; and second, with Reporters Sans Frontières (RSF), to use their Journalism Trust Initiative (JTI) data set in Microsoft products. These partnerships are part of a larger effort to empower Microsoft users to better understand the information they consume across our platforms and products.

The above mechanisms and the Bing algorithm's emphasis on promoting high authority content are applied equally to the new Bing generative AI features to help ensure that users are protected from misleading information in the new Bing experience. See, for example, How Microsoft Uses NewsGuard to Support its Trusted, Transparent Technology – and the below example displaying NewsGuard indicators within a Bing Chat response.

Measure 22.3	**LinkedIn**	**Bing Search**
QRE 22.3.1	In addition to the LinkedIn User Agreement, LinkedIn has established and published (a) the LinkedIn Professional Community Policies to set out and elaborate on LinkedIn's requirements and expectations for its member base; and (b) help center content that collates and expands upon existing resources to further explain the main parameters of LinkedIn recommender systems and options provided to users to influence and control these recommender systems. The Professional Community Policies and help center content are published on our platform and available in all languages that LinkedIn currently supports, including the following official EU and EEA languages: English, Czech, Danish, Dutch, French, German, Italian, Norwegian, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Spanish and Swedish. Additionally, we have extended this language coverage in accordance with the Digital Services Act. LinkedIn seeks to reflect the best version of professional life through a community where we treat each other with respect and help one another succeed. The Professional Community Policies have three main elements: (1) Be Safe, (2) Be Trustworthy and (3) Be Professional. Additionally, the Professional Community Policies set out how members can report content that may violate our policies and that a violation of our Professional Community Policies can result in action taken against that member's account or content.	The above-mentioned policies and measures are available to EU users in EU languages through the Microsoft Bing Webmaster Guidelines and How Bing delivers search results. In addition, the Bing Conversational Experiences and Image Creator Terms and The New Bing FAQ provide guidance to users on how to make informed decisions and evaluate content generated by AI features. More information about how Bing moderates its generative AI platforms to prevent users from being presented with harmful information is available at The new Bing: Our approach to Responsible AI.

	(1) Be Safe: do not post harassing content; do not threaten, incite, or promote violence; do not share material depicting the exploitation of children; do not promote, sell or attempt to purchase illegal or dangerous goods or services; do not share content promoting dangerous organisations or individuals. (2) Be Trustworthy: do not share false or misleading content; do not create a fake profile or falsify information about yourself; do not scam, defraud, deceive others. (3) Be Professional: do not be hateful, do not engage in sexual innuendos or unwanted advances; do not share harmful or shocking material; do not spam members or the platform.	
Measure 22.4 **QRE 22.4.1** **SLI 22.4.1 - actions enforcing policies above**	This measure is aimed specifically at "providers of trustworthiness indicators" and is therefore not relevant or pertinent to Microsoft and its services.	This measure is aimed specifically at "providers of trustworthiness indicators" and is therefore not relevant or pertinent to Microsoft and its services.

Measure 22.5 **QRE 22.5.1** **SLI 22.5.1 - actions enforcing policies above**	This measure is aimed specifically at "providers of trustworthiness indicators" and is therefore not relevant or pertinent to Microsoft and its services.	This measure is aimed specifically at "providers of trustworthiness indicators" and is therefore not relevant or pertinent to Microsoft and its services.

SLI 22.5.2 - actions enforcing policies above		

Measure 22.6 **QRE 22.6.1** **SLI 22.6.1 - actions enforcing policies above**	This measure is aimed specifically at "providers of trustworthiness indicators" and is therefore not relevant or pertinent to Microsoft and its services .	This measure is aimed specifically at "providers of trustworthiness indicators" and is therefore not relevant or pertinent to Microsoft and its services

Measure 22.7	LinkedIn	Bing Search
QRE 22.7.1	As the world around us changes, LinkedIn continues to evolve and adapt our systems and practices for combating misinformation and other inauthentic behaviour on our platform, including to respond to the unique challenges presented by world events. LinkedIn's Professional Community Policies, which all members agree to abide by on joining LinkedIn, prohibit misinformation. As described in more detail in our response to QRE 18.1.1, LinkedIn uses a combination of automated and manual activity to keep content that violates our policies off of LinkedIn. LinkedIn also aims to educate its members about civic discourse, electoral processes, and public security through its global team of news editors. These editors provide each member with relevant, timely information sourced from credible news sources that educate LinkedIn members about facts and news events, including global elections, and its content moderation teams closely monitor associated conversations in a number of languages. In addition to broader measures, LinkedIn has taken special care to counter low authority information in relation to the COVID-19 crisis and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine, as detailed below and further in the Crisis Reporting appendices. Some examples of steps we have taken to tackle disinformation in connection with unfolding world events include the following: In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, LinkedIn editors created and promoted trusted content. LinkedIn introduced the following measures: • Promote content from most credible organisations and experts, such as the World Health Organization • During the early years of the pandemic, any member that undertook a simple search of the term "coronavirus" was redirected to a link "*Know the facts about coronavirus*", which appears first in the list of search results. By clicking	In addition to broader measures, Bing Search has taken special care to counter low authority information and misinformation in relation to the COVID-19 crisis and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine, as detailed below and further in the Crisis Reporting appendices. Microsoft is also an active participant in the elections working group established by the Crisis Response Working Group. In addition, Microsoft works with election authorities responsible for running elections to promote trusted information regarding elections and monitors for foreign information operations targeting elections. In response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Bing Search has closely monitored low authority information trend and is working to promote authoritative content related to the conflict. • Bing Search has taken steps to algorithmically boost authority signals and has downgraded less authoritative information (*see* SLI 22.7.1). These queries are translated automatically into other languages supported by Bing Search and integrated into Bing Chat. • Bing search works with Microsoft's Democracy Forward, Threat Assessment Center (MTAC) and Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) to ensure access to signals regarding Russian cyber and information operations targeting Ukraine to inform potential algorithmic interventions both for traditional and generative AI search tools. • Bing Search regularly partners with independent research organizations and nonprofit organizations to maintain threat intelligence and inform potential algorithmic interventions both for traditional and generative AI search tools. • Bing Search also takes action to remove autosuggest and related search terms that have been found likely to lead users to low authority content. Bing Search continues to partner with fact checking organizations and apply fact check labels to help users understand the context and trustworthiness of certain content in the EU. • These measures have helped ensure that Bing Search is promoting authoritative news sources, timelines, and other factual information at the top of algorithmic search results and in Bing Chat.

	on this link, members are directed to LinkedIn's own official page on the coronavirus with information and broadcasts from verified sources, primarily from the World Health Organization. The storylines on this page are available in 8 languages across 54 countries. Launched a 'Special Report: Coronavirus' box above 'Today's News and Views' with story lines relevant to COVID-19 and including updates from the World Health Organization and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. • LinkedIn's team of editors cover the most recent developments of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, ranging from the economic impact to major military events that are taking place.	• Bing Search has also complied with EU sanctions orders requiring the removal of certain Russian sources, such as Russia Today and Sputnik. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Bing Search introduced several methods to promote reliable content for EU users: • Reliable health information is provided through public service announcements pointing to authoritative third-party sources of health information (e.g., the US Center For Disease Control and the World Health Organization) for certain COVID-19 queries, such as for queries seeking information about COVID-19 symptoms, an example of which is shown below. • Reliable information can also be found near the top of search results pages and in sidebar windows. • In general, Bing Search prioritizes trusted, high authority news sources and has utilized algorithmic defensive search strategies to help promote reliable information about COVID-19 and pandemic related information.
SLI 22.7.1 - actions enforcing policies above	Methodology of data measurement:	Methodology of data measurement:

We look forward to providing reports reflecting any applicable actions under this SLI during future reporting periods.

Bing has revised the SLI action descriptions below for accuracy with respect to the metrics provided pursuant to this Section. Please see below key.

During the reporting period Bing Search took defensive actions on at least 798,180 different queries related to this crisis at a global level, resulting in over 3.85 million impressions in the EEA.

Although defensive search actions are taken at a global level (and therefore applied in every Member State), Bing has endeavored to provide the additional following data for this SLI:
- **"Defensive Interventions (RU/UA)"** refers to the total number of queries entered by users that were addressed with defensive search interventions related to the Ukraine/Russia crisis during the Reporting Period.
- **"Impressions (RU/UA)"** reflects the number of user impressions for queries searched by users where defensive search interventions related to the Ukraine/Russia crisis were applied during the Reporting Period.

	Impressions	Clicks	CTR	Shares	Defensive Interventions (RU/UA)	Impressions (RU/UA)	CTR (N/A)	Shares (N/A)
Member States								
Austria					4,349	61,899		
Belgium					7,750	83,854		
Bulgaria					14	24		
Croatia					5	5		
Cyprus					3	3		
Czech Republic					43	56		
Denmark					1,843	18,764		
Estonia					12	15		
Finland					1,701	13,817		
France					13,982	377,397		
Germany					17,301	989,163		
Greece					5	7		
Hungary					2	4		

Ireland					4,114	59,766		
Italy					8,117	390,653		
Latvia					19	23		
Lithuania					16	17		
Luxembourg					1	1		
Malta					2	2		
Netherlands					7,731	84,706		
Poland					7,031	129,549		
Portugal					3,909	36,275		
Romania					15	17		
Slovakia					4	18		
Slovenia					3	3		
Spain					12,867	1,530,525		
Sweden					5,191	45,700		
Iceland					1	1		
Liechtenstein					0	0		
Norway					3,420	34,404		
Total EU					**96,030**	**3,822,263**		
Total EEA					**99,451**	**3,856,668**		

V. Empowering users		
Commitment 23		
Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with the functionality to flag harmful false and/or misleading information that violates Signatories policies or terms of service.		
	C.23	**M 23.1**	**M 23.2**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**

	LinkedIn	Bing Search
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New Implementation Measures Not applicable	New Implementation Measures Bing has updated its "Report a Concern" and "Feedback" tools to allow users to report issues with Bing Chat and Bing Image Creator.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures As part of our work to implement the Digital Services Act, we are working to introduce specific reporting flows for entities designated as Trusted Flaggers under which they will be able to report content which violates our Professional Community Policies, including false or misleading content.	Planned Implementation Measures Bing monitors user feedback and regularly evolves its product reporting process and forms in response to user feedback, new legal obligations, or product developments.

Measure 23.1	LinkedIn	Bing Search
QRE 23.1.1	If LinkedIn users locate content they believe violates our Professional Community Policies, we encourage them to report it using the in-product reporting mechanism represented by the three dots in the upper right-hand corner of the content itself on LinkedIn. Misinformation is specifically called out as one of the reporting options.	As a search engine that does not host or display user generated content, Bing Search does not have a reporting function for user generated content. Bing Search's Report a Concern Form permits users to report third-party websites for a variety of reasons including disclosure of private information, spam and malicious pages, and illegal materials.

	The reporting feature is available through, and largely identical across, LinkedIn's website and mobile app, although reporting reasons and their visual presentation may vary slightly for certain types of content. In most instances, the reporting process is located just one click away from the content being reported and, depending on whether content is reported in the LinkedIn App or on desktop, the reporting process takes between four or five clicks to complete. Reported content generally is reviewed by trained content reviewers. In addition, LinkedIn uses automation to flag potentially violative content to our content moderation teams. If reported or flagged content violates the Professional Community Policies, it will be actioned in accordance with our policies. When users use the above reporting process, they will receive an email acknowledging receipt of the report. They will also be provided access to updates on their report and the opportunity to appeal. Members also receive an email notifying them in in the event their content actioned in accordance with our policies. The email includes a link to a notice page for additional details and resources. If the member believes that their content complies with our Professional Community Policies, they can ask us to revisit our decision by submitting an appeal by clicking on the link in the notice page.	Bing Search's "Feedback" tool, which is accessible on the lower right corner on a search results page, allows users to provide feedback on search results (including a screenshot of the results page) to Bing Search. Depending on the nature of the feedback, Bing Search may take appropriate action, such as to engage in algorithmic interventions to ensure high authority content appears above low authority content in search results, remove links that violate local law or Bing policies, add answers, warnings or other media literacy interventions on certain topics, or remove autosuggest terms. As discussed in QRE 14.1.2, these tools have also been updated to make it easy for users to report problematic content they encounter while using Bing Chat by including the same "Feedback" button with direct links to Bing's "Report a Concern" tool on the footer of each page of Bing Chat and Image Creator. Bing also updated its Report a Concern page to address the new types of content that users can generate using Bing Image Creator and new Bing.
Measure 23.2	**LinkedIn**	**Bing Search**
QRE 23.2.1	As noted in our response to QRE 23.1.1, content that is flagged as misinformation (whether reported or automatically detected) is removed from LinkedIn. LinkedIn has a quality assurance team that is dedicated to ensure the quality of our content review processes and decisions. For example, the quality assurance team performs quality checks, on a routine basis, the content moderation decisions that have previously been made. This also allows us to improve our processes and further strengthen our platform as a trusted source of information.	See QRE 23.1.1. Bing Search generally does not experience issues with mass flagging of content or abuse of its reporting features. This concern appears more applicable to other types of services (e.g., social media and online media websites) or content outside the scope of this regulation that is more prone to mass flagging, such as copyright infringement. Bing Search engages in human review of reports submitted through its reporting functionality and evaluates each report consistent with its policies and procedures

	Furthermore, as a real identity professional network, LinkedIn acts vigilantly to maintain the integrity of all accounts and to ward off bot and false account activity. LinkedIn enforces the policies in its User Agreement prohibiting the use of "bots or other automated methods to access the Services, add or download contacts, send or redirect messages" through:

- Having a dedicated Anti-Abuse team to create the tools to enforce this prohibition
- Using automated systems detect and block automated activity
- Imposing hard limits on certain categories of activity commonly engaged in by bad actors
- Detecting whether members have installed known prohibited automation software
- Conducting manual investigation and restriction of accounts engaged in automated activity
- Partnering with the broader Microsoft organisation to develop technological solutions for detecting "deep fakes"
- Investing in and using AI to detect coordinated inauthentic activity and communities of fake accounts through similarities in their content and behaviour.

V. Empowering users
Commitment 24
Relevant Signatories commit to inform users whose content or accounts has been subject to enforcement actions (content/accounts labelled, demoted or otherwise enforced on) taken on the basis of violation of policies relevant to this section (as outlined in Measure 18.2), and provide them with the possibility to appeal against the enforcement action at issue and to handle complaints in a timely, diligent, transparent, and objective manner and to reverse the action without undue delay where the complaint is deemed to be founded.

	C.24	**M 24.1**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**LinkedIn**	**LinkedIn**

	LinkedIn	Commitment 24 is not relevant or pertinent to Bing Search as it does not allow the posting of user content that would require user appeals
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New Implementation Measures Not applicable	
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures Not applicable	

Measure 24.1	LinkedIn	Measure 24.1 is not relevant or pertinent to Bing Search as it does not allow the posting of user content that would require user appeals
QRE 24.1.1	When a post, comment, reply, or article, is reported and found to go against our Professional Community Policies, we take appropriate actions to remove it and/or restrict accounts depending on the severity of violation. The author whose content we've actioned will typically receive an email notifying them that their content does not comply with our policies. If the author believes LinkedIn has made a mistake in actioning their content, the author can ask LinkedIn to take a second look by submitting an appeal. To begin that appeal process, members can log into their account and follow the onscreen messaging or reply to the message they received notifying them of the content removal. Appeals made by members are treated the same regardless of whether they use LinkedIn's premium services. After our review is completed, the author will receive one of the following status updates:	

	- If your post complies with our Professional Community Policies, we'll put it back on LinkedIn. - If we find that your post doesn't comply with our Professional Community Policies, it will be removed from LinkedIn and only you will be able to access your post.			
SLI 24.1.1 - enforcement actions	Methodology of data measurement (where appropriate insights on data provided) [suggested character limit: 1500 characters] The table below reports metrics concerning content LinkedIn removed from its platform as Misinformation, pursuant to the policy outlined in QRE 18.2.1. The metrics include: - (1) the number of pieces of content removed as Misinformation between 1 January - 30 June 2023, broken out by EEA Member State; - (2) the number of those content removals that were appealed by the content author; - (3) the number of those appeals that were granted; - (4) the median time from appeal to appeal decision for those appeals. The metrics are assigned to EEA Member State based on the self-reported profile location of the content author.			
	The number of pieces of content removed as Misinformation between 1 January – 30 June 2023	The number of removals that were appealed by the content author	The number of appeals that were granted	The median time from appeal to appeal decision in hours
Data				
Member States				
Austria	314	9	3	23.6 hours
Belgium	715	6	1	
Bulgaria	130	0	0	
Croatia	82	0	0	

Cyprus	36	0	0
Czech Republic	70	1	0
Denmark	312	2	0
Estonia	27	1	0
Finland	76	1	0
France	9,012	21	4
Germany	2,516	27	2
Greece	155	1	0
Hungary	61	1	0
Ireland	187	3	0
Italy	4,534	6	0
Latvia	28	0	0
Lithuania	43	1	0
Luxembourg	194	1	0
Malta	22	0	0
Netherlands	3,203	26	1
Poland	241	3	0
Portugal	438	2	1
Romania	300	1	0
Slovakia	35	0	0
Slovenia	27	0	0
Spain	1,090	4	0
Sweden	357	1	0
Iceland	4	0	0
Liechtenstein	5	1	0
Norway	113	1	0
Total EU	**24,205**	**118**	**12**
Total EEA	**24,327**	**120**	**12**

V. Empowering users			
Commitment 25			
In order to help users of private messaging services to identify possible disinformation disseminated through such services, Relevant Signatories that provide messaging applications commit to continue to build and implement features or initiatives that empower users to think critically about information they receive and help them to determine whether it is accurate, without any weakening of encryption and with due regard to the protection of privacy.			
	C.25	**M 25.1**	**M 25.2**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Commitment 25 is not relevant to Bing Search and LinkedIn.	N/A	N/A

VI. Empowering the research community
Commitments 26 - 29

VI. Empowering the Research Community				
Commitment 26				
Relevant Signatories commit to provide access, wherever safe and practicable, to continuous, real-time or near real-time, searchable stable access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated, or manifestly-made public data for research purposes on Disinformation through automated means such as APIs or other open and accessible technical solutions allowing the analysis of said data.				
	C.26	**M 26.1**	**M 26.2**	**M 26.3**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**

	LinkedIn	**Bing Search**
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New Implementation Measures Beta program to allow bonafide researchers to access public data for research on impact of misinformation and other online harms impacting the Union.	New Implementation Measures Bing is working to provide additional open datasets and resources that may be used by the research community
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures Review Beta program and researcher feedback for improvements of program to better enable clarity and address obstacles to rightful access to public data.	Planned Implementation Measures Bing is actively exploring additional mechanisms to meet this commitment and welcomes feedback from the research community and Commission on the types of data that would be most useful to the research community.

Measure 26.1	LinkedIn	Bing Search
QRE 26.1.1	LinkedIn supports the aims of the research community and regularly provides information and data to the research community in a variety of ways. To date, we have made non-personal, aggregated data publicly available (data on gender equity in the workplace, data on green skills and jobs, data on industry and job skills, and data on engagement with labor markets and employment trends). Our goal with this action to enable researchers to understand the rapidly changing world of work through access to and use of LinkedIn data. Because much of our data is publicly available, the extent to which such data has been used for disinformation related research purposes cannot easily be ascertained. Additionally, LinkedIn is expanding its API access for public data for disinformation related research purposes. Information about the LinkedIn APIs are available to the public and researcher access is provided here. Finally, Microsoft is also a leader in research in Responsible AI and provides a range of tools and resources dedicated to promoting responsible usage of artificial intelligence to allow practitioners and researchers to maximize the benefits of AI systems while mitigating harms. For example, as part of its Responsible AI Toolbox, Microsoft provides a Responsible AI Mitigations Library, which enables practitioners to more easily experiment with different techniques for addressing failure (which could include inaccurate outputs), and the Responsible AI Tracker, which uses visualizations to show the effectiveness of the different techniques for more informed decision-making. These tools are available to the public and research community for free.	Bing Search and Microsoft are dedicated to supporting the research community and regularly provide information and data to the research community in a variety of ways. Bing Search provides researchers and the public with access to MS MARCO, a collection of datasets focused on deep learning in search that are derived from Bing Search queries and related data. Research organizations can gain access to the MS MARCO datasets instantaneously via the MS MARCO homepage. The MS MARCO dataset has been cited in over 1400 research papers since its release and has been utilized for a range of research issues, including in connection with misinformation and disinformation related issues. Because the dataset is provided open source, the extent to which it has been used for disinformation related research purposes cannot easily be ascertained. However, the dataset has been cited in various academic papers concerning misinformation, including the following research released during the Reporting Period: "Multiple Evidence Combination for Fact-Checking of Health-Related Information", Pritam Deka, Anna Jurek-Loughrey, Deepak P, In The 22nd Workshop on Biomedical Natural Language Processing and BioNLP Shared Tasks, 2023. "Scientific Fact-Checking: A Survey of Resources and Approaches," Juraj Vladika and Florian Matthes, Department of Computer Science Technical University of Munich, May 2023 Bing Search also provides researchers with access to ORCAS: Open Resource for Click Analysis in Search | msmarco (microsoft.github.io), a click-based dataset associated with the TREC Deep Learning Track, which provides 18 million connections to 10 million distinct queries and is available to researchers. In 2020, Bing Search also shared a search dataset for Coronavirus Intent comprised of queries from all over the world that had an intent related to the Coronavirus or Covid-19 (e.g., searches for "Coronavirus updates Seattle" or "Shelter in place") for use by researchers and the public. This data, which is divisible by country, is particularly relevant to misinformation research on public health issues and the COVID-19 pandemic, as it provides insights into how users sought information related to the coronavirus during the

pandemic. The dataset was also posted to Azure Open datasets for Machine Learning, Tensorflow.org and Kaggle. See additional information on the dataset at Extracting Covid-19 insights from Bing Search data | Bing Search Blog. This dataset has already been used by the disinformation research community. For example, Researchers at Aalborg University used the dataset as part of their research paper "'Does Vinegar Kill Coronavirus?' - Using Search Log Analysis to Estimate the Extent of COVID-19-Related Misinformation Searching Behaviour in the United States ". The Aalborg University study used Bing search log analysis to investigate the extent and characteristics of misinformation seeking behaviour in the US. Since Bing's last report, Harvard University's Kennedy School (HKS) Misinformation Review published the peer reviewed work "Less reliable media drive interest in anti-vaccine information" leveraging this dataset and Microsoft Research to study anti-vaccine discourse and patterns of misinformation.

Additionally, researchers who are registered webmasters may utilize Bing Search's Keyword Tools and Backlinks Webmaster Tools to provide insights into search usage and keywords. Bing is also working on ways to provide deeper research access to the tool across the research community and hopes to provide updates in its next report.

Bing Search also offers use of Bing APIs to the public, which include Bing Image Search, Bing News Search, Bing Video Search, Bing Visual Search, Bing Web Search, Bing Entity Search, Bing Autosuggest, and Bing Spell Check. Bing Search provides free access to these APIs for up to 1,000 transactions per month, which may be leveraged by the research community. Since its last report, Bing API was also leveraged as part of the research "Complex Claim Verification with Evidence Retrieved in the Wild" published by the University of Texas at Austin in May 2023, which analyzes means of fact-checking real-world claims by retrieving raw evidence from the web.

In addition to the above datasets, Microsoft Research maintains a public portal of codes, APIs, software development kits, and datasets that are available to the Research Community at Researcher tools: code & datasets - Microsoft Research. These public research tools can be accessed by researchers and downloaded instantaneously without formal applications or login credentials.

			Microsoft is also a leader in research in Responsible AI and provides a range of tools and resources dedicated to promoting responsible usage of artificial intelligence to allow practitioners and researchers to maximize the benefits of AI systems while mitigating harms. For example, as part of its Responsible AI Toolbox, Microsoft provides a Responsible AI Mitigations Library, which enables practitioners to more easily experiment with different techniques for addressing failure (which could include inaccurate outputs), and the Responsible AI Tracker, which uses visualizations to show the effectiveness of the different techniques for more informed decision-making. These tools are available to the public and research community for free. Lastly, given the open nature of the Bing Search index and public nature of search results, researchers can utilize Bing Search or Bing Chat to run specific queries and analyze results (unlike social media which may require private accounts or connections between users to access certain materials).	
QRE 26.1.2	LinkedIn published information on its [Beta] Researcher Access Program researcher access to public data.		Bing Search will publish information as it continues to build further data research infrastructure pertinent to these commitments.	
SLI 26.1.1 - uptake of the tools and processes described in Measure 26.1	Methodology of data measurement: LinkedIn will publish information as it continues to build its data research program pertinent to these commitments.		Methodology of data measurement: Because the above-mentioned tools discussed in QRE 26.1.2 predate the CoP and were provided open source without tracking mechanisms, Microsoft is working on developing adequate usage tracking for its many publicly accessible researcher tools and datasets.	
	Nr of users of public access	Other quantitative information on public access	Nr of users of public access	Other quantitative information on public access
Data				
Measure 26.2	**LinkedIn**		**Bing Search**	
QRE 26.2.1	See QRE 26.1.1		Unlike social media platforms, Bing Search does not have private user accounts or other personal data provided by users as contemplated by Measure 26.2. However, Bing does enable researcher access to data on the platform through a number of mechanisms, as described in QRE 26.1.1 and the research partnerships described in QRE 18.3.1. Bing Search welcomes feedback on the types of real-time data that would be most useful to the misinformation and disinformation research community in light of the above considerations; noting however that	

		providing access to an entire "real time" search engine dataset would be too large to feasibly process or share.
QRE 26.2.2	See QRE 26.1.1	See QRE 26.2.1 and 26.1.1.
QRE 26.2.3	Access to Data: For access to LinkedIn APIs, a researcher needs to submit an application, meet criteria for approval and provide additional information necessary for us to assess their project. APIs including non-public data may be made available for research purposes based on special requests and the ability of the researcher to protect personal data pursuant to GDPR and relevant intellectual property rights. Upon approval, the researcher's application with be provisioned with the relevant APIs. In addition, access is available to anyone who visits the relevant LinkedIn site. For access to other data, researchers may be provided with datasets and information as part of research inquiries and research partnerships with LinkedIn. Researchers may contact LinkedIn to discuss research opportunities.	Currently, there is not an application process to access the MS MARCO, ORCAS, or Bing Coronavirus Query datasets, as Microsoft intended to allow open and easy access to the public and research community without arduous credentialing or account creation processes. Users may freely access the datasets instantaneously through the MS MARCO and ORCAS websites and Bing Coronavirus Query page on Github. No application or credentialing is required, but unfortunately this open source model makes tracking usage more challenging and requires investment in additional tooling. For Bing Search's Keyword Research tool, Researchers may add their website (new or existing) to Bing Search Webmaster Tools and can freely use Keyword Research - Bing Webmaster Tools or Backlinks - Bing Webmaster Tools. Bing Search APIs are accessible at Bing APIs and may be accessed by signing up for an account. Other Microsoft datasets, including datasets derived by Bing Search, are accessible at Researcher tools: code & datasets - Microsoft Research. These also do not require credentials and datasets may be freely downloaded by researchers. For other research data, researchers may be provided datasets and information as part of research partnerships with Microsoft Research. Researchers may contact Microsoft Research to discuss research opportunities. And of course, the Bing Search service, including its generative AI services, is also public and may be used for a variety of research purposes without login or credentials. Microsoft is continuing to explore possibilities to streamline data access consistent with this provision and in accordance with Microsoft Research's longstanding data sharing and collaboration with the research community. Bing is also in the process of exploring additional research partnerships

							specifically related to Bing Chat and exploring additional red-team testing of Bing Chat within Microsoft.					
SLI 26.2.1 - meaningful metrics on the uptake, swiftness, and acceptance level of the tools and processes in Measure 26.2	Methodology of data measurement: We will make available this information at future reports because the program has only recently launched.						Methodology of data measurement: Bing does not gate access for its datasets and therefore this metric is inapplicable, as any individual may freely access the tools. Bing is working on approaches for better tracking of usage of publicly released datasets and APIs.					
	No of monthly users	No of applications received	No of applications rejected	No of applications accepted	Average response time	Other metrics	No of monthly users	No of applications received	No of applications rejected	No of applications accepted	Average response time	Other metrics
Data												
Measure 26.3	**LinkedIn**						**Bing Search**					
QRE 26.3.1	LinkedIn provides a comprehensive Help Center for assistance with other matters. LinkedIn endeavors to restore access and address any issues expeditiously.						Users can report issues accessing MS MARCO and ORCAS datasets to ms-marco@microsoft.com. Microsoft endeavors to restore access and address any issues with dataset access expeditiously. For Bing Search's Keyword Research tool, users can report issues by creating a support request ticket at Webmaster Support - Bing Webmaster Tools.					

VI. Empowering the research community
Commitment 27
Relevant Signatories commit to provide vetted researchers with access to data necessary to undertake research on Disinformation by developing, funding, and cooperating with an independent, third-party body that can vet researchers and research proposals.

	C.27		M 27.1	M 27.2	M 27.3	M 27.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**		**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**

	LinkedIn	Bing Search
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New Implementation Measures Microsoft, is an active participant in the EDMO Working Group for the Creation of an Independent Intermediary Body to Support Research on Digital Platforms.	New Implementation Measures Microsoft is an active participant in the EDMO Working Group for the Creation of an Independent Intermediary Body to Support Research on Digital Platforms.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures Microsoft plans to continue to engage in the work of above mentioned EDMO Working Group.	Planned Implementation Measures Microsoft plans to continue to engage in the work of above mentioned EDMO Working Group.

Measure 27.1	LinkedIn	Bing Search
QRE 27.1.1	Microsoft is a member of the Working Group for the Creation of an Independent Intermediary Body to Support Research on Digital Platforms. The Working Group has started its work on 10 May 2023 under the coordination of the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO). Its main task is to develop an organizational model for a new independent intermediary body that will facilitate data sharing between digital platforms and independent, external researchers. The Working Group plans to identify a set of governing principles for the new intermediary body, lay out its core functions, outline an organizational structure, staffing and budgetary needs, identify a form and place of establishment, and provide a timeline for the body's initial phases of work. The practical outcome of the Working Group is a report laying out a roadmap, guidance on timeline and roles, as well as other plans for establishing the independent, third-party body.	Microsoft is a member of the Working Group for the Creation of an Independent Intermediary Body to Support Research on Digital Platforms. The Working Group has started its work on 10 May 2023 under the coordination of the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO). Its main task is to develop an organizational model for a new independent intermediary body that will facilitate data sharing between digital platforms and independent, external researchers. The Working Group plans to identify a set of governing principles for the new intermediary body, lay out its core functions, outline an organizational structure, staffing and budgetary needs, identify a form and place of establishment, and provide a timeline for the body's initial phases of work. The practical outcome of the Working Group is a report laying out a roadmap, guidance on timeline and roles, as well as other plans for establishing the independent, third-party body.
Measure 27.2	LinkedIn	Bing Search
QRE 27.2.1	As the development of the independent third-party body has not yet been finalized, there has not yet been any funding allocated to the implementation of Measure 27.2.	As the development of the independent third-party body has not yet been finalized, there has not yet been any funding allocated to the implementation of Measure 27.2.

Measure 27.3	**LinkedIn**	**Bing Search**
QRE 27.3.1	As the development of the independent third-party body has not yet been finalized, no data has been shared with this body for the purposes of research as outlined under Measure 27.3.	As the development of the independent third-party body has not yet been finalized, no data has been shared with this body for the purposes of research as outlined under Measure 27.3.
SLI 27.3.1 - research projects vetted by the independent third-party body	Methodology of data measurement: As the development of the independent third-party body has not yet been finalized, no research projects have yet been vetted by this body, as set out under Measure 27.3.	Methodology of data measurement: As the development of the independent third-party body hasnot yet been finalized, no research projects have yet been vetted by this body, as set out under Measure 27.3.
	Nr of research projects for which they provided access to data Not applicable.	Nr of research projects for which they provided access to data Not applicable.
Data		
Measure 27.4	**LinkedIn**	**Bing Search**
QRE 27.4.1	Microsoft is partnering with Princeton University and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to fund and provide data to the Institute for Research on the Information Environment (IRIE), an international resource to study information ecosystems that can spur evidence-based policy solutions. Microsoft will continue investing in its data-driven partnership with Princeton until at least mid-2024 to continue bolstering this resource.	Microsoft is partnering with Princeton University and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to fund and provide data to the Institute for Research on the Information Environment (IRIE), an international resource to study information ecosystems that can spur evidence-based policy solutions. Microsoft will continue investing in its data-driven partnership with Princeton until at least mid-2024 to continue bolstering this resource.

VI. Empowering the research community					
Commitment 28 Relevant Signatories commit to support good faith research into Disinformation that involves their services.					
	C.28	**M 28.1**	**M 28.2**	**M 28.3**	**M 28.4**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**

	LinkedIn	Bing Search
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New Implementation Measures Published details on our [Beta] Researcher Access Program	New Implementation Measures Bing and Microsoft have initiated new research projects, published new research, and are in the process of preparing additional datasets for use by the research community.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures Ongoing review of researcher feedback and needs may result in additional measures and resources being made available.	Planned Implementation Measures Microsoft Research regularly explores potential partnerships with third party research institutions and is actively in discussions with several research institutions on potential misinformation and disinformation related research that may leverage Bing Search data. Microsoft's internal research divisions also regularly initiate and support research relevant to misinformation and disinformation and further research may be released in the next reporting period.

Measure 28.1	LinkedIn	Bing Search
QRE 28.1.1	LinkedIn facilitates research, engages with the research community, and provides data to the research community in a variety of ways, as described below and in QRE 26.1-2. Historically, LinkedIn's work with external stakeholders, including, for example, research institutes, and academia, to understand the rapidly changing world of work through access to and use of LinkedIn data. Additionally, LinkedIn employs academics to gain practical experience combining industry knowledge with academic expertise to solve complex business problems spanning all areas of engineering, with an initial focus on artificial intelligence (including work related to large recommender systems and deep learning algorithms) and data science. While the foregoing work remains critical to our mission, we are working to expand access to data for research purposes consistent with the goals of the CoP as well as the applicable requirements of the DSA and look forward to providing further information on this in future reports. Additionally, LinkedIn regularly explores potential partnerships with non-governmental and research institutions and is actively in discussions with one research institution to conduct a data and recommender system pilot project leveraging LinkedIn data. LinkedIn hopes to publicly announce this partnership in its next report. Finally, LinkedIn has in place the needed teams and tools to make data available to researchers in a variety of ways, including via Excel or XML files, GitHub repositories, sandboxed laptops, and APIs.	Bing Search facilitates research, engages with the research community, and provides data to the research community in a variety of ways, as described below and in QRE 26.1-2 and 18.3.1. Microsoft dedicates significant resources to supporting, promoting, and developing research on emerging issues including responsible AI, safe design, search and information retrieval, language learning models, and algorithms. Microsoft Research and other research groups within the company, such as the AI for Good Research Lab, employ robust teams of researchers and data scientists and regularly utilize Bing Search datasets as part of important research efforts, including research focused on misinformation and/or disinformation. Microsoft Research and the AI for Good Lab regularly explores potential partnerships with third party research institutions and are actively in discussions with research institutions on potential misinformation and disinformation related research that may leverage Bing Search data. Microsoft also plans to build upon its partnership with Princeton University and Carnegie foundation looking at ways to increase researcher access to data. Lastly, Bing Search also partners with third party nonprofits and research organizations to review and evaluate emerging trends, techniques, tactics, and threat intelligence in misinformation and/or disinformation.
Measure 28.2	LinkedIn	Bing Search
QRE 28.2.1	Please see QRE 26.1.1 and QRE 26.2.3.	Please see QRE 26.1.1. and 26.2.3

Measure 28.3	**LinkedIn**	**Bing Search**
QRE 28.3.1	We look forward to partnering with other relevant signatories on this project and will provide further reporting as the annual consultation is established.	We look forward to partnering with other relevant signatories on this project and will provide further reporting as the annual consultation is established.
Measure 28.4	**LinkedIn**	**Bing Search**
QRE 28.4.1	We will provide information on relevant financial commitments once such requests are received and the EDMO process for providing research funds is established.	We will provide information on relevant financial commitments once such requests are received and the EDMO process for providing research funds is established.

VI. Empowering the research community				
Commitment 29				
Relevant Signatories commit to conduct research based on transparent methodology and ethical standards, as well as to share datasets, research findings and methodologies with relevant audiences.				
	C.29	**M 29.1**	**M 29.2**	**M 29.3**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Commitment 29 is aimed specifically at the research community and is therefore not relevant or pertinent to Microsoft and its services.			

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community
Commitments 30 - 33

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community					
Commitment 30 Relevant Signatories commit to establish a framework for transparent, structured, open, financially sustainable, and non-discriminatory cooperation between them and the EU fact-checking community regarding resources and support made available to fact-checkers					
	C.30		**M 30.1**	**M 30.2**	**M 30.3**	**M 30.4**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**		**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**

	LinkedIn	**Bing Search**
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New Implementation Measures LinkedIn has engaged with and entered into an agreement with an external fact-checking organisation to increase the language coverage of its fact-checking arrangement.	New Implementation Measures Bing is actively exploring additional fact-checking support to provide enhanced coverage across EEA Member States and languages.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures Not applicable.	Planned Implementation Measures Bing is working to secure agreements with additional fact checking organizations and is in active, productive discussions with several fact-checking organizations.

Measure 30.1	**LinkedIn**	**Bing Search**
QRE 30.1.1	LinkedIn has entered into a fact-checking arrangement with an external, independent global news agency.	Bing Search supports the schema.org ClaimReview fact-check protocol as part of its search ingestion, as discussed further in QRE 21.1.1. Because

	This relationship helps our internal content reviewers determine if user generated content violates LinkedIn's Professional Community Policies. Content that violates LinkedIn's policies is removed from the platform.	ClaimReview is an open protocol available for all websites and search engines to use, Bing Search does not maintain formal agreements with any individual fact-checking organization. Nonetheless, Bing Search is in active discussions with additional fact checking organizations to evaluate potential agreements to provide expanded fact-checking coverage across EEA Member States and languages.
QRE 30.1.2	Reuters, a global news organization with 2,500 journalists in about 200 locations worldwide. Reuters is one of the largest news agencies in the world.	See QRE 30.1.1 and QRE 21.1.1. Bing Search continues to evaluate additional fact-checking organizations and tools for use by search engines and is actively working to secure agreements with additional fact-checking organizations to achieve broader coverage across EEA.
QRE 30.1.3	LinkedIn has implemented internal processes empowering our hundreds of global internal content reviewers to be able to obtain a fact-check from an external fact-checker partnership. Fact-checker conclusions are reviewed by internal content reviewers to determine whether the content at issue violates LinkedIn's Professional Community Policies and if so, the content is removed from the platform.	See QREs 30.1.1-2. As noted above, any authorized fact-checking organization can leverage the free ClaimReview protocol to provide fact-checks to Bing Search. Bing Search welcomes the opportunity to partner with additional fact-checking organizations and is actively exploring proposals and partnerships with additional fact-checking organizations. Bing Search would welcome additional coverage and usage of the ClaimReview protocols in EU Member States to help expand fact-checking coverage. Bing is also working to secure agreements with additional fact-checking organizations and signatories to achieve broader coverage across the EEA.
SLI 30.1.1 - Member States and languages covered by agreements with the fact-checking organisations	Methodology of data measurement: LinkedIn receives fact checking services for content in English, Spanish, Portuguese, French, German, and Italian. LinkedIn sends content to external fact checkers regardless of the location of the member posting the content, the viewers of the content, or the topic at issue. Content that violates LinkedIn's Professional Community Policies is removed.	Methodology of data measurement: As set out in QRE 30.1.2 and SLI 31.1.1, because ClaimReview is an open protocol available for all websites and search engines to use, Bing Search does not currently maintain formal agreements with any individual fact-checking organisation. As any fact-checking organisation can leverage the free ClaimReview protocol to embed fact-check tags into their website, there is no limitation in terms of languages and Member States covered.
	Nr of agreements with fact-checking organisations	Nr of agreements with fact-checking organisations
	1	Not applicable

Measure 30.2	LinkedIn	Bing Search
QRE 30.2.1	LinkedIn has engaged in arms-length negotiations with a large global news organisation that follows the highest ethical standards in news reporting, including those related to accuracy, independence, integrity, and freedom from bias. See Standards & Values	Style Guide	Reuters (reutersagency.com). Our agreements give the fact-checkers complete discretion in providing their fact-checking conclusions, and LinkedIn personnel leverage these conclusions to determine whether the content at issue violates LinkedIn's Professional Community Policies. Content that violates LinkedIn's policies is removed.	Bing Search is actively working to secure additional fact-checking partners and has engaged in efforts to discuss potential relationships with multiple fact-checking organizations. Bing Search currently supports the free and open ClaimReview protocol, which may be utilized by all fact-checking organizations to embed fact-check tags into content, articles, and websites that appear in search indexes. Bing Search welcomes the opportunity to partner with additional fact checking organizations. See also QREs 30.1.1-3.
QRE 30.2.2	LinkedIn regularly meets with its fact-checking partner to discuss improvements in process.	As noted above, Bing Search ingests ClaimReview tags embedded in fact-check content posted on websites that are indexed in the Bing Search index. Webmasters for fact-checking organizations have self-help tools available that allow them to review website analytics and search effectiveness (including insights into keywords or search queries used in Bing Search to reach their website) for websites containing ClaimReview tags as part of Bing Search's Webmaster Tools, discussed further at QRE 32.1.1. This dashboard provides website operators with a range of data and analytics that can be used by fact-checking organizations to assess how users found their fact-checked content, website traffic patterns, and the effectiveness of their fact-check tags. See QREs 30.1.1-2 for additional information on Bing Search's ClaimReview fact check program. Bing has also engaged in conversations with members of the fact-checking community and signatories to solicit feedback on its fact-checking tools and discuss potential agreements for enhanced fact-checking coverage.
QRE 30.2.3	This QRE is not relevant or pertinent as LinkedIn is not a fact-checking organisation.	This QRE is not applicable to Bing Search, as it is not a fact-checking organization.
Measure 30.3	LinkedIn	Bing Search
QRE 30.3.1	LinkedIn regularly meets with its fact-checking partner to discuss improvements in process.	Bing has engaged in conversations with members of the fact-checking community and signatories to solicit feedback on its fact-checking tools and discuss potential agreements for enhanced fact-checking coverage. Bing

		Search looks forward to partnering with other relevant signatories and the fact-checking community on this Measure moving forward.
Measure 30.4	**LinkedIn**	**Bing Search**
QRE 30.4.1	LinkedIn stands ready to cooperate in accordance with this QRE at the appropriate time.	Bing stands ready to cooperate in accordance with this QRE at the appropriate time.

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community						
Commitment 31						
Relevant Signatories commit to integrate, showcase, or otherwise consistently use fact-checkers' work in their platforms' services, processes, and contents; with full coverage of all Member States and languages.						
	C.31		**M 31.1**	**M 31.2**	**M 31.3**	**M 31.4**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**		**LinkedIn**	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**

	LinkedIn	**Bing Search**
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New Implementation Measures Same as Measure 30: LinkedIn has engaged with and entered into an agreement with an external fact-checking organisation.	New Implementation Measures Bing is actively exploring additional fact-checking support to provide enhanced coverage across EEA Member States and languages.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures Not applicable	Planned Implementation Measures Bing is working to secure agreements with additional fact checking organizations and is in

							active, productive discussions with several fact checking organizations.

Measure 31.1	**LinkedIn**				**Bing Search**		
Measure 31.2	**LinkedIn**				**Bing Search**		
QRE 31.1.1	LinkedIn leverages its fact-checker to review user generated content that may violate its Professional Community Policies, which prohibit misinformation. Content that violates LinkedIn's Professional Community Policies is removed from LinkedIn.				Bing Search uses ClaimReview tags embedded in websites with fact-checked content to help inform its algorithms (i.e., by leading users to more authoritative sources of information) and to provide useful context and indications of trustworthiness to its users in search results. See QREs 21.1.1 and 30.2.1-2 for an overview of Bing Search's use of Schema.org ClaimReview fact check labels and discussion of additional steps Bing Search is taking to attain further fact-checking coverage moving forward.		
SLI 31.1.1 - use of fact-checks	Methodology of data measurement: The figure for the number of content pieces reviewed by fact-checkers represents the number of pieces sent to our external fact checkers during the period 1 January 2023 – 30 June 2023. See also SLI 21.1.2				Methodology of data measurement: **Fact Check URLs ("FC URL")** – This represents the number of distinct URLs containing a ClaimReview tag (i.e. fact-check content) that appeared on the first page of Bing search results for any number of users located in the EU Member States. **Fact Check Impressions ("FCI")** – The number of times the above mentioned URLs appeared on the first page of Bing search results to a user located in the EU Member States.		
	Nr of fact-checked articles published	Reach of fact-checked	Nr of content pieces reviewed by fact-checkers	Other	Nr of fact-checked articles published	Reach of fact-checked (FCI)	Nr of content pieces reviewed by fact-checkers	Other (FC URL)
Member States								
Austria						967		202
Belgium						739		259
Bulgaria						0		0
Croatia						0		0
Cyprus						0		0
Czech Republic						0		0
Denmark						425		128

Estonia						0		0
Finland						165		66
France						2,085		402
Germany						10,306		672
Greece						0		0
Hungary						1		1
Ireland						974		287
Italy						1,264		325
Latvia						0		0
Lithuania						0		0
Luxembourg						0		0
Malta						0		0
Netherlands						1,502		436
Poland						755		232
Portugal						1,279		335
Romania						0		0
Slovakia						0		0
Slovenia						0		0
Spain						2,266		412
Sweden						778		241
Iceland						0		0
Liechtenstein						0		0
Norway						575		186
Total EU					**N/A**	**23,506**	**N/A**	**3,998**
Total EEA					**N/A**	**24,081**	**N/A**	**4,184**
Total Global	**0**	**N/A**	**765**					

SLI 31.1.2 - impact of actions taken	Methodology of data measurement: Not applicable as LinkedIn doesn't label content on its platform. LinkedIn leverages its fact-checkers to review content that may violate its Professional Community Policies, which prohibit misinformation. Content that violates LinkedIn's Professional Community Policies is removed from LinkedIn.			Methodology of data measurement: Bing Search is not able to provide metrics concerning the "impact" of individual fact check websites appearing in its search results in response to specific queries.		
	Nr of pieces of content labelled	Impact of said measures on user interactions with information labelled as false or misleading	Other	Nr of pieces of content labelled	Impact of said measures on user interactions with information labelled as false or misleading	Other
Total EEA	0	Not applicable		0	Not applicable	

SLI 31.1.3 – Quantitative information used for contextualisation for the SLIs 31.1.1 / 31.1.2	Methodology of data measurement: LinkedIn looks forward to continue working with other signatories on contextualisation for SLIs 31.1.1 and 31.1.2, taking into account the specificities of our platform.	Methodology of data measurement: Bing Search looks forward to continue working with other signatories on the contextualisation for SLIs 31.1.1 and 31.1.2.
	Denominator to be decided within the TF ahead of the baseline report Not applicable	Denominator to be decided within the TF ahead of the baseline report Not applicable
Total EEA	Not applicable	Not applicable

Measure 31.3	**LinkedIn**	**Bing Search**
QRE 31.3.1	As the work in the Permanent Task-force on the development of the repository of fact-checking content has not yet started at the time of submission of this report, no contributions as listed under Measure 31.3 can currently be reported on.	As the work in the Permanent Task-force on the development of the repository of fact-checking content has not yet started at the time of submission of this report, no contributions as listed under Measure 31.3 can currently be reported on.
Measure 31.4	**LinkedIn**	**Bing Search**
QRE 31.4.1	As the work in the Permanent Taskforce on the development of the repository of fact-checking content has not yet started at the time	As the work in the Permanent Taskforce on the development of the repository of fact-checking content has not yet started at the time of submission of this

	of submission of this report, no technical solutions as referred to under Measure 31.4 can currently be reported on.	report, no technical solutions as referred to under Measure 31.4 can currently be reported on.

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

Commitment 32

Relevant Signatories commit to provide fact-checkers with prompt, and whenever possible automated, access to information that is pertinent to help them to maximise the quality and impact of fact-checking, as defined in a framework to be designed in coordination with EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations.

	C.32	M 32.1	M 32.2	M 32.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**	**LinkedIn**	**LinkedIn** **Bing Search**

	LinkedIn	Bing Search
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New Implementation Measures Same as Measure 30: LinkedIn has engaged with and entered into an agreement with an external fact-checking organisations.	New Implementation Measures Bing has engaged in conversations with members of the fact-checking community and signatories to solicit feedback on its fact-checking tools and discuss potential agreements for enhanced fact-checking coverage. Bing Search looks forward to partnering with other relevant signatories and the fact-checking community on this Measure moving forward.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures Not applicable.	Planned Implementation Measures Bing is working to secure agreements with additional fact checking organizations and is in active, productive discussions with several fact checking organizations.

Measure 32.1	**LinkedIn**	**Bing Search**	
Measure 32.2	**LinkedIn**	This Measure is not relevant to Bing Search as it does not showcase User Generated Content.	
QRE 32.1.1	LinkedIn's Professional Community Policies prohibit misinformation, and LinkedIn will remove policy-violating content, after consulting with its fact-checking partners (if needed). LinkedIn provides its fact-checking partners with live links to content, which allows partners to easily determine whether that content was thereafter removed by LinkedIn.	See QREs 21.1.1 and 30.2.1-2.	
SLI 32.1.1 - use of the interfaces and other tools	Methodology of data measurement:		Methodology of data measurement: See SLI 31.1.1.	
	Monthly users	Other	Monthly users	Other
Total EEA	Not applicable.			
Measure 32.3	**LinkedIn**	**Bing Search**	
QRE 32.3.1	LinkedIn currently uses the Code's Task-force, in particular the Crisis Response and Empowerment of Fact-checkers subgroups, as a channel of communication with the fact-checking community represented by the signatories to the Code.	Bing Search currently uses the Code's Task-force, in particular the Crisis Response and Empowerment of Fact-checkers subgroups, as a channel of communication with the fact-checking community represented by the signatories to the Code. We continue to explore ways in which we can further support information exchange with the fact-checking community.	

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community		
Commitment 33

Relevant Signatories (i.e. fact-checking organisations) commit to operate on the basis of strict ethical and transparency rules, and to protect their independence. | | |
| | **C.33** | **M 33.1** |
| We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: | Commitment 33 is aimed specifically at fact-checking organisations and therefore not relevant or pertinent to Microsoft and its services. | N/A |

VIII. Transparency Centre

Commitments 34 - 36

VIII. Transparency Centre	
Commitment 34 To ensure transparency and accountability around the implementation of this Code, Relevant Signatories commit to set up and maintain a publicly available common Transparency Centre website	
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures - Microsoft is committed to the proper functioning of the Transparency Center website and will therefore continue its engagement in the Transparency Center subgroup in order to assess the necessity of technical adjustments and new actions to improve the website. - Microsoft will thereby contribute to, where necessary, making the website more user-friendly and easily accessible for users ahead of the next reporting period.
Measure 34.1	**Microsoft Corporation**
Measure 34.2	**Microsoft Corporation**
Measure 34.3	**Microsoft Corporation**
Measure 34.4	**Microsoft Corporation**
Measure 34.5	**Microsoft Corporation**

VIII. Transparency Centre	
Commitment 35 Signatories commit to ensure that the Transparency Centre contains all the relevant information related to the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures and that this information is presented in an easy-to-understand manner, per service, and is easily searchable.	
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New implementation Measures - Microsoft will upload its September 2023 Report to the Transparency Centre website in a timely manner, which includes clear and simple information on the new or existing policies and actions that each service has implemented based on its Subscription document.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures - Within the context of the work of the Transparency Center subgroup, Microsoft will assess the necessity of technical adjustments and contribute to actions where necessary, aiming to make the website more user-friendly and easily accessible for users ahead of the next reporting period. - Microsoft commits to publish in a timely manner information regarding specific mitigation actions related to future crises across the EEA.
Measure 35.1	**Microsoft Corporation**
Measure 35.2	**Microsoft Corporation**
Measure 35.3	**Microsoft Corporation**
Measure 35.4	**Microsoft Corporation**
Measure 35.5	**Microsoft Corporation**
Measure 35.6	**Microsoft Corporation**

VIII. Transparency Centre	
Commitment 36 Signatories commit to updating the relevant information contained in the Transparency Centre in a timely and complete manner.	
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New implementation Measures - By uploading this report, Microsoft updated the Transparency Centre with relevant information related to its new policies and implementation actions.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures - Microsoft reiterates its commitment with regard to providing regular updates as set out under Measures 36.1, 36.2 and 36.3.
Measure 36.1	**Microsoft Corporation**
Measure 36.2	**Microsoft Corporation**
Measure 36.3	**Microsoft Corporation**
QRE 36.1.1 (for the Commitments 34-36)	We are pleased to confirm that we have been an active participant in the working group that has successfully launched the common Transparency Centre this year. We have assisted with establishing the website's requirements, selecting a vendor to build the website and overseeing the development of the website's key functionalities and interface. We have ensured that the Centre will allow the general public to access general information about the Code as well as the underlying reports (and for the Centre to be navigated both by commitment and signatory). Each signatory will be responsible for ensuring that the information they upload to the website is correct and accurate. Entities interested in joining the Code's Task-force will be able to sign up through a dedicated online application form on the website. We have supported the working group in collecting feedback on the user experience of the website and will continue to seek such feedback from relevant stakeholders to better maintain and update the website.
QRE 36.1.2 (for the Commitments 34-36)	The Transparency Centre was successfully launched in February 2023. Microsoft will outline any material changes made to the Transparency Centre's content, operations, or functioning in upcoming reports, as relevant.

SLI 36.1.1 - (for Measures 34 and 36) meaningful quantitative information on the usage of the Transparency Centre, such as the average monthly visits of the webpage.	Methodology of data measurement: Website metrics
Data	The common Transparency Center has been visited by around 8,300 users globally between January 30th 2023 and June 30th 2023. The average engagement time on the website is 1m 22s.

IX. Permanent Task-Force

Commitment 37

IX. Permanent Task-Force	
Commitment 37	
Signatories commit to participate in the permanent Task-force. The Task-force includes the Signatories of the Code and representatives from EDMO and ERGA. It is chaired by the European Commission, and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Task-force can also invite relevant experts as observers to support its work. Decisions of the Task-force are made by consensus.	
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New implementation Measures - Microsoft has actively engaged in and contributed to the work of the Task-force and all of its Subgroups and Working Groups.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures - Microsoft is committed to continuing its active engagement in and contribution to the Task-force and all of its Subgroups and Working Groups in the upcoming six-month period.
Measure 37.1	**Microsoft Corporation**
Measure 37.2	**Microsoft Corporation**
Measure 37.3	**Microsoft Corporation**
Measure 37.4	**Microsoft Corporation**
Measure 37.5	**Microsoft Corporation**
Measure 37.6	**Microsoft Corporation**
QRE 37.6.1	Microsoft has actively engaged in and contributed to all the Task-force Plenary meetings as well as to the meetings of all Subgroups and Working Groups active in the current reporting cycle under the Task-force: • Subgroup on Scrutiny of Advertising • Subgroup on Integrity of Services • Subgroup on Monitoring and Reporting • Subgroup on Crisis Response • Working Group on Elections • Working Group on Structural Indicators • Subgroup on Transparency Centre

	- Subgroup on Outreach and Integration of New Signatories. - Subgroup on Empowerment of Fact-checkers - Working Group on Research Empowerment As part of each Subgroup and Working Group, Microsoft has actively contributed to the development of the deliverables that were collectively agreed leading up to this reporting cycle. Microsoft has continuously engaged with all Signatories of the Code, offering its perspectives on issues unique to its subscribed services and responding to ad-hoc inquiries related to various actions taken by its subscribed services. Microsoft appreciates the immense value and unique insights that the Task-Force has created for each Signatory individually as well as the collective community of Signatories. Microsoft looks forward to continued constructive cooperation within the Code of Practice's governance framework.

X. Monitoring of Code

Commitment 38 - 44

X. Monitoring of Code	
Commitment 38 The Signatories commit to dedicate adequate financial and human resources and put in place appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of their commitments under the Code.	
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New implementation Measures - A dedicated cross-company team continues to ensure proper tracking and compliance with the Code of Practice across all applicable geographical areas, consisting of relevant product members from all subscribed services, attorneys, members of the European Government Affairs team and Democracy Forward Team. - Budget items from across Microsoft teams have been used to ensure compliance including ongoing investment in trusted third parties.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures Microsoft will keep its dedicated cross-company team in place to ensure continued progress towards compliance of relevant measures.
Measure 38.1	**Microsoft Corporation**
QRE 38.1.1	- Implemented a dedicated cross-company team to ensure proper tracking and compliance with the Code of Practice across all applicable geographical areas, consisting of relevant product members from all subscribed services as well as relevant lawyers, members of the European Government Affairs team and Democracy Forward Team. - Implemented an internal tracking process that captured all relevant commitments, responsible entity and persons responsible for compliance with the Code of Practice. - Regular review of new product features to assess potential impacts and compliance under the Code.

X. Monitoring of Code	
Commitment 39	
Signatories commit to provide to the European Commission, within 1 month after the end of the implementation period (6 months after this Code's signature) the baseline reports as set out in the Preamble.	
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New implementation Measures This Commitment is only relevant for the Baseline Reports, which were provided to the European Commission in January 2023.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures Not applicable.

X. Monitoring of Code	
Commitment 40	
Signatories commit to provide regular reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs). The reports and data provided should allow for a thorough assessment of the extent of the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures by each Signatory, service and at Member State level.	
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New implementation Measures

	This Report sets out in detail the measures that Microsoft and its subscribing services have taken in view of the regular reporting that they have subscribed to under the Code of Practice.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures Microsoft has worked intensively over the past months to ensure it is in a good position for the delivery of the September 2023 Report and looks forward to further expanding and deepening its implementation work ahead of the next reporting cycle.
Measure 40.1	**Microsoft Corporation**
Measure 40.2	**Microsoft Corporation**
Measure 40.3	**Microsoft Corporation**
Measure 40.4	**Microsoft Corporation**
Measure 40.5	**Microsoft Corporation**
Measure 40.6	**Microsoft Corporation**

X. Monitoring of Code
Commitment 41
Signatories commit to work within the Task-force towards developing Structural Indicators, and publish a first set of them within 9 months from the signature of this Code; and to publish an initial measurement alongside their first full report. To achieve this goal, Signatories commit to support their implementation, including the testing and adapting of the initial set of Structural Indicators agreed in this Code. This, in order to assess the effectiveness of the Code in reducing the spread of online disinformation for each of the relevant Signatories, and for the entire online ecosystem in the EU and at Member State level. Signatories will collaborate with relevant actors in that regard, including ERGA and EDMO.

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New implementation Measures We have been an active participant in the working group dedicated to developing Structural Indicators.

	We supported the publication of pilot Structural Indicators by TrustLab, through our collaboration with EDMO, ERGA, Avaaz and the European Commission.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures We will continue to support the publication of Structural Indicators, and work towards further honing their methodology and scope.
Measure 41.1	**Microsoft Corporation**
Measure 41.2	**Microsoft Corporation**
Measure 41.3	**Microsoft Corporation**

X. Monitoring of Code
Commitment 42 Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Taskforce.

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New implementation Measures Microsoft has been an active participant in and contributor to the Task-force's Crisis Response Subgroup, in which it proactively provides analysis and data related to influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerges on its service, including through responding to ad-hoc requests for information by the European Commission and contributing to the development of the Crisis Response templates as part of the regular monitoring cycle of the Code. Microsoft's internal threat detection and research teams, including Digital Threat Analysis Center (DTAC), Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC), Microsoft Research (MSR), and AI For Good, collect and analyse data on actors of disinformation, misinformation and information manipulation across platforms. These teams work with external organisations

	and companies to share and ingest data that help support Microsoft product and service teams effectively respond to issues and threats.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures Microsoft looks forward to continuing the fruitful cooperation between Signatories in the context of the Task-force's Crisis Response Subgroup and Elections Working Group, including the development of a risk-assessment methodology and rapid response system as set out in Commitment 37.

X. Monitoring of Code
Commitment 43 Signatories commit to produce reports and provide data following the harmonised reporting templates and refined methodology for reporting and data disclosure, as agreed in the Task-force.

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New implementation Measures Microsoft has provided its September 2023 Report in accordance with the revised Harmonised Reporting Template and underlying methodologies as jointly developed by Signatories in the Monitoring and Reporting Subgroup under the Code's Task-force.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures

	Microsoft will continue its active engagement in the respective Task-force Subgroups to further develop and improve the Harmonised Reporting Template and underlying methodologies where necessary in view of its experience with reporting.

X. Monitoring of Code
Commitment 44 Relevant Signatories that are providers of Very Large Online Platforms commit, seeking alignment with the DSA, to be audited at their own expense, for their compliance with the commitments undertaken pursuant to this Code. Audits should be performed by organisations, independent from, and without conflict of interest with, the provider of the Very Large Online Platform concerned. Such organisations shall have proven expertise in the area of disinformation, appropriate technical competence and capabilities and have proven objectivity and professional ethics, based in particular on adherence to auditing standards and guidelines.

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	New implementation Measures N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Planned Implementation Measures Prepare for conducting audits of relevant services.

Reporting on the services' response during a period of crisis
Covid-19 pandemic

Reporting on the services' response during a period of crisis
Covid-19 pandemic

Overview of the main threats observed, such as crisis related disinformation campaigns, spread of misinformation, coordinated manipulative behaviours, malicious use of advertising products, involvement of foreign state actors, etc.:

- **LinkedIn** is an online professional networking site with a real identity requirement, which means that content posted by our members is visible to that member's professional network, including colleagues, managers, and potential future employers. As a result of LinkedIn's professional context, our members do not tend to post misinformation, nor does misinformation content gain traction on LinkedIn. Nonetheless, LinkedIn may be subject to certain members posting misinformation during crisis situations.
- In its role as an online advertising network, **Microsoft Advertising** may be subject to the malicious use of its advertising services through either the spreading of misleading or deceptive advertising content or the funneling of advertising revenue to sites spreading Disinformation.
- **Bing Search** has observed instances of data void manipulation to show low-authority content to unsuspecting users related to COVID-19. This type of search algorithm manipulation could potentially lead to the spread of misinformation/disinformation.

Executive summary of the company's main policies, strategies and actions taken to mitigate the identified threats and react to the crisis:

- **LinkedIn** has numerous workstreams that address misinformation, particularly during crisis situations like COVID-19. During such a crisis, LinkedIn proactively provides members with trustworthy information through news storylines created by our in-house team of global news editors. We also showed banners that took members to this trustworthy information when our members searched for COVID-related terms. In addition, we remove misinformation related to COVID, and also update the applicable policies as needed. See, e.g., https://www.linkedin.com/help/linkedin/answer/a1340752. Finally, we have multiple internal teams who ensure that both ads customers and state-sponsored actors do not exploit the crisis.
- **Bing Search** instituted a multi-prong approach to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, including (1) implementing defensive search interventions; (2) direction of users to authoritative public health information sources; and (3) usage of highly visible public service announcements. These measures were also integrated into Bing's generative AI experiences. In addition, Bing strives to prevent the display of low authority or controversial content in chat responses, as discussed along with the additional safeguards discussed at QRE 14.1.1 and QRE 14.1.2 and throughout this report.
- **Microsoft Advertising** takes action against advertisements that contain disinformation about COVID-19 through its policies, including its misleading content policies which prohibits advertising that can "reasonably [be] perceived as being deceptive, fraudulent or harmful to site visitors." Based on this policy, at the onset of the crisis we prohibited all advertising that seeks to exploit the COVID-19 crisis for commercial gain, spreads misinformation, or that may pose a danger to user-health or safety. Microsoft Advertising approved a discrete number of COVID-related advertising in its network, including vetted vaccine or medical providers and NGOs. Microsoft Advertising requires our publishing partners to abide by strict brand safety-oriented policies to avoid providing revenue streams to websites engaging in misleading, deceptive, harmful, or insensitive behaviors. These policies include a comprehensive list of prohibited content that our ads cannot serve against, including Disinformation. We require publishers to maintain a list of prohibited terms and provide us with information on their content management practices where applicable. In addition, we require publishers to abide by restrictions against engaging in business practices that are harmful to users. Microsoft Advertising reviews publisher properties and domains for compliance with these restrictions and promptly notifies publishers of properties or domains that violate Microsoft Advertising's policies.

Microsoft does not approve properties that violate our policies for live ad traffic; if a property or domain that violates our policies is already live, we remove it from our ad network until the publisher remedies the issue. We also give advertisers the option to block their ads from being displayed on particular web domains.

Best practices identified for future crisis situations:

- **LinkedIn** continues to mature its crisis response processes. In addition to the increase in resource allocation and process improvements, best practices include: 1) quickly coordinating with industry peers regarding the exchange of threat indicators; 2) engaging with external stakeholders regarding trends and TTPs; 3) continuously providing updated policy guidance to internal teams to assist with the removal of misinformation; and 4) continuing to proactively provide localised trustworthy information to our members.
- **Bing Search** considers measures discussed in this section to constitute best practices generally; however, the context and nature of a crisis (including the TTPs used in the spread of misinformation) will inform what mitigation measures are appropriate for a particular circumstance. Bing Search is reluctant to provide generalized suggestions, as each circumstance may warrant tailored approaches. With respect to public health crises, Bing believes that continued prioritization of high authority information (and use of defensive search strategies to help ensure users are not exposed to low authority content – absent intent to find such content) plays an important role as well as public service announcements, centralized information hubs (where warranted) and direction to authoritative public health sources can play an important role in providing reliable information to users.
- **Microsoft Advertising** applies the learnings and feedback into the platform and detection mechanisms to improve the ability to address future occurrences. Best practices include (i) multistakeholder coordination across industry and other experts, (ii) internal trainings and enforcement protocols, (iii) coordination with business partners, and (iv) partnership with leading experts to consume data and intel to aid detection.

Future measures planned within the next six months:

- **LinkedIn** will continue to follow its processes related to the removal of misinformation.
- **Bing Search** will continue to monitor the crisis and employ the below identified measures. Bing may consider whether additional measures are warranted depending on the evolution of the crisis.
- During the next reporting period, **Microsoft Advertising** plans to focus its enforcement actions on misleading or potentially harmful content. We plan to fade off the broader preclusion on covid and covid vaccine related advertisements so long as they don't pose a significant risk of Disinformation, while retaining our upfront blocks on higher-risk terms (i.e., to prevent any ads on web searchers for such terms), our monitoring for Disinformation and other misleading or harmful content, and our processes to remove content upon escalation.

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s)].

Changes in Policy Framework

	Policies	Rationale
Policies newly introduced for addressing the crisis	LinkedIn - None.	**LinkedIn -** Misinformation, disinformation campaigns, coordinated manipulative behaviours, malicious use of advertising products, and the involvement of foreign state actors, are all harms that existed

		prior to the COVID-19 crisis, and therefore LinkedIn already had policies in place to address these harms.
	Bing Search In connection with the launch of new Bing generative AI services, Bing published supplemental Terms of Use and a Code of Conduct and has implemented a number of safeguards to help address TTPs that could potentially be used on these new generative AI search experiences.	**Bing Search -** Since the start of the COVID-19 crisis, Bing Search has taken a number of measures to help promote high authority, high quality information and reliable information concerning the pandemic and public health measures in the EU as set forth below. These measures are also incorporated within Bing generative AI features.
	Microsoft Advertising – None.	**Microsoft Advertising** – Our current policies enable Microsoft Advertising to prevent and remove disinformation-related content, including false or misleading content that may cause public harm, or other similar behaviors.
Policies adapted for addressing the crisis	**LinkedIn -** False or misleading content | LinkedIn Help	**LinkedIn -** LinkedIn continually updates its policies as appropriate during any crisis, including the COVID-19 crisis.
	Bing Search In connection with the launch of new Bing generative AI services, Bing published supplemental Terms of Use (including a Code of Conduct prohibiting use of the service for misinformation) and has implemented a number of safeguards to help address TTPs that could potentially be used on these new generative AI search experiences. Otherwise, Bing Search has not adapted its policies specifically for addressing the crisis but, in line with existing policies, has implemented the below measures in response. *See* below and QRE 22.7.1.	**Bing Search -** Since the start of the COVID-19 crisis, Bing Search has taken a number of measures to help promote high authority, high quality information and reliable information concerning the pandemic and public health measures in the EU as set forth below. These measures are also incorporated within Bing generative AI features.
	Microsoft Advertising - Sensitive Advertising Policies, upon which we reserve the right to remove or limit advertising in response to a sensitive tragedy, disaster, death, or high-profile news event, - Misleading Content Policies, which prohibits advertising content that is misleading, deceptive, fraudulent, or that may be harmful. - Information Integrity Policy, which avoids the publishing and carriage of harmful Disinformation and the placement of advertising next to	

	Disinformation content. Such policies prohibit ads or sites that contain or lead to Disinformation. - Publishing partner policies include a comprehensive list of prohibited content that our ads cannot serve against, including Disinformation.	
Policies regarding the crisis repealed/removed	**LinkedIn** - None	**LinkedIn** - As described above, LinkedIn already had a policy in place and LinkedIn continually updates its policies as appropriate during any crisis, including the COVID-19 crisis.
	Bing Search - None	
	Microsoft Advertising – None.	**Microsoft Advertising** – As described above, Microsoft Advertising will iterate on its enforcement processes to address misleading or potentially harmful content.

Reporting on the services' response during a period of crisis

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine

Reporting on the services' response during a period of crisis
War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine

Overview of the main threats observed, such as crisis related disinformation campaigns, spread of misinformation, coordinated manipulative behaviours, malicious use of advertising products, involvement of foreign state actors, etc.:

- **LinkedIn** is an online professional networking site with a real identity requirement, which means that content posted by our members is visible to that member's professional network, including colleagues, managers, and potential future employers. As a result of LinkedIn's professional context, our members do not tend to post misinformation, nor does misinformation content gain traction on LinkedIn. Nonetheless, LinkedIn may be subject to certain members posting misinformation during crisis situations.
- In its role as an online advertising network, **Microsoft Advertising** may be subject to the malicious use of its advertising services through either the spreading of misleading or deceptive advertising content or the funneling of advertising revenue to sites spreading Disinformation.
- **Bing Search** has observed instances of data void manipulation to show low-authority content to unsuspecting users related to Russia/Ukraine crisis. This type of search algorithm manipulation could potentially lead to the spread of misinformation/disinformation.

Executive summary of the company's main strategies and actions taken to mitigate the identified threats and react to the crisis:

- **Microsoft**'s Threat Analysis Center (MTAC) team closely tracks cyber-enabled influence operations. MTAC analysts focused on Europe/Eurasia report on a wide range of Russian influence tactics used to malign or diminish support for Ukraine: propaganda and disinformation published across different languages; people-to-people and party-to-party engagement; real-world provocations; and those that blend cyber and influence activity, like hack-and-leak campaigns. MTAC's work includes analysing the ways these methods are leveraged to target audiences in Central and Eastern Europe.
- In June of last year, Microsoft issued its "Defending Ukraine" report and a follow up report issued in early December, both of which detailed the relentless and destructive Russian cyberattacks and influence operations, that we have directly observed in the hybrid war Russia is waging against Ukraine. Microsoft followed those reports with a report in March of this year outlining how Russia was regrouping for additional offensive measures against Ukraine including cyber and influence operations.
- Microsoft has in addition supported nonprofits, journalists, and academics both within Ukraine and across allies, allowing those partners to broaden their defense of the information ecosystem. For example, Microsoft has supported the formation of an investigative journalism unit at the Kiev Independent focused on documenting possible Russian War Crimes. Also, Microsoft has worked with TruePic and ACHQ on the use of content provenance to document damage to cultural heritage and national infrastructure for accountability, advocacy, and reconstruction efforts.
- **LinkedIn**'s Professional Community Policies expressly prohibit false and misleading content, including misinformation and disinformation, and its in-house Editorial team provides members with trustworthy content regarding global events, including the conflict in Ukraine. LinkedIn has an internal team of hundreds of content reviewers located all over the world (for 24/7 coverage), approximately 235 of which are located in the EMEA region, and includes specialists in a number of languages including English, German, French, Russian, and Ukrainian. These reviewers use policies and guidance developed by a dedicated content policy team and experienced lawyers, and work with external fact checkers as needed. When LinkedIn sees content or behaviour that violates its Professional Community Policies, it takes action, including the removal of content or the restriction of an account for repeated abusive behaviour. LinkedIn has been banned in Russia since 2016 and has implemented the European bans on Russian state media. In addition to not operating in Russia, political ads are banned on LinkedIn, which includes prohibitions on ads that exploit

a sensitive political issue, including the current Russia-Ukraine war. LinkedIn also does not provide a mechanism for content creators to monetise the content they post on LinkedIn.

- **Bing Search** To respond to the crisis, Bing Search has implemented the following measures: (1) Defensive search interventions; (2) regular direction of users to high authority, high quality sources; (3) removed auto suggest and related search terms considered likely to lead users to low authority content; and (4) partnered with research and nonprofit organizations to maintain threat intelligence and inform potential algorithmic interventions. These measures are also integrated into Bing generative AI experiences, along with the additional safeguards discussed at QRE 14.1.1 and QRE 14.1.2 and other measures discussed throughout this report.
- **Microsoft Advertising** has not seen any significant traffic or recently received escalations or takedown requests related to the Ukrainian crisis. Microsoft Advertising is preventing serving advertising related to the Ukrainian crisis pursuant to its Sensitive Advertising Policies. Under this policy, Microsoft Advertising reserves the right to remove or limit advertising in response to a sensitive or high-profile news event to prevent the commercial exploitation of such events and to ensure user safety. Furthermore, our Misleading Content Policies prohibit advertising content that is misleading, deceptive, fraudulent, or that can be harmful to its users, including advertisements spreading disinformation. Microsoft Advertising requires its syndication partners (i.e., those partners that display our advertisements on their services) to abide by strict brand safety-oriented policies to avoid providing revenue streams to websites engaging in misleading, deceptive, harmful, or insensitive behaviours. Our publisher policies include a comprehensive list of prohibited content that ads cannot serve against, including, but not limited to, sensitive political content (e.g., extreme, aggressive, or misleading interpretations of news, events, or individuals), and unsavory content (such as content disparaging individuals or organisations). Partner properties that violate our policies are removed from our network until the partner remedies the issue. Microsoft Advertising banned all advertisements from the media outlets Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik across our ad network and will not place any ads from our ad network on these sites. In the current reporting period, we blocked an additional 463 domains in our network (for a total of 2,789 since February 2022) and suspended 1,483 advertisers from our ad network.

Best practices identified for future crisis situations:

- **LinkedIn** continues to mature its crisis response processes. In addition to the increase in resource allocation and process improvements, best practices include: 1) quickly coordinating with industry peers regarding the exchange of threat indicators; 2) engaging with external stakeholders regarding trends and TTPs; 3) continuously providing updated policy guidance to internal teams to assist with the removal of misinformation; and 4) continuing to proactively provide localised trustworthy information to our members.
- **Microsoft Advertising** applies the learnings and feedback into the platform and detection mechanisms to improve the ability to address future occurrences. Best practices include (i) multistakeholder coordination across industry and other experts, (ii) internal trainings and enforcement protocols, (iii) coordination with business partners, and (iv) partnership with leading experts to consume data and intel to aid detection.
- **Bing Search** considers measures discussed in this section to constitute best practices generally; however, the context and nature of a crisis (including the TTPs used in the spread of misinformation) will inform what mitigation measures are appropriate for a particular circumstance. Bing Search is reluctant to provide generalised suggestions, as each circumstance may warrant tailored approaches.

Future measures planned within the next six months:

- None. **LinkedIn** will continue to follow its processes related to the removal of misinformation.
- None. **Microsoft Advertising** will continue monitoring the landscape to enforce its policies.
- **Bing Search** will continue to monitor and evaluate the crisis and may modify its response as appropriate.

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].		
Changes in Policy Framework		
	Policies	**Rationale**
Policies newly introduced for addressing the crisis	**LinkedIn** None.	**LinkedIn** Misinformation, disinformation campaigns, coordinated manipulative behaviours, malicious use of advertising products, and the involvement of foreign state actors, are all harms that existed prior to the Ukraine crisis, and therefore LinkedIn already had policies in place to address these harms.
	Microsoft Advertising None.	**Microsoft Advertising** Our current policies enable Microsoft Advertising to prevent and remove disinformation-related content, including false or misleading content that may cause public harm, or other similar behaviors.
	Bing Search In connection with the launch of new Bing generative AI services, Bing published supplemental Terms of Use (including a Code of Conduct prohibiting use of the service for misinformation) and has implemented a number of safeguards to help address TTPs that could potentially be used on these new generative AI search experiences. Otherwise, Bing Search has not adapted its policies specifically for addressing the crisis but, in line with existing policies, has implemented the below measures in response. *See* below and QRE 22.7.1.	**Bing Search** Since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Bing Search has taken a number of measures to help promote high authority, high quality information and reliable information concerning this crisis, which are detailed further below.
Policies adapted for addressing the crisis	**LinkedIn** False or misleading content | LinkedIn Help	**LinkedIn** LinkedIn continually updates its policies as appropriate during any crisis, including the Ukraine crisis.

	Microsoft Advertising - <u>Sensitive Advertising Policies</u>, upon which we reserve the right to remove or limit advertising in response to a sensitive tragedy, disaster, death, or high-profile news event, - <u>Misleading Content Policies</u>, which <u>prohibits advertising content that is misleading, deceptive, fraudulent, or that may be harmful.</u> - [Information Integrity Policy](), which avoids the publishing and carriage of harmful Disinformation and the placement of advertising next to Disinformation content. Such policies prohibit ads or sites that contain or lead to Disinformation. - Publishing partner policies include a comprehensive list of prohibited content that our ads cannot serve against, including Disinformation.	**Microsoft Advertising** Microsoft Advertising leverages these policies to prevent content monetisation related to sensitive or high-profile new events, and to remove or block ad content or sites spreading disinformation.
	Bing Search In connection with the launch of new Bing generative AI services, Bing published supplemental Terms of Use (including a Code of Conduct prohibiting use of the service for misinformation) and has implemented a number of safeguards to help address TTPs that could potentially be used on these new generative AI search experiences. Otherwise, Bing Search has not adapted its policies specifically for addressing the crisis but, in line with existing policies, has implemented the below measures in response. *See* below and QRE 22.7.1.	**Bing Search** Since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Bing Search has taken a number of measures to help promote high authority, high quality information and reliable information concerning this crisis, which are detailed further below.
Actions to mitigate the crisis impact on the service		
Type of mitigation	**Intervention or action (short summary)**	**Intervention or action (explanation and implementation)** / **Impact metrics**

Actions taken against dis- and misinformation content (for example deamplification, labelling, removal etc.)	*Intervention applied* **LinkedIn** Removal of content, consequences for the posting member.	*Implementation and enforcement action(s) corresponding to Intervention* **LinkedIn** LinkedIn's Professional Community Policies prohibit misinformation, and misinformation is removed from the LinkedIn platform. Members that post misinformation are notified of LinkedIn's removal of their content. Members that repeatedly post misinformation are permanently restricted. State-sponsored attempts to post misinformation, if any, are removed.	*Performance Metrics (either as a subset of SLI 18.1.1. or 18.1.2. for the crisis context or other meaningful performance metrics available for the referenced intervention)* **LinkedIn** LinkedIn does not track misinformation content removal by subject matter, and a comprehensive listing of its misinformation content takedowns is provided in this disclosure and in its Transparency Report. See also SLI 18.2.1.
	Microsoft Advertising Ad content and sites blocks or removal, customer account suspension.	**Microsoft Advertising** Microsoft Advertising policies prohibit ads and sites associated to Disinformaiotn. We employ both proactive and reactive mechanisms to enforce our policies by: - Preventing or taking down advertiser submissions related to the Ukraine crisis. - Blocking or removing domains associated with Disinformation across the ad network. Banning all advertisements from media outlet or domains (including state-sponsored) associated to Disinformation, including by not placing any ads from our ad network on these sites to disrupt monetisation.	**Microsoft Advertising** Between January and June 2023, we removed 463 domains from our network, for a total of 2,789 since February 2022, and suspended 1,483 advertisers from our ad network.
	Bing Search – Defensive search interventions	**Bing Search** *Implementation measures*	**Bing Search** *Performance Metrics (either as a subset of SLI 18.2.1. or 22.7.1. for the crisis context, or other*

	− Direction of users to high authority, high quality sources − Remove auto suggest and related search terms considered likely to lead users to low authority content − Partnership with research and nonprofit organisations to maintain threat intelligence and inform potential algorithmic interventions. See also QRE 22.7.1.	1. Bing Search has taken steps to algorithmically boost authority signals and has downgraded less authoritative information (see SLI 22.7.1). These queries are translated automatically into other languages supported by Bing Search. 2. Bing Search regularly partners with independent research organisations and nonprofit organisations to maintain threat intelligence and inform potential algorithmic interventions. 3. Bing Search also takes action to remove autosuggest and related search terms that have been found likely to lead users to low authority content. 4. Bing Search continues to partner with fact checking organisations and apply fact check labels to help users understand the context and trustworthiness of certain content in the EU. 5. These measures have helped ensure that Bing Search is promoting authoritative news sources, timelines, and other factual information at the top of algorithmic search results. 6. The above measures are also integrated into Bing generative AI experiences, along with additional safeguards discussed at QRE 14.1.1 and QRE 14.1.2.. *See also* QRE 22.7.1.	*meaningful performance metrics available for the referenced intervention)* During the reporting period Bing Search took defensive actions on at least 798,180 different queries related to this crisis, resulting in 3.85 million impressions in the EEA. See also SLI 22.7.1.

Promotion of authoritative information, including via recommender systems and products and features such as banners and panels	*Source promoted, Product deployed or Initiative taken* **LinkedIn** Editorial storylines and search banners	*Implementation measures* **LinkedIn** LinkedIn has an internal team of global news editors that provides trustworthy and authoritative content to its member-base at all times. During the Ukraine crisis, this team provided manually curated and localised storylines. When members searched for Ukraine related terms, LinkedIn displayed a search banner that pointed members to this content.	*Performance Metrics (either as a subset of SLI 18.2.1. or 22.7.1. for the crisis context, or other meaningful performance metrics available for the referenced intervention)* **LinkedIn** LinkedIn no longer actively promotes Ukraine storylines, and therefore does not have associated metrics.
	Microsoft Advertising Not relevant to Microsoft Advertising. When we learn that an advertisement on our system contains Disinformation, we remove it (rather than leave it in place and merely alert users about the Disinformation it contains).		
	Bing Search – Defensive search interventions – Direction of users to high authority, high quality sources – Remove auto suggest and related search terms considered likely to lead users to low authority content – Partnership with research and nonprofit organisations to maintain threat intelligence and inform potential algorithmic interventions. See also QRE 22.7.1.	**Bing Search** 1. Bing Search has taken steps to algorithmically boost authority signals and has downgraded less authoritative information (see SLI 22.7.1). These queries are translated automatically into other languages supported by Bing Search. 2. Bing Search regularly partners with independent research organisations and nonprofit organisations to maintain threat intelligence and inform potential algorithmic interventions. 3. Bing Search also takes action to remove autosuggest and related search terms that have been found likely to lead users to low authority content.	**Bing Search** During the reporting period Bing Search took defensive actions on at least 798,180 different queries related to this crisis, resulting in 3.85 million impressions in the EEA. *See also* SLI 22.7.1.

		4. Bing Search continues to partner with fact checking organisations and apply fact check labels to help users understand the context and trustworthiness of certain content in the EU. 5. These measures have helped ensure that Bing Search is promoting authoritative news sources, timelines, and other factual information at the top of algorithmic search results. 6. The above measures are also integrated into Bing generative AI experiences, along with additional safeguards discussed at QRE 14.1.1 and QRE 14.1.2.. *See* also QRE 22.7.1.	
Cooperation with independent fact-checkers in the crisis context, including coverage in the EU	*Implementation measure (Agreement with fact-checker in Member state)* **LinkedIn** Fact-checking agreements	*Approach of cooperation with Fact-checkers in specific country* **LinkedIn** LinkedIn works with globally-recognised fact-checkers to receive their independent judgment regarding user-generated content. Content that violates LinkedIn's Professional Community Policies, including misinformation, is removed.	*Performance Metrics (either as a subset of SLI 21.1.1., 21.1.2., 30.1.1., 31.1.1., 31.1.2., or 32.1.1. for the crisis context or other meaningful performance metrics available for the referenced intervention)* **LinkedIn** LinkedIn does not separately track Ukraine-related content sent to external fact checkers. Further detail regarding content sent to fact checkers is available at SLI 21.1.1, 30.1.1, and 31.1.1.

	Microsoft Advertising Not relevant to Microsoft Advertising.		
	Bing Search Bing utilises the ClaimReview open protocol to ingest fact checks into search results and is exploring further fact checking partnerships in the EU. See QRE 22.7.1 and QRE 21.1.1 for further information.	*Approach of cooperation with Fact-checkers in specific country* As discussed further in QRE 22.7.1, Bing relies on independent fact checkers around the world to incorporate schema.org ClaimReview tags into their content so that fact check content is identified within search results. However, the specific nature of a fact check article (e.g., relating to COVID-19 or a particular election) is not available to Bing Search when ingesting fact check labels.	*Performance Metrics (either as a subset of SLI 21.1.1., 21.1.2., 30.1.1., 31.1.1., 31.1.2., or 32.1.1. for the crisis context or other meaningful performance metrics available for the referenced intervention)* Bing Search cannot provide data on fact check coverage specific to this crisis, as fact check labels are created by third parties and are not "tagged" as pertaining to a specific topic when ingested.
Measures taken to demonetise disinformation related to the crisis	*Intervention applied* **LinkedIn** Not applicable	*Implementation measures* **LinkedIn** LinkedIn does not pay its members for creating content, other than in rare instances where we individually select and manage a small group of content creators to create professionally-relevant content.	*Performance Metrics (either as a subset of SLI 1.1.1., 1.2.1. for the crisis context or other meaningful performance metrics available for the referenced intervention)* **LinkedIn** None.
	Microsoft Advertising Please see responses to "Actions taken against dis- and misinformation content" above.		
	Bing Search N/A	**Bing Search** N/A	**Bing Search** N/A
	Intervention applied	*Implementation measure*	*Performance metrics (either as a subset of SLI 2.1.1., 2.3.1., 2.4.1. for the crisis context or*

Measures taken to prevent malicious advertising	**LinkedIn** Manual review	**LinkedIn** LinkedIn maintains a robust ad-review process wherein ads related to crises, including the Ukraine war, are manually reviewed and approved by our internal team.	*other meaningful performance metrics available for the referenced intervention)* **LinkedIn** See SLI 2.1.1 and 2.3.1.
	Microsoft Advertising Please see responses to "Actions taken against dis- and misinformation content" above.		
	Bing Search N/A	**Bing Search** N/A	**Bing Search** N/A
Measures taken in the context of the crisis to counter manipulative behaviours/TTPs	*Intervention applied* **LinkedIn** Industry cooperation .	*Implementation measures* **LinkedIn** LinkedIn regularly meets with and exchanges information with industry peers to identify and share granular information related to manipulative behaviours, coordinated influence operations, and TTPs. All such content that violates LinkedIn's Professional Community Policies is removed.	*Performance metrics (either as a subset of SLI 14.1.1., 14.2.1., 14.2.2., 14.2.3., 14.2.4. for the crisis context or other meaningful performance metrics available for the referenced intervention)* **LinkedIn** See SLI 14.1.1 and 14.2.1.
	Microsoft Advertising Not relevant to Microsoft Advertising.		
	Bing Search – Defensive search interventions – Partnership with research and nonprofit organisations to maintain threat intelligence and inform potential algorithmic interventions.	**Bing Search** *Implementation measures* 1. Bing Search has taken steps to algorithmically boost authority signals and has downgraded less authoritative information (*see* SLI	**Bing Search** *Performance metrics (either as a subset of SLI 14.1.1., 14.2.1., 14.2.2., 14.2.3., 14.2.4. for the crisis context or other meaningful performance metrics available for the referenced intervention)*

	See also QRE 22.7.1 and QRE 14.1.1-2.	22.7.1). These queries are translated automatically into other languages supported by Bing Search. 2. Bing Search regularly partners with independent research organisations and nonprofit organisations to maintain threat intelligence and inform potential algorithmic interventions. 3. Bing Search also takes action to remove autosuggest and related search terms that have been found likely to lead users to low authority content. 4. The above measures are also integrated into Bing generative AI experiences, along with additional safeguards discussed at QRE 14.1.1 and QRE 14.1.2.. *See* also QRE 22.7.1 and QRE 14.1.1-2.	During the reporting period Bing Search took defensive actions on at least 798,180 different queries related to this crisis, resulting in 3.85 million impressions in the EEA. *See also* SLI 22.7.1 and 14.2.1.

Measures taken to support research into crisis related misinformation and disinformation	*Program supported*	*Implementation measures*	*Performance Metrics (either as a subset of SLI 26.1.1., 26.2.1. or 27.3.1. for the crisis context or other meaningful performance metrics available for the referenced intervention)*
	Microsoft Detection and Research efforts and sharing	**Microsoft** Microsoft's internal threat detection and research teams, including Digital Threat Analysis Center (MTAC), Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC), Microsoft Research (MSR), and AI For Good, collect and analyse data on actors of disinformation, misinformation and information manipulation. These teams work with external organisations and companies to share and ingest data that help support Microsoft product and service teams effectively respond to issues and threats.	
	LinkedIn None for LinkedIn.	**LinkedIn** None for LinkedIn.	**LinkedIn** None.
	Microsoft Advertising Not relevant to Microsoft Advertising.		
	Bing Search *See* QRE 26.1.1 for general research support. Bing Search has not made datasets available pertaining specifically to this crisis.	**Bing Search** *Implementation measures* N/A	**Bing Search** *See SLI 22.7.1.* N/A
Relevant changes to working practices to respond to the demands of the crisis situation and/or additional human resources	*Changes to working practices* **LinkedIn** Continual increase in resource allocation and process improvements	*Actions carried out* **LinkedIn** LinkedIn has continued to mature its crisis response playbook by continually monitoring crisis situations globally, expanding internal teams that work on crisis response, and	*Any available meaningful metrics for the referenced changes* **LinkedIn** None.

189

procured for the mitigation of the crisis		maturing our processes to respond more efficiently and effectively to crisis situations.	
	Microsoft Advertising. Re-allocation of resources and policy/process improvements.	**Microsoft Advertising**. Microsoft Advertising cooperates with relevant industry groups and peers to address crisis, as applicable.	**Microsoft Advertising**. None.
	Bing Search Bing Search continues to monitor and evaluate the crisis but has not determined a need to add additional headcount or modify working practices to adequately respond to the crisis.	**Bing Search** *Actions carried out* N/A	**Bing Search** *Any available meaningful metrics for the referenced changes* N/A