Code of Conduct on

Disinformation – Report by

Google Ireland Limited ('Google')

for the period of

1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025

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# **Executive summary**

Google's mission is to organise the world's information and make it universally accessible and useful. To deliver on this mission, and as technology evolves, helping users find useful, relevant and high-quality information across our services is of utmost importance.

Since Google was founded, Google's product, policy, and content enforcement decisions have been guided by the following three principles:

- 1. **We value openness and accessibility:** We lean towards keeping content accessible by providing access to an open and diverse information ecosystem.
- 2. We respect user choice: If users search for content that is not illegal or prohibited by our policies, they should be able to find it.
- 3. **We build for everyone:** Our services are used around the world by users from different cultures, languages, and backgrounds, and at different stages in their lives. We take the diversity of our users into account in policy development and policy enforcement decisions.

With these principles in mind, Google has long invested in ranking systems and has teams around the world working to connect people with high-quality content; in developing and enforcing rules that prohibit harmful behaviours and content on Google services; and in innovative ways to provide context to users when they might need it most.

How companies like Google address information quality concerns has an impact on society and on the trust users place in our services. We are cognisant that these are complex issues, affecting all of society, which no single actor is in a position to fully tackle on their own. That is why we have welcomed the multi-stakeholder approach put forward by the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation.

Alongside our participation in the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation, we continue to work closely with regulators to ensure that our services appropriately comply with the EU Digital Services Act (EU DSA), in full respect of EU fundamental rights such as freedom of expression.

The work of supporting a healthy information ecosystem is never finished and we remain committed to it. This is in our interest and the interest of our users.

This report includes metrics and narrative detail for Google Search, YouTube, and Google Advertising users in the European Union (EU), and covers the period from 1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025.

Updates to highlight in this report include (but are not limited to):

- 2025 Elections across EU Member States: In H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025), voters cast their ballots in Germany, Portugal, Romania, and Poland. Google supported these democratic processes by surfacing high-quality information to voters, safeguarding its platforms from abuse, and equipping campaigns with best-in-class security tools and training. In addition, Google put in place a number of policies and other measures that helped people navigate political content that was AI-generated, including ad disclosures, content labels on YouTube, and digital watermarking tools.
- Advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI): In H1 2025, we announced new AI safeguards to help protect against misuse. We introduced
   <u>SynthID Detector</u>, a verification portal to identify AI-generated content made with Google AI. The portal, still in the early stages of tester
   mode, provides detection capabilities across different modalities in one place, and provides essential transparency in the rapidly evolving
   landscape of generative media.
  - When we <u>launched</u> SynthID a state-of-the-art tool that embeds imperceptible watermarks and enables the identification of Al-generated content — our aim was to provide a suite of novel technical solutions to help minimise misinformation and misattribution.
  - SynthID not only preserves the content's quality, it acts as a robust watermark that remains detectable even when the content is shared or undergoes a range of transformations. While originally focused on AI-generated imagery only, we've since expanded SynthID to Include AI-generated text, audio and video content, including content generated by our Gemini, Imagen, Lyria and Veo models. Over 10 billion pieces of content have already been watermarked with SynthID.
  - How SynthID Detector works: When you upload an image, audio track, video or piece of text created using Google's Al tools, the portal will scan the media for a SynthID watermark. If a watermark is detected, the portal will highlight specific portions of the content most likely to be watermarked. For audio, the portal pinpoints specific segments where a SynthID watermark is detected, and for images, it indicates areas where a watermark is most likely.
- In addition to our continued work and investment in new tools, we are also committed to working with the greater ecosystem to help others benefit from and improve on the advances we are making. As such, we have open-sourced SynthID text watermarking through our updated Responsible Generative Al Toolkit. Underpinning our advancements in Al, as a member of the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA), we collaborate with Adobe, Microsoft, OpenAl, Meta, startups, and many others to build and implement the newest version (2.1) of the coalition's technical standard, Content Credentials. This version is more secure against a wider range of tampering attacks due to stricter technical requirements for validating the history of the content's provenance.

Google has been working on AI for over a decade to solve society's biggest challenges and also power Google services people use every day. The progress in large-scale AI models (including generative AI) has sparked additional discussion about the social impacts of AI and raised concerns on topics such as disinformation. Google is committed to developing technology responsibly and first published AI Principles in 2018 to guide our work. Google's robust internal governance focuses on responsibility throughout the AI development lifecycle, covering model development, application deployment, and post-launch monitoring. While we recently updated our Principles to adapt to shifts in technology, the global conversation, and the AI ecosystem, our deep commitment to responsible AI development remains unchanged.

Through our philanthropic arm Google.org we have <u>supported organisations</u> that are using AI to tackle important societal issues. Google Search has published <u>guidance</u> on AI-generated content, outlining its approach to maintaining a high standard of information quality and the overall helpfulness of content on Search. To help enhance information quality across its services, Google continuously works to integrate new innovations in watermarking, metadata, and other techniques into its latest generative models. Google has also joined other leading AI companies to jointly commit to advancing responsible practices in the development of artificial intelligence which will support efforts by the G7, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and national governments. Going forward we will continue to report and expand upon Google developed AI tools and are committed to advance bold and responsible AI, to maximise AI's benefits and minimise its risks.

Lastly, the contents of this report should be read with the following context in mind:

- This report discusses the key approaches across the following Google services when it comes to addressing disinformation: Google Search, YouTube, and Google Advertising.
- For chapters of the Code that involve the same actions across all three services (e.g. participation in the Permanent Task-force or in development of the Transparency Centre), we respond as 'Google, on behalf of related services'.
- This report follows the structure and template laid out by the Code's Permanent Task-force, organised around Commitments and Chapters of the Code.
- Unless otherwise specified, metrics provided cover activities and actions during the period from 1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025.
- The data provided in this report is subject to a range of factors, including product changes and user settings, and so is expected to fluctuate over the time of the reporting period. As Google continues to evolve its approach, in part to better address user and regulatory needs, the data reported here could vary substantially over time.
- We are continuously working to improve the safety and reliability of our services. We are not always in a position to pre-announce
  specific launch dates, details or timelines for upcoming improvements, and therefore may reply 'no' when asked whether we can disclose
  future plans for Code implementation measures in the coming reporting period. This 'no' should be understood against the background
  context that we are constantly working to improve safety and reliability and may in fact launch relevant changes without the ability to
  pre-announce.

- This report is filed concurrently with two 'crisis reports' about our response to the Israel-Gaza conflict and to the war in Ukraine.

  Additionally, an annex on Google's response toward the recent elections in Romania, Portugal, Poland and Germany is included in this report.
- The term 'disinformation' in this report refers to the definition included in the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation.

Google looks forward to continuing to work together with other stakeholders in the EU to address challenges related to disinformation.

# **Navigation per Service**

Commitments	Measures	Google Advertising <sup>1</sup>	YouTube	Google, on behalf of related services				
		II. Scrutiny of	Ad Placements					
	Measure 1.1		Not sub	scribed				
	Measure 1.2		Not subscribed					
4	Measure 1.3	$\checkmark$						
1	Measure 1.4		Not sub	scribed				
	Measure 1.5							
	Measure 1.6							
	Measure 2.1		Not sub	scribed				
	Measure 2.2	$\checkmark$						
2	Measure 2.3							
	Measure 2.4	$\checkmark$						
	Measure 3.1							
3	Measure 3.2	$\checkmark$						
	Measure 3.3	$\checkmark$						
		III. Politica	l advertising					
4	Measure 4.1		Not sub	scribed				
4	Measure 4.2		Not sub	scribed				
5	Measure 5.1		Not sub	scribed				
	Measure 6.1	Not subscribed						
	Measure 6.2		Not sub	scribed				
6	Measure 6.3		Not sub					
	Measure 6.4		Not sub	scribed				
	Measure 6.5		Not sub	scribed				

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> **Note:** Google Advertising refers to both Google Ads and Google AdSense where appropriate. Within the body of the report, 'Google Advertising' is used to refer to both services, whereas the individual service will be named if a statement is only applicable to Google Ads or Google AdSense.

	Measure 7.1			oscribed				
7	Measure 7.2		Not subscribed					
,	Measure 7.3	Not subscribed						
	Measure 7.4			scribed				
8	Measure 8.1			oscribed				
	Measure 8.2			scribed				
9	Measure 9.1			oscribed				
,	Measure 9.2			scribed				
10	Measure 10.1		Not sub	scribed				
10	Measure 10.2			scribed				
	Measure 11.1			scribed				
11	Measure 11.2			scribed				
11	Measure 11.3			scribed				
	Measure 11.4			oscribed				
	Measure 12.1		Not subscribed					
12	Measure 12.2	Not subscribed						
	Measure 12.3			scribed				
	Measure 13.1			oscribed				
13	Measure 13.2			oscribed				
	Measure 13.3			oscribed				
		IV. Integrit	y of services					
	Measure 14.1			$\checkmark$				
14	Measure 14.2							
	Measure 14.3							
45	Measure 15.1			$\checkmark$				
15	Measure 15.2							
	Measure 16.1							
16	Measure 16.2			$\square$				
		V. Empow	vering users	_				
v. Empowering about								

		_	_	_	_		
	Measure 17.1			$\checkmark$			
17	Measure 17.2						
	Measure 17.3			$\checkmark$			
	Measure 18.1		Not sub	scribed			
18	Measure 18.2			$\checkmark$			
	Measure 18.3			$\checkmark$			
10	Measure 19.1		$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$			
19	Measure 19.2			$\checkmark$			
20	Measure 20.1		Not sub	scribed			
20	Measure 20.2		Not sub	oscribed			
	Measure 21.1		Not sub	oscribed			
21	Measure 21.2		Not sub	scribed			
	Measure 21.3		Not sub	scribed			
	Measure 22.1		Not subscribed				
	Measure 22.2		Not subscribed				
	Measure 22.3			oscribed			
22	Measure 22.4			scribed			
	Measure 22.5			pscribed			
	Measure 22.6		Not sub	oscribed			
	Measure 22.7			$\checkmark$			
23	Measure 23.1			$\checkmark$			
23	Measure 23.2			$\checkmark$			
24	Measure 24.1			$\checkmark$			
25	Measure 25.1	Not subscribed					
25	Measure 25.2		Not sub	oscribed			
		VI. Empowering the	e research communi	ity			
	Measure 26.1						
26	Measure 26.2						
	Measure 26.3			$\checkmark$			

	Measure 27.1	Not subscribed						
	Measure 27.2	Not subscribed						
27	Measure 27.3	Not subscribed						
	Measure 27.4		Not subscribed					
	Measure 28.1		$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$				
	Measure 28.2			$\checkmark$				
28	Measure 28.3			$\checkmark$				
	Measure 28.4			$\checkmark$				
	Measure 29.1		Not sub	scribed				
29	Measure 29.2		Not sub	oscribed				
	Measure 29.3		Not sub	scribed				
	VI	I. Empowering the fa	act-checking comm	unity				
	Measure 30.1			scribed				
30	Measure 30.2		Not subscribed					
30	Measure 30.3	Not subscribed						
	Measure 30.4			scribed				
	Measure 31.1		Not subscribed					
31	Measure 31.2			oscribed				
01	Measure 31.3			scribed				
	Measure 31.4			oscribed				
	Measure 32.1			oscribed				
32	Measure 32.2			oscribed				
	Measure 32.3			oscribed				
33	Measure 33.1			oscribed				
		VIII. Transp	arency centre					
	Measure 34.1							
	Measure 34.2				$\checkmark$			
34	Measure 34.3							
	Measure 34.4							
	Measure 34.5							

	Measure 35.1		П		$\checkmark$
	Measure 35.2			П	
	Measure 35.3				
35	Measure 35.4				
	Measure 35.5				
	Measure 35.6				
	Measure 36.1				
36	Measure 36.2				
	Measure 36.3				
	<u> </u>	IX. Permane	ent Task-Force		
	Measure 37.1				
	Measure 37.2				<u></u>
	Measure 37.3				
37	Measure 37.4				
	Measure 37.5				
	Measure 37.6				
		X. Monitorir	ng of the Code		
38	Measure 38.1				
39	-				
	Measure 40.1				
	Measure 40.2				
40	Measure 40.3				
40	Measure 40.4				
	Measure 40.5				
	Measure 40.6				
	Measure 41.1				
41	Measure 41.2				
	Measure 41.3				

42	-		
43	-		
44	-		$\checkmark$

#### **Guidelines for filling out the report for VLOPSEs**

The reporting period to be covered in the reports is six months (1 January to 30 June 2025) for Very Large Online Platforms and Search Engines (VLOPSEs). Signatories shall submit reports outlining policy updates and actions taken to implement the Commitments and Measures they signed up to under the Code. All data and policy updates should be reported for six months period from the submission of last reports.

#### Reporting per Service

When filling in a report for several services, use colour codes to clearly distinguish between services. At the beginning of the report, clarify what colour is used for which service.

#### Reporting in text form

Reporting in the form of written text is required for several parts of the report. Most of them are accompanied by a target character limit. Please stick to the target character limit as much as possible. We encourage you to use bullet points and short sentences. When providing information to the QRE, please make sure that your answer covers all the elements of the associated commitment and measure. Links should only be used to provide examples or to illustrate the point. They should not be used to replace explanations or to provide data in the forms. All relevant explanations and data must be included in the report directly, in written form.

#### Reporting SLIs and data

Reporting on SLIs requires quantitative information to be reported on in this harmonised reporting template.

- SLIs should generally be reported on per Member State. Where required by the Code, reporting needs to be done both per Member State and per language, e.g. SLI 30.1.1.
- If no data is available on Member State level, SLIs might, instead, be exceptionally reported on per language. (NB that Signatories agreed to revisit this issue after the first reporting, to ensure harmonised and meaningful reporting.)
- Please report data in the format provided by the harmonised reporting template, not through external links. Please use the Member State/language template provided in the harmonised reporting template. Where the table asks for 'Other relevant metrics', please name the metric that you would like to report on in addition to the ones already provided. You may include more than the number of additional fields provided where necessary; in that case, please adjust the table as needed.
- Please contextualise all data as much as possible, i.e. include baseline quantitative information that will help contextualise the SLIs (e.g. number of pieces of content labelled out of what volume of content).
- If there are no relevant metrics to report on, please leave the respective columns blank.

#### Reporting on TTPs

If subscribed to Commitment 14, Integrity of Services, we ask you to report on each identified TTP individually. The number of identified TTPs may vary per service. Where more than one TTP are reported under the same action, clarify the reasoning in the methodology. Where input is not provided, keep the placeholder for the relevant TTP and explain reasons and planned remedial action. Additionally, as with all other SLIs, data should be provided per Member State for each individual TTP.

#### Missing Data and insights on methodology

In case that at the time of reporting there is no data available yet, the data is insufficient, or the methodology is lacking, please outline in the dedicated field (i.e. in the field about further implementation measures planned) how this will be addressed over the upcoming six months, being as specific as possible.

Signatories are encouraged to provide insights about the data/numbers they provide by inserting possible explanations in the boxes of the template "Methodology of data measurement & insights on data provided". This should aim to explain the why of what is being reported, for instance - Are there trends or curiosities that could require or use contextual explanation? What may be driving the change or the difference in the number? Please also indicate inconsistencies or gaps regarding methodology in the dedicated box.

#### **Attachments**

We ask you not to enclose any additional attachments to the harmonised reporting template.

#### Crisis and elections reporting template

Relevant signatories are asked to provide proportionate and appropriate information and data during a period of crisis and during an election. Reporting is a part of a special chapter at the end of the harmonised reporting template and should follow the guidelines:

- The reporting of signatories' actions should be as specific to the particular crisis or election reported on as possible. To this extent, the rows on "Specific Action[s]" should be filled in with actions that are either put in place specifically for a particular event (for example a media literacy campaign on disinformation related to the Ukraine war, an information panel for the European elections), or to explain in more detail how an action that forms part of the service's general approach to implementing the Code is implemented in the specific context of the crisis or election reported on (for example, what types of narratives in a particular election/crisis would fall into scope of a particular policy of the service, what forms of advertising are ineligible).
- The harmonised reporting template should be filled in by adding additional rows for each item reported on. This means that rather than combined/bulk reporting such as "Depending on severity of violation, we demote or remove content based on policies X, Y, Z", there should be individual rows stating for example "Under Policy X, content is demoted or removed based on severity", "Under Policy Y, content [...]" etc.
- The rows should be colour-coded to indicate which service is being reported on, using the same colour code as for the overall harmonised reporting template.
- Reporting should be brief and to the point, with a suggested character limit entry of 2000 characters.

#### Uploading data to the Transparency Centre

The reports should be submitted to the Commission in the form of the pdf via e-mail to the address CNECT COP TASK FORCE CNECT-COP-TASK-FORCE@ec.europa.eu within the agreed deadline. Signatories will upload all data from the harmonised reporting template to the Transparency Centre, allowing easy data access and filtering within the agreed deadline. It is the responsibility of the Signatories to ensure that the uploading takes place and is executed on time. Signatories are also responsible to ensure that the Transparency Centre is operational

and functional by the time of the reports' submission, that the data from the reports are uploaded and made accessible in the Transparency Centre within the above deadline, and that users are able to read, search, filter and download data as needed in a user-friendly way and format.

# **II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements**

Commitments 1 - 3

# **II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements**

# Commitment 1

Relevant signatories participating in ad placements commit to defund the dissemination of disinformation, and improve the policies and systems which determine the eligibility of content to be monetised, the controls for monetisation and ad placement, and the data to report on the accuracy and effectiveness of controls and services around ad placements.

	C.1	M 1.1	M 1.2	M 1.3	M 1.4	M 1.5	M 1.6
We signed up to the following	Google	Not	Not	Google	Not	Google	Google
measures of this commitment:	Advertising	subscribed	subscribed	Advertising	subscribed	Advertising	Advertising

	Google Advertising
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 1.1	Not subscribed
QRE 1.1.1	Not subscribed
SLI 1.1.1 – Numbers by actions enforcing policies above (specify if at page and/or domain level)	Not subscribed
Member States	Not subscribed

This additional Service Level Indicator provides an estimated financial value of the actions taken by Signatories to demonetise disinformation sources (under SLI 1.1.1). It is based on media metrics available to Signatories (query/bid² or impression³) and applying an agreed-upon conversion factor provided by a third party designated by the Task-force of the Code (Ebiquity plc.).

SLI 1.1.2 -	Not subscribed
Preventing the	
flow of	
legitimate	
advertising	
investment to	
sites or content	
that are	
designated as	
disinformation	
Member States	Not subscribed

Measure 1.2	Not subscribed
QRE 1.2.1	Not subscribed
SLI 1.2.1	Not subscribed
Member States	Not subscribed

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Request placed between a seller and buyer of advertising that can detail amongst other things website, specific content, targeting data inclusive of audience or content.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Comprehensive calculation of the number of people who have been reached by a piece of media content by passive exposure (viewing a piece of content) or active engagement (visiting a destination).

Measure 1.3	Google Advertising			
	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.			
QRE 1.3.1	Google sets a high bar for information quality on services that involve advertising and content monetisation. Given that many bad actors may seek to make money by spreading harmful content, raising the bar for monetisation can also diminish their incentives to misuse Google services. For example, Google prohibits deceptive behaviour on Google advertising products.			
	Google Ads also provides advertisers with additional controls and helps them exclude types of content that, while in compliance with AdSense policies, may not fit their brand or business. These controls let advertisers apply content filters or exclude certain types of content or terms from their video, display, and search ad campaigns. Advertisers can exclude content such as politics, news, sports, beauty, fashion and many other categories. These categories are listed in the Google Ads Help Centre.			
Measure 1.4	Not subscribed			
QRE 1.4.1	Not subscribed			
Measure 1.5	Google Advertising			
QRE 1.5.1	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.  Google partakes in audits including those conducted by independent accreditation organisations such as the Media Rating Council (MRC) and maintains this accreditation via participation in annual audit cycles conducted by the MRC.  The current MRC accreditation certifies that:  • Google Ads display and search clicks measurement methodology and AdSense ad serving technologies adhere to			
	<ul> <li>Google Ads display and search clicks measurement methodology and Adsense ad serving technologies adhere to the industry standards for click measurement.</li> <li>Google Ads video impression and video viewability measurement as reported in the Video Viewability Report adheres to the industry standards for video impression and viewability measurement.</li> </ul>			

F	The processes supporting these technologies are accurate. This applies to Google's measurement technology which is used across all device types: desktop, mobile, and tablet, in both browser and mobile apps environments.  For more information about what this accreditation means, please see this <a href="help page">help page</a> .			
<b>QRE 1.5.2</b> S	See response to QRE 1.5.1.			
Measure 1.6	Google Advertising			
QRE 1.6.1 S	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.  Google Ads provides its advertising partners with features that enable them to maintain control over where their ads appear, the format in which their ads run, and their intended audience.  Since April 2021, advertisers have the ability to use dynamic exclusion lists that can be updated seamlessly and continuously over time. These lists can be created by advertisers themselves or by a third party they trust, such as brand safety organisations and industry groups. Once advertisers upload a dynamic exclusion list to their Google Ads account, they can schedule automatic updates as new web pages or domains are added, ensuring that their exclusion lists remain effective and up-to-date.			
QRE 1.6.2	Not relevant for Google Ads (intended for Signatories that purchase ads).			
QRE 1.6.3	Not relevant for Google Ads (intended for Signatories that provide brand safety tools).			
QRE 1.6.4	Not relevant for Google Ads (intended for Signatories that rate sources).			
SLI 1.6.1	Not relevant for Google Ads (intended for Signatories that purchase ads).			
Data				

#### **II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements** Commitment 2 Relevant Signatories participating in advertising commit to prevent the misuse of advertising systems to disseminate Disinformation in the form of advertising messages. C.2 M 2.1 M 2.2 M 2.3 M 2.4 We signed up to the following Google Google Google Google Not subscribed measures of this commitment: **Advertising** Advertising Advertising Advertising

	Google Advertising
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	In H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025), Google updated the Ads Transparency Policy to include the display of additional information about the entity that pays for the ads. This update was implemented in two phases:  • In May 2025, Google began displaying the payment profile name as the payer name for verified advertisers, if that name differs from their verified advertiser name. The payer name will be visible in the 'My Ad Center' panel and the Ads Transparency Centre.  • Since June 2025, Google Ads advertisers have been able to edit the displayed payer name by navigating to the advertiser verification page under billing. When such an edit is made, the revised payer name will display instead of the payment profile name.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No

If yes, which further implementation	N/A
measures do you plan to put in place in	
the next 6 months?	

Measure 2.1	Not subscribed
QRE 2.1.1	Not subscribed
SLI 2.1.1	Not subscribed
Member States	Not subscribed

Measure 2.2	Google Advertising		
	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.		
QRE 2.2.1	All newly created ads and ads that are edited by users are reviewed for policy violations. The review of new ads is performed by either, or a combination of:  • Automated mechanisms; and • Manual reviews performed by human reviewers.		
	For more information on how the ad review process works, please see the 'About the ad review process' page.		

Measure 2.3	Google Advertising	
QRE 2.3.1	See response to QRE 2.2.1.	
	Number of own-initiative actions taken on advertisements that affect the availability, visibility, and accessibility of	
SLI 2.3.1 – Numbers	information provided by recipients of Google Ads services, by EEA Member State billing country and policy in H1 2025 (1	
by actions	January 2025 to 30 June 2025). These actions taken include enforcement against ads and ad assets that violate any of	
enforcing relevant	the policy topics in scope for reporting.	
policies		
	Google takes content moderation actions on content which violates or may be shown to violate Google Ads policies, or	

where the content is illegal. These can encompass both proactive and reactive enforcement actions. Proactive enforcement takes place when Google employees, algorithms, or contractors flag potentially policy-violating content. Reactive enforcement takes place in response to external notifications, such as user policy flags or legal complaints (e.g. an Article 9 order or an Article 16 notice under the Digital Services Act).

To ensure a safe and positive experience for users, Google requires that advertisers comply with all applicable laws and regulations in addition to the Google Ads policies. Ads, assets, destinations, and other content that violates Google Ads policies can be blocked on the Google Ads platform and associated networks.

#### Ad or asset disapproval

Ads and assets that do not follow Google Ads policies will be disapproved. A disapproved ad will not be able to run until the policy violation is fixed and the ad is reviewed.

#### **Account suspension**

Google Ads Accounts may be suspended if Google finds violations of its policies or the Terms and Conditions.

For more information on what happens when an ad or account is violating Google Ads policies, please see the <u>'What happens if you violate our policies' page.</u>

#### Policies in scope:

- <u>Destination Requirements</u> (Insufficient Original Content);
- <u>Inappropriate Content</u> (Dangerous or Derogatory Content, Shocking Content, Sensitive Events);
- <u>Misrepresentation</u> (Unacceptable Business Practices, Coordinated Deceptive Practices, Misleading Representation, Manipulated Media, Unreliable Claims, Misleading Ad Design, Clickbait Ads, Unclear Relevance, Unavailable Offers, Dishonest Pricing Practices).

	Number of actions taken, by policy		
	Number of actions taken, for	Number of actions taken, for	Number of actions taken, for
	Destination Requirements	Inappropriate Content	Misrepresentation
Level	Ads & Ad Assets	Ads & Ad Assets	Ads & Ad Assets
Member States			

Austria	5,679,742	152,315	306,606
Belgium	6,771,548	121,570	555,205
Bulgaria	7,203,929	18,865	355,403
Croatia	1,904,898	20,974	94,461
Cyprus	5,382,607	290,609	1,142,090
Czech Republic	13,608,158	359,832	4,235,014
Denmark	6,847,768	201,918	1,406,770
Estonia	1,384,422	12,757	210,660
Finland	2,080,150	32,778	327,317
France	391,100,341	794,427	2,887,710
Germany	106,072,196	1,148,272	2,402,796
Greece	1,875,045	36,299	128,314
Hungary	5,503,166	140,868	252,077
Ireland	19,331,043	1,579,743	1,899,322
Italy	47,864,574	265,087	3,049,594
Latvia	1,637,301	30,738	1,933,507
Lithuania	8,357,484	93,765	193,107
Luxembourg	1,075,313	29,661	442,666
Malta	5,866,262	15,759	3,687,084
Netherlands	71,198,546	658,263	2,131,593
Poland	23,028,128	747,208	2,382,988
Portugal	2,648,319	65,962	279,512
Romania	7,698,926	303,699	422,070

Total EEA	862,552,182	7,984,598	35,215,470
Total EU	858,632,841	7,959,076	34,915,232
Norway	3,439,066	22,644	206,561
Liechtenstein	322,224	676	7,245
Iceland	158,051	2,202	86,432
Sweden	12,044,118	176,689	256,526
Spain	95,254,245	556,151	2,567,776
Slovenia	3,003,559	28,852	138,664
Slovakia	4,211,053	76,015	1,226,400

Measure 2.4	Google Advertising
	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.
QRE 2.4.1	Notification  Ads that do not follow Google Ads policies will be disapproved or (if appropriate) limited in where and when they can show. This will be shown in the 'Status' column as 'Disapproved' or 'Eligible (limited),' and the ad may not be able to run until the policy violation is fixed and the ad is re-reviewed. By hovering the cursor over the status of the ad, there is additional information, including the policy violation impacting the ad. For more information on how to fix a disapproved ad, see the external Help Centre page.
	Appeal process  Advertisers have multiple options and pathways to appeal a policy decision directly from their Google Ads account, for instance the 'ads and assets' table, the Policy Manager, or the <u>Disapproved Ads and Policy Questions</u> form. For more information about the appeal process, check the <u>Help Centre page</u> . For account suspensions, advertisers can also appeal following the <u>submit an appeal process</u> .

Number of content moderation complaints received from advertisers located in EEA Member States during H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025), broken down by EEA Member State and by complaint outcome. Advertiser complaints were received via Google Ads standardised path for appealing policy decisions.

Complaint outcomes include initial decision upheld and initial decision reversed. An 'initial decision' refers to the first enforcement of Google's terms of service or product policies. These decisions may be reversed in light of additional information provided by the appellant as part of an appeal or additional automatic, manual review of the content.

#### **SLI 2.4.1**

#### Policies in scope:

- <u>Destination Requirements</u> (Insufficient Original Content);
- <u>Inappropriate Content</u> (Dangerous or Derogatory Content, Shocking Content, Sensitive Events);
- <u>Misrepresentation</u> (Unacceptable Business Practices, Coordinated Deceptive Practices, Misleading Representation, Manipulated Media, Unreliable Claims, Misleading Ad Design, Clickbait Ads, Unclear Relevance, Unavailable Offers, Dishonest Pricing Practices).

Number of complaints received, by EU Member State for relevant policies described above, and complaint outcome in H1 2025.

	Number of Ads Appeals	Number of Successful Appeals	Number of Failed Appeals
Level	Ads	Ads	Ads
Member States			
Austria	68,158	52,996	15,162
Belgium	25,671	13,280	12,391
Bulgaria	42,739	13,207	29,532
Croatia	9,568	4,423	5,145
Cyprus	143,815	44,042	99,773
Czech Republic	142,345	62,184	80,161
Denmark	49,175	23,477	25,698
Estonia	29,176	10,144	19,032

Total EU	2,043,767	798,141	1,245,626
Norway	5,407	1,554	3,853
Liechtenstein	1,252	313	939
Iceland	419	88	331
Sweden	15,145	10,308	4,837
Spain	251,087	121,197	129,890
Slovenia	25,667	7,143	18,524
Slovakia	15,751	9,896	5,855
Romania	40,741	14,509	26,232
Portugal	16,924	8,183	8,741
Poland	137,049	62,249	74,800
Netherlands	246,757	88,441	158,316
Malta	46,200	12,897	33,303
Luxembourg	551	356	195
Lithuania	147,455	26,493	120,962
Latvia	16,239	6,463	9,776
Italy	168,738	33,998	134,740
Ireland	12,186	6,225	5,961
Hungary	23,583	14,451	9,132
Greece	10,853	6,585	4,268
Germany	242,262	99,494	142,768
France	91,582	34,113	57,469
Finland	24,350	11,387	12,963

Total EEA	2,050,845	800,096	1,250,749

# **II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements**

# Commitment 3

Relevant Signatories involved in buying, selling and placing digital advertising commit to exchange best practices and strengthen cooperation with relevant players, expanding to organisations active in the online monetisation value chain, such as online e-payment services, e-commerce platforms and relevant crowd-funding/donation systems, with the aim to increase the effectiveness of scrutiny of ad placements on their own services.

	C.3	M 3.1	M 3.2	M 3.3
We signed up to the following measures	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	Google Advertising	Google Advertising
of this commitment:				

	Google Advertising
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 3.1	Google Advertising
QRE 3.1.1	Google Advertising works across industry and with civil society to facilitate the flow of information, relevant to tackling disinformation. For example, Google participates in the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation Permanent Task-force's dedicated Working Groups, such as the elections working group, which involves civil society and Industry Signatories.
Measure 3.2	Google Advertising
QRE 3.2.1	Google takes part in the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation Permanent Task-force's Working Group on elections - as mentioned in response to QRE 3.1.1. In addition, Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) continues to engage with other Industry Signatories to the Code in order to stay abreast of cross-platform deceptive practices, such as operations leveraging fake or impersonated accounts.
Measure 3.3	Google Advertising
QRE 3.3.1	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.  Google Advertising frequently engages with third-party organisations in order to explain, collect feedback on, and improve Google Advertising policies. Google Advertising has also exchanged views with experts at numerous policy roundtables, conferences, and workshops - both in Brussels and in the EU capitals.  Please also see QRE 3.1.1 for additional information on the collaboration with third party organisations and government entities.

# III. Political Advertising

Commitments 4 - 13

III. Political Advertising				
	Commitment 4			
Relevant Signatories commit to adopt a common definition of 'political and issue advertising'.				
C.4 M 4.1 M 4.2				
We signed up to the following  Not subscribed  Not subscribed  Not subscribed  Not subscribed				

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Not subscribed
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Not subscribed

Measure	4.1	Not subscribed
Measure	4.2	Not subscribed

QRE 4.1.1 (for	Not subscribed
measures 4.1 and	
4.2)	
QRE 4.1.2 (for	Not subscribed
measures 4.1 and	
4.2)	

# III. Political Advertising Commitment 5 Relevant Signatories commit to apply a consistent approach across political and issue advertising on their services and to clearly indicate in their advertising policies the extent to which such advertising is permitted or prohibited on their services. C.5 We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: Not subscribed Not subscribed

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Not subscribed
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Not subscribed

Measure 5.1	Not subscribed
QRE 5.1.1	Not subscribed

# III. Political Advertising

# Commitment 6

Relevant Signatories commit to make political or issue ads clearly labelled and distinguishable as paid-for content in a way that allows users to understand that the content displayed contains political or issue advertising.

	C.6	M 6.1	M 6.2	M 6.3	M 6.4	M 6.5
We signed up to the following	Not	Not	Not	Not	Not	Not
measures of this commitment:	subscribed	subscribed	subscribed	subscribed	subscribed	subscribed

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Not subscribed
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed

If yes, which further implementation Not subscribed measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? Not subscribed Measure 6.1 **QRE 6.1.1** Not subscribed Not subscribed Measure 6.2 **QRE 6.2.1** Not subscribed **QRE 6.2.2** Not subscribed SLI 6.2.1 -Not subscribed numbers for actions enforcing policies above **Member States** Not subscribed Not subscribed Measure 6.3 **QRE 6.3.1** Not subscribed Not subscribed Measure 6.4 Not subscribed **QRE 6.4.1** Not subscribed Measure 6.5 Not subscribed **QRE 6.5.1** 

# III. Political Advertising

### Commitment 7

Relevant Signatories commit to put proportionate and appropriate identity verification systems in place for sponsors and providers of advertising services acting on behalf of sponsors placing political or issue ads. Relevant signatories will make sure that labelling and user-facing transparency requirements are met before allowing placement of such ads.

C.7	M 7.1	M 7.2	M 7.3	M 7.4

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Not subscribed				
	Not subscribed				
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed				
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Not subscribed				
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed				
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Not subscribed				

Measure 7.1	Not subscribed
QRE 7.1.1	Not subscribed
SLI 7.1.1 – numbers for actions enforcing policies above (comparable metrics as for SLI 6.2.1)	Not subscribed
Member States	Not subscribed

Measure 7.2	Not subscribed
QRE 7.2.1	Not subscribed
QRE 7.2.2	Not subscribed
Measure 7.3	Not subscribed
QRE 7.3.1	Not subscribed
QRE 7.3.2	Not subscribed
Measure 7.4	Not subscribed
QRE 7.4.1	Not subscribed

III. Political Advertising				
Commitment 8				
Relevant Signatories commit to provide transparency information to users about the political or issue ads they see on their service.				
C.8 M 8.1 M 8.2				
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Not subscribed
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the	Not subscribed

implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Not subscribed

Measure 8.1	Not subscribed
Measure 8.2	Not subscribed
QRE 8.2.1 (for measures 8.1 & 8.2)	Not subscribed

# III. Political Advertising Commitment 9 Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with clear, comprehensible, comprehensive information about why they are seeing a political or issue ad.

	C.9	M 9.1	M 9.2
We signed up to the following	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Not subscribed
measures of this commitment:			

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Not subscribed
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in	Not subscribed

the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Not subscribed

Measure 9.1	Not subscribed
Measure 9.2	Not subscribed
QRE 9.2.1 (for measures 9.1 & 9.2)	Not subscribed

# III. Political Advertising

## Commitment 10

Relevant Signatories commit to maintain repositories of political or issue advertising and ensure their currentness, completeness, usability and quality, such that they contain all political and issue advertising served, along with the necessary information to comply with their legal obligations and with transparency commitments under this Code.

	C.10	M 10.1	M 10.2
We signed up to the following	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Not subscribed
measures of this commitment:			

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you	Not subscribed
deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms	
of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	
etc): [Tes/No]	

If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Not subscribed
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Not subscribed

Measure 10.1	Not subscribed
Measure 10.2	Not subscribed
QRE 10.2.1 (for measures 10.1 & 10.2)	Not subscribed

# III. Political Advertising

## Commitment 11

Relevant Signatories commit to provide application programming interfaces (APIs) or other interfaces enabling users and researchers to perform customised searches within their ad repositories of political or issue advertising and to include a set of minimum functionalities as well as a set of minimum search criteria for the application of APIs or other interfaces.

	C.11	M 11.1	M 11.2	M 11.3	M 11.4
We signed up to the following	Not subscribed				
measures of this commitment:					

- 1	
- 1	l Not subscribed
- 1	I NOT SUBSCIDED
- 1	

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Not subscribed
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Not subscribed

Measure 11.1	Not subscribed
Measure 11.2	Not subscribed
Measure 11.3	Not subscribed
Measure 11.4	Not subscribed
QRE 11.1.1 (for measures 11.1-11.4)	Not subscribed
QRE 11.4.1	Not subscribed

	III. Political Advertising
	Commitment 12
1	

	C.12	M 12.1	M 12.2	M 12.3
We signed up to the following	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Not subscribed
measures of this commitment:				
	Not subscribed			
In line with this commitment, did you	Not subscribed			
deploy new implementation measures				
(e.g. changes to your terms of service,				
new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]				
If yes, list these implementation	Not subscribed			
measures here [short bullet points].				
Do you plop to put further	Not subscribed			
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in	NOT SUBSCRIBED			
the next 6 months to substantially				
improve the maturity of the				
implementation of this commitment?				
[Yes/No]				
If yes, which further implementation	Not subscribed			
measures do you plan to put in place	1101 00.0011.000			
in the next 6 months?				
Network				
Measure 12.1 Not subscribed				
Measure 12.2 Not subscribed				
Measure 12.3 Not subscribed				

QRE 12.1.1 (for

measures 12.1-12.3)

Not subscribed

# III. Political Advertising

### Commitment 13

Relevant Signatories agree to engage in ongoing monitoring and research to understand and respond to risks related to Disinformation in political or issue advertising.

	C.13	M 13.1	M 13.2	M 13.3
We signed up to the following	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Not subscribed
measures of this commitment:				

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Not subscribed
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Not subscribed

Measure 13.1	Not subscribed
Measure 13.2	Not subscribed
Measure 13.3	Not subscribed

QRE 13.1.1 (for Not subscribed measures 13.1-13.3)

# **IV. Integrity of Services**

Commitments 14 - 16

#### IV. Integrity of Services

#### Commitment 14

In order to limit impermissible manipulative behaviours and practices across their services, Relevant Signatories commit to put in place or further bolster policies to address both misinformation and disinformation across their services, and to agree on a cross-service understanding of manipulative behaviours, actors and practices not permitted on their services. Such behaviours and practices, which should periodically be reviewed in light with the latest evidence on the conducts and TTPs employed by malicious actors, such as the AMITT Disinformation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Framework, include:

The following TTPs pertain to the creation of assets for the purpose of a disinformation campaign, and to ways to make these assets seem credible:

- 1. Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts);
- 2. Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, up votes, comments);
- 3. Use of fake followers or subscribers:
- 4. Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains;
- 5. Account hijacking or impersonation.

The following TTPs pertain to the dissemination of content created in the context of a disinformation campaign, which may or may not include some forms of targeting or attempting to silence opposing views. Relevant TTPs include:

- 6. Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g. via personalised advertising, location spoofing or obfuscation);
- 7. Deploy deceptive manipulated media (e.g. "deep fakes", "cheap fakes"...);
- 8. Use "hack and leak" operation (which may or may not include doctored content);
- 9. Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers);
- 10. Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers;
- 11. Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers;
- 12. Coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts.

	C.14	M 14.1	M 14.2	M 14.3
We signed up to the following	Google Search	Google Search	Google Search	Google Search
measures of this commitment:	YouTube	YouTube	YouTube	YouTube

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	But, see QRE 14.1.2
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 14.1	Google Search	YouTube
	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in
	some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as	some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as
	there is no new information to share now.	there is no new information to share now.
QRE 14.1.1	Google Search's systems are designed to elevate high-quality information and combat the threats listed in Commitment 14. While many of those tactics, techniques,	YouTube's systems are designed to connect people with high-quality content.
	and procedures (TTPs) are not relevant to search engines (e.g. TTPs 1 through 5, TTP 11), by seeking to elevate	In addition, YouTube has various policies which set out what is not allowed on YouTube. These policies, which can be

trustworthy, high-quality information, Search's ranking systems directly tackle threats like inauthentic domains (TTP 4), obfuscation (TTP 6), deceptive manipulated media (TTP 7), hack and leak operations (TTP 8), inauthentic coordination (TTP 9), and a broad range of deceptive practices (TTP 10). More information about the design of Search's ranking systems is outlined in the User Empowerment chapter.

Google Search's <u>Overall Content Policies</u> outline that Search takes action against spam, which is content that exhibits deceptive or manipulative behaviour designed to deceive users or game search systems. Learn more about <u>Google Search Webmaster Guidelines</u>.

In line with these policies, Search deploys spam protection tools. These efforts address a range of deceptive practices and help reduce the spread of low quality content on Google Search through inauthentic behaviours outlined in relevant TTPs.

Moreover, Search has policies and community guidelines specifically governing what can appear in Google Search features (e.g. knowledge panels, content advisories, 'About This Result', etc.) to make sure that Search is showing high-quality and helpful content, while also taking action against content that may promote harmful mis-/disinformation. Relevant policies to the threats listed above include the following:

 <u>Deceptive Practices Policy</u>: This policy prohibits content that impersonates any person or accessed in <u>YouTube's Help Centre</u>, address relevant TTPs. Notably, YouTube's policies tend to be broader than the identified TTPs. As such, related SLIs providing information about actions taken related to the TTP may be overinclusive.

YouTube's <u>Community Guidelines</u>, commitment to promote high-quality content and curb the spread of harmful misinformation, disclosure requirements for paid product placements, sponsorships & endorsements, and ongoing work with Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) broadly address TTPs: 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 - and notably, go beyond these TTPs.

In this report, YouTube has provided data relating to TTPs 1, 5, 7 and 9. Removals relating to the remaining TTPs are included, in part or in whole, in the <u>Community Guidelines enforcement report</u>, but YouTube does not have more detailed removal reporting at this time. TTPs do not necessarily map singularly to one Community Guideline, and therefore, there are challenges in providing more granular mapping for TTPs.

YouTube continues to assess, evaluate, and update its policies on a regular basis, the latest updated policies, including Community Guidelines, can be found <a href="https://example.com/here/">https://example.com/here/</a>.

organisation, misrepresentation or concealment of ownership or primary purpose, and engagement in inauthentic or coordinated behaviour to deceive. defraud, or mislead. This policy does not cover content with certain artistic, educational, historical, documentary, or scientific considerations, or other substantial benefits to the public. Manipulated Media Policy: This policy prohibits audio, video, or image content that has been manipulated to deceive, defraud, or mislead by means of creating a representation of actions or events that verifiably did not take place. <u>Transparency Policy</u>: This policy notes that news sources on Google should provide clear dates and bylines, as well as information about authors, the publication, the publisher, company or network behind it, and contact information. Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now. there is no new information to share now. Google Search uses a variety of proactive detection efforts YouTube's approach to combating misinformation involves to counter spam, which overlaps significantly with tactics, removing content that violates YouTube's policies, raising **QRE 14.1.2** high-quality information in rankings and recommendations techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used to disseminate curbing the spread of harmful misinformation, and disinformation. As outlined in the overall Google Search **Content Policies** and Community Guidelines for user rewarding trusted, eligible creators and artists. YouTube applies these principles globally, including across the EU. generated content, action is taken against spam, which is content that exhibits deceptive or manipulative behaviour designed to deceive users or game search systems. YouTube uses a combination of people and machine learning to detect problematic content automatically and at

Pursuant to the Spam Content Policy, Google Search scale. Machine learning is well-suited to detect patterns, deploys spam protection tools, such as SpamBrain including harmful misinformation, which helps YouTube find (Google's Al-based spam-prevention system), to protect content similar to other content that YouTube has already search quality and user safety. Addressing a wider range of removed, even before it is viewed. Every quarter, YouTube content than only mis-/disinformation, these efforts help publishes data in the Community Guidelines enforcement reduce the spread of low quality content on Google Search. report about removals that were first detected by Additional information can be found in the 2022 Google automated means. Search Webspam Report. In March 2024, Google Search released an <u>update</u> to its Spam Policies that addresses YouTube's Intelligence Desk monitors the news, social 'scaled content abuse' - artificially-generated content media, and user reports to detect new trends surrounding (including Al-generated content) that seeks to manipulate inappropriate content, and works to make sure YouTube's Google's search ranking. teams are prepared to address them before they can become a larger issue. In addition, Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) and Trust and Safety Teams are central to Google's work to monitor In addition, Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) and Google and YouTube's Trust and Safety Teams are central to malicious actors around the globe, including but not limited to coordinated information operations that may affect EU Google's work to monitor malicious actors around the Member States. More information about this work is globe, including but not limited to coordinated information outlined in QRE 16.1.1. operations that may affect EU Member States. More information about this work is outlined in QRE 16.1.1. YouTube continues to invest in automated detection systems, and rely on both human evaluators and machine learning to train their systems on new data. YouTube's engineering teams also continue to update and improve their detection systems regularly. **Google Search** YouTube Measure 14.2 Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the some instances truncated in order to meet the **QRE 14.2.1** suggested character limit) from the previous report as suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now. there is no new information to share now.

Google Search relies on a combination of people and technology to enforce Google Search policies. Machine learning, for example, plays a critical role in content moderation on Google Search. Google Search systems are built to identify and weigh signals of high-quality information so people can find the most reliable and timely information available. Google Search algorithms look at many factors and signals to raise high-quality content and reduce low quality content. Google Search's publicly available website, How Search Works, explains the key factors that help determine which results are returned for a query. Google Search works continuously to improve the quality and effectiveness of automated systems to protect platforms and users from harmful content.

Furthermore, to ensure its algorithms meet high standards of relevance and quality, Google Search has a rigorous process that involves both live tests and thousands of trained external Search Quality Raters from around the world. Raters do not determine the ranking of an individual, specific page or website, but they help to benchmark the quality of Google Search's results so that Google Search can meet a high bar for users all around the world. Under the Google Search Quality Rater Guidelines, raters are instructed to assign the lowest rating to pages that are potentially harmful to users or specified groups, misleading, untrustworthy, and spammy. Google Search also provides users the ability to flag content that might be violating Google Search policies.

YouTube enforces a broad range of policies to help build a safer community. These policies include, but are not limited to, YouTube's <u>Community Guidelines</u>, which include policies covering <u>Spam</u>, <u>Deceptive Practices</u>, and <u>Scams</u>, <u>Impersonation Policy</u> and <u>Fake Engagement Policy</u>. YouTube applies these policies globally, including across the EEA Member States.

#### Implementing and enforcing YouTube policies

In general, enforcement of YouTube's policies is a joint effort between people and machine learning technology. YouTube starts by giving a team of experienced content moderators enforcement guidelines (detailed explanations of what makes content violative and non-violative), and asks them to differentiate between violative and non-violative material. If the new guidelines allow them to achieve a very high level of accuracy, YouTube expands the testing group to include moderators across different backgrounds, languages and experience levels.

Then YouTube may begin revising the guidelines so that they can be accurately interpreted across a larger, more diverse set of moderators. These findings then help train YouTube's machine learning technology to detect potentially violative content at scale. As done with its content moderators, YouTube also tests its models to understand whether it has provided enough context for them to make accurate assessments about what to surface for people to review.

Once models are trained to identify potentially violative content, the role of content moderators remains essential throughout the enforcement process. Machine learning helps identify potentially violative content at scale and content moderators may then help assess whether the content should be removed.

This collaborative approach helps improve the accuracy of YouTube's models over time, as models continuously learn and adapt based on content moderator feedback. It also means YouTube's enforcement systems can manage the sheer scale of content that is uploaded to YouTube, while still digging into the nuances that determine whether a piece of content is violative.

For TTPs 1, 5, 7 and 9, YouTube provides details around mapping to its policies. To learn more about these methodologies, refer to SLI 14.2.1, SLI 14.2.2, and SLI 14.2.4.

	Google Search											
	SLI 14.2.1 – SLI 14.2.4											
ACTION 1 6. D 9. In (e.g influ 10. V	Ps covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter  Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g. via personalised advertising, location spoofing or obfuscation); nauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by luencers);  Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data ids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers;  Coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts.											

#### SLI 14.2.1

#### Methodology

- (1) Manual enforcement instances under relevant policy violations (including Deceptive Practices, Manipulated Media, Medical Content, Misleading Content and Transparency Policies) on a global level in H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025).
- (2) Domains affected by manual and algorithmic actions for Spam Policies for Google web search on a global level in H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025).

#### Response

- (1) In H1 2025, there were 31,308 instances of policy enforcement, globally, which resulted in removal of false, disputed, non-representative facts, misrepresentation information, content that contradicts scientific or medical based consensus and evidence based best practices. The actions were enforced across Search features including knowledge engine, webanswers, news, discover, image and video search.
- (2) In H1 2025, there were 513,525 manual actions and 37,216,430 algorithmic actions taken against spam policies. Globally, a total of 37,429,641 unique domains were affected by manual and algorithmic actions for Spam Policies for Google web search.

#### **SLI 14.2.2**

These metrics are not feasible for Google Search as it is not known what queries a user will issue and, therefore, Google Search cannot do a before and after comparison. Google Search's systems are trained to block policy-violating content.

#### SLI 14.2.3

This SLI is not applicable for Google Search, as users do not need accounts to use the search engine, and generally do not post content on Google Search.

#### **SLI 14.2.4**

These metrics are not feasible for Google Search as it is not known what queries a user will issue and, therefore, Google Search cannot do a before and after comparison. Google Search's systems are trained to block policy-violating content.

SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
Nr of	Nr of	Views/	Interacti	Views/	Interacti	Penetrati	Trends	Trends	TTPs	Views/	Interacti
instances	actions	impressi	on/	impressi	on/	on and	on	on	related	impressi	on/
of		ons	engagem		engage	impact	targeted		content	ons of	engage

	identified	taken by	before	ent	ons after	ment	on	audience	narrative	in	TTP	ment
	TTPs	type	action	before	action	after	genuine	s	s used	relation	related	with TTP
				action		action	users			to overall	content	related
										content	(in	content
										on the	relation	(in
										service	to overall	relation
											views/im	to overall
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											s on the	on/enga
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Member												
States												

TTP OR ACTION 2												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of	Nr of	Views/	Interacti	Views/	Interacti	Penetrati	Trends	Trends	TTPs	Views/	Interacti
	instances	actions	impressi	on/	impressi	on/	on and	on	on	related	impressi	on/
	of	taken by	ons	engage	ons after	engage	impact	targeted	narrative	content	ons of	engage
	identified	type	before	ment	action	ment	on	audience	s used	in	TTP	ment
	TTPs		action	before		after	genuine	s		relation	related	with TTP
				action		action	users			to overall	content	related
										content	(in	content
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										service	to overall	relation
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											pression	interacti

						s on the	on/enga
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TTP OR ACTION 3														
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4				
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	taken by	Views/ impressi ons before action	Interacti on/ engagem ent before action	Views/ impressi ons after action	Interacti on/ engage ment after action	Penetrati on and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audience s	Trends on narrative s used	TTPs Views/ Interacti related impressi on/ ons of engage in TTP ment relation related with TTP to overall content (in content on the service to overall pression interacti s on the service) Interacti interacti interacti on the service) Interacti interacti interacti on the service)				
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TTP OR												
ACTION 4												
ACTION 4												
	0114404		0114400				0114400			0114404		
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
					T						1	
	Nr of	Nr of	Views/	Interacti	Views/	Interacti	Penetrati	Trends	Trends	TTPs	Views/	Interacti
	instances	actions	impressi	on/	impressi	on/	on and	on	on	related	impressi	on/
	of	taken by	ons	engagem	ons after	engage	impact	targeted	narrative	content	ons of	engage
	identified	type	before	ent	action	ment	on	audience	s used	in	TTP	ment
	TTPs		action	before		after	genuine	s		relation	related	with TTP
				action		action	users			to overall	content	related
										content	(in	content
										on the	relation	(in
										service	to overall	relation
											views/im	to overall
											pression	interacti
											s on the	on/enga
											service)	gement
												on the
												service)
Member States												

TP OR CTION 5														
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.4							
	Nr of	Nr of	Views/	Interacti	Views/	Interacti	Penetrati	Trends	Trends	TTPs	Views/	Interacti		
	instances	actions	impressi	on/	impressi	on/	on and	on	on	related	impressi	on/		
	of	taken by	ons	engagem	ons after	engage	impact	targeted	narrative	content	ons of	engage		
		type		ent	action	ment	on		s used	in	TTP	ment		

	identified	before	before	after	genuine	audience	relation	related	with TTP
	TTPs	action	action	action	users	s	to overall	content	related
							content	(in	content
							on the	relation	(in
							service	to overall	relation
								views/im	to overall
								pression	interacti
								s on the	on/enga
								service)	gement
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									service)
Member									
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TTP OR ACTION 6												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of	Nr of	Views/	Interacti	Views/	Interacti	Penetrati	Trends	Trends	TTPs	Views/	Interactio
	instance	actions	impressi	on/	impressi	on/	on and	on	on	related	impressi	n/
	s of	taken by	ons	engage	ons after	engage	impact	targeted	narrative	content	ons of	engagem
	identifie	type	before	ment	action	ment	on	audience	s used	in	TTP	ent with
	d TTPs		action	before		after	genuine	s		relation	related	TTP
				action		action	users			to overall	content	related
										content	(in	content
										on the	relation	(in
										service	to overall	relation
											views/im	to overall
											pression	interactio
												n/engage

						s on the service)	ment on the
						,	the service)
Member							
States							

TTP OR												
ACTION 7												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of	Nr of	Views/	Interacti	Views/	Interacti	Penetrati	Trends	Trends	TTPs	Views/	Interacti
	instances	actions	impressi	on/	impressi	on/	on and	on	on	related	impressi	on/
	of	taken by	ons	engagem	ons after	engage	impact	targeted	narrative	content	ons of	engage
	identified	type	before	ent	action	ment	on	audience	s used	in	TTP	ment
	TTPs		action	before		after	genuine	s		relation	related	with TTP
				action		action	users			to overall	content	related
										content	(in	content
										on the	relation	(in
										service	to overall	relation
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											service)	on/enga
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States												

TTP OR ACTION 8												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of instances of identified TTPs	taken by	Views/ impressi ons before action	Interacti on/ engagem ent before action	Views/ impressi ons after action	Interacti on/ engage ment after action	Penetrati on and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audience s	Trends on narrative s used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressi ons of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/im pression s on the service)	Interaction/ engagemen t with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/e ngagement on the service)
Member States											33. 1100)	

TTP OR												
ACTION 9												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of	Nr of	Views/	Interacti	Views/	Interacti	Penetrati	Trends	Trends	TTPs	Views/	Interaction/
	instances	actions	impressi	on/	impressi	on/	on and	on	on	related	impressi	engagemen
	of	taken by	ons	engagem	ons after	engage	impact	targeted	narrative	content	ons of	t with TTP
	identified	type	before	ent	action	ment	on	audience	s used	in	TTP	related
	TTPs		action					s		relation	related	content (in

		before	after	genuine		to overall	content	relation to
		action	action	users		content	(in	overall
						on the	relation	interaction/
						service	to overall	engagemen
							views/im	t on the
							pression	service)
							s on the	
							service)	
Member								
States								

TTP OR ACTION 10												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of	Nr of	Views/	Interacti	Views/	Interacti	Penetrati	Trends	Trends	TTPs	Views/	Interaction
	instances	actions	impressi	on/	impressi	on/	on and	on	on	related	impressi	/
	of	taken by	ons	engagem	ons after	engage	impact	targeted	narrative	content	ons of	engageme
	identified	type	before	ent	action	ment	on	audience	s used	in	TTP	nt with TTP
	TTPs		action	before		after	genuine	s		relation	related	related
				action		action	users			to overall	content	content (in
										content	(in	relation to
										on the	relation	overall
										service	to overall	interaction
											views/im	/engagem
											pression	ent on the
											s on the	service)
											service)	
Member												
States												

TTP OR												
ACTION 11												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of	Nr of	Views/	Interacti	Views/	Interacti	Penetrati	Trends	Trends	TTPs	Views/	Interactio
	instances	actions	impressi	on/	impressi	on/	on and	on	on	related	impressi	n/
	of	taken by	ons	engagem	ons after	engage	impact	targeted	narrative	content	ons of	engagem
	identified	type	before	ent	action	ment	on	audience	s used	in	TTP	ent with
	TTPs		action	before		after	genuine	s		relation	related	TTP
		irs		action		action	users			to overall	content	related
										content	(in	content (in
										on the	relation	relation to
										service	to overall	overall
											views/im	interactio
											pression	n/engage
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											service)	the
												service)
Member												
States												

TP OR CTION 12												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of	Nr of	Views/	Interacti	Views/	Interacti	Penetrati	Trends	Trends	TTPs	Views/	Interactio
	instances	actions	impressi	on/	impressi	on/	on and	on	on	related	impressi	n/
	of	taken by	ons	engagem	ons after	engage	impact	targeted	narrative	content	ons of	engagem
		type		ent	action	ment	on		s used	in	TTP	ent with

	identified	before	before	after	genuine	audience	relation	related	TTP
	TTPs	action	action	action	users	s	to overall	content	related
							content	(in	content (in
							on the	relation	relation to
							service	to overall	overall
								views/im	interactio
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Y			

#### SLI 14.2.1 - SLI 14.2.4

#### TTP OR ACTION 1

Where possible, each TTP has been mapped to relevant YT Community Guidelines. However, there is not an exact one-to-one mapping. Content might be violative of more than one of YouTube's Community Guidelines so could be labelled under more than one policy violation. This means the data presented here is a best estimation of relevant TTP-activity under the relevant Community Guideline.

Refer to QRE 14.1.1 for more information on YouTube's efforts to broadly address these TTPs.

#### **SLI 14.2.1**

#### Methodology

- (1) Number of channels for TTP 1, identified for potential removal by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025);
- (2) Number of removals of channels for TTP 1 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025.

The number of removals may represent an overcount, as the respective Community Guidelines may be inclusive of more

policy-violative activity than identified by the TTP alone.

#### Response

- (1) Please see table below:
- (2) Please see table below.

#### **SLI 14.2.2**

#### Methodology

- (1) Views threshold on video removals for TTP 1 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025;
- (2) Interaction/engagement before action for TTP 1 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025;
- (3) Views/impressions after action for TTP 1 by video by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025;
- (4) Interaction/engagement after action for TTP 1 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025.

For SLI 14.2.2 (3): Actions in this context constitute removals of the video themselves. And therefore there should be no views after YouTube removes the content.

#### Response

- (1) N/A;
- (2) N/A;
- (3) N/A;
- (4) N/A.

#### <u>SLI 14.2.3</u>

Views are a measure of penetration / impact on the platform. SLI 14.2.2 provides data on video removals by view threshold and view / impressions on the platform after action has been taken.

#### SLI 14.2.4

#### Methodology

(1) Percentage of TTP 1 channel removals out of all related channel removals by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025;

(2) N/A;

(3) N/A.

#### Response

- (1) Please see table below;
- (2, 3) The Community Guidelines enforcement report provides information regarding views on videos before they are removed for Community Guidelines violations.

SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2	2						SLI 14.2	2.3		SLI 14.2.	4	
Numbe	Numbe	Numbe	Numbe	Numbe	Numbe	Numbe	Numbe	Views	Penetr	Trends	Trends	Percen	Views	1 1
r of	r of	r of	r of	r of	r of	r of	r of	after	ation	on	on	tage of	/	tion/
channel	channe	videos	videos	videos	videos	videos	videos	action	and	target	narrati	TTP 1	impre	engag
s	Is	remov	remov	remov	remov	remov	remov		impact	ed	ves	channe	ssions	ement
identifi	remov	ed	ed	ed	ed with	ed with	ed with		on	audien	used	I	of	with
ed	ed	with 0	with	with	101-1,0	1,001-	>10,00		genuin	ces		remova	TTP	TTP
		views	1-10	11-100	00	10,000	0		е			Is out	relate	related
			views	views	views	views	views		users			of all	d	conten
												related	conte	t (in
												channe	nt (in	relatio
												I	relati	n to
												remova	on to	overall
												Is	overal	interac
														tion/en
													views	gagem
													/impr	ent on
													essio	the
													ns on	service
													the	)
													servic	
													e)	

Member									
States									
Austria	838	838					34.57	%	
Belgium	758	758					26.03	%	
Bulgaria	629	629					28.03	%	
Croatia	176	176					20.39	%	
Cyprus	605	605					45.52	%	
Czech Republic	1,234	1,234					29.87	%	
Denmark	466	466					27.27	%	
Estonia	195	195					35.01	%	
Finland	531	531					27.00	%	
France	9,483	9,483					39.29	%	
Germany	115,514	115,514					81.51	%	
Greece	8,851	8,851					46.36	%	
Hungary	695	695					30.96	%	
Ireland	1,082	1,082					46.28	%	
Italy	3,127	3,127					30.74	%	
Latvia	432	432					37.66	%	
Lithuania	1,220	1,220					41.17	%	
Luxembourg	119	119					23.61	%	
Malta	62	62					33.33	%	
Netherlands	14,499	14,499					49.78	%	
Poland	7,480	7,480					43.86	%	

Portugal	1,048	1,048						33.04%	
Romania	1,724	1,724						23.48%	
Slovakia	264	264						21.34%	
Slovenia	153	153						32.01%	
Spain	4,827	4,827						34.29%	
Sweden	1,260	1,260						34.85%	
Iceland	27	27						20.45%	
Liechtenstein	5	5						41.67%	
Norway	551	551						29.95%	
Total EU	177,272	177,272						59.34%	
Total EEA	177,855	177,855						59.14%	

TTP OR ACTION														
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4				
	Nr of	Nr of	Views/	Interacti	Views/	Interacti	Penetrati	Trends	Trends	TTPs	Views/	Interacti		
	instances	actions	impressi	on/	impressi	on/	on and	on	on	related	impressi	on/		
	of	taken by	ons	engagem	ons after	engagem	impact	targeted	narrative	content	ons of	engagem		
	identified	type	before	ent	action	ent after	on	audience	s used	in	TTP	ent with		
	TTPs		action	before		action	genuine	s		relation	related	TTP		
				action			users			to overall	content	related		
										content	(in	content		
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										service	to overall	relation		
											views/im	to overall		
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						s on the	n/engage
						service)	n/engage ment on
							the
							service)
Member States							
States							

TTP OR ACTION 3														
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4				
	Nr of instances of taken by identified TTPs		Views/ impressi ons before action	Interacti on/ engagem ent before action	Views/ impressi ons after action	Interacti on/ engagem ent after action	Penetrati on and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audience s	Trends on narrative s used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressi ons of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/im pression s on the service)	Interacti on/ engagem ent with TTP related content (in relation to overall interactio n/engage ment on the service)		
Member States														

TTP OR												
ACTION 4												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of	Nr of	Views/	Interacti	Views/	Interacti	Penetrati	Trends	Trends	TTPs	Views/	Interactio
	instances	actions	impressi	on/	impressi	on/	on and	on	on	related	impressi	n/
	of	taken by	ons	engagem	ons after	engage	impact	targeted	narrative	content	ons of	engagem
	identified	type	before	ent	action	ment	on	audience	s used	in	TTP	ent with
	TTPs		action	before		after	genuine	s		relation	related	TTP
				action		action	users			to overall	content	related
										content	(in	content
										on the	relation	(in relation
										service	to overall	to overall
											views/im	interactio
											pression	n/engage
											s on the	ment on
											service)	the
												service)
Member												
States												

# TTP OR ACTION 5

Where possible, each TTP has been mapped to relevant YT Community Guidelines. However, there is not an exact one-to-one mapping. Content might be violative of more than one of YouTube's Community Guidelines so could be labelled under more than one policy violation. This means the data presented here is a best estimation of relevant TTP-activity under the relevant Community Guideline.

Refer to QRE 14.1.1 for more information on YouTube's efforts to broadly address these TTPs.

# SLI 14.2.1

Methodology

- (1) Number of channels for TTP 5, identified for potential removal by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025);
- (2) Number of removals of channels for TTP 5 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025;
- (3) Number of videos for TTP 5, identified for potential removal by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025;
- (4) Number of removals of videos for TTP 5 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025.

The number of removals may represent an overcount, as the respective Community Guidelines may be inclusive of more policy-violative activity than identified by the TTP alone.

#### Response

- (1) Please see table below;
- (2) Please see table below;
- (3) Please see table below;
- (4) Please see table below.

#### **SLI 14.2.2**

#### Methodology

- (1) Views threshold on video removals for TTP 5 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025;
- (2) Interaction/engagement before action for TTP 5 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025;
- (3) Views/ impressions after action for TTP 5 by video by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025;
- (4) Interaction/engagement after action for TTP 5 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025.

For SLI 14.2.2 (1): Starting March 2025, YouTube updated the terminology used for Shorts view counts. This terminology change does not apply to YouTube's transparency reporting view-related metrics, which remain the same in name and methodology. <u>Learn more here</u>.

For SLI 14.2.2 (3): Actions in this context constitute removals of the video themselves. And therefore there should be no views after YouTube removes the content.

#### Response

(1) Please see table below:

- (2) N/A:
- (3) Please see table below;
- (4) N/A.

#### **SLI 14.2.3**

Views are a measure of penetration / impact on the platform. SLI 14.2.2 provides data on video removals by view threshold and view / impressions on the platform after action has been taken.

#### **SLI 14.2.4**

#### Methodology

- (1) Percentage of TTP 5 channel removals out of all related channel removals by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025;
- (2) Percentage of TTP 5 video removals out of all related video removals by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025;
- (3) N/A;
- (4) N/A.

#### Response

- (1) Please see table below:
- (2) Please see table below;
- (3, 4) The Community Guidelines enforcement report provides information regarding views on videos before they are removed for Community Guidelines violations.

SLI 14.2	SLI 14.2.1				.2.2						SLI 14	.2.3		SLI 14.2.4				
Numb Numb Numb				Num	Num	Num	Num	Num	Num	View	Pene	Tren	Tren	Perce	Perce	View	Inter	
er of	er of	er of	er of	ber	ber	ber	ber	ber	ber	s	trati	ds	ds	ntage	ntage	s/	actio	
chann	chann	video	video	of	of	of	of	of	of	after	on	on	on	of	of	impr	n/	
els	els	s	s	video	video	video	video	video	video	actio	and	targ	narr	TTP 5	TTP 5	essi	enga	
identi	remov	identi	remov	s	s	s	s	s	s	n	impa	eted	ative	chan	video	ons	gem	
fied	ed	fied	ed	remo	remo	remo	remo	remo	remo		ct	audi	s	nel	remo	of	ent	
				ved	ved	ved	ved	ved	ved		on			remo	vals	TTP	with	

											I	Ι	1					TTD
					with	with	with	with		with		gen		used	1	out of		TTP
					0	1-10			1,001			uine	S		out of		ed	relat
					view	view	0	,000	-	00		user			all	relate	cont	ed
					S	S	view	view	10,0	view		S			relate	d	ent	cont
							S	S	00	S					d	video	(in	ent
									view						chan	remo		(in
									S						nel	vals	on	relati
															remo		to	on to
															vals		over	over
																	all	all
																	view	inter
																	s/im	actio
																	pres	n/en
																	sion	gage
																	s on	ment
																	the	on
																	servi	the
																	ce)	servi
																		ce)
Member																		
States																		
Austria	78	78	24	24	0	2	0	1	1	20	0				3.22%	0.16%		
Belgium	123	123	53	53	13	2	14	20	2	2	0				4.22%	0.21%		
Bulgaria	82	82	115	115	7	2	1	13	37	55	0				3.65%	0.56%		
Croatia	34	34	14	14	9	0	2	3	0	0	0				3.94%	0.23%		
Cyprus	36	36	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				2.71%	0.00%		
Czech Republic	90	90	71	71	5	4	27	31	4	0	0				2.18%	0.13%		
Denmark	48	48	27	27	3	0	1	21	2	0	0				2.81%	0.07%		

Estonia	20	20	3	3	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	3.59	% 0.06%	
Finland	38	38	83	83	18	5	10	28	19	3	0	1.93	% 0.68%	
France	708	708	798	798	99	58	33	123	220	265	0	2.93	% 0.57%	
Germany	863	863	4,523	4,523	813	275	730	1,221	668	816	0	0.6	% 2.43%	
Greece	85	85	8	8	1	0	3	4	0	0	0	0.45	% 0.06%	
Hungary	57	57	4	4	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	2.54	% 0.03%	
Ireland	78	78	71	71	3	1	24	28	8	7	0	3.34	% 0.40%	
Italy	402	402	332	332	19	7	18	108	175	5	0	3.95	% 0.39%	
Latvia	28	28	51	51	14	6	16	15	0	0	0	2.44	% 0.58%	
Lithuania	35	35	15	15	1	0	1	1	8	4	0	1.18	% 0.18%	
Luxembourg	9	9	5	5	0	0	3	2	0	0	0	1.79	% 0.29%	
Malta	6	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3.23	% 0.00%	
Netherlands	224	224	447	447	44	20	72	163	105	43	0	0.77	% 0.59%	
Poland	391	391	264	264	14	22	35	48	145	0	0	2.29	% 0.30%	
Portugal	106	106	52	52	6	1	9	36	0	0	0	3.34	% 0.23%	
Romania	307	307	379	379	16	1	12	32	8	310	0	4.18	% 0.54%	
Slovakia	45	45	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3.64	% 0.00%	
Slovenia	19	19	9	9	2	0	4	2	1	0	0	3.97	% 0.35%	
Spain	462	462	1,656	1,656	79	35	233	366	307	636	0	3.28	% 1.69%	
Sweden	133	133	210	210	44	12	51	71	28	4	0	3.68	% 0.66%	
Iceland	9	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6.82	% 0.00%	
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00	% 0.00%	
Norway	53	53	11	11	1	1	2	7	0	0	0	2.88	% 0.07%	

Total EU	4,507	4,507	9,214	9,214	1,213	453	1,299	2,339	1,738	2,172	0		1.	51%	0.87%	
Total EEA	4,569	4,569	9,225	9,225	1,214	454	1,301	2,346	1,738	2,172	0		1.5	52%	0.86%	

TTP OR ACTION 6												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of	Nr of	Views/	Interactio	Views/	Interacti	Penetrati	Trends	Trends	TTPs	Views/	Interaction
	instances	actions	impressio	n/	impressio	on/	on and	on	on	related	impressi	/
	of	taken by	ns before	engagem	ns after	engage	impact	targeted	narrative	content	ons of	engageme
	identified	type	action	ent	action	ment	on	audience	s used	in	TTP	nt with TTP
	TTPs			before		after	genuine	s		relation	related	related
				action		action	users			to overall	content	content (in
										content	(in	relation to
										on the	relation	overall
										service	to overall	interaction
											views/im	/engagem
											pression	ent on the
											s on the	service)
											service)	
Member												
States												

# TTP OR ACTION 7

Where possible, each TTP has been mapped to relevant YT Community Guidelines. However, there is not an exact one-to-one mapping. Content might be violative of more than one of YouTube's Community Guidelines so could be labelled under more than one policy violation. This means the data presented here is a best estimation of relevant TTP-activity under the relevant Community Guideline.

Refer to QRE 14.1.1 for more information on YouTube's efforts to broadly address these TTPs.

#### SLI 14.2.1

#### Methodology

- (1) Number of videos for TTP 7, identified for potential removal, by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025);
- (2) Number of removals of videos for TTP 7, by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025.

The number of removals may represent an overcount, as the respective Community Guidelines may be inclusive of more policy-violative activity than identified by the TTP alone.

#### Response

- (1) Please see table below:
- (2) Please see table below.

#### SLI 14.2.2

#### Methodology

- (1) Views threshold on video removals for TTP 7 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025;
- (2) Interaction/engagement before action for TTP 7 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025;
- (3) Views/ impressions after action for TTP 7 by video by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025;
- (4) Interaction/engagement after action for TTP 7 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025.

For SLI 14.2.2 (1): Starting March 2025, YouTube updated the terminology used for Shorts view counts. This terminology change does not apply to YouTube's transparency reporting view-related metrics, which remain the same in name and methodology. Learn more here.

For SLI 14.2.2 (3): Actions in this context constitute removals of the video themselves. And therefore there should be no views after YouTube removes the content.

## Response

- (1) Please see table below;
- (2) N/A;
- (3) Please see table below;

(4) N/A.

# **SLI 14.2.3**

Views are a measure of penetration / impact on the platform. SLI 14.2.2 provides data on video removals by view threshold and view / impressions on the platform after action has been taken.

#### **SLI 14.2.4**

#### Methodology

- (1) Percentage of TTP 7 video removals out of all related video removals by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025;
- (2) N/A;
- (3) N/A.

## Response

- (1) Please see table below;
- (2, 3) The Community Guidelines enforcement report provides information regarding views on videos before they are removed for Community Guidelines violations.

SLI 14.2	2.1	SLI 14.2	2.2						SLI 14.2	2.3		SLI 14.2.	.4	
Numb	Numb	Numb	Numb	Numb	Numb	Numb	Numb	Views	Penetr	Trends	Trends	Percen	Views/	Interac
er of	er of	er of	er of	er of	er of	er of		after	ation	on	on	tage of		tion/
video	videos	videos	videos	videos	videos	videos	videos	action	and	target	narrati	TTP 7	sions	engage
s	remov	remov	remov	remov	remov	remov	remov		impact	ed	ves	video	of TTP	ment
identif	ed	ed	ed	ed	ed	ed	ed		on	audien	used	remov	related	with
ied		with 0	with	with	with	with	with		genuin	ces		als out	conten	TTP
		views	1-10	11-100	101-1,	1,001-	>10,00		е			of all	t (in	related
			views	views	000	10,00	0		users			related	relation	conten
					views	0	views					video	to	t (in
						views						remov	overall	relation
												als	views/i	to

												mpress ions on the service	overall interact ion/eng ageme nt on
													the service )
Member States													
Austria	29	29	3	9	9	6	1	1	0		0.20%		
Belgium	28	28	1	18	6	2	0	1	0		0.11%		
Bulgaria	34	34	7	12	6	4	4	1	0		0.17%		
Croatia	4	4	0	3	0	0	0	1	0		0.07%		
Cyprus	10	10	4	3	3	0	0	0	0		0.17%		
Czech Republic	41	41	11	20	3	5	2	0	0		0.08%		
Denmark	27	27	2	12	7	4	1	1	0		0.07%		
Estonia	7	7	0	2	3	0	1	1	0		0.13%		
Finland	12	12	3	3	4	0	2	0	0		0.10%		
France	365	365	53	159	80	49	13	11	0		0.26%		
Germany	512	512	52	219	100	66	41	34	0		0.28%		
Greece	35	35	3	11	5	9	5	2	0		0.26%		
Hungary	11	11	0	7	4	0	0	0	0		0.07%		
Ireland	42	42	2	13	14	9	3	1	0		0.24%		
Italy	129	129	15	51	28	24	7	4	0		0.15%		

Latvia	3	3	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0.03%	
Lithuania	6	6	1	3	0	0	1	1	0	0.07%	
Luxembourg	2	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0.12%	
Malta	5	5	1	2	0	1	1	0	0	0.40%	
Netherlands	180	180	28	86	34	15	12	5	0	0.24%	
Poland	84	84	12	31	14	13	9	5	0	0.10%	
Portugal	29	29	6	12	6	3	2	0	0	0.13%	
Romania	41	41	6	11	10	8	4	2	0	0.06%	
Slovakia	6	6	0	2	2	1	0	1	0	0.05%	
Slovenia	2	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0.08%	
Spain	99	99	17	38	13	14	10	7	0	0.10%	
Sweden	33	33	3	15	6	4	5	0	0	0.10%	
Iceland	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.10%	
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00%	
Norway	18	18	0	5	9	1	2	1	0	0.12%	
Total EU	1,776	1,776	230	745	359	238	124	80	0	0.17%	
Total EEA	1,795	1,795	230	751	368	239	126	81	0	0.17%	

OR TION 8												
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of	Nr of	Views/	Interactio	Views/	Interactio	Penetrati	Trends	Trends	TTPs	Views/	Interacti
	instances	actions	impressio	n/	impressio	n/	on and	on	on	related	impressio	on/
	of			engagem		engagem	impact	targeted		content	ns of TTP	engage

	identified	taken by	ns before	ent	ns after	ent after	on	audience	narrative	in	related	ment
		· ·						addictice				
	TTPs	type	action	before	action	action	genuine	S	s used	relation	content	with TTP
				action			users			to overall	(in	related
										content	relation	content
										on the	to overall	(in
										service	views/im	relation
											pressions	to overall
											on the	interacti
											service)	on/enga
												gement
												on the
												service)
Member												
States												

# TTP OR ACTION 9

Where possible, each TTP has been mapped to relevant YT Community Guidelines. However, there is not an exact one-to-one mapping. Content might be violative of more than one of YouTube's Community Guidelines so could be labelled under more than one policy violation. This means the data presented here is a best estimation of relevant TTP-activity under the relevant Community Guideline.

Refer to QRE 14.1.1 for more information on YouTube's efforts to broadly address these TTPs.

#### **SLI 14.2.1**

# Methodology

- (1) Number of channels for TTP 9, identified for potential removal by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025);
- (2) Number of removals of channels for TTP 9 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025;
- (3) Number of videos for TTP 9, identified for potential removal by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025;
- (4) Number of removals of videos for TTP 9 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025.

The number of removals may represent an overcount, as the respective Community Guidelines may be inclusive of more

policy-violative activity than identified by the TTP alone.

#### Response

- (1) Please see table below:
- (2) Please see table below:
- (3) Please see table below;
- (4) Please see table below.

#### **SLI 14.2.2**

#### Methodology

- (1) Views threshold on video removals for TTP 9 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025;
- (2) Interaction/engagement before action for TTP 9 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025;
- (3) Views/ impressions after action for TTP 9 by video by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025;
- (4) Interaction/engagement after action for TTP 9 by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025.

For SLI 14.2.2 (1): Starting March 2025, YouTube updated the terminology used for Shorts view counts. This terminology change does not apply to YouTube's transparency reporting view-related metrics, which remain the same in name and methodology. Learn more here.

For SLI 14.2.2 (3): Actions in this context constitute removals of the video themselves. And therefore there should be no views after YouTube removes the content.

# Response

- (1) Please see table below;
- (2) N/A;
- (3) Please see table below:
- (4) N/A.

#### **SLI 14.2.3**

Views are a measure of penetration / impact on the platform. SLI 14.2.2 provides data on video removals by view threshold and

view / impressions on the platform after action has been taken.

# **SLI 14.2.4**

# Methodology

- (1) Percentage of TTP 9 channel removals out of all related channel removals by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025;
- (2) Percentage of TTP 9 video removals out of all related channel removals by EEA Member State for reporting period H1 2025;
- (3) N/A;
- (4) N/A.

## Response

- (1) Please see table below;
- (2) Please see table below;
- (3, 4) The Community Guidelines enforcement report provides information regarding views on videos before they are removed for Community Guidelines violations.

SLI 14	.2.1			SLI 14.	.2.2						SLI 14	.2.3		SLI 14.2	2.4		
Num	Num	Num	Num	Num	Num	Num	Num	Num	Num	View	Penet	Trend	Trend	Perce	Perce	View	Intera
ber	ber	ber	ber	ber	ber	ber	ber	ber	ber	s	ration	s on	s on	ntage	ntage	s/	ction/
of	of	of	of	of	of	of	of	of	of	after	and	targe	narra	of	of TTP	impr	enga
chan	chan	vide	vide	video	video	video	video	video	video	actio	impa	ted	tives	TTP 9	9	essi	geme
nels	nels	os	os	s	s	s	s	s	s	n	ct on	audie	used	chann	video	ons	nt
ident	remo	ident	remo	remo	remo	remo	remo	remo	remo		genui	nces		el	remov	of	with
ified	ved	ified	ved	ved	ved	ved	ved	ved	ved		ne			remo	als	TTP	TTP
				with	with	with	with	with	with		users			vals	out of	relat	relate
				0	1-10	11-10	101-1,	1,001	>10,0					out of	all	ed	d
				views	views	0	000	-	00					all	relate	cont	conte
						views	views	10,00	views					relate	d	ent	nt (in
								0						d	video	(in	relati
								views						chann	remov	relat	on to
														el	als	ion	overa

													remo		to	
													vals		over	intera
															all	ction/
															view	enga
															s/im pres	geme nt on
															sion	the
															s on	servic
															the	e)
															servi	
Member															ce)	
States																
Austria	71	71	15	15	0	0	3	5	2	5	0		2.93%	0.10%		
Belgium	99	99	20	20	1	1	2	6	4	6	0		3.40%	0.08%		
Bulgaria	48	48	9	9	0	1	1	4	2	1	0		2.14%	0.04%		
Croatia	31	31	3	3	0	0	0	2	0	1	0		3.59%	0.05%		
Cyprus	59	59	28	28	0	1	2	5	13	7	0		4.44%	0.48%		
Czech Republic	119	119	26	26	0	4	0	9	7	6	0		2.88%	0.05%		
Denmark	69	69	11	11	0	2	2	5	1	1	0		4.04%	0.03%		
Estonia	13	13	2	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0		2.33%	0.04%		
Finland	58	58	7	7	0	1	3	1	2	0	0		2.95%	0.06%		
France	579	579	121	121	1	11	17	47	23	22	0		2.40%	0.09%		
Germany	769	769	265	265	1	15	21	86	99	43	0		0.54%	0.14%		
Greece	104	104	16	16	1	1	4	6	3	1	0		0.54%	0.12%		
Hungary	79	79	3	3	0	0	0	1	1	1	0		3.52%	0.02%		

Ireland	65	65	17	17	0	0	4	5	4	4	0	2.78%	0.10%	
Italy	281	281	48	48	0	1	8	11	18	10	0	2.76%	0.06%	
Latvia	31	31	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2.70%	0.02%	
Lithuania	116	116	7	7	0	2	2	1	2	0	0	3.91%	0.08%	
Luxembourg	11	11	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	2.18%	0.12%	
Malta	11	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5.91%	0.00%	
Netherlands	436	436	120	120	2	2	16	34	46	20	0	1.50%	0.16%	
Poland	581	581	99	99	5	8	34	33	11	8	0	3.41%	0.11%	
Portugal	73	73	3	3	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	2.30%	0.01%	
Romania	141	141	45	45	3	2	12	11	8	9	0	1.92%	0.06%	
Slovakia	40	40	5	5	0	0	1	2	1	1	0	3.23%	0.04%	
Slovenia	16	16	5	5	0	0	0	1	4	0	0	3.35%	0.20%	
Spain	293	293	37	37	2	2	6	9	13	5	0	2.08%	0.04%	
Sweden	91	91	19	19	0	2	5	4	3	5	0	2.52%	0.06%	
Iceland	7	7	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	5.30%	0.10%	
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	
Norway	82	82	9	9	1	1	1	4	2	0	0	4.46%	0.06%	
Total EU	4,284	4,284	935	935	17	56	144	291	268	159	0	1.43%	0.09%	
Total EEA	4,373	4,373	945	945	18	58	145	295	270	159	0	1.45%	0.09%	

	TTP OR				
4	ACTION 10				
		SLI 14.2.1	SLI 14.2.2	SLI 14.2.3	SLI 14.2.4

	Nr of	Nr of	Views/	Interacti	Views/	Interacti	Penetrati	Trends	Trends	TTPs	Views/	Interacti
	instances	actions	impressi	on/	impressi	on/	on and	on	on	related	impressi	on/
	of	taken by	ons	engagem	ons after	engagem	impact	targeted	narrative	content	ons of	engagem
	identified	type	before	ent	action	ent after	on	audience	s used	in	TTP	ent with
	TTPs		action	before		action	genuine	s		relation	related	TTP
				action			users			to overall	content	related
										content	(in	content
										on the	relation	(in
										service	to overall	relation
											views/im	to overall
											pression	interactio
											s on the	n/engage
											service)	ment on
												the
												service)
Member												
States												

TTP OR												
ACTION	11											
	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2	!			SLI 14.2.3			SLI 14.2.4		
	Nr of	Nr of	Views/	Interacti	Views/	Interacti	Penetrati	Trends	Trends	TTPs	Views/	Interactio
	instances	actions	impressi	on/	impressi	on/	on and	on	on	related	impressi	n/
	of	taken by	ons	engagem	ons after	engagem	impact	targeted	narrative	content	ons of	engagem
	identified	type	before	ent	action	ent after	on	audience	s used	in	TTP	ent with
	TTPs		action	before		action	genuine	s		relation	related	TTP
				action			users			to overall	content	related
										content	(in	content
											relation	(in relation

							to overall
					service	views/im	interactio
						pression	n/engage
						s on the	ment on
						service)	the
							service)
Member							
States							

TTP OR ACTION 12												
	SLI 14.2.1	SLI 14.2.1 SLI 14.2.2				SLI 14.2.3			SI I 14 2 A	SLI 14.2.4		
	OEI 14.2.1		JEI 14.2.2				OLI 14.2.3			OEI 14.2.4		
	Nr of	Nr of	Views/	Interacti	Views/	Interacti	Penetrati	Trends	Trends	TTPs	Views/	Interaction/
	instances	actions	impressi	on/	impressi	on/	on and	on	on	related	impressi	engageme
	of	taken by	ons	engagem	ons after	engage	impact	targeted	narrative	content	ons of	nt with TTP
	identified	type	before	ent	action	ment	on	audience	s used	in	TTP	related
	TTPs		action	before		after	genuine	s		relation	related	content (in
				action		action	users			to overall	content	relation to
										content	(in	overall
										on the	relation	interaction/
										service	to overall	engageme
											views/im	nt on the
											pression	service)
											s on the	
											service)	
Member												
States												

Measure 14.3	Google Search	YouTube
	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some in character limit) from the previous report as there is no new info	
QRE 14.3.1	The final list of TTPs agreed within the Permanent Task-force in H2 20 then on, as intended. The Permanent Task-force will continue to exar of the art.	,

# IV. Integrity of Services

# Commitment 15

Relevant Signatories that develop or operate AI systems and that disseminate AI-generated and manipulated content through their services (e.g. deep fakes) commit to take into consideration the transparency obligations and the list of manipulative practices prohibited under the proposal for Artificial Intelligence Act.

	C.15	M 15.1	M 15.2
We signed up to the following	Google Search	Google Search	Google Search
measures of this	YouTube	YouTube	YouTube
commitment:			

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new	No	No
implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]		

If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	But, see QRE 15.2.1
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 15.1	Google Search	YouTube
	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in
	some instances truncated in order to meet the	some instances truncated in order to meet the
	suggested character limit) from the previous report as	suggested character limit) from the previous report as
	there is no new information to share now.	there is no new information to share now.
	The Google Search Manipulated Media Policy prohibits	All content uploaded to YouTube is subject to its Community
QRE 15.1.1	audio, video, or image content that has been manipulated to	Guidelines—regardless of how it is generated.
	deceive, defraud, or mislead by means of creating a	
	representation of actions or events that verifiably did not	YouTube's long-standing Misinformation Policies prohibit
	take place. This includes if such content would cause a	content that has been technically manipulated or doctored in
	reasonable person to have a fundamentally different	a way that misleads users (usually beyond clips taken out of
	understanding or impression, such that it might cause	context) and may pose a serious risk of egregious harm.
	significant harm to groups or individuals, or significantly	YouTube detects content that violates Community

	undermine participation or trust in electoral or civic processes.	Guidelines using a combination of machine learning and human review. YouTube also has policies on:  Spam, Deceptive Practices, and Scams that prohibit, for example, spam, scams, and other deceptive practices that take advantage of the YouTube community; Impersonation; Fake Engagement.  Refer to QRE 18.2.1 for how YouTube enforces these policies.
Measure 15.2	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 15.2.1	Google Search has published guidance on Al-generated content. This guidance explains how Al and automation can be a useful tool to create helpful content. However, if Al is used for the primary purpose of manipulating search rankings, that is a violation of Google Search's long-standing policy against spammy automatically-generated content.  Improved Al systems can help bolster spam fighting capabilities and even help combat known loss patterns. Google Search introduced a system to better identify queries seeking explicit content, so Google Search can better avoid shocking or offending users not looking for that information, and ultimately make the Google Search experience safer for everyone.	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.  All content uploaded to YouTube is subject to its Community Guidelines—regardless of how it is generated.  YouTube requires creators to disclose when they have created altered or synthetic content that is realistic, including using Al tools. YouTube also informs viewers that content may be altered or synthetic in two ways. A label may be added to the description panel indicating that some of the content was altered or synthetic. For certain types of content about sensitive topics, YouTube will apply a more prominent label to the video player. Examples of content that require disclosures can be found here.  YouTube has noted feedback from its community, including creators, viewers, and artists, about the ways in which

emerging technologies could impact them. YouTube makes it possible to request the removal of Al-generated or other synthetic or altered content that simulates an identifiable individual, including their face or voice, using its <u>privacy</u> request process. Not all content will be removed from YouTube, and YouTube will consider a variety of factors when evaluating these requests, some examples can be found here.

Additionally, YouTube has highlighted how it will <u>build</u> responsibility into its Al tools and features for creators. This includes significant, ongoing work to develop guardrails that will prevent its Al tools from generating the type of content that does not belong on YouTube.

YouTube works to continuously improve protections. And within YouTube, dedicated teams like the intelligence desk are specifically focused on adversarial testing and threat detection to ensure YouTube's systems meet new challenges as they emerge. Content generated by YouTube's Al tools includes a SynthID watermark, which is a tool for watermarking and identifying Al-generated images. Across the industry, Google, including YouTube, continues to help increase transparency around digital content. This includes its work as a steering member of the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA).

#### Deploying AI technology to power content moderation

YouTube has always used a combination of people and machine learning technologies to enforce its Community Guidelines. Al helps YouTube detect potentially violative content at scale, and reviewers work to confirm whether

	content has actually crossed policy lines. Al is continuously increasing both the speed and accuracy of YouTube's content moderation systems.
	Improved speed and accuracy of YouTube's systems also allows it to reduce the amount of harmful content human reviewers are exposed to.

# IV. Integrity of Services

# Commitment 16

Relevant Signatories commit to operate channels of exchange between their relevant teams in order to proactively share information about cross-platform influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerge on their respective services, with the aim of preventing dissemination and resurgence on other services, in full compliance with privacy legislation and with due consideration for security and human rights risks.

	C.16	M 16.1	M 16.2
We signed up to the following	Google Search	Google Search	YouTube
measures of this commitment:	YouTube	YouTube	

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	, , , , ,	shed its <u>Q1 2025</u> , and <u>Q2 2025</u> Quarterly Bulletin, d influence operation campaigns terminated on

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 16.1	Google Search	YouTube
	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (character limit) from the previous report as there is no	in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested new information to share now.
	Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) and Trust & Safety disable their accounts, and remove the content that they operations and other operations that may affect EEA Men	-
QRE 16.1.1	Google teams to make enforcement decisions backed by	inated information operations threat actors. TAG's work enables rigorous analysis. TAG's investigations do not focus on making ather examining technical signals, heuristics, and behavioural ed inauthentic behaviour.
	operation campaigns terminated on Google's platforms, a	here, which provides updates around coordinated influence is well as additional periodic blog posts. TAG also engages with ecessary for security purposes, share information related to To learn more, refer to SLI 16.1.1.
	rulnerabilities for developers and security professionals.	

Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) posts a quarterly Bulletin, which includes disclosure of coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google's products and services, as well as additional periodic blog posts. In the Bulletin, TAG often notes when findings are similar to or supported by those reported by other platforms.

#### YouTube

The publicly available H1 2025 TAG Bulletins (1 January 2025 - 30 June 2025) show 34,177 YouTube channels across 52 separate actions were involved in Coordinated Influence Operation Campaigns. Industry partners supported 4 of those separate actions by providing leads. The TAG Bulletin and periodic blog posts are Google's, including YouTube's, primary public source of information on coordinated influence operations and TTP-related issues.

SLI 16.1.1 – Numbers of actions as a result of information sharing As reported in the Bulletin, some channels YouTube took action on were part of campaigns that uploaded content in some EEA languages, specifically: Romanian (80 channels), German (77 channels), Polish (68 channels), French (51 channels), Spanish (34 channels), Italian (16 channels), and Greek (4 channels). Certain campaigns may have uploaded content in multiple languages, or in other countries outside of the EEA region utilising EEA languages. Please note that there may be many languages for any one coordinated influence campaign and that the presence of content in an EEA Member State language does not necessarily entail a particular focus on that Member State. For more information, please see the <u>TAG</u> <u>Bulletin</u>.

The EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation Rapid Response System (RRS) is a collaborative initiative involving both non-platform and platform Signatories of the Code of Conduct to provide a means for cooperation and communication between them for a period of time ahead, during and after the election period.

The RRS allows non-platform Signatories of the Code of Conduct to report time-sensitive content or accounts that they deem may present serious or systemic concerns to the integrity of the electoral process, and enables discussion with the platform Signatories in light of their respective policies.

The disclosures below also include reporting through the RRS of allegedly illegal content. Although the Article 16 Digital Services Act (DSA) mechanism should be used by non-platform Signatories to report allegedly illegal content, Google reviews such notifications, too, as part of the RRS, provided the non-platform Signatory has already used the Article 16 DSA mechanism to submit them and shares the appropriate notification reference with Google through the RRS.

	Search			
	Germany - No notifications were received through	h RRS.		
	Poland - One notification was received through RRS. 252 URLs were flagged as allegedly illegal content, of which 213 URLs were removed.			
	Portugal - No notifications were received through	n RRS.		
	Romania - No notifications were received through RRS.			
	YouTube  • Germany - Two notifications were received through RRS. Two videos were flagged of which one was removed and one was found to be non-violative of policies.			
	Poland - Two notifications were received through RRS. One video was flagged and found to be non-violative of policies. One channel was flagged and found to be non-violative of policies.			
	Portugal - No notifications were received through RRS.			
	Romania - No notifications were received through RRS.			
Data				
Measure 16.2	Not subscribed	YouTube		
QRE 16.2.1	Not subscribed	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.		
₩E 10.2.1		Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) and Trust & Safety Teams work to monitor malicious actors around the globe, disable their accounts, and remove the content that they posted, including but not limited to coordinated information		

operations and other operations that may affect EU Member States.

Refer to the <u>TAG Bulletin articles that cover the reporting</u> period to learn more about the number of YouTube channels terminated as part of TAG's investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia, Poland, and other countries around the world.

The most recent examples of specific tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used to lure victims, as well as how Google collaborates and shares information, can be found in Google's <u>TAG Blog</u>.

# V. Empowering Users

Commitments 17 - 25

# V. Empowering Users

# Commitment 17

In light of the European Commission's initiatives in the area of media literacy, including the new Digital Education Action Plan, Relevant Signatories commit to continue and strengthen their efforts in the area of media literacy and critical thinking, also with the aim to include vulnerable groups.

	C.17	M 17.1	M 17.2	M 17.3
We signed up to the following	Google Search	Google Search	Google Search	Google Search
measures of this commitment:	YouTube	YouTube	YouTube	YouTube

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	No	But, see QRE 17.1.1
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No

If yes, which further	N/A	N/A
implementation measures do		
you plan to put in place in the		
next 6 months?		

Measure 17.1	Google Search	YouTube
	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced
	some instances truncated in order to meet the	(in some instances truncated in order to meet the
	suggested character limit) from the previous report as	suggested character limit) from the previous report as
	there is no new information to share now.	there is no new information to share now.
	Google Search aims to connect users with high-quality	YouTube takes its responsibility efforts seriously, outlining
	information, and help users understand and evaluate that	clear policies used to moderate content on the platform
	information. Google Search has deeply invested in both	and providing tools that users can leverage to improve
	information quality and information literacy. Some ways in	their media literacy education and better evaluate what
	which Google Search does this include:	content and sources to trust.
	'About This Result': Next to most results on Google	Information panels may appear alongside search results
QRE 17.1.1	Search, there is a menu icon that users can tap to	and below relevant videos to provide more context and to
	learn more about the result or feature and where	help people make more informed decisions about the
	the information is coming from. With this additional	content they are viewing. For example, topics that are
	context, users can make a more informed decision	more prone to misinformation may have information panels
	about the sites they want to visit and what results	that show basic background info, sourced from
	will be most useful for them. When available, users	independent, third-party partners, to give more context on
	will see a description of the website from Wikipedia,	the topic. If a user wants to learn more, the panels also link
	which provides free, reliable information about tens	to the third-party partner's website. YouTube continues to
	of millions of sites on the web. If a website does not	assess and update the topics prone to misinformation that
	have a Wikipedia description, Google Search will	receive additional context from information panels.
	show additional context that may be available, such	
	as when Google Search first indexed the site. Users	
	will also be able to quickly see if their connection to	

the site is secure based on its use of the HTTPS protocol, which encrypts all data between the website and the browser they are using, to help them stay safe as they browse the web. More information on the 'About This Result' feature can be found <a href="https://example.com/here">here</a>, and <a href="https://example.com/here">here</a>.

The 'More About This Page' link within the 'About This Result' feature provides additional insights about sources and topics users find on Google Search. When a user taps the three dots on any search result, they will be able to learn more about the page. Users can:

- See more information about the source:
   Users will be able to read what a site says about itself in its own words, when that information is available.
- Find what others on the web have said about a site: Reading what others on the web have written about a site can help users better evaluate sources.
- Learn more about the topic: In the 'About the topic' section, users can find information about the same topic from other sources.

Additional information can be found in the Google Search blog post <u>here</u>.

 'About This Image': With added insights in 'About This Image', users will know if an image may have been generated with Google's AI tools when they During election periods, text-based information panels about a candidate, how to vote, and election results may also be displayed to users.

Further EEA Member State coverage can be found in SLI 17.1.1.

come across it in Search or Chrome. All images generated with Imagen 2 in Google's consumer products are marked by SynthID, a tool developed by Google DeepMind that adds a digital watermark directly into the pixels of images generated. SynthID watermarks are imperceptible to the human eye but detectable for identification. 'About This Image' tool is available in more than 40 languages around the world, including English, French, German, Hindi, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Portuguese, Spanish and Vietnamese.

 Google Search has also conducted extensive adversarial testing and red teaming to identify and mitigate potential harmful and problematic content. Google Search is also applying filters to avoid generating images of named people.

More information on the 'About This Image' feature can be found here.

 Content Advisory Notices: Helpful notices for users that highlight when information is scarce or when interest is travelling faster than facts. These are specifically designed to address data voids which include queries for which either content is limited or nonexistent or when a topic is rapidly evolving and reliable information is not yet available for that topic.

the 'About

result'

advisories

advisories

	for low relevance results (%)	for rapidly changing results (%)	feature was viewed	This Result' panel was viewed	section of the 'About This Result' panel was viewed		
Level	Impressions	Impressions	Impressions	Impressions	Impressions	Impressions	Impressions
Member States							
Austria	0.109%	0.00173%	559,648	10,595,132	10,312,776	36,950,757	35,908,138
Belgium	0.113%	0.00094%	751,892	12,692,068	12,390,968	167,407,873	32,192,311
Bulgaria	0.138%	0.00055%	469,972	5,907,616	5,702,776	49,748,085	22,197,544
Croatia	0.141%	0.00070%	329,544	5,236,660	4,924,932	54,222,976	13,074,600
Cyprus	0.178%	0.00125%	107,668	1,172,260	1,142,124	4,183,263	6,346,362
Czech Republic	0.111%	0.00066%	760,664	9,846,284	9,673,916	157,675,234	43,550,449
Denmark	0.103%	0.00184%	343,212	6,067,760	5,969,640	22,016,705	31,720,890
Estonia	0.178%	0.00201%	91,720	1,498,140	1,477,272	16,418,581	5,646,988
Finland	0.116%	0.00175%	367,616	7,642,084	7,507,412	15,279,046	16,681,096
France	0.088%	0.00078%	4,862,860	82,663,676	79,663,736	1,000,634,704	212,319,334
Germany	0.113%	0.00185%	5,400,416	101,763,324	98,227,356	2,552,766,596	413,944,130
Greece	0.160%	0.00051%	796,392	11,283,288	10,742,560	25,349,565	36,600,994
Hungary	0.127%	0.00052%	618,180	8,365,604	8,113,340	51,006,178	17,389,712
Ireland	0.122%	0.00179%	484,276	7,712,380	7,392,148	72,559,534	27,200,214
Italy	0.156%	0.00065%	4,749,996	84,481,308	79,533,468	758,249,496	255,118,514
Latvia	0.195%	0.00196%	125,016	1,629,840	1,598,232	50,972,400	11,553,365
Lithuania	0.175%	0.00113%	185,580	2,728,196	2,673,144	47,908,078	12,661,456

Total EEA	0.111%	0.00106%	33,039,408	548,028,032	527,940,540	6,758,209,194	1,893,413,936
Total EU	0.111%	0.00105%	32,559,988	541,706,056	521,720,208	6,735,834,907	1,870,892,947
Norway	0.079%	0.00159%	462,756	5,923,932	5,829,708	21,105,606	20,788,623
Liechtenstein	0.158%	0.00224%	2,420	38,972	38,204	210,543	217,258
Iceland	0.158%	0.00263%	14,244	359,072	352,420	1,058,138	1,515,108
Sweden	0.093%	0.00190%	658,320	12,917,312	12,686,580	121,980,070	41,023,290
Spain	0.086%	0.00109%	4,562,252	61,229,376	58,729,760	451,036,417	277,140,219
Slovenia	0.193%	0.00073%	141,960	2,348,816	2,278,504	16,569,288	6,249,370
Slovakia	0.149%	0.00054%	347,696	4,688,868	4,578,192	27,063,094	11,456,529
Romania	0.111%	0.00057%	982,724	12,451,072	12,008,332	89,583,459	46,238,625
Portugal	0.097%	0.00103%	810,384	11,777,648	11,413,412	28,842,733	45,132,552
Poland	0.080%	0.00040%	2,476,700	49,084,352	47,822,796	454,115,580	159,350,791
Netherlands	0.110%	0.00105%	1,491,312	24,564,280	23,830,508	458,307,918	84,857,904
Malta	0.179%	0.00181%	46,404	654,492	638,028	2,356,838	2,594,124
Luxembourg	0.147%	0.00173%	37,584	704,220	688,296	2,630,439	2,743,446

Measure 17.2	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 17.2.1	<ul> <li>Grants         In H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025), Google support online world. This includes:     </li> <li>A \$103,220 grant to GLOBSEC, which is a platform the and personalised learning to educate users on civic to the content of the content</li></ul>	at combines prebunking techniques, AI content recognition,
	<ul> <li>A \$102,640 grant to the Social Incubator nonprofit or offers a suite of tools, including interactive chatbots,</li> </ul>	ganisation, an Al-powered civic education platform that personalized learning paths, gamified content, and

comprehensive digital literacy training.

- A \$102,640 grant to Parlons Démocratie, which helps teachers deliver better civic education through a
  professionally designed massive open online course (MOOC) combined with an Al-powered chatbot that
  provides personalised, real-time support.
- A \$103,060 grant to CyberPeace Institute to support European civil society organisations (CSO) to combat cyber attacks and disinformation by using AI for actionable insights and collective intelligence.

#### Search

To raise awareness of its features and build literacy across society, Google Search works with information literacy experts to help design tools in a way that allows users to feel confident and in control of the information they consume and the choices they make.

In addition, Google, in partnership with Public Libraries 2030, launched Super Searchers in 2022. The ongoing program has trained thousands of library staff in community and school libraries in the EU to increase the search and information literacy skills of tens of thousands of library patrons.

#### YouTube

YouTube remains committed to supporting efforts that deepen users' collective understanding of misinformation. To empower users to think critically and use YouTube's products safely and responsibly, YouTube invests in media literacy campaigns to improve users' experiences on YouTube. In 2022, YouTube launched 'Hit Pause', a global media literacy campaign, which is live in all EEA Member States and the campaign has run in 40+ additional countries around the world, including all official EU languages.

The program seeks to teach viewers critical media literacy skills via engaging and educational public service announcements (PSAs) via YouTube home feed and pre-roll ads, and on a dedicated <u>YouTube channel</u>. The YouTube channel hosts videos from the YouTube Trust & Safety team that explain how YouTube protects the YouTube community from misinformation and other harmful content, as well as additional campaign content that provides members of the YouTube community with the opportunity to increase critical thinking skills around identifying different manipulation tactics used to spread misinformation – from using emotional language to cherry picking information.

	EEA Member State coverage of 'Hit Pause' media literacy impressions can be found in SLI 17.2.1.	
SLI 17.2.1 - actions enforcing policies above	In H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025), as part of the Super Searchers Program, 666 librarians were trained across the 17 training sessions held in Europe.	Media Literacy campaign impressions in H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025), broken down by EEA Member State.  Note: Due to an operational issue, media literacy campaign impressions were undercounted for Malta in the H2 2024 Report. The corrected number for SLI 17.2.1 for Malta in H2 2024 is 362,838. The error has been corrected starting with this H1 2025 Report.
		Impressions from YouTube's media literacy campaigns
Level		Impressions
Member States		4./50./10
Austria		4,650,619
Belgium		5,581,901
Bulgaria		4,856,246
Croatia		2,924,101
Cyprus		633,498
Czech Republic		10,183,474
Denmark		5,266,332
Estonia		514,536
Finland		3,755,871
France		40,742,901
Germany		44,797,416
Greece		10,489,944
Hungary		7,398,316

Ireland	3,252,276
Italy	36,945,233
Latvia	881,253
Lithuania	2,100,449
Luxembourg	318,473
Malta	490,705
Netherlands	11,133,841
Poland	38,145,203
Portugal	8,590,420
Romania	11,863,927
Slovakia	5,141,025
Slovenia	1,454,433
Spain	23,225,987
Sweden	7,026,252
Iceland	250,719
Liechtenstein	27,918
Norway	2,333,149
Total EU	292,364,632
Total EEA	294,976,418

Measure 17.3	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 17.3.1	See response to QRE 17.2.1.	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in
		some instances truncated in order to meet the
		suggested character limit) from the previous report as
		there is no new information to share now.

YouTube partners with media literacy experts and researchers to identify unique and engaging ways to build up the YouTube Community's media literacy. For example, to inform the 'Hit Pause' global campaign, YouTube partnered with the National Association for Media Literacy Education (NAMLE), a U.S.-based organisation, to identify which competency areas the campaign should focus on.

For additional information about YouTube's 'Hit Pause' campaign, please refer to QRE 17.2.1.

# V. Empowering Users

# Commitment 18

Relevant Signatories commit to minimise the risks of viral propagation of Disinformation by adopting safe design practices as they develop their systems, policies, and features.

	C.18	M 18.1	M 18.2	M 18.3
We signed up to the following	Google Search	Not subscribed	Google Search	Google Search
measures of this commitment:	YouTube		YouTube	YouTube

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No

If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 18.1	Not subscribed	
QRE 18.1.1	Not subscribed	
QRE 18.1.2	Not subscribed	
QRE 18.1.3	Not subscribed	
SLI 18.1.1 - actions proving effectiveness of measures and policies	Not subscribed	
Data	Not subscribed	
Measure 18.2	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 18.2.1	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.

Google Search has the following policies which complement the <u>Content Policies</u> outlined in QRE 14.1.1:

Medical Content Policy: This policy prohibits content that contradicts or runs contrary to scientific or medical consensus and evidence-based best practices.

Misleading Content Policy: This policy states that Search features and News prohibits preview content that misleads users to engage with it by promising details which are not reflected in the underlying content.

These policies also provide users with information on how to report specific types of content that violate those policies. Google Search removes content for policy violations based on user reports as well as through its internal content moderation processes. More extensive policies are deployed for Search features, and can be found at the Content Policies <u>Help Centre</u>.

In addition, Google Search removes content that has been determined to be unlawful under applicable law, in response to a notification from a third party, such as a user or an authority. Examples include material in relation to which Google Search has received a valid 'right to be forgotten request' or material in relation to which Google Search has received a valid court order. Google Search measures the number of court and government Legal Removal requests biannually (across all products), and publishes this information in transparency reports.

See response to QRE 14.1.1 to see how YouTube's <u>Community</u> <u>Guidelines</u> map to the TTPs. These policies seek to, among other things, limit the spread of misleading or deceptive content that poses a serious risk of egregious harm.

#### **Community Guidelines Enforcement**

After a creator's first <u>Community Guidelines</u> violation, they will typically get a warning with no penalty to their channel. They will have the chance to take <u>a policy training</u> to allow the warning to expire after 90 days. Creators will also get the chance to receive a warning in another policy category. If the same policy is violated within that 90 day window, the creator's channel will be given a strike.

If the creator receives three strikes in the same 90-day period, their channel may be removed from YouTube. In some cases, YouTube may terminate a channel for a single case of severe abuse, as <u>explained</u> in the Help Centre. YouTube may also remove content for reasons other than Community Guidelines violations, such as a first-party privacy complaint or a court order. In these cases, creators will not be issued a strike.

If a creator's channel gets a strike, they will receive an email, and can have notifications sent to them through their mobile and desktop notifications. The emails and notifications received by the creator explain the action taken on their content and which of YouTube's policies the content violated. More detailed guidelines of YouTube's processes and policies on strikes can be found <a href="here">here</a>.

		YouTube also reserves the right to restrict a creator's ability to create content on YouTube at its discretion. A channel may be turned off or restricted from using any YouTube features. If this happens, users are prohibited from using, creating, or acquiring another channel to get around these restrictions. This prohibition applies as long as the restriction remains active on the YouTube channel. A violation of this restriction is considered circumvention under YouTube's Terms of Service, and may result in termination of all existing YouTube channels of the user, any new channels created or acquired, and channels in which the user is repeatedly or prominently featured.  Refer to SLI 18.2.1 on YouTube's enforcement at an EEA Member State level
		This prohibition applies as long as the restriction remains active on the YouTube channel. A violation of this restriction is considered circumvention under YouTube's Terms of
		and channels in which the user is repeatedly or prominently
		Refer to SLI 18.2.1 on YouTube's enforcement at an EEA Member State level.
		(1) Number of videos removed for violations of YouTube's Misinformation Policies in H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025), broken down by EEA Member State;
	See response to SLI 14.2.1.	(2) Views threshold on videos removed for violations of YouTube's Misinformation Policies in H1 2025 broken down by EEA Member State.
SLI 18.2.1 - actions taken in response to policy violations		For SLI 18.2.1 (2): Starting March 2025, YouTube updated the terminology used for Shorts view counts. This terminology change does not apply to YouTube's transparency reporting view-related metrics, which remain the same in name and methodology. Learn more here.
	YouTube only	

	Number of videos removed	Number of videos removed with 0 views	Number of videos removed with 1-10 views	Number of videos removed with 11-100 views	Number of videos removed with 101-1,000 views	Number of videos removed with 1,001- 10,000 views	Number of videos removed with >10,000 views
Level	Videos	Videos	Videos	Videos	Videos	Videos	Videos
Member States							
Austria	62	6	26	16	12	1	1
Belgium	49	3	29	8	7	1	1
Bulgaria	90	28	23	14	15	7	3
Croatia	18	2	6	1	3	4	2
Cyprus	39	6	6	9	12	5	1
Czech Republic	70	17	27	7	10	5	4
Denmark	53	4	20	12	12	3	2
Estonia	30	2	9	4	10	4	1
Finland	41	8	7	17	5	3	1
France	528	70	209	124	74	29	22
Germany	902	108	339	194	138	74	49
Greece	76	4	14	15	17	21	5
Hungary	37	3	20	9	3	1	1
Ireland	136	19	52	26	23	13	3
Italy	311	30	119	67	54	24	17
Latvia	44	4	10	10	11	6	3
Lithuania	30	6	7	10	4	2	1
Luxembourg	3	0	2	1	0	0	0

Malta	6	1	3	0	1	1	0
Netherlands	320	46	134	72	43	17	8
Poland	155	26	47	31	24	21	6
Portugal	65	11	26	12	9	6	1
Romania	95	19	31	18	21	4	2
Slovakia	13	1	5	4	1	1	1
Slovenia	48	10	9	6	13	9	1
Spain	747	89	215	141	130	128	44
Sweden	92	8	34	15	12	17	6
Iceland	3	0	2	0	0	1	0
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Norway	47	4	15	11	13	2	2
Total EU	4,060	531	1,429	843	664	407	186
Total EEA	4,110	535	1,446	854	677	410	188
Measure 18.3	Google Search	1		YouTube	9		
QRE 18.3.1	Google, including good policies, incresearch.  Described below Jigsaw-led Resulting Jigsaw is a unit	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.  Google, including YouTube, works with stakeholders across the technology sector, government, and civil society to set good policies, remain abreast of emerging challenges, and establish, share, and learn from industry best practices and research.  Described below are examples that demonstrate Google's, including YouTube, commitment to these actions:  Jigsaw-led Research  Jigsaw is a unit within Google that explores threats to open societies and builds technology that inspires scalable solutions. Jigsaw began conducting research on 'information interventions' more than 10 years ago. Jigsaw has since					

contributed research and technology on ways to make people more resilient to disinformation. Their research efforts are based on behavioural science and ethnographic studies that examine when people might be vulnerable to specific messages and how to provide helpful information when people need it most. These interventions provide a methodology for proactively addressing a range of threats to people online, as a complement to approaches that focus on removing or downranking material online.

An example of a notable research effort by Jigsaw run on and with YouTube is:

Accuracy Prompts (APs): APs remind users to think about accuracy. The prompts work by serving users bite-sized
digital literacy tips at a moment when it might matter. Lab studies conducted across 16 countries with over 30,000
participants, suggest that APs increase engagement with accurate information and decrease engagement with
less accurate information.

#### V. Empowering Users

## Commitment 19

Relevant Signatories using recommender systems commit to make them transparent to the recipients regarding the main criteria and parameters used for prioritising or deprioritising information, and provide options to users about recommender systems, and make available information on those options.

	C.19	M 19.1	M 19.2
We signed up to the following	Google Search	Google Search	Google Search
measures of this commitment:	YouTube	YouTube	YouTube

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 19.1	Google Search	YouTube
	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.
QRE 19.1.1	Google Search's ranking systems sort through hundreds of billions of web pages and other content in the Search index to present the most relevant, useful results in a fraction of a second. Main parameters that help determine which results are returned for a user's query include:	On YouTube, recommendations help users discover more of the videos they love, whether it is a great new recipe to try or finding their next favourite song.  Users can find recommendations across the platform, including the homepage, the 'Up Next' panel, and the Shorts
	<ul> <li>Meaning of user's query: To return relevant results,         Google Search first needs to establish the intent         behind a user's query. Google Search builds         language models to decipher how the words that a         user enters into the search box match up to the         most useful content available.</li> <li>Relevance of content: Next, Google Search         systems analyse the content to assess whether it         contains information that might be relevant to what</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Homepage: A user's homepage is what they typically see when they first open YouTube.</li> <li>Up Next: The Up Next panel appears when a user is watching a video. It suggests additional content based on what they are currently watching and personalised signals (details below).</li> </ul>

- the user is looking for. The most basic signal that information is relevant is when content contains the same keywords as the user's search query.
- Quality of content: Google Search systems
   prioritise content that seems most helpful by
   identifying signals that can help determine which
   content demonstrates expertise, high-quality, and
   trustworthiness. For example, one of several factors
   that Google Search uses to help determine this is by
   understanding if other prominent websites link or
   refer to the content. Aggregated feedback from the
   Google Search quality evaluation process is used to
   further refine how Google Search systems discern
   the quality of information.
- Usability: Google Search systems also consider the usability of content. When all things are relatively equal, content that people will find more accessible may perform better.
- Context and settings: Information such as user location, past Google Search history, and Search settings all help Google Search ensure user results are what is most useful and relevant at that moment. Google Search uses the user's country and location to deliver content relevant to their area. For instance, if a user in Chicago searches 'football', Google Search will likely show the user results about American football and the Chicago Bears first. Whereas if the user searches 'football' in London, Google will show results about soccer and the Premier League. Google Search settings are also an important indicator of which results a user is likely to find useful, such as if they set a preferred language

 Shorts: Shorts are ranked based on their performance and relevancy to that individual viewer.

YouTube understands that individuals have unique viewing habits and <u>uses signals to recommend content</u>. YouTube's system compares the user's viewing habits with those that are similar to others, and uses that information to suggest other content.

YouTube's recommendation system is constantly evolving, learning every day from over 80 billion pieces of information or 'signals,' the primary ones being:

- Watch history: YouTube's system uses the videos a user watches to give better recommendations, remember where a user left off, and more.
- Search history: YouTube's system uses what a user searches for on YouTube to influence future recommendations.
- Channel subscriptions: YouTube's system uses information about the channels a user subscribes to in order to recommend videos they may like.
- Likes: YouTube's system uses a user's likes information to try to predict the likelihood that they will be interested in similar videos in the future.
- Dislikes: YouTube's system uses videos a user dislikes to inform what to avoid recommending in the future.
- 'Not interested' feedback selections: YouTube's system uses videos a user marks as 'Not interested' to inform what to avoid recommending in the future.
- 'Don't recommend channel' feedback selections:
   YouTube's system uses 'Don't recommend channel'

or opted in to SafeSearch (a tool that helps filter out explicit results). Google Search also includes features that personalise results based on the activity in their Google account. The user can control what Google Search activity is used to improve their experience, including adjusting what data is saved to their Google account at <u>myaccount.google.com</u>. To disable Google Search personalisation based on activity in a user's account, the user can turn off personal results in Search. Users can also prevent activity being stored to the user's account or delete particular history items in Web & App Activity. Google Search systems are designed to match a user's interests, but they are not designed to infer sensitive characteristics like race, religion or political party.

The <u>How Search Works website</u> explains the ins and outs of Google Search. The following links provide additional information about <u>helping people and businesses learn how Search works</u> and <u>how results are automatically generated</u>.

- feedback selections as a signal that the channel content likely is not something a user enjoyed watching.
- Satisfaction surveys: YouTube's system uses user surveys that ask a user to rate videos that they watched, which helps the system understand satisfaction, not just watch time.

Different YouTube features rely on certain recommendation signals more than others. For example, YouTube uses the video a user is currently watching as an important signal when suggesting a video to play next. The influence of each signal on recommendations can vary based on many variables, including but not limited to the user's device type and the type of content they are watching. This is why the same user will see different recommendations on a mobile phone vs. a television.

#### Recommendations

Recommendations connect viewers to high-quality information and complement the work done by the Community Guidelines that define what is and is not allowed on YouTube. YouTube raises up videos in search and recommendations to viewers on certain topics where quality is key. Human evaluators, trained using <u>publicly available</u> <u>guidelines</u>, assess the quality of information from a variety of channels and videos.

These human evaluations are used to train YouTube's system to model their decisions, and YouTube then scales their assessments to all videos across the platform. Learn more

		about how YouTube elevates high-quality information on the How YouTube Works website and the YouTube Blog.  Controls to personalise recommendations YouTube has built controls that help users decide how much data they want to provide. Users can view, delete, or turn on or off their YouTube watch and search history whenever they want. And, if users do not want to see recommendations at all on the homepage or on the Shorts tab, they can turn off and clear their YouTube watch history. For users with YouTube watch history off and no significant prior watch history, the homepage will show the search bar and the Guide menu, with no feed of recommended videos.  Users can also tell YouTube when it is recommending something a user is not interested in. For example, buttons on the homepage and in the 'Up next' section allow users to filter and choose recommendations by specific topics. Users can also click on 'Not interested' and/or 'Don't recommend channel' to tell YouTube that a video or channel is not what a user wanted to see at that time, and YouTube will consider that when generating recommendations for that viewer in the future.  Additional information about how a user can manage their recommendation settings are outlined here in YouTube's Help Centre.
Measure 19.2	Google Search	Help Centre.  YouTube
iviedSure 19.2		
SLI 19.2.1 – user settings	Number of views for each unique combination of a user and their device on the personal results control in H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025), specifically within the	YouTube is sharing the percentage of Daily Active Users that are signed in to the platform (those not signed in are signed out). Signed in users are able to amend their settings in their

	context of Search Personalisation, broken down by EEA	YouTube or Google Accounts.
	Member State.	The average percentage of signed in Daily Active Users over H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025), broken down by EEA Member State.
	Number of views for each unique combination of a user	Percentage of daily active users that are signed in
	and their device on the personal results control	
Level	Impressions	Signed In Users
Member States		
Austria	249,011	73%
Belgium	364,212	76%
Bulgaria	165,655	76%
Croatia	140,045	79%
Cyprus	32,030	79%
Czech Republic	294,091	80%
Denmark	115,231	76%
Estonia	34,729	77%
Finland	182,382	76%
France	2,279,998	76%
Germany	2,477,120	73%
Greece	303,362	77%
Hungary	240,766	77%
Ireland	169,237	72%
Italy	2,376,666	80%
Latvia	57,753	78%

Lithuania	80,374	78%
Luxembourg	15,308	71%
Malta	12,375	77%
Netherlands	593,291	77%
Poland	1,373,105	78%
Portugal	288,409	80%
Romania	461,778	79%
Slovakia	136,890	76%
Slovenia	55,262	76%
Spain	1,853,395	80%
Sweden	253,458	71%
Iceland	5,649	72%
Liechtenstein	546	62%
Norway	114,171	68%
Total EU	14,605,933	77%
Total EEA	14,726,299	77%

	V. Empowering Users				
	Commitment 20				
Relevant Signatories commit to er	Relevant Signatories commit to empower users with tools to assess the provenance and edit history or authenticity or accuracy of digital content.				
C.20 M 20.1 M 20.2					
We signed up to the following Not subscribed Not subscribed Not subscribed Not subscribed					

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Not subscribed
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Not subscribed

Measure 20.1	Not subscribed
QRE 20.1.1	Not subscribed
Measure 20.2	Not subscribed
QRE 20.2.1	Not subscribed

## V. Empowering Users

## Commitment 21

Relevant Signatories commit to strengthen their efforts to better equip users to identify Disinformation. In particular, in order to enable users to navigate services in an informed way, Relevant Signatories commit to facilitate, across all Member States languages in which their services are provided, user access to tools for assessing the factual accuracy of sources through fact-checks from fact-checking organisations that have flagged potential Disinformation, as well as warning labels from other authoritative sources.

	C.21	M 21.1	M 21.2	M 21.3
We signed up to the following	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Not subscribed
measures of this commitment:				

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Not subscribed
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Not subscribed

Measure 21.1

Not subscribed

QRE 21.1.1	Not subscribed
SLI 21.1.1 - actions taken under measure 21.1	Not subscribed
Data	Data

SLI 21.1.2 -	Not subscribed
actions taken	
under measure	
21.1	
Data	Data

Measure 21.2	Not subscribed
QRE 21.2.1	Not subscribed
Measure 21.3	Not subscribed
QRE 21.3.1	Not subscribed

## V. Empowering Users

# Commitment 22

Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with tools to help them make more informed decisions when they encounter online information that may be false or misleading, and to facilitate user access to tools and information to assess the trustworthiness of information sources, such as indicators of trustworthiness for informed online navigation, particularly relating to societal issues or debates of general interest.

	C.22	M 22.1	M 22.2	M 22.3	M 22.4	M 22.5	M 22.6	M 22.7
We signed up to the following	Google Search	Not	Not	Not	Not	Not	Not	Google Search
measures of this commitment:	YouTube	subscribed	subscribed	subscribed	subscribed	subscribed	subscribed	YouTube

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you	No	No
deploy new implementation		
measures (e.g. changes to your		

terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]		
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	But, see QRE 22.7.1
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 22.1	Not subscribed
QRE 22.1.1	Not subscribed
SLI 22.1.1 - actions enforcing policies above	Not subscribed
Member States	Not subscribed

Measure 22.2	Not subscribed
QRE 22.2.1	Not subscribed
Measure 22.3	Not subscribed
QRE 22.3.1	Not subscribed
Measure 22.4	Not subscribed
QRE 22.4.1	Not subscribed
SLI 22.4.1 -	Not subscribed
actions enforcing	
policies above	

Data	
Measure 22.5	Not subscribed
QRE 22.5.1	Not subscribed
SLI 22.5.1 -	Not subscribed
actions enforcing	
policies above	
Member States	

SLI 22.5.2 - actions enforcing policies above Data Measure 22.6 QRE 22.6.1 SLI 22.6.1 - actions enforcing policies above	Not subscribed  Not subscribed  Not subscribed  Not subscribed	
Data Measure 22.7	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 22.7.1	Google Search deploys the following features:  • 'SOS Alerts': Structured content that appears on a Google Search page, including high-quality help links and local relevant information when a crisis strikes. The alerts aim to make emergency information more accessible during a crisis. Google brings together relevant and high-quality content from the web, media, and Google products, and then highlights that information across Google products such as Google Search and Google Maps. See Help Centre for more information.	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.  YouTube highlights information from high-quality, third-party sources using information panels. As users navigate YouTube, they might see a variety of different information panels. These panels provide additional context, with each designed to help users make their own decisions about the content they find.  These information panels will show regardless of what opinions or perspectives are expressed in a video. If users want to learn

 Search raises authoritative election-related information to be more discoverable to users, such as features that tell users how to register to vote, how to vote in an upcoming election, and the current state of the ballot results for an ongoing election. more, most panels also link to the third-party partner's website.

Information panels on YouTube include, but are not limited to:

- Panels on topics prone to misinformation: Topics that are prone to misinformation, such as the moon landing, may display an information panel at the top of search results or under a video. These information panels show basic background information, sourced from independent, third-party partners, to give more context on a topic. The panels also link to the third-party partner's website. YouTube continues to assess and update the topics prone to misinformation that receive additional context from information panels. More details found <a href="https://example.com/here">here</a>.
- Election information panels: The election-related features are only available in select countries/regions during election cycles. Users may see candidate information panels, voting information panels, election integrity information panels, or election results information panels. More details found <a href="here">here</a>.
- Health-related information panels: Health-related topics, such as cancer treatment misinformation, may have a health information panel in your search results.
   These panels show info like symptoms, prevention and treatment options. More details found <a href="here">here</a>.
- Crisis resource panels: These panels let users
  connect with live support, 24/7 from recognised
  service partners. The panels may surface on the Watch
  page, when a user watches videos on topics related to
  suicide or self-harm, or in search results, when a user

		searches for topics rela emotional distress. Mor Additional data points and EEA provided in SLI 22.7.1.	
	Number of views/impressions on the following Google Search features in H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025), for EEA Member States:  • Crisis Response (e.g. 'SOS Alerts', 'Public Alerts').	(1) Impressions of information p panels, crisis resource panel, no 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June Member State. (2) Impressions on labels indicate content.	e 2025), broken down by EEA
SLI 22.7.1 - actions enforcing policies above	In H1 2025, the following number of views/impressions were made on the Google Search features below:  • 130,453,844 views/impressions on Crisis Response alerts (e.g. 'SOS Alerts', 'Public Alerts').	Note: Due to a technical issue, s were undercounted. YouTube re calculate this metric and make t as possible. Since the last repor reporting the metric via samplir from a subset of the data by usi better estimate of the number of	elies on a number of systems to the best effort to be as accurate t, YouTube has moved to ag, which derives the metric ag random sampling for a
		Impressions of information panels	Impressions on labels indicating altered or synthetic content
Level		Impressions	Impressions
Member States			
Austria		36,950,757	35,908,138
Belgium		167,407,873	32,192,311

Bulgaria         49,748,085         22,197,544           Croatia         54,222,976         13,074,600           Cyprus         4,183,263         6,346,362           Czech Republic         157,675,234         43,550,449           Denmark         22,016,705         31,720,890           Estonia         16,418,581         5,646,988           Finland         15,279,046         16,681,096           France         1,000,634,704         212,319,334           Germany         2,552,766,596         413,944,130           Greece         25,349,565         36,600,994           Hungary         51,006,178         17,389,712           Ireland         72,555,34         27,200,214           Italy         50,972,409         15,551,815           Latvia         50,972,409         11,553,856           Luxembourg         47,908,079         27,434,46           Matta         2,356,838         2,594,124           Netherlands         458,307,918         38,857,904           Poland         458,307,918         38,857,904           Poland         458,132,552         46,238,625           Slovakia         16,569,288         6,249,370			
Cyprus         4.183,263         6,346,362           Czech Republic         157,675,234         43,550,449           Denmark         22,016,705         31,720,890           Estonia         16,418,581         5,646,988           Finland         15,279,046         16,681,096           France         1,000,634,704         212,319,334           Germany         2,552,766,596         413,944,130           Greece         25,349,565         36,600,994           Hungary         51,006,178         17,389,712           Ireland         72,559,534         27,200,214           Italy         758,249,496         255,118,514           Latvia         50,972,400         11,553,365           Lithuania         47,908,078         12,661,456           Luxembourg         2,630,439         2,743,446           Malta         2,356,838         2,594,124           Netherlands         458,307,918         84,857,904           Poland         454,115,580         159,350,791           Portugal         28,842,733         45,132,552           Romania         27,003,094         11,456,529	Bulgaria	49,748,085	22,197,544
Czech Republic         157.675.234         43,550,449           Denmark         22.016,705         31,720,890           Estonia         16,418,581         5,646,988           Finland         15,279,046         16,681,096           France         1,000,634,704         212,319,334           Germany         2,552,766,596         413,944,130           Greece         25,349,565         36,600,994           Hungary         51,006,178         17,389,712           Ireland         72,559,534         27,200,214           Italy         758,249,496         255,118,514           Latvia         50,972,400         11,553,365           Lithuania         47,908,078         12,661,456           Luxembourg         2,630,439         2,743,446           Malta         2,356,838         2,594,124           Netherlands         458,307,918         84,857,904           Poland         458,307,918         84,857,904           Portugal         28,842,733         45,132,552           Romania         89,583,459         46,238,625           Slovakia         27,063,094         11,456,529	Croatia	54,222,976	13,074,600
Denmark         22,016,705         31,720,890           Estonia         16,418,581         5,646,988           Finland         15,279,046         16,681,096           France         1,000,634,704         212,319,334           Germany         2,552,766,596         413,944,130           Greece         25,349,565         36,600,994           Hungary         51,006,178         17,389,712           Ireland         72,559,534         27,200,214           Italy         758,249,496         255,118,514           Latvia         50,972,400         11,553,365           Lithuania         47,908,078         12,661,456           Luxembourg         2,630,439         2,743,446           Malta         2,356,838         2,594,124           Netherlands         458,307,918         84,857,904           Poland         454,115,580         159,350,791           Portugal         28,842,733         45,132,552           Romania         89,583,459         46,238,625           Slovakia         27,063,094         11,456,529	Cyprus	4,183,263	6,346,362
Estonia         16,418,581         5,646,988           Finland         15,279,046         16,681,096           France         1,000,634,704         212,319,334           Germany         2,552,766,596         413,944,130           Greece         25,349,565         36,600,994           Hungary         51,006,178         17,389,712           Ireland         72,559,534         27,200,214           Italy         758,249,496         255,118,514           Latvia         50,972,400         11,553,365           Lithuania         47,908,078         12,661,456           Luxembourg         2,630,439         2,743,446           Malta         2,356,838         2,594,124           Netherlands         458,307,918         84,857,904           Poland         454,115,580         159,350,791           Portugal         28,842,733         45,132,552           Romania         89,583,459         46,238,625           Slovakia         27,063,094         11,456,529	Czech Republic	157,675,234	43,550,449
Finland         15,279,046         16,681,096           France         1,000,634,704         212,319,334           Germany         2,552,766,596         413,944,130           Greece         25,349,565         36,600,994           Hungary         51,006,178         17,389,712           Ireland         72,559,534         27,200,214           Italy         758,249,496         255,118,514           Latvia         50,972,400         11,553,365           Lithuania         47,908,078         12,661,456           Luxembourg         2,630,439         2,743,446           Malta         2,356,838         2,594,124           Netherlands         458,307,918         84,857,904           Poland         454,115,580         159,350,791           Portugal         28,842,733         45,132,552           Romania         89,583,459         46,238,625           Slovakia         27,063,094         11,456,529	Denmark	22,016,705	31,720,890
France         1,000,634,704         212,319,334           Germany         2,552,766,596         413,944,130           Greece         25,349,565         36,600,994           Hungary         51,006,178         17,389,712           Ireland         72,559,534         27,200,214           Italy         758,249,496         255,118,514           Latvia         50,972,400         11,553,365           Lithuania         47,908,078         12,661,456           Luxembourg         2,630,439         2,743,446           Malta         2,356,838         2,594,124           Netherlands         458,307,918         84,857,904           Poland         454,115,580         159,350,791           Portugal         28,842,733         45,132,552           Romania         89,583,459         46,238,625           Slovakia         27,063,094         11,456,529	Estonia	16,418,581	5,646,988
Germany         2,552,766,596         413,944,130           Greece         25,349,565         36,600,994           Hungary         51,006,178         17,389,712           Ireland         72,559,534         27,200,214           Italy         758,249,496         255,118,514           Latvia         50,972,400         11,553,365           Lithuania         47,908,078         12,661,456           Luxembourg         2,630,439         2,743,446           Malta         2,356,838         2,594,124           Netherlands         458,307,918         84,857,904           Poland         454,115,580         159,350,791           Portugal         28,842,733         45,132,552           Romania         89,583,459         46,238,625           Slovakia         27,063,094         11,456,529	Finland	15,279,046	16,681,096
Greece         25,349,565         36,600,994           Hungary         51,006,178         17,389,712           Ireland         72,559,534         27,200,214           Italy         758,249,496         255,118,514           Latvia         50,972,400         11,553,365           Lithuania         47,908,078         12,661,456           Luxembourg         2,630,439         2,743,446           Malta         2,356,838         2,594,124           Netherlands         458,307,918         84,857,904           Poland         454,115,580         159,350,791           Portugal         28,842,733         45,132,552           Romania         89,583,459         46,238,625           Slovakia         27,063,094         11,456,529	France	1,000,634,704	212,319,334
Hungary         51,006,178         17,389,712           Ireland         72,559,534         27,200,214           Italy         758,249,496         255,118,514           Latvia         50,972,400         11,553,365           Lithuania         47,908,078         12,661,456           Luxembourg         2,630,439         2,743,446           Malta         2,356,838         2,594,124           Netherlands         458,307,918         84,857,904           Poland         454,115,580         159,350,791           Portugal         28,842,733         45,132,552           Romania         89,583,459         46,238,625           Slovakia         27,063,094         11,456,529	Germany	2,552,766,596	413,944,130
Ireland       72,559,534       27,200,214         Italy       758,249,496       255,118,514         Latvia       50,972,400       11,553,365         Lithuania       47,908,078       12,661,456         Luxembourg       2,630,439       2,743,446         Malta       2,356,838       2,594,124         Netherlands       458,307,918       84,857,904         Poland       454,115,580       159,350,791         Portugal       28,842,733       45,132,552         Romania       89,583,459       46,238,625         Slovakia       27,063,094       11,456,529	Greece	25,349,565	36,600,994
Italy         758,249,496         255,118,514           Latvia         50,972,400         11,553,365           Lithuania         47,908,078         12,661,456           Luxembourg         2,630,439         2,743,446           Malta         2,356,838         2,594,124           Netherlands         458,307,918         84,857,904           Poland         454,115,580         159,350,791           Portugal         28,842,733         45,132,552           Romania         89,583,459         46,238,625           Slovakia         27,063,094         11,456,529	Hungary	51,006,178	17,389,712
Latvia       50,972,400       11,553,365         Lithuania       47,908,078       12,661,456         Luxembourg       2,630,439       2,743,446         Malta       2,356,838       2,594,124         Netherlands       458,307,918       84,857,904         Poland       454,115,580       159,350,791         Portugal       28,842,733       45,132,552         Romania       89,583,459       46,238,625         Slovakia       27,063,094       11,456,529	Ireland	72,559,534	27,200,214
Lithuania       47,908,078       12,661,456         Luxembourg       2,630,439       2,743,446         Malta       2,356,838       2,594,124         Netherlands       458,307,918       84,857,904         Poland       454,115,580       159,350,791         Portugal       28,842,733       45,132,552         Romania       89,583,459       46,238,625         Slovakia       27,063,094       11,456,529	Italy	758,249,496	255,118,514
Luxembourg       2,630,439       2,743,446         Malta       2,356,838       2,594,124         Netherlands       458,307,918       84,857,904         Poland       454,115,580       159,350,791         Portugal       28,842,733       45,132,552         Romania       89,583,459       46,238,625         Slovakia       27,063,094       11,456,529	Latvia	50,972,400	11,553,365
Malta       2,356,838       2,594,124         Netherlands       458,307,918       84,857,904         Poland       454,115,580       159,350,791         Portugal       28,842,733       45,132,552         Romania       89,583,459       46,238,625         Slovakia       27,063,094       11,456,529	Lithuania	47,908,078	12,661,456
Netherlands       458,307,918       84,857,904         Poland       454,115,580       159,350,791         Portugal       28,842,733       45,132,552         Romania       89,583,459       46,238,625         Slovakia       27,063,094       11,456,529	Luxembourg	2,630,439	2,743,446
Poland         454,115,580         159,350,791           Portugal         28,842,733         45,132,552           Romania         89,583,459         46,238,625           Slovakia         27,063,094         11,456,529	Malta	2,356,838	2,594,124
Portugal 28,842,733 45,132,552 Romania 89,583,459 46,238,625 Slovakia 27,063,094 11,456,529	Netherlands	458,307,918	84,857,904
Romania 89,583,459 46,238,625 Slovakia 27,063,094 11,456,529	Poland	454,115,580	159,350,791
Slovakia 27,063,094 11,456,529	Portugal	28,842,733	45,132,552
	Romania	89,583,459	46,238,625
Slovenia 16,569,288 6,249,370	Slovakia	27,063,094	11,456,529
	Slovenia	16,569,288	6,249,370

Spain	451,036,417	277,140,219
Sweden	121,980,070	41,023,290
Iceland	1,058,138	1,515,108
Liechtenstein	210,543	217,258
Norway	21,105,606	20,788,623
Total EU	6,735,834,907	1,870,892,947
Total EEA	6,758,209,194	1,893,413,936

## V. Empowering users

# Commitment 23

Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with the functionality to flag harmful false and/or misleading information that violates Signatories policies or terms of service.

	C.23	M 23.1	M 23.2
We signed up to the following	Google Search	Google Search	Google Search
measures of this commitment:	YouTube	YouTube	YouTube

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the	No	No

implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]		
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 23.1	Google Search	YouTube
	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.
	Google Search aims to make the process of submitting removal requests as easy as possible, and has built reporting tools, which allow users in all EU Member States to report potentially violative content for review under Search's <a href="Content Policies">Content Policies</a> and <a href="Community Guidelines for user generated content">Community Guidelines for user generated content</a> . The <a href="Report Content On Google tool">Report Content On Google tool</a> , for	YouTube's approach to combating misinformation involves removing content that violates YouTube's policies, and surfacing high-quality information in ranking and recommendations. YouTube applies these principles globally, including across the EU.
QRE 23.1.1	example, guides users to the right reporting form to provide the necessary information for the legal or policy issue they seek to flag.  Google Search has reporting tools for Search features, such as knowledge panels and featured snippets. For overall Search Results, users can flag content via the three dots in Search features and 10 blue links. Using the Send Feedback option in 'About This Result', users can then send feedback about the result, describing the issue and attaching a	Implementing and enforcing YouTube policies  Each of YouTube's policies is carefully thought through so they are consistent, well-informed, and can be applied to content from around the world. They are developed in consultation with a wide range of external experts, as well as YouTube Creators. New policies go through testing before they go live to ensure YouTube's global team of content reviewers can apply them accurately and consistently.
	screenshot.	Flagging inappropriate or harmful content on YouTube YouTube offers YouTube users the possibility to report or flag content that they believe violates YouTube's Community

Guidelines or other policies. Users can report content using YouTube's flagging feature, which is available to signed-in users in all EU Member States via computer (desktop or laptop), mobile devices, and other surfaces. Details on how to report different types of content using YouTube's flagging feature is outlined in YouTube's Help Centre.

In addition to user flagging, YouTube uses machine learning technology to flag videos for review. YouTube developed powerful machine learning that detects content that may violate YouTube's policies and sends it for human review. In some cases, that same machine learning automatically takes an action, if there is high confidence that content is violative given information about similar or related content that has been previously removed.

YouTube relies on this combination of people and machine learning technology to flag inappropriate content and enforce YouTube's community guidelines.

Information about YouTube's content moderation efforts across the official EU Member State languages can be found in the **Human Resources involved in Content Moderation** section of the <u>VLOSE/VLOP Transparency Report under the European Union Digital Services Act (EU DSA)</u>.

## Reporting illegal content

While YouTube's Community Guidelines are policies that apply globally, YouTube is available in more than 100 different countries; therefore, processes are in place to review and appropriately act on requests from users, courts, and governments about content that violates local laws. Users

		can report illegal content using webforms dedicated to specific legal issues such as trademark, copyright, counterfeit and defamation. Webforms may also be accessed via the flagging feature after selecting Legal Issue as the report reason. To expedite the review, users should report content that violates the legal policies outlined here in YouTube's Help Centre.
Measure 23.2	Google Search	YouTube
	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.
QRE 23.2.1	Google Search carefully scrutinises most removal complaints that arrive in Google Search systems. Removal requests are handled according to the product area, issue type, and region, by a global team of front-line reviewers and Policy Leads who have expertise in a range of product areas, issue types (such as defamation or copyright infringement), local laws, and languages. Removal requests are processed in	Content can be flagged by YouTube users, YouTube's machine learning technology, and human content moderators. All users agree to not 'misuse any reporting, flagging, complaint, dispute, or appeals process, including by making groundless, vexatious, or frivolous submissions' in YouTube's Terms of Service.
	accordance with the mission of complying with the law and Google's policies while maximising access to information and preserving user expression.  For most classes of requests, trained reviewers manually assess the removals. In some cases, such as copyright takedowns, Google Search deploys automation to speed the processing of high-volume complaints. To avoid abuse in this process, Google Search relies upon:	Additionally, YouTube ensures integrity of its systems through:  • Having a dedicated team to identify and mitigate the impact of sophisticated bad actors on YouTube at scale, while protecting the broader community;  • Partnering with Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) and Trust & Safety Teams to monitor malicious actors around the globe, disable their accounts, and remove the content that they post (See QRE 16.1.1 and QRE 16.2.1);

- 1) Limitations on who may submit high volumes of requests through flows like the Trusted Copyright Removals Program, ensuring that participants in this program are organisations with bona fide copyright interests unlikely to abuse their rights to suppress unrelated content;
- 2) Legal protections, such as those found in the Digital Services Act, or the possibility for Google or webmasters to file suit against submitters of bad-faith copyright complaints;
- 3) Handling counter-notifications from affected webmasters;
- 4) Tracking patterns of abusive behaviour and adjusting Google Search automation to avoid automatically honouring abusive takedowns of a kind Google Search has become aware of.

#### Services Act:

- Educating users about Community Guidelines violations through its <u>guided policy experience</u>;
- Providing clear communication on <u>appeals</u> <u>processes and notifications</u>, and regular <u>policy</u> <u>updates</u> on its Help Centre; and,
- Investing in <u>automated systems</u> to provide efficient detection of content to be evaluated by human reviewers.

Where appropriate, YouTube makes it clear to users that it has taken action on their content and provides them the opportunity to appeal that decision.

For more detailed information about YouTube's complaint handling systems (i.e. appeals), please see the latest VLOSE/VLOP Transparency Report under the European Union Digital Services Act (EU DSA).

#### V. Empowering users

#### Commitment 24

Relevant Signatories commit to inform users whose content or accounts has been subject to enforcement actions (content/accounts labelled, demoted or otherwise enforced on) taken on the basis of violation of policies relevant to this section (as outlined in Measure 18.2), and provide them with the possibility to appeal against the enforcement action at issue and to handle complaints in a timely, diligent, transparent, and objective manner and to reverse the action without undue delay where the complaint is deemed to be founded.

	C.24	M 24.1
	C.24	IVI 24.1
We signed up to the following	YouTube	YouTube
measures of this commitment:		

	Not subscribed	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Not subscribed	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Not subscribed	N/A

Measure 24.1	Not subscribed	YouTube
	Not subscribed	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in
		some instances truncated in order to meet the
		suggested character limit) from the previous report as
		there is no new information to share now.
QRE 24.1.1		As noted in QRE 18.2.1, if a creator's channel gets a strike,
		they will receive an email, and can have notifications sent to
		them through their mobile and desktop notifications. The
		emails and notifications received by the creator explain what
		content was removed or age restricted, which policies the
		content violated, how it affects the user's channel, and what

the creator can do next. More detailed guidelines of YouTube's processes and policies on strikes <u>here</u>.

Sometimes a single case of severe abuse will result in <u>channel termination</u> without warning.

The below appeals processes are available in all Member States, which are outlined in the YouTube Help Centre:

- Appeal a Community Guidelines strike;
- Appeal a Community Guidelines video removal;
- Appeal the age restriction of a video;
- Appeal playlist or thumbnail removals;
- Appeal a channel termination.

#### After a creator submits an appeal

After a creator submits an appeal, they will get an email from YouTube letting them know the appeal outcome. One of the following will happen:

- If YouTube finds that a user's content followed YouTube's Community Guidelines, YouTube will reinstate it and remove the strike from their channel.
   If a user appeals a warning and the appeal is granted, the next offence will be a warning.
- If YouTube finds that a user's content followed YouTube's Community Guidelines, but is not appropriate for all audiences, YouTube will apply an age-restriction. If it is a video, it will not be visible to users who are signed out, are under 18 years of age, or have <u>Restricted Mode</u> turned on. If it is a custom thumbnail, it will be removed.

		of YouTube's Commun stay and the video will	ouTube's median time needed ee the latest <u>VLOSE/VLOP</u>
SLI 24.1.1 - enforcement actions	Not subscribed	<ul> <li>(1) Appeals following video removal for violations of YouTube's Misinformation Policies in H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025), broken down by EEA Member State;</li> <li>(2) Video reinstatements following a successful appeal against content removals for violations of YouTube's Misinformation Policies in H1 2025, broken down by EEA Member State.</li> </ul>	
	Not subscribed	Number of videos removed that were subsequently appealed	Number of videos removed that were then reinstated following a creator's appeal
Member States	Not subscribed		
Austria		21	3
Belgium		13	3

Bulgaria	14	0
Croatia	4	1
Cyprus	4	0
Czech Republic	12	1
Denmark	9	2
Estonia	3	2
Finland	12	1
France	95	14
Germany	177	29
Greece	12	1
Hungary	12	2
Ireland	39	8
Italy	72	10
Latvia	5	0
Lithuania	6	2
Luxembourg	0	0
Malta	2	1
Netherlands	58	9
Poland	45	5
Portugal	16	5
Romania	20	1
Slovakia	3	1
Slovenia	2	0

Spain	175	19
Sweden	16	2
Iceland	0	0
Liechtenstein	0	0
Norway	9	2
Total EU	847	122
Total EEA	856	124

#### V. Empowering users

## Commitment 25

In order to help users of private messaging services to identify possible disinformation disseminated through such services, Relevant Signatories that provide messaging applications commit to continue to build and implement features or initiatives that empower users to think critically about information they receive and help them to determine whether it is accurate, without any weakening of encryption and with due regard to the protection of privacy.

	C.25	M 25.1	M 25.2
We signed up to the following	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Not subscribed
measures of this commitment:			

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Not subscribed

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Not subscribed

Measure 25.1	Not subscribed
QRE 25.1.1	Not subscribed
SLI 25.1.1	Not subscribed
Data	Not subscribed
Measure 25.2	Not subscribed
QRE 25.2.1	Not subscribed
SLI 25.2.1 - use of	Not subscribed
select tools	
Data	Not subscribed

# VI. Empowering the research community

Commitments 26 - 29

## VI. Empowering the research community

## Commitment 26

Relevant Signatories commit to provide access, wherever safe and practicable, to continuous, real-time or near real-time, searchable stable access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated, or manifestly-made public data for research purposes on Disinformation through automated means such as APIs or other open and accessible technical solutions allowing the analysis of said data.

	C.26	M 26.1	M 26.2	M 26.3
We signed up to the following	Google Search	Google Search	YouTube	Google Search
measures of this commitment:	YouTube	YouTube		YouTube

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 26.1	Google Search YouTube			
	Google Trends Google Search and YouTube provide publicly available data via Google Trends, which provides access to a largely unfilted sample of actual search requests made to Google Search and YouTube's search function. It is anonymised (no one is personally identified), categorised (determined by the topic for a search query) and aggregated (grouped together). The allows Google Trends to display interest in a particular topic from around the globe or down to city-level geography. See Trends Help Centre for details.			
	Google Researcher Program  Eligible EU researchers can apply for access to publicly available data across some of Google's products, including Search and YouTube, through the Google Researcher Program. Search and YouTube will provide eligible researchers (including non-academics that meet predefined eligibility criteria) with access to limited metadata scraping for public data. This program aims to enhance the public's understanding of Google's services and their impact. For additional details, see the Researcher Program landing page.			
QRE 26.1.1	YouTube Researcher Program The YouTube Researcher Program provides scaled, expanded access to global video metadata across the entire public YouTube corpus via a Data API for eligible academic researchers from around the world, who are affiliated with an accredited, higher-learning institution. Learn more about the data available in the YouTube API reference.			
	Transparency into paid content on YouTube YouTube provides users a bespoke front end search page to access publicly available data containing organic content with paid product placements, sponsorships and endorsements as disclosed by creators. This is to enable users to understand that creators may receive goods or services in exchange for promotion. This search page complements YouTube's existing process of displaying a disclosure message when creators disclose to YouTube that their content contains paid promotions. Learn more about adding paid product placements, sponsorships & endorsements here.			
	Users can also query the same set of results using the <u>YouTube Data API</u> . Use is subject to <u>YouTube's API Terms of Service</u> .			
QRE 26.1.2	Google Trends The information provided via Google Trends is a sample of all of Google Search and YouTube's search activity. The 2 different samples of Google Trends data that can be accessed are:			

- Real-time data a sample covering the last seven days;
- Non real-time data a separate sample from real-time data that goes as far back as 2004 and up to 72 hours before one's search.

Only a sample of Google Search and YouTube searches are used in Google Trends (a publicly available research tool), because Google, including YouTube, handles billions of searches per day. Providing access to the entire data set would be too large to process quickly. By sampling data, Google can look at a dataset representative of all searches on Google, which includes YouTube, while finding insights that can be processed within minutes of an event happening in the real world. See Trends Help Centre for details.

#### **Google Researcher Program**

Approved researchers will receive permissions and access to public data for Search and YouTube in the following ways:

- Search: Access to an API for limited scraping with a budget for quota;
- YouTube: Permission for scraping limited to metadata.

For additional details, see the Researcher Program landing page.

#### YouTube Researcher Program

The <u>YouTube Researcher Program</u> provides scaled, expanded access to global video metadata across the entire public YouTube corpus via a Data API. The program allows eligible academic researchers around the world to independently analyse the data they collect, including generating new/derived metrics for their research. Information available via the Data API includes video title, description, views, likes, comments, channel metadata, search results, and other data.

#### Transparency into paid content on YouTube

The information provided via the <u>bespoke front end search page</u> allows users to view videos with active paid product placements, sponsorships, and endorsements that have been declared on YouTube.

#### • Paid product placements

- Videos about a product or service because there is a connection between the creator and the maker of the product or service;
- Videos created for a company or business in exchange for compensation or free of charge products/services;
- o Videos where that company or business's brand, message, or product is included directly in the content and

	<ul> <li>the company has given the creator money or free of charge products to make the video.</li> <li>Endorsements - Videos created for an advertiser or marketer that contains a message that reflects the opinions, beliefs, or experiences of the creator.</li> <li>Sponsorships - Videos that have been financed in whole or in part by a company, without integrating the brand, message, or product directly into the content. Sponsorships generally promote the brand, message, or product of the third party.</li> <li>Definitions can be found on the YouTube Help Centre.</li> <li>Additional data points are provided in SLI 26.1.1 and 26.2.1.</li> </ul>		
SLI 26.1.1 - uptake of the tools and processes described in	(1) Number of Fact Check API H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 (2) Number of Fact Check Exp broken down by EEA Member (3) Number of users of the Go research information relating broken down by EEA Member	D June 2025), globally; blorer tool users in H1 2025, r State (see table below); bogle Trends online tool to to Google Search in H1 2025,	Number of users of the Google Trends online tool to research information relating to YouTube in H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025), broken down by EEA Member State (see table below).
Measure 26.1	(1) In H1 2025, the Fact Check Search API received approximately 130,558 requests from Google Search users, globally.		New house of Consultation Visit Tube
	Number of Fact Check Explorer tool users	Number of Google Trends users researching Google Search	Number of Google Trends users researching YouTube
Level	Users	Users	Users
Member State			
Austria	750	278,583	796

Belgium	934	370,772	1,183
Bulgaria	605	663,503	1,767
Croatia	336	170,138	487
Cyprus	121	122,916	392
Czech Republic	581	372,473	1,227
Denmark	808	187,353	722
Estonia	98	72,304	241
Finland	501	118,561	549
France	5,184	1,492,305	5,270
Germany	5,606	3,155,044	9,618
Greece	691	937,455	2,548
Hungary	774	697,221	2,071
Ireland	806	6,105,469	1,134
Italy	3,764	2,970,023	7,908
Latvia	113	129,200	426
Lithuania	176	177,276	550
Luxembourg	101	20,970	71
Malta	48	25,992	100
Netherlands	2,180	620,348	2,326
Poland	2,235	1,126,389	3,767
Portugal	951	493,259	1,748
Romania	1,004	688,936	2,212
Slovakia	291	186,217	601

Slovenia	178	91,818	279
Spain	6,859	2,815,292	8,124
Sweden	946	396,555	1,352
Iceland	68	434	11
Liechtenstein	2	820	7
Norway	1,185	239,140	881
Total EU	36,641	24,486,372	57,469
Total EEA	37,896	24,726,766	58,368
Measure 26.2	Not subscribed		YouTube
QRE 26.2.1	Not subscribed		Please refer to QRE 26.1.1 and QRE 26.1.2.
QRE 26.2.2	Not subscribed		Please refer to QRE 26.1.1 and QRE 26.1.2.
QRE 26.2.3	Not subscribed		Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.  Google Researcher Program The Google Researcher Program, which includes YouTube, has a 3-step application process:  1. Review and confirm the applicant's eligibility; 2. Submit an application, which requires a Google account; 3. If approved, the applicant gains permission to access public data relevant to their research.

		Once an application has been submitted, accepted
		researchers will be notified via email.
		researchers will be notified via email.
		YouTube Researcher Program
		The YouTube Researcher Program has a 3-step application
		process:
		<ol> <li>YouTube verifies the applicant is an academic researcher affiliated with an accredited, higher-learning institution;</li> <li>The Researcher creates an API project in the Google Cloud Console and enables the relevant YouTube APIs. They can learn more by visiting the enabled APIs page;</li> <li>The Researcher applies with their institutional email (e.g. with a .edu suffix), includes as much detail as possible, and confirms that all of their information is accurate.</li> </ol>
		Once an application has been submitted, YouTube's operations team will conduct a review and let applicants know if they are accepted into the program.
SLI 26.2.1 - meaningful metrics on the uptake, swiftness, and acceptance	Not subscribed	(1-4) Applications received, approved, rejected or under review for the YouTube Researcher Program in H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025), broken down by EEA Member States (* indicates applications that were rejected on the basis of incorrect/incomplete application);
level of the tools and processes in Measure 26.2		(5) Total number of unique researchers accessing the YouTube Researcher Program API in H1 2025, broken down by EEA Member States;

there were r from that co there were r under review Applications	O' under appl no application country. Similation no application wew for that co	ons submit arly, cells v ons approv ountry. ew reflect	tted by a res with '0' signi ved, rejecte	searcher fy that d, or
			those appli	
<ul> <li>Applications under review reflect those applications still being processed at the end of the reporting period. The outcomes of these applications will be included in the next reporting period.</li> </ul>				ing
<ul> <li>Researchers accessing the Researcher Program API from 1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025 may have been approved before H1 2025. There can be more than one researcher per application.</li> </ul>				ve been
<ul> <li>Median Application Resolution time is the median number of days from application creation to application resolution. Applications may go back and forth between the applicant and API Ops Agents throughout the approval process. This metric does no reflect YouTube's first response back to the applicant</li> </ul>				ack and ents does not
throughout	Tube's first re		Number	Median
thr				

						accessi ng the API	
Member State	Not subscribed						
Austria		1	0	1	0	0	-
Belgium		0	0	0	0	2	-
Bulgaria		0	0	0	0	0	-
Croatia		0	0	0	0	0	-
Cyprus		0	0	0	0	0	-
Czech Republic		0	0	0	0	1	-
Denmark		2	1	1	0	1	-
Estonia		0	0	0	0	0	-
Finland		1	1	0	0	1	-
France		1	0	1	0	3	-
Germany		7	5	2	0	22	-
Greece		1	0	1	0	0	-
Hungary		1	1	0	0	1	-
Ireland		0	0	0	0	0	-
Italy		1	1	0	0	6	-
Latvia		0	0	0	0	0	-
Lithuania		0	0	0	0	0	-
Luxembourg		0	0	0	0	0	-
Malta		0	0	0	0	0	-
Netherlands		4	2	2	0	1	-

Poland		1	1	0	0	1	-
Portugal		1	1	0	0	0	-
Romania		0	0	0	0	1	-
Slovakia		0	0	0	0	0	-
Slovenia		0	0	0	0	0	-
Spain		9	6	3	0	8	-
Sweden		1	0	1	0	0	-
Iceland		0	0	0	0	0	-
Liechtenstein		0	0	0	0	0	-
Norway		0	0	0	0	0	-
Total EU		31	19	12	0	48	10.0 days
Total EEA		31	19	12	0	48	10.0 days
Measure 26.3	Google Search	YouTube					
QRE 26.3.1	Google Trends For Google Trends, users have an option to report an issue by taking a screenshot of the malfunction area and then submitting it for feedback via the Send Feedback option on the Google Trends page. Additionally, users can access the Trends Help Centre to troubleshoot any issues they may be experiencing.  Google Researcher Program For the Google Researcher Program, the most up to date information is captured in the Program description on the Transparency Centre, and also on the Acceptable Use Policy page. Google Search has additional Help Centre support via their Search Researcher Result API guidelines.  YouTube Researcher Program For the YouTube Researcher Program, there is support available via email. Researchers can contact YouTube, with questions and to report technical issues or other suspected faults, via a unique email alias, provided upon acceptance into the program. Questions are answered by YouTube's Developer Support team and by other relevant internal parties as needed.						

Google is not aware of any malfunctions during the reporting period that would have prevented access to these reporting systems.

# VI. Empowering the research community

# Commitment 27

Relevant Signatories commit to provide vetted researchers with access to data necessary to undertake research on Disinformation by developing, funding, and cooperating with an independent, third-party body that can vet researchers and research proposals.

	C.27	M 27.1	M 27.2	M 27.3	M 27.4
We signed up to the following	Not subscribed				
measures of this commitment:					

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Not subscribed
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Not subscribed

Measure 27.1	Not subscribed
QRE 27.1.1	Not subscribed
Measure 27.2	Not subscribed
QRE 27.2.1	Not subscribed
Measure 27.3	Not subscribed
QRE 27.3.1	Not subscribed
SLI 27.3.1 - research projects vetted by the independent third-party body	Not subscribed
Data	
Measure 27.4	Not subscribed
QRE 27.4.1	Not subscribed

VI. Empowering the research community								
	Commitment 28							
Relevant Signatories commit to support good faith research into Disinformation that involves their services.								
	C.28 M 28.1 M 28.2 M 28.3 M 28.4							
We signed up to the following Google Search Google Search Google Search Google Search Google Search								
measures of this commitment:	YouTube	YouTube	YouTube	YouTube	YouTube			

	Google Search	YouTube
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<ul> <li>adjacent to the Conference on Human Fact</li> <li>In June 2025, Google announced the 3 area</li> </ul>	rkshop with over 30 attendees, in Tokyo, Japan tors in Computing Systems ( <u>CHI 2025</u> ). as of primary interest for this year's Google vale, the program will focus on Trust, Safety,
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 28.1	Google Search	YouTube				
	, ,	as a longstanding commitment to transparency, and has led the way in transparency reporting of content and government requests for user data over the past decade plus.				
QRE 28.1.1	Google and YouTube's products, processes, and practices ways that Google provides tools to support not only research Google.	via the Lumen Database and Google Trends show some of the chers, but journalists and others, to understand more about				

Please refer to QRE 26.1.1, QRE 26.1.2, and QRE 26.3.1 for further information about Google Trends.

### Google

Eligible EU researchers can apply for access to publicly available data across some of Google's products, including Search and YouTube, through the <u>Google Researcher Program</u>. Search and YouTube will provide eligible researchers (including non-academics that meet predefined eligibility criteria) with access to limited metadata scraping for public data. This program aims to enhance the public's understanding of Google's services and their impact.

Google has teams that operate the Google Researcher Program. They manage the researcher application process and evaluate potential updates and developments for the Google Researcher Program. Additional information can be found on the Google Transparency Centre. Google Search has additional Help Centre support via their Search Researcher Result API guidelines.

Additionally, Google's partnership with Lumen is an independent research project managed by the <u>Berkman Klein Centre for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School</u>. The Lumen database houses millions of content takedown requests that have been voluntarily shared by various companies, including Google. Its purpose is to facilitate academic and industry research concerning the availability of online content. As part of Google's partnership with Lumen, information about the legal notices Google receives may be sent to the Lumen project for publication. Google informs users about its Lumen practices under the 'Transparency at our core' section of the <u>Legal Removals Help Centre</u>. Additional information on Lumen can be found here.

### YouTube

The <u>YouTube Researcher Program</u> provides eligible academic researchers from around the world with scaled, expanded access to global video metadata across the entire public YouTube corpus via a Data API. Information available via the Data API includes video title, description, views, likes, comments, channel metadata, search results, and other data. (See <u>YouTube API reference</u> for more information).

YouTube has teams that operate the YouTube Researcher Program. They manage the researcher application process and provide technical support throughout the research project. They also evaluate potential updates and developments for the YouTube Researcher Program. Researchers can use any of the options below to obtain support:

• YouTube provides a contact email alias to researchers who have been granted access to the program;

	YouTube API Code Samples at GitHub.	
Measure 28.2	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 28.2.1	See response to QRE 28.1.1.	
Measure 28.3	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 28.3.1	Google continues to engage constructively with the Code Digital Media Observatory (EDMO). As of the time of this restands ready to collaborate with EDMO to that end in 2025	of Conduct's Permanent Task-force and with the European eport, no annual consultation has yet taken place, but Google
Measure 28.4	Google Search	YouTube
QRE 28.4.1	provided to date. Overall, 121 projects related to informatio 26 EEA Member States).  The EMIF was established by the European University Instit Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) agreed to play a scienti	ean Media & Information Fund (EMIF), of which €22.5M has been n quality have now received grants across 28 countries (including ute and the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. The European fic advisory role in the evaluation and selection of projects that e funding. Google has no role in the assessment of applications.

# VI. Empowering the research community

# Commitment 29

Relevant Signatories commit to conduct research based on transparent methodology and ethical standards, as well as to share datasets, research findings and methodologies with relevant audiences.

	C.29	M 29.1	M 29.2	M 29.3
We signed up to the following	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Not subscribed
measures of this commitment:				

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Not subscribed
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Not subscribed

Measure 29.1	Not subscribed
QRE 29.1.1	Not subscribed
QRE 29.1.2	Not subscribed
QRE 29.1.3	Not subscribed
SLI 29.1.1 -	Not subscribed
reach of	Not subscribed
stakeholders or	
citizens	
informed about	

the outcome of	
research	
projects	
Data	Not subscribed
Measure 29.2	Not subscribed
QRE 29.2.1	Not subscribed
QRE 29.2.2	Not subscribed
QRE 29.2.3	Not subscribed
SLI 29.2.1 -	Not subscribed
reach of	Not subscribed
stakeholders or	
citizens	
informed	
about the	
outcome of	
research	
projects (of	
various resilience-foste	
ring measures)	
Data	
Measure 29.3	Not subscribed
QRE 29.3.1	Not subscribed
SLI 29.3.1 -	Not subscribed
reach of	Not subscribed
stakeholders or	
citizens	
informed about the outcome of	
research	
projects	
(effective	
repositories of	
advertising)	
Data	Not subscribed

# VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

Commitments 30 - 33

# VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

# Commitment 30

Relevant Signatories commit to establish a framework for transparent, structured, open, financially sustainable, and non-discriminatory cooperation between them and the EU fact-checking community regarding resources and support made available to fact-checkers.

	C.30	M 30.1	M 30.2	М 30.3	M 30.4
We signed up to the following	Not subscribed				
measures of this commitment:					

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Not subscribed
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Not subscribed

Measure 30.1	Not subscribed
QRE 30.1.1	Not subscribed

QRE 30.1.2	Not subscribed
QRE 30.1.3	Not subscribed
SLI 30.1.1 - Member States and languages covered by agreements with the fact-checking organisations	Not subscribed
Member States	

Measure 30.2	Not subscribed
QRE 30.2.1	Not subscribed
QRE 30.2.2	Not subscribed
QRE 30.2.3	Not subscribed
Measure 30.3	Not subscribed
QRE 30.3.1	Not subscribed
Measure 30.4	Not subscribed
QRE 30.4.1	Not subscribed

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community					
	Commitment 31				
	Relevant Signatories commit to integrate, showcase, or otherwise consistently use fact-checkers' work in their platforms' services, processes, and contents; with full coverage of all Member States and languages.				
C.31 M 31.1 M 31.2 M 31.3 M 31.4					
We signed up to the following	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Not subscribed
measures of this commitment:					

- 1	Not subscribed
- 1	Trot babbornood

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Not subscribed
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Not subscribed
Measure 31.1 Not subscribed	
Measure 31.2 Not subscribed	
QRE 31.1.1 Not subscribed	
SLI 31.1.1 - use of fact-checks	
Member States	
SLI 31.1.2 - Not subscribed impact of actions taken	
Member States	

SLI 31.1.3 -	Not subscribed
Quantitative	
information used	
for	
contextualisatio	
n for the SLIs	
31.1.1 / 31.1.2	
Member States	Not subscribed

Measure 31.3	Not subscribed
QRE 31.3.1	Not subscribed
Measure 31.4	Not subscribed
QRE 31.4.1	Not subscribed

# VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

# Commitment 32

Relevant Signatories commit to provide fact-checkers with prompt, and whenever possible automated, access to information that is pertinent to help them to maximise the quality and impact of fact-checking, as defined in a framework to be designed in coordination with EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations.

	C.32	M 32.1	M 32.2	M 32.3
We signed up to the following	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Not subscribed	Not subscribed
measures of this commitment:				

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Not subscribed

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Not subscribed

Measure 32.1	Not subscribed
Measure 32.2	Not subscribed
QRE 32.1.1	Not subscribed
SLI 32.1.1 - use of the interfaces and other tools	Not subscribed
Data	Not subscribed
Measure 32.3	Not subscribed
QRE 32.3.1	Not subscribed

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community						
Commitment 33						
Relevant Signatories (i.e. fact-checking organisations) commit to operate on the basis of strict ethical and transparency rules, and to protect their independence.						
C.33 M 33.1						
We signed up to the following	We signed up to the following  Not subscribed  Not subscribed					
measures of this commitment:						

	Not subscribed
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Not subscribed
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Not subscribed
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Not subscribed

Measure 33.1	Not subscribed
QRE 33.1.1	Not subscribed
SLI 33.1.1 -	Not subscribed
number of	
European	
fact-checkers	
that are	
IFCN-certified	
Data	Not subscribed

# **VIII. Transparency Centre**

Commitments 34 - 36

# VIII. Transparency Centre

# Commitment 34

To ensure transparency and accountability around the implementation of this Code, Relevant Signatories commit to set up and maintain a publicly available common Transparency Centre website.

	C.34	M 34.1	M 34.2	M 34.3	M 34.4	M 34.5
We signed up to the following	Google, on					
measures of this commitment:	behalf of					
	related	related	related	related	related	related
	services	services	services	services	services	services

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	In line with Code commitments and alongside other Signatories, Google helped maintain the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation Transparency Centre, located at <a href="https://disinfocode.eu">https://disinfocode.eu</a> in H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025).
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 34.1	Google, on behalf of related services
Measure 34.2	Google, on behalf of related services
Measure 34.3	Google, on behalf of related services
Measure 34.4	Google, on behalf of related services
Measure 34.5	Google, on behalf of related services

# VIII. Transparency Centre

# Commitment 35

Signatories commit to ensure that the Transparency Centre contains all the relevant information related to the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures and that this information is presented in an easy-to-understand manner, per service, and is easily searchable.

	C.35	M 35.1	M 35.2	M 35.3	M 35.4	M 35.5	M 35.6
We signed up to the following	Google, on						
measures of this commitment:	behalf of						
	related						
	services						

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	In line with Code commitments, and alongside other Signatories, Google populated the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation Transparency Centre with related relevant information in H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025).
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the	N/A
next 6 months?	

Measure 35.1	Google, on behalf of related services
Measure 35.2	Google, on behalf of related services
Measure 35.3	Google, on behalf of related services
Measure 35.4	Google, on behalf of related services
Measure 35.5	Google, on behalf of related services
Measure 35.6	Google, on behalf of related services

VIII. Transparency Centre					
Commitment 36					
Signatories commit to updating the relevant information contained in the Transparency Centre in a timely and complete manner.					
C.36 M 36.1 M 36.2 M 36.3					
We signed up to the following Google, on behalf of Google, on behalf of Google, on behalf of Google, on behalf of					
measures of this commitment:	related services	related services	related services	related services	

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	In line with Code commitments, Google uploaded its H2 2024 report PDF report to the newly launched Transparency Centre in March 2025, and completed the final upload in May 2025 after site maintenance.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	In line with Code commitments, Google plans to upload reports and pertinent updates to the Transparency Centre located at <a href="https://disinfocode.eu">https://disinfocode.eu</a> .

Measure 36.1	Google, on behalf of related services
Measure 36.2	Google, on behalf of related services
Measure 36.3	Google, on behalf of related services
QRE 36.1.1 (for the Commitments 34-36)	N/A
QRE 36.1.2 (for the Commitments 34-36)	N/A
SLI 36.1.1 - (for Measures 34 and 36) meaningful quantitative information on the usage of the Transparency Centre, such as the average monthly visits of the webpage.	Between 1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025, the common Transparency Centre was viewed 38,817 times by approximately 11,367 users and 19,767 reports were downloaded. For Google specifically, over 5,384 downloads (combined) occurred of its most recent and previous reports by over 3,491 unique users.
Data	

# IX. Permanent Task-Force

Commitment 37

### IX. Permanent Task-Force

# Commitment 37

Signatories commit to participate in the Permanent Task-force. The Task-force includes the Signatories of the Code and representatives from EDMO and ERGA. It is chaired by the European Commission, and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Task-force can also invite relevant experts as observers to support its work. Decisions of the Task-force are made by consensus.

	C.37	M 37.1	M 37.2	M 37.3	M 37.4	M 37.5	M 37.6
We signed up to the following	Google, on						
measures of this commitment:	behalf of						
	related						
	services						

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 37.1	Google, on behalf of related services	
Measure 37.2	Google, on behalf of related services	
Measure 37.3	Google, on behalf of related services	
Measure 37.4	Google, on behalf of related services	
Measure 37.5	Google, on behalf of related services	

Measure 37.6	Google, on behalf of related services
QRE 37.6.1	Google has continued to meaningfully engage in Permanent Task-force Plenary sessions and sub groups, including but not limited to participation in meetings, and providing feedback.

# X. Monitoring of Code

Commitment 38 - 44

X. Monitoring of Code				
Commitment 38				
The Signatories commit to dedicate adequate financial and human resources and put in place appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of their commitments under the Code.				
C.38 M 38.1				
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:  Google, on behalf of related services  Google, on behalf of related services				

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

Measure 38.1	Google, on behalf of related services
	Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested
	character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.
QRE 38.1.1	Google has several teams across the company, including teams in Product, Policy, and Trust and Safety, whose work is relevant to but not restricted to Commitments made under this Code. This is core to Google's mission of connecting people with high-quality information and preventing bad actors from misusing Google services to spread harmful content. To

enforce policies fairly, consistently, and at scale, Google relies both on specially-trained experts and machine learning technology and has invested heavily in moderation efforts across platforms. Google enforces its policies globally, including in all EEA Member States and languages.

# X. Monitoring of the Code Commitment 39 Signatories commit to provide to the European Commission, within 1 month after the end of the implementation period (6 months after this Code's signature) the baseline reports as set out in the Preamble. C.39 We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: Google, on behalf of related services

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	In line with Code commitments in H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025), Google provided its fifth report to the European Commission.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

# X. Monitoring of the Code

# Commitment 40

Signatories commit to provide regular reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs). The reports and data provided should allow for a thorough assessment of the extent of the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures by each Signatory, service and at Member State level.

	C.40	M 40.1	M 40.2	M 40.3	M 40.4	M 40.5	M 40.6
We signed up to the following	Google, on	Google,					
measures of this commitment:	behalf of	on behalf					
	related	related	related	related	related	related	of
	services	services	services	services	services	services	related
							services

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	In line with Code commitments in H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025), Google provided its fifth report which included reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs) to the European Commission.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

# X. Monitoring of the Code

# Commitment 41

Signatories commit to work within the Task-force towards developing Structural Indicators, and publish a first set of them within 9 months from the signature of this Code; and to publish an initial measurement alongside their first full report. To achieve this goal, Signatories commit to support their implementation, including the testing and adapting of the initial set of Structural Indicators agreed in this Code. This, in order to assess the effectiveness of the Code in reducing the spread of online disinformation for each of the relevant Signatories, and for the entire online ecosystem in the EU and at Member State level. Signatories will collaborate with relevant actors in that regard, including ERGA and EDMO.

	C.41	M 41.1	M 41.2	M 41.3
We signed up to the following	Google, on behalf of			
measures of this commitment:	related services	related services	related services	related services

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	<ul> <li>Google has been a participant in the working group dedicated to developing Structural Indicators.</li> <li>Google supported the publication of Structural Indicators by TrustLab, through its collaboration with the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA), Avaaz and the European Commission.</li> </ul>
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next	Google will continue to support the publication of
6 months?	Structural Indicators, and work towards further honing
	their methodology and scope.

# X. Monitoring of the Code Commitment 42 Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Task-force. C.42 We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: Google, on behalf of related services

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As requested by the European Commission, Google provides an Annex on Elections to this report. In H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025), Google activated temporary RRSs for elections in Germany, Romania, Poland, and Portugal at the EC's request and also participated in discussions on the establishment of a permanent Elections Rapid Response System (RRS) by the Task-Force.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next	N/A
6 months?	

# X. Monitoring of the Code Commitment 43 Signatories commit to produce reports and provide data following the harmonised reporting templates and refined methodology for reporting and data disclosure, as agreed in the Task-force. C.43 We signed up to the following measures of this commitment: Google, on behalf of related services

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

# X. Monitoring of the Code

# Commitment 44

Relevant Signatories that are providers of Very Large Online Platforms commit, seeking alignment with the DSA, to be audited at their own expense, for their compliance with the commitments undertaken pursuant to this Code. Audits should be performed by organisations, independent from, and without conflict of interest with, the provider of the Very Large Online Platform concerned. Such organisations shall

have proven expertise in the area of disinformation, appropriate technical competence and capabilities and have proven objectivity and professional ethics, based in particular on adherence to auditing standards and guidelines.		
C.44		
We signed up to the following Google, on behalf of related services		
measures of this commitment:		

	Google, on behalf of related services
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	N/A - It was agreed with the European Commission that this commitment is duplicative of the EU Digital Services Act (DSA) requirements, and should therefore be deleted from the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation text. Google is taking steps to be subject to an audit under the DSA, for relevant services.
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	N/A
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A

# Reporting on the service's response during a period of crisis

# Reporting on the service's response during a crisis

# War in Ukraine

### Overview

The ongoing war in Ukraine has continued into 2025, and Google continues to <u>help by</u> providing cybersecurity and humanitarian assistance, and providing high-quality information to people in the region. The following list outlines the main threats observed by Google during this conflict:

- 1. Continued online services manipulation and coordinated influence operations;
- 2. Advertising and monetisation linked to state-backed Russia and Ukraine disinformation;
- 3. Threats to security and protection of digital infrastructure.

The following sections summarise Google's main strategies and actions taken to mitigate the identified threats and react to the war in Ukraine.

## 1. Online services manipulation and malign influence operations

Google's <u>Threat Analysis Group (TAG)</u> is helping Ukraine by <u>monitoring the threat landscape in Eastern Europe</u> and disrupting coordinated influence operations from Russian threat actors.

## 2. Advertising and monetisation linked to Russia and Ukraine disinformation

In H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025), Google continued to pause the majority of commercial activities in Russia – including ads serving in Russia via Google demand and third-party bidding, ads on Google's properties and networks globally for all Russian-based advertisers, AdSense ads on state-funded media sites, and monetisation features for YouTube viewers in Russia. Google <u>paused ads</u> containing content that exploits, dismisses, or condones the war. In addition, Google paused the ability of Russia-based publishers to monetise with AdSense, AdMob, and Ad Manager in August 2024. Free Google services such as Search, Gmail and YouTube are still operating in Russia. Google will continue to closely monitor developments.

## 3. Threats to security and protection of digital infrastructure

Google expanded eligibility for <u>Project Shield</u>, Google's free protection against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, shortly after the war in Ukraine broke out. The expansion aimed to allow Ukrainian government websites and embassies worldwide to stay online and continue to offer their critical services. Since then, Google has continued to implement protections for users and track and disrupt cyber threats.

TAG has been tracking threat actors, both before and during the war, and sharing their findings publicly and with law enforcement. TAG's findings have shown that government-backed actors from Russia, Belarus, China, Iran, and North Korea have been targeting Ukrainian and Eastern European government and defence officials, military organisations, politicians, nonprofit organisations, and journalists, while financially motivated bad actors have also used the war as a lure for malicious campaigns.

Google aims to continue to follow the following approach when responding to future crisis situations:

- Elevate access to high-quality information across Google services;
- Protect Google users from harmful disinformation;
- Continue to monitor and disrupt cyber threats;
- Explore ways to provide assistance to support the affected areas more broadly.

#### **Future measures**

Google will continue to monitor the situation and take additional action as needed.

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].

Policies and Terms and Conditions		
Google Advertising		
Enforcement of existing policies	Google Ads continued to enforce all Google Ads policies during the war in Ukraine, including its Sensitive Events Policy.	No changes to Ads policies and to Terms and Conditions were made as a result of the war in Ukraine during this reporting period. Google Ads continues to enforce all Google Ads policies, including the ones mentioned in this report.
Google Search		
N/A	N/A	N/A
YouTube		
N/A	N/A	N/A
Google, on behalf of related services		

N/A	N/A	N/A
Scrutiny of Ads Placements		
Google Advertising		
Enforces the Google Ads Misleading Representation Policy focusing on ensuring ads are honest and transparent, providing users with the information needed to make informed decisions. This policy covers various forms of deception, including unacceptable business practices and misleading representations.	Specifically for the war in Ukraine, Google Ads for in the Misleading Representation Policy which disa media related to politics, social issues or matters of Google Ads also enforced the Clickbait Ads Policy Representation Policy. This policy prohibits ads the imagery to drive traffic.  Please refer to SLI 2.3.1 for more details on Google Manipulated Media and Clickbait Ads sub-category.	allows the practice of deceptively doctoring of public concern.  y which is a sub-category under the Misleading at use clickbait tactics or sensationalist text or a Ads Misrepresentation Policy, including
As noted above, Google Ads enforces the Sensitive Events Policy which does not allow ads that potentially profit from or exploit a sensitive event with significant social, cultural, or political impact, such as civil emergencies, natural disasters, public health emergencies, terrorism and related activities, conflict, or mass acts of violence.	Due to the war in Ukraine, Google Ads enforced to pages containing content that is exploitative, dismorthis is in addition to the pausing of ads from and of February 2022.  Google Advertising continues to remain vigilant in Sensitive Events Policy, related to the war in Ukrain	nissive, or condones the invasion in March 2022. on Russian Federation state-funded media in a enforcing all relevant policies, including the
Enforces the Inappropriate Content Policy which does not allow ads or destinations that display shocking content or that promote hatred, intolerance, discrimination, or violence.	Due to the war in Ukraine, Google Ads focused on enforcing the Dangerous or Derogatory and Shocking Content sub-categories of the Inappropriate Content Policy. The Dangerous or Derogatory sub-category does not allow content that incites hatred against, promotes	

	Please refer to SLI 2.3.1 for more details on Google Ads Inappropriate Content Policy.
Enforces the Other Restricted Businesses Policy which restricts certain kinds of businesses from advertising with Google Ads to prevent users from being exploited, even if individual businesses appear to comply with other policies.	In order to protect users, Google Ads specifically focused on enforcing the Government Documents and Official Services Policy which disallows the promotion of documents and/or services that facilitate the acquisition, renewal, replacement or lookup of official documents or information that are available directly from a government or government delegated provider.  No applicable metrics to report at this time.
Enforces policies, such as the Misleading Representation Policy and the Dangerous or Derogatory Content Policy, on AdSense that aim to prohibit the monetisation of content that has misleading representation,	Google AdSense will continue to monitor and prevent monetisation of content that violates these policies.
unreliable and harmful claims, deceptive practices, manipulated media, or is deemed dangerous or derogatory.	No applicable metrics to report at this time.
Paused Google AdSense's monetisation of Russian Federation state-funded media.	Beginning in February 2022, Google AdSense prohibited the monetisation of any Russian Federation state-funded media (i.e. sites, apps, YouTube channels). It is important to note that Google's current Publisher Policies and advertiser-friendly guidelines already prohibited many forms of content related to the war in Ukraine from monetising. In addition, Google Advertising paused the monetisation of content that exploits, dismisses, or condones the invasion across services.
Paused the ability of Russian-based publishers to monetise with AdSense, AdMob, and Ad Manager.	No applicable metrics to report at this time.  In August 2024, due to ongoing developments in Russia, Google paused the ability of Russia-based publishers to monetise with AdSense, AdMob, and Ad Manager.

	No applicable metrics to report at this time.
Paused ads from and for Russian Federation state-funded media since February 2022.	Google also paused ads from and for Russian Federation <u>state-funded media</u> .
	No applicable metrics to report at this time.
Enforced the Coordinated Deceptive	Accounts found to be engaging in Coordinated Deceptive Practices are suspended immediately
Practices Policy which prohibits advertisers from promoting content related to public	and without prior warning.
concerns while misrepresenting or	Clickbait ads are disapproved upon detection. Repeated violations of this policy can lead to an
concealing their identity or country or origin.	account suspension.
	No applicable metrics to report at this time.
	Political Advertising
Google Advertising	
Google will stop serving political advertising in the EU before the EU's	N/A
Transparency and Targeting of Political	N/A
Advertising (TTPA) Regulation enters into	
force in October 2025. Additionally, paid	
political promotions, where they qualify as political ads under the TTPA, will no longer	
be permitted on YouTube in the EU.	
Integrity of Services	
Google Search	
Continued to enforce Spam and	See more details about Google Search's implementation of its Spam and Webmaster Policies in
Webmaster Policies.	the response to QRE 14.1.2.

	See overall spam metrics in SLI 14.2.1. Google Search is unable to provide spam metrics specific to this crisis event.
YouTube	
YouTube continues to enforce its  Community Guidelines, including but not limited to misinformation policies, which	See Commitment 14 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for information on how YouTube enforces its Community Guidelines.
establish what type of content and behaviour is not allowed on the platform.	<ul> <li>Since 24 February 2022, related to the ongoing war in Ukraine:         <ul> <li>YouTube has removed over 12,000 channels and over 160,000 videos related to the ongoing war in Ukraine for violating its content policies, including those pertaining to misinformation, hate speech, and graphic violence.</li> <li>YouTube has blocked over 1,000 channels and over 5.9 million videos related to the ongoing war in Ukraine.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
Google, on behalf of related services	
Continued to provide direct assistance to the Ukrainian government and critical infrastructure entities under the <u>Cyber</u> <u>Defense Assistance Collaborative</u> —	N/A
including compromise assessments, incident response services, shared cyber threat intelligence, and security transformation services — to help detect, mitigate and defend against cyber attacks.	N/A

Announced a new Online Safety and IFES and Google will partner to provide valuable online safety resources to high-risk users across Security Partnership with the International the world, including: Foundation of Electoral Systems (IFES) to • Security training: In collaboration with Google's Safety Engineering Centre, IFES will expand provide free security training and tools to its curriculum to address the evolving threat environment, account security best practices high-risk users. Google's new partnership and create content for specialised audiences. with IFES combines Google's account • Raising awareness on security tools across 30 countries: Google's tools and resources security tools, like the Advanced Protection for high-risk individuals will be shared to IFES's international networks, helping more people Program (APP), and IFES's history in use things like Advanced Protection Program (APP), Google's strongest form of account security for high-risk users, Google Titan Security Keys, Project Shield, a free tool to help supporting high risk users around the world like journalists, activists and elections protect sites from Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, and more. management bodies. • Industry thought leadership and case studies: IFES will highlight evolving trends and share insights to help Google contextualise how IFES's partners engage with its products, to keep improving. Google will also provide insights from its Threat Analysis Group (TAG) to help IFES further understand evolving trends from threat actors trying to undermine the democratic process. N/A Expanded eligibility for **Project Shield**, Project Shield allows Google to absorb or deflect the bad traffic in a DDoS attack and act as a Google's free protection against DDoS 'shield' for smaller websites run by independent media, human rights organisations, election attack, so that Ukrainian government monitoring groups, or in certain cases, government entities or embassies, allowing them to websites, embassies worldwide and other continue operating and defend against these attacks. governments in close proximity to the conflict can stay online, protect themselves N/A and continue to offer their crucial services. Google is actively monitoring activity in Eastern Europe with regard to the war in Ukraine. Google Added websites and domains identified as sends targeted Gmail and Workspace users government-backed attacker alerts notifying them threats to Safe Browsing to protect users from further exploitation. of the activity. Google encourages any potential targets to enable Google Account Level Enhanced Safe Browsing and ensure that all devices are updated. N/A

Automatically increased Google account Google increased account security protections on Workspace and the Advanced Protection security protections (including more Program — which delivers Google's highest level of security — is currently protecting the frequent authentication challenges) for accounts of hundreds of high-risk users in Ukraine. people in Ukraine and the surrounding region. N/A Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) Throughout 2025, Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) identified several campaigns as part of works to monitor malicious actors around their investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. the globe, disable their accounts, and remove the content that they posted, For additional examples of coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google including but not limited to coordinated platforms, see the Q1 2025 TAG Bulletin and Q2 2025 TAG Bulletin. information operations and other operations that may affect EU Member Please refer to the Q1 2025 TAG Bulletin and Q2 2025 TAG Bulletin for additional metrics on States, including related to the war in actions taken related to coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google Ukraine. TAG provides monthly updates platforms. about these operations in the TAG Bulletin and in periodic blog posts. **Empowering Users Google Search** Limited recommendations globally for a N/A number of Russian state-funded media outlets. Under the Elections Rapid Response System for the elections in Poland, Google removed 213 URLs that were delisted under the EU sanctions on Russian state media in H1 2025 (1 January **Enforced its Content Policies, including** 2025 to 30 June 2025). Misinformation Policies, which establish what types of content is not allowed on Google Search.

In efforts to help users find accurate and	'About This Image' enables users to check the credibility and context of an image or photo found
fact-checked information online, Google	online. This feature allows users to discover the image's history, how other websites are using the
Search deployed 'About This Image' to	image, and any metadata available. The tool is available in over 40 additional languages around
English language users globally in October	the world, including English, French, German, Hindi, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Portuguese,
2023, and was made available on <u>Circle to</u>	Spanish and Vietnamese. It is also available on <u>Circle to Search</u> and <u>Google Lens</u> , giving users
Search and Google Lens starting in July 2024.	more ways to quickly get context on images that they see wherever they come across them.
	Please refer to QRE 17.1.1 for more details on 'About This Image'.
Deploys features that enhance access to	Globally, Google has surfaced features on Search to provide quick access to high-quality
high-quality information on Search.	information, including highlighting news coverage from trusted sources and other helpful context about the invasion. See below for details on features in Ukraine.
	Search reports metrics on the 'About This Result' & the 'More About This Page' features in SLI 17.1.1.
Displays an 'SOS Alert' on Google Search in	Google Search features an 'SOS Alert' in Ukraine that provides refugees with information in
Ukraine and Eastern Europe and works with	English, Russian, and Ukrainian. This includes links to the United Nations High Commissioner for
expert organisations to source helpful	Refugees's (UNHCR) Ukraine Help pages and hotline, safety tips from the International
humanitarian information.	Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and a link to the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry's Foreign student emergency info hotline.
	Google Search also launched an 'SOS Alert' in Poland that provides refugees with information in
	English, Polish, and Ukrainian, including links to the 'I Help Ukrainians Hub' created by the
	Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland and the 'Information for Ukrainian citizens' page
	hosted by the Polish Office for Foreigners.
	See overall metrics in SLI 22.7.1.
Displayed content advisories when results	This notice is particularly important during the crisis, given how quickly new search terms are
for a query are rapidly evolving, providing a	developing. In such cases, it is helpful to alert users to the fact that a new search term or query is
	so new that high-quality information has not been published yet on the open web. Among other

message that lets users know the topic may still be developing.	languages, these notices are launched in Bosnian, Bulgarian, Czech, Croatian, Estonian, Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish, Romanian, Russian, Serbian, Slovak, Slovenian, Serbian, and Ukrainian.
	See SLI 17.1.1 for metrics on the impression proportion estimate of content advisories for rapidly changing results.
To help the increasing number of refugees in the region, Google developed ways for businesses to flag if they are providing services to refugees.	Hotel owners in countries neighbouring Ukraine can indicate on their Business Profile whether they are offering free or discounted accommodations for refugees. Local businesses can post to their Business Profile on Search and Maps to offer various services and aid to refugees from Ukraine.
	No applicable metrics to report at this time.
YouTube	
YouTube continues its 'Hit Pause' global media literacy campaign, to teach viewers critical skills and to improve users' experiences on YouTube.	See Commitment 17 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how YouTube's 'Hit Pause' campaign has been teaching viewers critical media literacy skills. These skills are important in all crisis situations, including the war in Ukraine.
	See Commitment 17 for metrics on these efforts.
YouTube continues to surface videos from high-quality sources in search results and recommendations.	See Commitments 17 and 18 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how YouTube surfaces videos from high-quality sources in search results and recommendations. These high-quality sources are important in all crisis situations, including the war in Ukraine.
	See Commitments 17 and 18 for metrics on these efforts.
YouTube continues to provide features to enhance access to high-quality information, including Information Panels, on YouTube.	See Commitments 17 and 18 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how YouTube enhances access to high-quality information, including information panels on topics prone to misinformation.

See Commitments 17 and 18 for metrics on these efforts.

## Google, on behalf of related services

Continued operation of a rapid Air Raid Alerts system for Android phones in Ukraine and expanded initiative to include Artillery Alerts. Access to high-quality information is critical for those on the ground and those seeking to flee danger in the region. In the early days of the invasion, Google <u>worked</u> closely with the Ukrainian government to set up a system that sends rapid Air Raid Alerts to Android mobile phones in at-risk areas, and to feature information on Search and Maps about shelter, humanitarian services, and aid points. In February 2023, Google expanded this initiative to also include Artillery Alerts.

No applicable metrics to report at this time.

## **Empowering the research community**

## **Google Search**

See more details about how Google Search provides access to researchers in the response to Commitment 26 and 28.

#### YouTube

YouTube provides publicly available data via Google Trends. YouTube also established the YouTube Researcher Program, which continues to provide scaled, expanded access to global video metadata via a Data API for verified and affiliated academic researchers.

See Commitments 26 and 28 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how YouTube provides publicly available data via Google Trends and provides eligible academic researchers access to global video metadata, which may include content about the ongoing war in Ukraine.

See Commitment 26 for metrics on these efforts.

## Google, on behalf of related services

Eligible EU researchers can apply for access to publicly available data across some of Google's products, including Search and YouTube, through the Google Researcher Program. This program aims to enhance the

See Commitments 26 and 28 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how Google, including YouTube, provides access to eligible researchers through the Google Researcher Program, which may include content about the ongoing war in Ukraine.

public's understanding of Google's services and their impact.

See Commitments 26 and 28 for metrics on these efforts.

Ukrainian founders Andriy Kusyy and Ksenia Iliuk created LetsData, which provides businesses and organisations with real-time threat detection and analysis to mitigate the intensified cybersecurity concerns surrounding disinformation as a result of the ongoing war in Ukraine. LetsData is one of 17 companies joining the second cohort of the Google for Startups Growth Academy: Al for Cybersecurity program.

The ongoing war in Ukraine has intensified the cybersecurity concerns surrounding disinformation. Ukrainian founders Andriy Kusyy and Ksenia Iliuk created <a href="LetsData">LetsData</a>, which provides businesses and organisations with real-time threat detection and analysis to mitigate this challenge. LetsData offers Al radar against disinformation. It provides real-time media and social media monitoring in more than 50 countries, empowering state agencies, businesses and civil societies to proactively navigate risks and seize opportunities in the face of disinformation.

Since launching, their Al-powered solution has experienced rapid growth, establishing operations in the U.S. while continuing to anchor their technology and product development in Europe.

Now, they are one of <u>17 companies</u> joining the second cohort of the <u>Google for Startups Growth</u> <u>Academy: Al for Cybersecurity program</u>. This group of startups, from nine countries across Europe and North America, will get access to Google's tools, partners and practices to help them continue to scale — and ultimately make the world a safer place.

See Commitment 28 for metrics on these efforts.

In June 2025, Google <u>announced</u> the final recipients of the <u>Google for Startups</u> <u>Ukraine Support Fund</u>, a \$10 million fund providing additional equity-free cash awards along with Google support, mentorship and product expertise to Ukrainian-founded tech companies.

In March 2022, Google launched the <u>Google for Startups Ukraine Support Fund</u>, which began with an initial \$5 million in 2022 and expanded with a new \$10 million fund for 2024. This fund provides crucial equity-free cash awards and dedicated Google support to help founders sustain and grow their businesses, strengthen their community and lay a vital foundation for post-war economic recovery.

In June 2025, Google <u>announced</u> the final 35 recipients of the program. These 35 ambitious companies are making incredible technological advancements in critical areas from medical research to AI. Each selected startup receives up to \$100,000 in non-dilutive funding, ongoing Google mentorship, product support and up to \$350,000 in Google Cloud credits. Google's goal is to provide them with unique expertise, connections and resources to adapt and expand despite the ongoing war. We're confident these entrepreneurs and all the others supported by

	this fund will drive their country's economic recovery and lead the next generation of global tech leaders.  Google for Startups has now supported a total of 98 companies with equity-free funding and hands-on mentorship. Google will continue to provide each recipient with mentoring sessions and product support.		
	IN/A		
	Empowering the fact-checking community		
Google Search			
N/A	N/A		
	N/A		
YouTube			
N/A	N/A		
	N/A		
Google, on behalf of related services			
N/A	N/A		
	N/A		

# Reporting on the service's response during a crisis

## Israel-Gaza conflict

#### Overview

Following the Israel-Gaza conflict, Google has <u>actively worked</u> to support humanitarian and relief efforts, ensure platforms and partnerships are responsive to the current crisis, and counter the threat of disinformation. Google identified a few areas of focus for addressing the ongoing crisis:

- Humanitarian and relief efforts:
- Platforms and partnerships to protect our services from coordinated influence operations, hate speech, and graphic and terrorist content.

#### **Humanitarian and relief efforts**

Google.org has provided more than \$18 million to nonprofits providing relief to civilians affected in Israel and Gaza. This includes more than \$11 million raised globally by Google employees with company match and \$1 million in donated Search Ads to nonprofits so they can better connect with people in need and provide information to those looking to help. We also provided \$6 million in Google.org grant funding, including \$3 million provided to Natal, an apolitical nonprofit organisation focused on psychological treatment of victims of trauma. The remaining funds were provided to organisations focussed on humanitarian aid and relief Gaza, including \$1 million to Save the Children, \$1 million to Palestinian Red Crescent, \$1 million to International Medical Corps.

Specifically, Google's humanitarian and relief efforts with these organisations include:

- Natal Israel Trauma and Resiliency Centre: In the early days of the war, calls to Natal's support hotline went from around 300 a day to 8,000 a day. With our funding, they were able to scale their support to patients by 450%, including multidisciplinary treatment and mental & psychosocial support to direct and indirect victims of trauma due to terror and war in Israel.
- As of mid-April, the International Medical Corps has provided care to more than 433,000 civilians, delivered more than 5,400 babies, performed more than 11,800 surgeries and supplied safe drinking water to more than 302,000 people. We continue to care for some 800 patients per day, responding to mass-casualty events and performing an average of 15 surgeries per day.

## Platforms and partnerships

As the conflict continues, Google is <u>committed</u> to tackling disinformation, hate speech, graphic content and terrorist content by continuing to find ways to provide support through its products. For example, Google has deployed language capabilities to support emergency efforts

including emergency translations, and localising Google content to help users, businesses and nonprofit organisations. Google has also pledged to help its partners in these extraordinary circumstances. For example, when schools closed in October 2023, the Ministry of Education in Israel used Meet as their core teach-from-home platform and Google provided support. Google has been in touch with Gaza-based partners and participants in its Palestine Launchpad program, its digital skills and entrepreneurship program for Palestinians, to try to support those who have been significantly impacted by this crisis.

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].

Policies and Terms and Conditions			
Google Advertising			
Enforcement of existing policies	Google Ads continued to enforce all Google Ads policies during the Israel-Gaza conflict.	No changes to Ads policies or to Terms and Conditions were made as a result of the Israel-Gaza conflict. Google Ads continues to enforce all Google Ads policies, including the ones mentioned in this report.	
Google Search	Google Search		
Enhanced enforcement of existing policies	While Google Search relied on existing policies to address the information challenges posed by the Hamas attacks and Israel's response, Google Search gave special priority to reports of issues related to the crisis in recognition of the importance and urgency of the risks to human life.	No changes to Search policies and to Terms and Conditions were made as a result of the Israel-Gaza conflict. Google Search continues to enforce all Google Search policies, including the ones mentioned in this report.	
YouTube			
Enforcement of existing policies, including YouTube's <u>Hate Speech Policy</u>	YouTube's <u>Hate Speech Policy</u> prohibits content denying, trivialising, or minimising violent historical events, including the 7 October Hamas attacks in Israel. YouTube relies on a variety of	No changes to YouTube Community Guidelines and to Terms and Conditions were made as a result of the Israel-Gaza conflict.	

	factors to determine whether a major violent event is covered, using guidance from outside experts and governing bodies to inform its approach.	YouTube continues to enforce all policies, including the ones mentioned in this report.
Google, on behalf of related services		
N/A	N/A	N/A
	Scrutiny of Ads Placements	
Google Advertising		
Google AdSense enforces the <u>Dangerous</u> or <u>Derogatory Content Policy</u> which does not allow monetisation of content that incites hatred against, promotes discrimination of, or disparages an individual or group of people on the basis of their race or ethnic origin, religion, or nationality.		
Implementation of a <u>Sensitive Event</u>	No applicable metrics to report at this time.  Since 7 October 2023, Google Ads has taken several measures across its platforms in response to the Israel-Gaza conflict, including implementing a sensitive event to help prevent exploitative ads around this conflict. Google's mission to elevate high-quality information and enhance information quality across its services is of utmost importance and Google Ads has and will continue to rigorously enforce its policies.	

	Google Ads often institutes sensitive events following natural disasters or other tragic events.  When a sensitive event is declared, Google Ads does not allow ads that exploit or capitalise on these tragedies.
	Google does not allow ads that potentially profit from or exploit a sensitive event with significant social, cultural, or political impact, such as civil emergencies, natural disasters, public health emergencies, terrorism and related activities, conflict, or mass acts of violence. Google does not allow ads that claim victims of a sensitive event were responsible for their own tragedy or similar instances of victim blaming; ads that claim victims of a sensitive event are not deserving of remedy or support.
	See SLI 2.3.1 for metrics on this policy.
Within the Inappropriate Content Policy, Google Advertising does not allow Shocking Content.	Google does not allow promotions containing violent language, gruesome or disgusting imagery, or graphic images or accounts of physical trauma.
	Google does not allow promotions containing gratuitous portrayals of bodily fluids or waste.
	Google does not allow promotions containing obscene or profane language.
	Google does not allow promotions that are likely to shock or scare.
	See SLI 2.3.1 for metrics on this policy.
Google Advertising enforces the Misrepresentation Policy, which includes Clickbait ads.	Google does not allow ads that use clickbait tactics or sensationalist text or imagery to drive traffic. Google also does not allow ads that use negative life events such as death, accidents, illness, arrests or bankruptcy to induce fear, guilt or other strong negative emotions to pressure the viewer to take immediate action.
	See SLI 2.3.1 for metrics on this policy.

No changes to the enforcement of Ads	To ensure a safe and positive experience for users, Google requires that advertisers comply with
Policies as a result of the Israel-Gaza	all <u>applicable laws and regulations</u> in addition to the <u>Google Ads policies</u> . Ads, assets,
conflict.	destinations, and other content that violate these policies can be blocked on the Google Ads
	platform and associated networks. Google Ads policy violations can lead to ad or asset
	disapproval, or account suspension.
	No applicable metrics to report at this time.
Teams across the company are dedicating	Google Advertising invests heavily in the enforcement of its policies. Google Advertising has a
resources as part of an urgent escalations workforce to respond to the Israel-Gaza	team of thousands working around the clock to create and enforce its policies at scale.
conflict and take quick measures as needed.	No applicable metrics to report at this time.
	Political Advertising
Google Advertising	
Google will stop serving political advertising	N/A
in the EU before the EU's Transparency and	
Targeting of Political Advertising (TTPA)	N/A
Regulation enters into force in October	
2025. Additionally, paid political promotions,	
where they qualify as political ads under the	
TTPA, will no longer be permitted on	
YouTube in the EU.	
	Integrity of Services
Google Search	

Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) is closely monitoring relevant activity concerning the ongoing conflict in Israel and Gaza, focusing on the safety and security of users and the platforms that help them access and share important information.

See Commitment 16 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) and Trust & Safety Teams work to monitor malicious actors around the globe, disable their accounts, and remove the content that they post, including but not limited to coordinated information operations and other operations that may affect EEA Member States.

See Commitment 16 for metrics on these efforts.

#### YouTube

YouTube's teams have been working quickly to remove content that violates its policies including those pertaining to hate speech, violent extremism, violent or graphic content, harassment, and misinformation. These policies apply to all forms of content, including videos, livestreams and comments, and YouTube's policies are enforced across languages and locales.

- Per YouTube's <u>Hate Speech Policy</u>, content that promotes violence or hatred against groups based on their ethnicity, nationality, race or religion is not allowed on YouTube. This includes Jewish, Muslim, and other religious or ethnic communities.
- Per YouTube's <u>Violent Extremist Policy</u>, content that praises, promotes or in any way aids
  violent criminal organisations is prohibited. Additionally, content produced by designated
  terrorist organisations, such as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (U.S.), or organisation
  identified by the United Nations, is not allowed on YouTube. This includes content
  produced by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).
  - In addition, YouTube has a dedicated button underneath every video on YouTube to flag content with the option to mark it as 'promotes terrorism.'
- Per YouTube's <u>Violent or Graphic Content Policies</u>, YouTube prohibits violent or gory
  content intended to shock or disgust viewers. Additionally, content encouraging others to
  commit violent acts against individuals or a defined group of people, including the
  Jewish, Muslim and other religious communities, is not allowed on YouTube.
- Per YouTube's <u>Harassment Policies</u>, content that promotes harmful conspiracy theories or targets individuals based on their protected group status is not allowed on YouTube.
   Additionally, content that realistically simulates deceased minors or victims of deadly or well-documented major violent events describing their death or violence experienced, is not allowed on YouTube.
- Per YouTube's <u>Misinformation Policies</u>, content containing certain types of misinformation that can cause real-world harm, including certain types of misattributed content, is not allowed on YouTube.

As of 30 June 2025, following the terrorist attack by Hamas in Israel and the escalated conflict now underway in Israel and Gaza, YouTube has globally:

- Removed over 140,000 videos;
- Terminated over 6.000 channels: and
- Removed over 500 million comments.

## Google, on behalf of related services

Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) works to monitor malicious actors around the globe, disable their accounts, and remove the content that they posted, including but not limited to coordinated information operations and other operations that may affect EU Member States, including related to the Israel-Gaza conflict. TAG provides monthly updates about these operations in the TAG Bulletin and in periodic blog posts.

Throughout 2025, Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) has identified several campaigns as part of their investigation into coordinated influence operations related to the Israel-Gaza conflict. For example, in October 2024, TAG identified a campaign that was sharing content in Arabic, English, French and Spanish about various topics including the Israel-Gaza conflict.

For additional examples of coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google platforms, see the Q1 2025 TAG Bulletin and Q2 2025 TAG Bulletin.

Please refer to the <u>Q1 2025 TAG Bulletin</u> and <u>Q2 2025 TAG Bulletin</u> for additional metrics on actions taken related to coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google platforms.

## **Empowering Users**

## **Google Search**

In 2025, Search will continue efforts to help people make informed decisions, and surface high-quality and high-quality information to users. See Commitments 17-25 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report.

See Commitments 17-25 for metrics on these efforts.

#### YouTube

YouTube is continuing to actively surface YouTube's recommendation system is prominently surfacing news from high-quality sources on the homepage, in search results and the 'Up Next' panel. YouTube's systems do this across every high-quality news content in search results for queries about Israel and Gaza, including country where YouTube operates. through its breaking news and top news YouTube's Top News and Breaking News shelves are surfacing at the top of search results related shelves. to the attacks in Israel and on the homepage, prominently featuring content from high-quality news sources. See Commitments 17 and 18 for metrics on these efforts. Google, on behalf of related services N/A N/A N/A **Empowering the research community Google Search** Google established the Google Research See Commitments 26 and 28 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how Program in August 2023, which provides Google Search provides publicly available data via Google Trends, and provides eligible academic eligible EU researchers to apply for access researchers access to global video metadata, which may be applied to the ongoing conflict in to publicly available data across some of Israel and Gaza. Google's products, including Search and YouTube. See Commitments 26 and 28 for metrics on these efforts. YouTube YouTube provides publicly available data via See Commitments 26 and 28 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how YouTube provides publicly available data via Google Trends, and provides eligible academic Google Trends. YouTube also established researchers access to global video metadata, which may be applied to the ongoing conflict in the YouTube Researcher Program, which continues to provide scaled, expanded Israel and Gaza. access to global video metadata via a Data API for verified and affiliated academic See Commitment 26 for metrics on these efforts.

researchers.

Google, on behalf of related services	
As of 28 August 2023, eligible EU researchers can apply for access to publicly available data across some of Google's products, including Search and YouTube, through the Google Researcher Program. This program aims to enhance the public's understanding of Google's services and their impact.	See Commitments 26 and 28 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how Google, including YouTube, provides access to eligible researchers through the Google Researcher Program, which may include content about the ongoing conflict in Israel and Gaza.  See Commitments 26 and 28 for metrics on these efforts.
Empowering the fact-checking community	
Google Search	
N/A	N/A N/A
YouTube	
N/A	N/A N/A
Google, on behalf of related services	
N/A	N/A

N/A

# Reporting on the service's response during an election

# Reporting on the service's response during an election

## Elections in the EU

#### Overview

In elections and other democratic processes, people want access to high-quality information and a broad range of perspectives. High-quality information helps people make informed decisions when voting and counteracts abuse by bad actors. Consistent with its broader approach to elections around the world, during the various elections across the EU in H1 2025 (1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025), Google was committed to supporting these democratic processes by surfacing high-quality information to voters, safeguarding its platforms from abuse and equipping campaigns with best-in-class security tools and training – with a strong focus on helping people navigate Al-generated content.

Across Google, various teams support democratic processes by connecting people to election information like practical tips on how to register to vote or providing high-quality information about candidates. In 2025, a number of key elections took place around the world and across the EU in particular. In H1 2025, voters cast their votes in Germany, Poland, Portugal and Romania. Google was committed to supporting these democratic processes by surfacing high-quality information to voters, safeguarding its platforms from abuse and equipping campaigns with the best-in-class security tools and training. Across its efforts, Google also has an increased focus on the role of artificial intelligence (AI) and the part it can play in the disinformation landscape — while also leveraging AI models to augment Google's abuse-fighting efforts.

## Safeguarding Google platforms and disrupting the spread of disinformation

To better secure its products and prevent abuse, Google continues to enhance its enforcement systems and to invest in Trust & Safety operations — including at its <u>Google Safety Engineering Centre (GSEC)</u> for Content Responsibility in Dublin, dedicated to online safety in Europe and around the world. Google also continues to partner with the wider ecosystem to combat disinformation.

- Enforcing Google policies and using AI models to fight abuse at scale: Google has long-standing policies that inform how it approaches areas like manipulated media, hate and harassment, and incitement to violence along with policies around demonstrably false claims that could undermine democratic processes, for example in YouTube's Community Guidelines. To help enforce Google policies, Google's AI models are enhancing its abuse-fighting efforts. With recent advances in Google's Large Language Models (LLMs), Google is building faster and more adaptable enforcement systems that enable us to remain nimble and take action even more quickly when new threats emerge.
- Working with the wider ecosystem: Since Google's inaugural commitment of €25 million to help launch the European Media & Information Fund, an effort designed to strengthen media literacy and information quality across Europe, 121 projects have been funded across 28 countries so far.

## Helping people navigate Al-generated content

Like any emerging technology, Al presents new opportunities as well as challenges. For example, generative Al makes it easier than ever to create new content, but it can also raise questions about trustworthiness of information. Google put in place a number of policies and other measures that have helped people navigate content that was Al-generated. Overall, harmful altered or synthetic political content did not appear to be widespread on Google's platforms. Measures that helped mitigate that risk include:

- Ads disclosures: Google expanded its <u>Political Content Policies</u> to require advertisers to disclose when their election ads include synthetic content that inauthentically depicts real or realistic-looking people or events. Google's <u>ads policies</u> already prohibit the use of manipulated media to mislead people, like deep fakes or doctored content.
- Content labels on YouTube: YouTube's <u>Misinformation Policies</u> prohibit technically manipulated content that misleads users and could pose a serious risk of egregious harm and YouTube <u>requires creators to disclose</u> when they have created realistic altered or synthetic content, and will display a label that indicates for people when the content they are watching is synthetic. For sensitive content, including election related content, that contains realistic altered or synthetic material, the label appears on the video itself and in the video description.
- Provide users with additional context: 'About This Image' in Search helps people assess the credibility and context of images found online.
- Industry collaboration: Google is a member of the <u>Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA) and standard</u>, a cross-industry effort to help provide more transparency and context for people on Al-generated content.

## Informing voters surfacing high-quality information

In the build-up to elections, people need useful, relevant and timely information to help them navigate the electoral process. Here are some of the ways Google makes it easy for people to find what they need, and which were deployed during elections that took place across the EU in 2025:

- High-quality Information on YouTube: For news and information related to elections, YouTube's systems prominently surface
  high-quality content, on the YouTube homepage, in search results and the 'Up Next' panel. YouTube also displays information panels at
  the top of search results and below videos to provide additional context. For example, YouTube may surface various election
  information panels above search results or on videos related to election candidates, parties or voting.
- Ongoing transparency on Election Ads: All advertisers who wish to run election ads in the EU on Google's platforms are required to go through a verification process and have an in-ad disclosure that clearly shows who paid for the ad. These ads are published in Google's Political Ads Transparency Report, where anyone can look up information such as how much was spent and where it was shown. Google also limits how advertisers can target election ads. Google will stop serving political advertising in the EU before the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising (TTPA) Regulation enters into force in October 2025.

## Equipping campaigns and candidates with best-in-class security features and training

As elections come with increased cybersecurity risks, Google works hard to help high-risk users, such as campaigns and election officials, civil society and news sources, improve their security in light of existing and emerging threats, and to educate them on how to use Google's products and services.

- Security tools for campaign and election teams: Google offers free services like its <u>Advanced Protection Program</u> Google's strongest set of cyber protections and <u>Project Shield</u>, which provides unlimited protection against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. Google also partners with <u>Possible</u>, <u>The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)</u> and <u>Deutschland sicher im Netz (DSIN)</u> to scale account security training and to provide security tools including <u>Titan Security Keys</u>, which defend against phishing attacks and prevent bad actors from accessing users' Google Accounts.
- Tackling coordinated influence operations: Google's Threat Intelligence Group helps identify, monitor and tackle emerging threats, ranging from coordinated influence operations to cyber espionage campaigns against high-risk entities. Google reports on actions taken in its quarterly bulletin, and meets regularly with government officials and others in the industry to share threat information and suspected election interference. Mandiant also helps organisations build holistic election security programs and harden their defences with comprehensive solutions, services and tools, including proactive exposure management, proactive intelligence threat hunts, cyber crisis communication services and threat intelligence tracking of information operations. A recent publication from the team gives an overview of the global election cybersecurity landscape, designed to help election organisations tackle a range of potential threats.

Google is committed to working with government, industry and civil society to protect the integrity of elections in the European Union — building on its commitments made in the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation.

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].

Policies and Terms and Conditions			
Google Advertising			
Please see the 'Scrutiny of Ads Placement' section below.	Please see the 'Scrutiny of Ads Placement' section below.	Please see the 'Scrutiny of Ads Placement' section below.	
Google Search			

N/A	N/A	N/A
YouTube		
N/A	N/A	N/A
Google, on behalf of related services		
N/A	N/A	N/A
	Scrutiny of Ads Placements	
Google Advertising		
Political Content Policy  Google will stop serving political advertising in the EU before the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising (TTPA) Regulation enters into force in October 2025.	In 2019, Google launched the EU Election Ads Policy, which requires advertisers wishing to run EU Election Ads in the EU to complete a two-step verification process.  Once an advertiser has completed EU Election Ads verification, all their EU Election Ads must contain a disclosure that identifies who paid for the ad. For most ad formats, Google will automatically generate a 'Paid for by' disclosure, using the information provided during the verification process.  All EU Election Ads run by verified EU election advertisers in the EU are also subject to targeting restrictions, whereby only the following criteria may be used to target election ads:  • Geographic location (except radius around a location); • Age, gender; • Contextual targeting options such as: ad placements, topics, keywords against sites, apps, pages and videos.  All other types of targeting are not allowed for use in election ads.	
	To provide transparency for users, Google publis and a political ads library. Only ads that are in scool by verified election advertisers, will be included in Election Ads run by a verified EU election advertisers. US Election Ads run by a verified EU election included.	ope of the Election Ads Policy, and that are run n the report at this time. For example, EU iser that serve in the EU will be included in the

In July 2024, Google updated the Disclosure requirements for synthetic content under the Political Content Policy, requiring advertisers to disclose election ads that contain synthetic or digitally altered content that inauthentically depicts real or realistic-looking people or events by selecting the checkbox in the 'Altered or synthetic content' section in their campaign settings. Google will generate an in-ad disclosure based on that checkbox, for certain types of formats. This is because Google believes that users should have information to make informed decisions when viewing election ads that contain synthetic content that has been digitally altered or generated. Accordingly, verified election advertisers in regions where verification is required, must prominently disclose when their ads contain synthetic content that inauthentically depicts real or realistic-looking people or events. This disclosure must be clear and conspicuous and must be placed in a location where it is likely to be noticed by users. This policy applies to image, video and audio content. In June 2024, Google updated the policy for EU Election Ads to include restrictions in Italy that 'Advertisers must comply with applicable local electoral laws, including pausing ads as required during periods defined by law as silence periods. Google does not allow EU Election Ads, as defined by Ads' policies, to serve in Italy during a silence period.' This is because Google supports responsible political advertising, and has consistently expected all political ads and destinations to comply with local legal requirements. This includes campaign and election laws and election 'silence periods' for any geographic areas they target. Google requires all advertisers to fully comply with applicable laws and regulations, including local electoral laws. Advertisers are expected to familiarise themselves with the local law and regulations for any location their ads target. No applicable metrics to report at this time. Misrepresentation Policy AdSense policies that disrupt the monetisation incentives of malicious and misrepresentative actors related to politics in the AdSense ecosystem that publishers must adhere to include Manipulated Media and Deceptive Practices.

Google Ads provides a way for advertisers and businesses to reach new customers as they search on Google for words related to an advertiser's business, or browse websites with related themes. However, Google Ads enforces policies that do not allow ads or destinations related to politics that display Inappropriate Content or Misrepresentation. Policies that prohibit political ads and destinations that display Inappropriate Content include the Sensitive Event Policy and Hacked Political Materials Policy. Policies that prohibit political ads and destinations that display Misrepresentation include the Coordinated Deceptive Practices and Manipulated Media Policy.

In March 2024, Google Advertising <u>updated</u> the <u>Unacceptable business practices</u> portion of the <u>Misrepresentation Policy</u> to include enticing users to part with money or information by impersonating or falsely implying affiliation with or endorsement by a public figure, brand, or organisation. Google Advertising began enforcing this policy in March 2024 for advertisers outside of France. For advertisers in France, Google Advertising began enforcing this policy in April 2024. The reason for this was that toward the end of 2023 and into 2024, Google Advertising faced a targeted campaign of ads featuring the likeness of public figures to scam users, often through the use of deep fakes. When Google Advertising detected this threat, it created a dedicated team to respond immediately. It also pinpointed patterns in the bad actors' behaviour, trained its automated enforcement models to detect similar ads and began removing them at scale. Google Advertising also <u>updated its Misrepresentation Policy</u> to better enable it to rapidly suspend the accounts of bad actors.

Please refer to SLI 2.3.1 for metrics related to these policies.

Political Advertising	
Google Advertising	
Google will stop serving political advertising	N/A
in the EU before the EU's Transparency and	
Targeting of Political Advertising (TTPA)	N/A
Regulation enters into force in October 2025.	
Additionally, paid political promotions, where	
they qualify as political ads under the TTPA,	

will no longer be permitted on YouTube in the EU.			
	Integrity of Services		
Google Search	Google Search		
Search works quickly to remove content that violates its policies. Search policies are enforced globally.	See Commitment 14-15 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how Search's policies are enforced globally, including during elections in the EU.		
	See Commitment 14-15 for metrics on these efforts.		
Google Search has published guidance on Al-generated content. This guidance explains how Al and automation can be a useful tool to create helpful content.	See Commitment 15 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how Search will approach responsible AI innovation, which may be applied to future elections.		
	See Commitment 15 for more details on these efforts.		
YouTube			
YouTube works quickly to remove content that violates its policies. These policies apply to all forms of content, including videos, livestreams and comments, and YouTube's policies are enforced across languages and locales.	YouTube continues to assess, evaluate, and update its policies on a regular basis, the latest updates policies, including Community Guidelines, can be found <a href="https://example.com/here/">here</a> .		
	See Commitment 14 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for more details on this effort.		
YouTube creators are <u>required</u> to disclose when they upload a video that contains realistic altered or synthetic content, after which YouTube adds a transparency label so that viewers have this important context.	See Commitment 15 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how YouTube approaches responsible Al innovation, which were applied to elections, like the Germany, Poland, Portugal, and Romania Elections that were held in 2025.		
	See Commitment 17 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for more details on this effort.		

Google, on behalf of related services	
Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) will monitor activity in the EU and around the world, focusing on the safety and security of users and the platforms that help them access and share important information.	See Commitment 16 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) monitors activity in the EU and around the world.  See Commitment 16 for metrics on these efforts, as well as the Q1 2025 TAG Bulletin and Q2 2025 TAG Bulletin.
Google helped develop the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation Rapid Response System (RRS) to streamline the exchange of information between civil society organisations, fact-checkers and online	The EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation Rapid Response System (RRS) is a collaborative initiative involving both non-platform and platform Signatories of the Code of Conduct to ensure rapid and effective cooperation and communication between them ahead and during the election period.
platforms.	The RRS allows non-platform Signatories to swiftly report time-sensitive content, accounts, or trends that they deemed to present threats to the integrity of the electoral process and discuss them with the platforms in light of their respective policies. The RRS also provides an opportunity for platform Signatories to provide feedback - such as on broader trends - to the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation Permanent Task-force Working Group with Member State authorities, independent experts and civil society organisations.
	See Commitment 16 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for more details on this effort.
In an effort to equip election campaigns and candidates with best-in-class security features and training, Google's <u>Project Shield</u> provides free and unlimited protection against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)	Project Shield allows Google to absorb or deflect the bad traffic in a DDoS attack and act as a 'shield' for smaller websites run by independent media, human rights organisations, election monitoring groups, or in certain cases, government entities or embassies, allowing them to continue operating and defend against these attacks.
attacks - a method of censorship and intimidation.	N/A
Empowering Users	

Google Search		
In 2025, Search will continue efforts to help people make informed decisions, and surface high-quality information to voters.	See Commitments 17-25 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report.  See Commitments 17-25 for metrics on these efforts.	
Users often see a Knowledge Panel on the Search Results page for searches about people and organisations—a box with an overview of key information (e.g. candidates and parties) to help them go deeper. See here for more information.	Search is committed to providing timely and high-quality information on Google Search to help voters understand, navigate, and participate in democratic processes. Through its products, Google Search hopes to connect users with the civic information that they need. Find more information <a href="https://example.com/here">here</a> .  Google Search will continue to explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.	
YouTube		
YouTube's systems prioritise connecting viewers with high-quality information, including on events such as elections in the EU.	YouTube's recommendation system prominently surfaces news from high-quality sources on the homepage, in search results and the 'Up Next' panel. YouTube's systems do this across every country where YouTube operates.  YouTube's Top News and Breaking News shelves surface at the top of search results, prominently featuring content from high-quality news sources, which may include information about EU elections.  See Commitments 17 and 18 for metrics on these efforts.	
Election information panels may appear alongside search results and below relevant videos to provide more context and to help people make more informed decisions about election related content they are viewing.	Information panels may appear alongside search results and below relevant videos to provide more context and to help people make more informed decisions about the content they are viewing. During election periods, text-based information panels about a candidate, how to vote, and election results may also be displayed to users.	

See Commitment 17 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for more details on this effort. Google on behalf of related services Leading up to and during key elections in the In advance of the 2025 elections in the EU, Google launched features to help users prepare for EU, Google Search deployed 'How to Vote', the election and access high-quality election information. 'How to Register', and Election Results features to help users prepare for the In Germany, for example, to prepare for the federal election: election and access high-quality election Google partnered with the Federal Returning Officer to ensure high-quality information information. on how to vote and election results are available on Google Search's German site, both on desktop and mobile, to help increase voter awareness and democratic participation. No applicable metrics to report at this time. Google partnered with ThinkYoung, a Belgian With the voting age lowered to 16+ in some European countries, more young people can participate in the democratic process. To support them, Google.org has awarded a \$1 million think tank, to empower young voters to combat disinformation and develop grant to ThinkYoung, a Belgian think tank looking for innovative solutions to fight election disinformation and reduce barriers to voting using tech. The grant funded youth-led solutions with a focus on underserved hackathons across Europe, empowering young voters to focus on information quality and communities. develop solutions with a focus on underserved communities. This initiative builds on Google.org's long standing commitment to youth media literacy and online safety, having supported 60+ organisations in this space since 2018. ThinkYoung launched a call for applications for a chance to test and develop solutions alongside its partners and experts. By the end of this initiative, €300,000 will have been shared in cash and prizes to the winning teams. In June 2025, with Google's support, two winners were awarded €10,000 at the Palermo Hackathon and another two were awarded €10,000 at the Hamburg Hackathon.

In late 2020, Google launched an online news experience called <u>Google News</u>
<u>Showcase</u>, and is available in most EU

Member States. Most recently, in H1 2025 (1

January 2025 to 30 June 2025), the News
Showcase <u>launched</u> in Croatia.

The <u>Google News Showcase</u> helps participating publishers share their expertise and editorial voice through an enhanced storytelling experience, and is also a global content licensing program, meaning Google pays participating publishers to curate quality journalism for an improved online news experience that benefits readers and publishers. Through this experience, publishers, including award-winning newsrooms, can give readers more insight on local, national, and international news to help them understand the stories that matter, such as news related to local and national elections.

This platform has launched in select countries/regions, with more to follow soon. To date, the Google News Showcase has been launched in 21 of the 27 EU Member States.

## **Empowering the Research Community**

## **Google Search**

Search provides publicly available data via Google Trends.

See Commitments 26 and 28 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how Search provides publicly available data via Google Trends.

Please refer to SLI 26.1.1 for metrics on these efforts.

#### YouTube

YouTube provides publicly available data via Google Trends. YouTube also established the YouTube Researcher Program, which continues to provide scaled, expanded access to global video metadata via a Data API for verified and affiliated academic researchers.

See Commitments 26 and 28 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how YouTube provides publicly available data via Google Trends, and provides eligible academic researchers access to global video metadata, which may be applied to EU elections in 2025.

See Commitment 26 for metrics on these efforts.

## Google on behalf of related services

As of 28 August 2023, eligible EU researchers	See Commitments 26 and 28 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on
can apply for access to publicly available	how Google, including YouTube, provides access to eligible researchers through the Google
data across some of Google's products,	Researcher Program, which may include content about the EU elections in 2025.
including Search and YouTube, through the	
Google Researcher Program. This program	See Commitments 26 and 28 for metrics on these efforts.
aims to enhance the public's understanding	
of Google's services and their impact.	
Google regularly undertakes stakeholder	Google's consultations with civil society organisations, academics and other relevant subject
engagement to discuss Google's election	matter experts serve to both inform and share its resources and technologies. The Google
preparedness.	Safety Engineering Centre in Dublin alone has held approximately 100 public and private
	engagements in the past two years to share Google's experience of managing content risk and
	hear from experts across a wide range of topics related to election integrity. Google also
	offered training to political parties on how to efficiently use Google platforms ahead of
	elections and secured direct communication channels with all these parties and key candidates.
	Google will continue to explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.
	Empowering the Fact-Checking Community
Google Search	
N/A	N/A
	N/A
YouTube	
N/A	N/A
	N/A
Google on behalf of related services	
N/A	N/A
	N/A