Code of Conduct on Disinformation – Report of Meta for the period 01 January to 30 June 2025

Executive summary

We are pleased to share our sixth report under the 2022 EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation, which also draws from our work with the Code's Taskforce. In accordance with the subscription form submitted by Meta Platforms Ireland Limited (Meta) in January 2025, this report is being submitted by Meta in respect of the Facebook, Messenger, and Instagram services and on behalf of WhatsApp Ireland Limited in respect of the WhatsApp messaging service.

The aim of this report is to provide an update on how Meta approached misinformation and disinformation in the European Union between January and June 2025. We have additionally included any pertinent updates which occurred after the reporting period, where relevant in the report. Highlights include:

- **Elections:** The National Elections chapter provides an overview of our work on elections within the EU, detailing our core policies, processes, and implementation strategies. It outlines our comprehensive approach to elections, which continued for European elections held in the first half of 2025. The election responses covered in this report include the parliamentary elections in Germany, the presidential and presidential runoff elections in Romania, the parliamentary elections in Portugal, and the presidential elections in Poland.

- **Expanding GenAI Transparency for Meta's Ads Products**: We began gradually rolling out "AI Info" labels on ad creative videos using a risk-based framework. When a video is created or significantly edited with our generative AI creative features in our advertiser marketing tools, a label will appear in the three-dot menu or next to the "Sponsored" label. We plan to share more information on our approach to labeling ad images made or edited with non-Meta generative AI tools. We will continue to evolve our approach to labeling AI-generated content in partnership with experts, advertisers, policy stakeholders and industry partners as people's expectations and the technology change.

- **Media literacy**: Meta published its first Media Literacy Annual Plan on 21 July 2025, which set out its current approach to media literacy and the products and features we make available to users of Facebook and Instagram. It also provided details on specific media literacy initiatives run by Meta, including its work on digital citizenship, its media literacy lessons in Get Digital, We Think Digital and Soy Digital, and its election literacy programs.

- **Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour trends:** We are sharing insights into a covert influence operation that we disrupted in Romania at the beginning of 2025. We detected and removed this campaign before it was able to build authentic audiences on our apps.

Here are a few of the figures which can be found throughout the report:

- From 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025, we removed over 5 million ads from Facebook and Instagram in EU Member States, of which over 83,000 ads were removed from Facebook and Instagram for violating our misinformation policy.

- From 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025, we labelled over 1.2 million ads on both Facebook and Instagram with "paid for by" disclaimers in the EU.

- We removed 1 network for violating our Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) policy which targeted one or more European countries (effectively or potentially). We also took steps to remove fake accounts, prioritising the removal of fake accounts that seek to cause harm. In Q1 2025, we took action against 1 billion fake accounts and in Q2 2025, we took action against 687 million fake accounts on Facebook globally. We estimate that fake accounts represented approximately 3% of our worldwide monthly active users (MAU) on Facebook during Q1 2025 and 4% during Q2 2025.

This report addresses the practices implemented for Facebook, Instagram, Messenger, and WhatsApp within the EU during the reporting period of H1 2025. In alignment with Meta's public announcements on 7 January 2025, we will continue to evaluate the applicability of these practices to Meta products. We will also regularly review the appropriateness of making adjustments in response to changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes.

Navigation per Service

Commitments	Measures	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram	Service C – Messenger	Service D – WhatsApp
		II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements			
1	Measure 1.1	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 1.2	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 1.3	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 1.4	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 1.5	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 1.6	☐	☐	☐	☐
2	Measure 2.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 2.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 2.3	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 2.4	☐	☐	☐	☐
3	Measure 3.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 3.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 3.3	☑	☑	☐	☐
		III. Political advertising			
4	Measure 4.1	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 4.2	☐	☐	☐	☐
5	Measure 5.1	☐	☐	☐	☐
6	Measure 6.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 6.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 6.3	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 6.4	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 6.5	☐	☐	☑	☐
7	Measure 7.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 7.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 7.3	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 7.4	☑	☑	☐	☐

8	Measure 8.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 8.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
9	Measure 9.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 9.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
10	Measure 10.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 10.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
11	Measure 11.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 11.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 11.3	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 11.4	☑	☑	☐	☐
12	Measure 12.1	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 12.2	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 12.3	☐	☐	☐	☐
13	Measure 13.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 13.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 13.3	☑	☑	☐	☐
IV. Integrity of services					
14	Measure 14.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 14.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 14.3	☑	☑	☐	☐
15	Measure 15.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 15.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
16	Measure 16.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 16.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
V. Empowering users					
17	Measure 17.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 17.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 17.3	☑	☑	☐	☐

		Blue	Orange	Yellow	Green
18	Measure 18.1	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 18.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 18.3	☑	☑	☐	☐
19	Measure 19.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 19.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
20	Measure 20.1	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 20.2	☐	☐	☐	☐
21	Measure 21.1	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 21.2	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 21.3	☑	☑	☐	☐
22	Measure 22.1	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 22.2	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 22.3	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 22.4	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 22.5	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 22.6	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 22.7	☐	☐	☐	☐
23	Measure 23.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 23.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
24	Measure 24.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
25	Measure 25.1	☐	☐	☑	☑
	Measure 25.2	☐	☐	☑	☑
VI. Empowering the research community					
26	Measure 26.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 26.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 26.3	☑	☑	☐	☐
27	Measure 27.1	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 27.2	☐	☐	☐	☐

	Measure 27.3	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 27.4	☐	☐	☐	☐
28	Measure 28.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 28.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 28.3	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 28.4	☑	☑	☐	☐
29	Measure 29.1	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 29.2	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 29.3	☐	☐	☐	☐
VII. Empowering the fact-checking community					
30	Measure 30.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 30.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 30.3	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 30.4	☑	☑	☐	☐
31	Measure 31.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 31.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 31.3	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Measure 31.4	☐	☐	☐	☐
32	Measure 32.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 32.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 32.3	☑	☑	☐	☐
33	Measure 33.1	☐	☐	☐	☐
VIII. Transparency Centre					
34	Measure 34.1	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 34.2	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 34.3	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 34.4	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 34.5	☑	☑	☑	☑

35	Measure 35.1	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 35.2	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 35.3	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 35.4	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 35.5	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 35.6	☑	☑	☑	☑
36	Measure 36.1	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 36.2	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 36.3	☑	☑	☑	☑
IX. Permanent Taskforce					
37	Measure 37.1	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 37.2	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 37.3	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 37.4	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 37.5	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 37.6	☑	☑	☑	☑
X. Monitoring of the Code					
38	Measure 38.1	☑	☑	☑	☑
39	–	☑	☑	☑	☑
40	Measure 40.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 40.2	☐	☐	☑	☑
	Measure 40.3	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 40.4	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 40.5	☑	☑	☑	☑
	Measure 40.6	☑	☑	☑	☑
41	Measure 41.1	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 41.2	☑	☑	☐	☐
	Measure 41.3	☑	☑	☐	☐

42		☑	☑	☐	☐
43	–	☑	☑	☑	☑
44	–	☑	☑	☐	☐

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements
Commitments 1 – 3

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements

Commitment 1

Relevant signatories participating in ad placements commit to defund the dissemination of disinformation, and improve the policies and systems which determine the eligibility of content to be monetised, the controls for monetisation and ad placement, and the data to report on the accuracy and effectiveness of controls and services around ad placements

	C.1	M 1.1	M 1.2	M 1.3	M 1.4	M 1.5	M 1.6
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram	N/A	N/A	Facebook, Instagram	N/A	Facebook, Instagram	N/A

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	- Inventory Filter for Facebook Feed gives advertisers the ability to adjust their preferences for adjacency to different content types. Within this control, advertisers can choose between expanded, moderate, and limited inventory settings based on the suitability level that's right for their brand. Meta will continue to invest resources in the ongoing development and enhancement of the inventory filter. - We plan to expand integrations with our third-party partners to introduce additional functionality. - We are building a simplified creator monetization experience: Facebook Content Monetization. This program gives creators the opportunity to earn money based on the performance of their eligible Facebook videos, reels, photos, stories, and text posts. - The Content Monetization program combines 3 existing Facebook monetization programs: - In-stream ads, which monetizes videos - Ads on Reels, which monetizes reels - Performance bonus program, which monetizes video, photo and text posts - To use the Facebook Content Monetization program, creators must continue to follow our Partner and Content Monetization Policies. Creators, publishers, and third-party providers posting content that is flagged as misinformation or false news may be ineligible or may lose their eligibility to monetize. For example, the following types of content are ineligible to monetize: - Misinformation - Misleading medical information	- Inventory Filter for Instagram Feed gives advertisers the ability to adjust their preferences for adjacency to different content types. Within this control, advertisers can choose between expanded, moderate, and limited inventory settings based on the suitability level that's right for their brand. Meta will continue to invest resources in the ongoing development and enhancement of the inventory filter. - We plan to expand integrations with our third-party partners to introduce additional functionality.

Measure 1.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 1.1.1	N/A	N/A
SLI 1.1.1 – Numbers by actions enforcing policies above (specify if at page and/or domain level)	N/A	N/A

This additional Service Level Indicator provides an estimated financial value of the actions taken by Signatories to demonetise disinformation sources (under SLI 1.1.1). It is based on media metrics available to Signatories (query/bid[1] or impression[2]) and applying an agreed-upon conversion factor provided by a third party designated by the Taskforce of the Code (Ebiquity plc.).		
SLI 1.1.2 – Preventing the flow of legitimate advertising investment to sites or content that are designated as disinformation	N/A	N/A

Measure 1.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 1.2.1	N/A	N/A
SLI 1.2.1	N/A	N/A

Measure 1.3	Facebook	Instagram

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[1] Request placed between a seller and buyer of advertising that can detail amongst other things website, specific content, targeting data inclusive of audience or content.
[2] Comprehensive calculation of the number of people who have been reached by a piece of media content by passive exposure (viewing a piece of content) or active engagement (visiting a destination).

QRE 1.3.1	We continue to offer several brand safety controls to allow advertisers to have control over the placement of their advertising, including preventing ads from running alongside certain types of content on Facebook. Advertisers can see and update brand safety settings directly and these controls can be used in combination or on their own [see here for details]. These controls are transparent and advertisers can access details about Meta's brand safety description of methodology.	We continue to offer several brand safety controls to allow advertisers to have control over the placement of their advertising, including preventing ads from running alongside certain types of content on Instagram. Advertisers can see and update brand safety settings directly and these controls can be used in combination or on their own [see here for details]. These controls are transparent and advertisers can access details about Meta's brand safety description of methodology.
Measure 1.4	N/A	N/A
QRE 1.4.1	Measure 1.4 applies to signatories responsible for the buying of advertising.	Measure 1.4 applies to signatories responsible for the buying of advertising.
Measure 1.5	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 1.5.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, Facebook received accreditation from the Media Rating Council (MRC) for content-level Brand Safety on Facebook covering Meta's Partner Monetisation Policies, Content Monetisation Policies, and associated content-level brand safety and suitability controls applied to Facebook In-Stream Video and Instant Articles in desktop, mobile web, and mobile in-app. In June 2025, Meta received accreditation for Content-Level Brand Safety on Facebook and Instagram, including Facebook in-stream reels on desktop, mobile web, and mobile in-app browser; Facebook Feed on desktop, mobile web and mobile app; and Instagram Feed on mobile app. See here for additional details.	In June 2025, Meta received accreditation for Content-Level Brand Safety on Facebook and Instagram, including Facebook in-stream reels on desktop, mobile web, and mobile in-app browser; Facebook Feed on desktop, mobile web and mobile app; and Instagram Feed on mobile app. See here for additional details.
QRE 1.5.2	N/A	N/A
Measure 1.6	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 1.6.1	N/A	N/A
QRE 1.6.2	N/A	N/A
QRE 1.6.3	N/A	N/A
QRE 1.6.4	N/A	N/A
SLI 1.6.1	N/A	N/A

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements

Commitment 2

Relevant Signatories participating in advertising commit to prevent the misuse of advertising systems to disseminate Disinformation in the form of advertising messages.

	C.2	M 2.1	M 2.2	M 2.3	M 2.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	N/A

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report, we enforce Advertising Standards on what is allowed across Meta technologies, and our advertisers must also follow our Terms of service and our Community Standards. *(For monetisation policies, see Commitment 1)*	As mentioned in our baseline report, we enforce Advertising Standards on what is allowed across Meta technologies, and our advertisers must also follow our Terms of service and our Community Standards. *(For monetisation policies, see Commitment 1)*
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you	As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the	As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the

plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	integrity of our platforms and adjusting our Advertising Standards, policies, tools, and processes.	world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our Advertising Standards, policies, tools, and processes.

Measure 2.1	Facebook		Instagram	
QRE 2.1.1	As noted in our baseline report, advertisers that are running ads across Meta technologies must follow our Terms of Service, our <u>Community Standards</u> and our <u>Advertising Standards.</u> As such, Misinformation is considered to be unacceptable content under our Advertising Standards. See <u>more</u> here.		As noted in our baseline report, advertisers that are running ads across Meta technologies must follow our Terms of Use, our <u>Community Standards</u> and our <u>Advertising Standards.</u> As such, Misinformation is considered to be unacceptable content under our Advertising Standards. See <u>more</u> here.	
SLI 2.1.1 – Numbers by actions enforcing policies above	1. Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy in the EU from 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025.* 2. Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EU) from 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025.		1. Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy in the EU from 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025.* 2. Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EU) from 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025.	
	Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy in the EU from 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025.	Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EU) from 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025.	Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy in the EU from 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025.	Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EU) from 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025.
Member States				
Austria	Over 1,000	Over 59,000	Over 1,000	Over 59,000
Belgium	Over 4,400	Over 170,000	Over 4,400	Over 170,000
Bulgaria	Over 1,400	Over 69,000	Over 1,400	Over 69,000
Croatia	Over 630	Over 34,000	Over 630	Over 34,000
Cyprus	Over 4,700	Over 180,000	Over 4,700	Over 180,000
Czech Republic	Over 2,000	Over 110,000	Over 2,000	Over 110,000
Denmark	Over 2,400	Over 190,000	Over 2,400	Over 190,000
Estonia	Over 1,500	Over 63,000	Over 1,500	Over 63,000

Finland	Over 640	Over 45,000	Over 640	Over 45,000
France	Over 12,000	Over 860,000	Over 12,000	Over 860,000
Germany	Over 9,800	Over 580,000	Over 9,800	Over 580,000
Greece	Over 1,400	Over 120,000	Over 1,400	Over 120,000
Hungary	Over 960	Over 95,000	Over 960	Over 95,000
Ireland	Less than 500	Over 34,000	Less than 500	Over 34,000
Italy	Over 13,000	Over 830,000	Over 13,000	Over 830,000
Latvia	Over 770	Over 28,000	Over 770	Over 28,000
Lithuania	Over 990	Over 42,000	Over 990	Over 42,000
Luxembourg	Less than 500	Over 7,100	Less than 500	Over 7,100
Malta	Over 630	Over 37,000	Over 630	Over 37,000
Netherlands	Over 3,400	Over 200,000	Over 3,400	Over 200,000
Poland	Over 5,700	Over 280,000	Over 5,700	Over 280,000
Portugal	Over 2,500	Over 160,000	Over 2,500	Over 160,000
Romania	Over 2,200	Over 99,000	Over 2,200	Over 99,000
Slovakia	Over 760	Over 50,000	Over 760	Over 50,000
Slovenia	Over 560	Over 32,000	Over 560	Over 32,000
Spain	Over 6,700	Over 460,000	Over 6,700	Over 460,000
Sweden	Over 2,000	Over 200,000	Over 2,000	Over 200,000
Total EU	Over 83,000	Over 5,100,000	Over 83,000	Over 5,100,000

Measure 2.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 2.2.1	As noted in our baseline report, misinformation is considered to be unacceptable content under our Advertising Standards, and as such those	As noted in our baseline report, misinformation is considered to be unacceptable content under our Advertising Standards, and as such those types

	types of content are ineligible to monetise: See our <u>Advertising Standards</u> for more information. In the EU, Meta's third party fact-checkers may review ads posted on Facebook, labelling them where a falsity assessment has concluded that they are false.	of content are ineligible to monetise: See our <u>Advertising Standards</u> for more information. In the EU, Meta's third party fact-checkers may review ads posted on Instagram, labelling them where a falsity assessment has concluded that they are false.
Measure 2.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 2.3.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, the <u>ad review system</u> checks ads for violations of our policies. This review process may include the specific components of an ad, such as images, video, text and targeting information, as well as an ad's associated landing page or other destinations, among other information. More specifically, once fact-checking partners have determined that a piece of content contains misinformation, we use technology to identify identical and near-identical versions across Facebook. If we find ads that are identical or near identical to content fact-checkers have rated, we reject them.	As mentioned in our baseline report, the <u>ad review system</u> checks ads for violations of our policies. This review process may include the specific components of an ad, such as images, video, text and targeting information, as well as an ad's associated landing page or other destinations, among other information. More specifically, once fact-checking partners have determined that a piece of content contains misinformation, we can use technology to identify near-identical versions across Instagram. If we find ads that are near identical to content fact-checkers have rated, we reject them.

SLI 2.3.1	1. Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy in the EU from 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025.* 2. Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EU) from 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025.		1. Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy in the EU from 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025.* 2. Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EU) from 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025.	
	Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy in the EU from 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025.	Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EU) from 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025.	Number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined for violating our Misinformation policy in the EU from 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025.	Overall number of Ads removed on Facebook and Instagram combined (in the EU) from 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025.
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Croatia	Over 630	Over 34,000	Over 630	Over 34,000
Cyprus	Over 4,700	Over 180,000	Over 4,700	Over 180,000
Czech Republic	Over 2,000	Over 110,000	Over 2,000	Over 110,000
Denmark	Over 2,400	Over 190,000	Over 2,400	Over 190,000
Estonia	Over 1,500	Over 63,000	Over 1,500	Over 63,000
Finland	Over 640	Over 45,000	Over 640	Over 45,000

France	Over 12,000	Over 860,000	Over 12,000	Over 860,000
Germany	Over 9,800	Over 580,000	Over 9,800	Over 580,000
Greece	Over 1,400	Over 120,000	Over 1,400	Over 120,000
Hungary	Over 960	Over 95,000	Over 960	Over 95,000
Ireland	Less than 500	Over 34,000	Less than 500	Over 34,000
Italy	Over 13,000	Over 830,000	Over 13,000	Over 830,000
Latvia	Over 770	Over 28,000	Over 770	Over 28,000
Lithuania	Over 990	Over 42,000	Over 990	Over 42,000
Luxembourg	Less than 500	Over 7,100	Less than 500	Over 7,100
Malta	Over 630	Over 37,000	Over 630	Over 37,000
Netherlands	Over 3,400	Over 200,000	Over 3,400	Over 200,000
Poland	Over 5,700	Over 280,000	Over 5,700	Over 280,000
Portugal	Over 2,500	Over 160,000	Over 2,500	Over 160,000
Romania	Over 2,200	Over 99,000	Over 2,200	Over 99,000
Slovakia	Over 760	Over 50,000	Over 760	Over 50,000
Slovenia	Over 560	Over 32,000	Over 560	Over 32,000
Spain	Over 6,700	Over 460,000	Over 6,700	Over 460,000
Sweden	Over 2,000	Over 200,000	Over 2,000	Over 200,000
Total EU	Over 83,000	Over 5,100,000	Over 83,000	Over 5,100,000

Measure 2.4	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 2.4.1	N/A	N/A
SLI 2.4.1	N/A	N/A

II. Scrutiny of Ad Placements

Commitment 3

Relevant Signatories involved in buying, selling and placing digital advertising commit to exchange best practices and strengthen cooperation with relevant players, expanding to organisations active in the online monetisation value chain, such as online e-payment services, e-commerce platforms and relevant crowd-funding/donation systems, with the aim to increase the effectiveness of scrutiny of ad placements on their own services.

		C.3	M 3.1	M 3.2	M 3.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:		Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram	Facebook, Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you	N/A	N/A

plan to put in place in the next 6 months?		

	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 3.1		
QRE 3.1.1	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.
Measure 3.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 3.2.1	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.
Measure 3.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 3.3.1	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.

III. Political Advertising
Commitments 4 – 13

III. Political Advertising			
Commitment 4 Relevant Signatories commit to adopt a common definition of "political and issue advertising".			
	C.4	**M 4.1**	**M 4.2**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram	N/A	N/A

	Service A – Facebook	**Service B – Instagram**
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	N/A	N/A
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	N/A	N/A
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 4.1	N/A	N/A
Measure 4.2	N/A	N/A
QRE 4.1.1 (for measures 4.1 and 4.2)	N/A	N/A
QRE 4.1.2 (for measures 4.1 and 4.2)	N/A	N/A

III. Political Advertising		
Commitment 5		
Relevant Signatories commit to apply a consistent approach across political and issue advertising on their services and to clearly indicate in their advertising policies the extent to which such advertising is permitted or prohibited on their services.		
	C.5	M 5.1
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	N/A	N/A

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	N/A	N/A
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the	Yes	Yes

implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]		
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Beginning in October 2025, Meta will no longer allow political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	Beginning in October 2025, Meta will no longer allow political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.

Measure 5.1	N/A	N/A
QRE 5.1.1	N/A	N/A

III. Political Advertising					
Commitment 6					
Relevant Signatories commit to make political or issue ads clearly labelled and distinguishable as paid-for content in a way that allows users to understand that the content displayed contains political or issue advertising					
	C.6	M 6.1	M 6.2	M 6.3	M 6.4	M 6.5
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Messenger

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram	Service C – Messenger
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A	

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Beginning in October 2025, Meta will no longer allow political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.	Beginning in October 2025, Meta will no longer allow political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.	Beginning in October 2025, Meta will no longer allow political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.

Measure 6.1	Facebook	Instagram	
QRE 6.1.1	As noted in our baseline report, Meta currently uses disclaimers for ads about social issues, elections or politics. Not all placement nor formats can support ads with a "Paid for by" disclaimer, hence we would reject ads on social issues, elections or politics in such placements or formats.	As noted in our baseline report, Meta currently uses disclaimers for ads about social issues, elections or politics. Not all placement nor formats can support ads with a "Paid for by" disclaimer, hence we would reject ads on social issues, elections or politics in such placements or formats.	N/A
Measure 6.2	Facebook	Instagram	N/A
QRE 6.2.1	As noted in our baseline report, Ads about social issues, elections or politics currently require authorizations and a "Paid for by" disclaimer.	As noted in our baseline report, Ads about social issues, elections or politics currently require authorizations and a "Paid for by" disclaimer.	N/A
QRE 6.2.2	As noted in our baseline report, examples of political ad labelling may be found in the Ad Library.	As noted in our baseline report, examples of political ad labelling may be found in the Ad Library.	N/A

SLI 6.2.1 – numbers for actions enforcing policies above	Number of unique SIEP ads on Facebook and Instagram combined displaying "paid for by" disclaimers from 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025 in EU Member States. Country determined by inferred advertiser location at time of enforcement.	Number of unique SIEP ads on Facebook and Instagram combined displaying "paid for by" disclaimers from 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025 in EU Member States. Country determined by inferred advertiser location at time of enforcement.	N/A
	Number of ads accepted & labelled on Facebook and Instagram combined	Number of ads accepted & labelled on Facebook and Instagram combined	N/A
Member States			
Austria	Over 41,000	Over 41,000	
Belgium	Over 140,000	Over 140,000	
Bulgaria	Over 4,300	Over 4,300	
Croatia	Over 25,000	Over 25,000	
Cyprus	Over 3,700	Over 3,700	
Czech Republic	Over 19,000	Over 19,000	
Denmark	Over 28,000	Over 28,000	
Estonia	Over 3,200	Over 3,200	
Finland	Over 44,000	Over 44,000	
France	Over 41,000	Over 41,000	
Germany	Over 88,000	Over 88,000	
Greece	Over 18,000	Over 18,000	
Hungary	Over 56,000	Over 56,000	
Ireland	Over 7,600	Over 7,600	
Italy	Over 78,000	Over 78,000	
Latvia	Over 15,000	Over 15,000	
Lithuania	Over 5,500	Over 5,500	
Luxembourg	Over 880	Over 880	
Malta	Over 1,500	Over 1,500	

Netherlands	Over 440,000	Over 440,000	
Poland	Over 38,000	Over 38,000	
Portugal	Over 24,000	Over 24,000	
Romania	Over 31,000	Over 31,000	
Slovakia	Over 26,000	Over 26,000	
Slovenia	Over 2,800	Over 2,800	
Spain	Over 33,000	Over 33,000	
Sweden	Over 36,000	Over 36,000	
Total EU	Over 1,200,000	Over 1,200,000	N/A

Measure 6.3	Facebook	Instagram	
QRE 6.3.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, we developed labels for SIEP ads as part of our broader efforts to protect elections and increase transparency on Facebook so people can make more informed decisions about the posts they read, trust and share. For this, we worked with third-parties to develop a list of key issues, which we continue to refine over time.	As mentioned in our baseline report, we developed labels for SIEP ads as part of our broader efforts to protect elections and increase transparency on Instagram so people can make more informed decisions about the posts they read, trust and share. For this, we worked with third-parties to develop a list of key issues, which we continue to refine over time.	N/A
Measure 6.4	Facebook	Instagram	
QRE 6.4.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, we are committed to making ads about social issues, elections or politics more transparent. If someone sees and shares an ad about social issues, elections or politics, the shared version will still contain the disclaimer and available information about the ad.	As mentioned in our baseline report, we are committed to making ads about social issues, elections or politics more transparent. If someone sees and shares an ad about social issues, elections or politics, the shared version will still contain the disclaimer and available information about the ad.	N/A
Measure 6.5	N/A	N/A	Messenger
QRE 6.5.1	N/A	N/A	As noted in our baseline report, when an ad, labelled as SIEP on the Facebook app, is shared via Messenger, the link redirects the user to the ad where the label is visible.

III. Political Advertising					
Commitment 7					
Relevant Signatories commit to put proportionate and appropriate identity verification systems in place for sponsors and providers of advertising services acting on behalf of sponsors placing political or issue ads. Relevant signatories will make sure that labelling and user–facing transparency requirements are met before allowing placement of such ads.					
	C.7	**M 7.1**	**M 7.2**	**M 7.3**	**M 7.4**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to	Beginning in October 2025, Meta will no longer allow political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.	Beginning in October 2025, Meta will no longer allow political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.

put in place in the next 6 months?		

Measure 7.1	Facebook	Instagram

QRE 7.1.1	As mentioned in our baseline report: Any advertiser who wants to create or edit ads in the European Union that reference political figures, political parties, elections in the EU or social issues within the EU will be required to go through the <u>authorisation process</u> and have a "Paid for by" label. This requirement includes anyone who performs actions on ads, about social issues, elections or politics such as starting or pausing ads, adjusting targeting, creating or editing disclaimers, or any other function related to ad management.
	
	Identity confirmation is at the individual level, only needs to be done once and consists of:
	● Turning on two-factor authentication
	● Choosing one of the following options to confirm your identity:
	   – Valid photo ID
	   – Two official documents
	   – A notarized form that you download from facebook.com/id
	
	To help guard against foreign interference, advertisers (including political organisations and agencies) who want to run ads about social issues, elections or politics must have their ad run by a person who is authorised in the EU country that they're targeting.
	
	European Union institutions, registered European political parties and official political groups qualify to run ads about social issues, elections, and politics in Member States unless otherwise prohibited.
	
	Advertisers are required to follow all other stated terms and conditions.
	
	To help maintain the integrity of our authorization requirements, we'll periodically require that some advertisers <u>reconfirm</u> their identity and location. Identity reconfirmation must be done within 60 days of initial notice.
		As mentioned in our baseline report: Any advertiser who wants to create or edit ads in the European Union that reference political figures, political parties, elections in the EU or social issues within the EU will be required to go through the <u>authorisation process</u> and have a "Paid for by" label. This requirement includes anyone who performs actions on ads, about social issues, elections or politics such as starting or pausing ads, adjusting targeting, creating or editing disclaimers, or any other function related to ad management.
		
		Identity confirmation is at the individual level, only needs to be done once and consists of:
		● Turning on two-factor authentication
		● Choosing one of the following options to confirm your identity:
		   – Valid photo ID
		   – Two official documents
		   – A notarized form that you download from facebook.com/id
		
		To help guard against foreign interference, advertisers (including political organisations and agencies) who want to run ads about social issues, elections or politics must have their ad run by a person who is authorised in the EU country that they're targeting.
		
		European Union institutions, registered European political parties and official political groups qualify to run ads about social issues, elections, and politics in Member States unless otherwise prohibited.
		
		Advertisers are required to follow all other stated terms and conditions.
		
		To help maintain the integrity of our authorization requirements, we'll periodically require that some advertisers <u>reconfirm</u> their identity and location. Identity reconfirmation must be done within 60 days of initial notice.

SLI 7.1.1 – numbers for actions enforcing policies above	Number of unique Ads removed for not complying with our policy on SIEP ads on both Facebook and Instagram from 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025 in EU Member States.	Number of unique Ads removed for not complying with our policy on SIEP ads on both Facebook and Instagram from 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025 in EU Member States.

(comparable metrics as for SLI 6.2.1)	Number of unique Ads removed for not complying with our policy on SIEP ads on both Facebook and Instagram from 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025 in EU Member States.	Number of unique Ads removed for not complying with our policy on SIEP ads on both Facebook and Instagram from 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025 in EU Member States.
Member States		
Austria	Over 7,400	Over 7,400
Belgium	Over 11,000	Over 11,000
Bulgaria	Over 2,600	Over 2,600
Croatia	Over 3,900	Over 3,900
Cyprus	Over 3,600	Over 3,600
Czech Republic	Over 11,000	Over 11,000
Denmark	Over 9,100	Over 9,100
Estonia	Over 2,000	Over 2,000
Finland	Over 17,000	Over 17,000
France	Over 38,000	Over 38,000
Germany	Over 38,000	Over 38,000
Greece	Over 5,700	Over 5,700
Hungary	Over 7,800	Over 7,800
Ireland	Over 2,500	Over 2,500
Italy	Over 41,000	Over 41,000
Latvia	Over 1,500	Over 1,500
Lithuania	Over 2,300	Over 2,300
Luxembourg	Over 820	Over 820
Malta	Over 740	Over 740
Netherlands	Over 11,000	Over 11,000
Poland	Over 19,000	Over 19,000
Portugal	Over 6,700	Over 6,700
Romania	Over 8,900	Over 8,900

Slovakia	Over 5,700	Over 5,700
Slovenia	Over 2,000	Over 2,000
Spain	Over 16,000	Over 16,000
Sweden	Over 6,900	Over 6,900
Total EU	Over 280,000	Over 280,000

Measure 7.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 7.2.1	As mentioned in our baseline report: ● Political ads must have a disclaimer with the name and entity that paid for the ads. If we detect an ad running without a disclaimer, it'll be paused, disapproved and added to the Ad Library, until the advertiser completes the authorization process. Requirements vary by country. ● As mentioned in our Advertising standards, we enforce our policies against all advertisers, and as a general rule, advertisers must not evade or attempt to evade our review process and enforcement actions. ● Regarding specifically social issues, electoral, or political ads, advertisers who repeatedly run such ads without being authorised will face some restrictions, which could result in permanent restrictions of the advertisers' ability to advertise.	As mentioned in our baseline report: ● Political ads must have a disclaimer with the name and entity that paid for the ads. If we detect an ad running without a disclaimer, it'll be paused, disapproved and added to the Ad Library, until the advertiser completes the authorization process. Requirements vary by country. ● As mentioned in our Advertising standards, we enforce our policies against all advertisers, and as a general rule, advertisers must not evade or attempt to evade our review process and enforcement actions. ● Regarding specifically social issues, electoral, or political ads, advertisers who repeatedly run such ads without being authorised will face some restrictions, which could result in permanent restrictions of the advertisers' ability to advertise.
QRE 7.2.2	As mentioned in our baseline report, details for country-specific ID verification processes may be found online on our Business Help Centre. An advertiser must confirm their identity and link an ad account with a Page using a valid disclaimer to complete authorization. The review process is usually within 48 hours and disclaimer reviews are typically completed within 24 hours. However in some cases, the time to review ads about elections, social issues or politics can be up to 72 hours.	As mentioned in our baseline report, details for country-specific ID verification processes may be found online on our Business Help Centre. An advertiser must confirm their identity and link an ad account using a valid disclaimer to complete authorization. The review process is usually within 48 hours and disclaimer reviews are typically completed within 24 hours. However in some cases, the time to review ads about elections, social issues or politics can be up to 72 hours.
Measure 7.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 7.3.1	As mentioned in our baseline report: ● We require advertisers to acknowledge how we define social issues and review text examples before they can post SIEP ads. Ads where the primary purpose of the ad is the sale of a product or promotion of a service may not be considered	As mentioned in our baseline report: ● We require advertisers to acknowledge how we define social issues and review text examples before they can post SIEP ads. Ads where the primary purpose of the ad is the sale of a product or promotion of a service may not be considered social issue ads,

	social issue ads, which wouldn't require authorizations and a disclaimer. This doesn't apply to products or services about politicians, political parties or legislation, which continue to require transparency. ● All ads are subject to our ad review system before they're shown on Facebook against our <u>Advertising Standards</u>. ● In certain cases, a post or ad that's already running can be flagged by AI or reported by our community. If this happens, the content may be reviewed again, and if found to be in violation of our policies and/or the ad is missing a "Paid for by" disclaimer, we disapprove it. The <u>Community Standards</u> prohibit ads that promote voter interference.	which wouldn't require authorizations and a disclaimer. This doesn't apply to products or services about politicians, political parties or legislation, which continue to require transparency. ● All ads are subject to our ad review system before they're shown on Instagram against our <u>Advertising Standards</u>. ● In certain cases, a post or ad that's already running can be flagged by AI or reported by our community. If this happens, the content may be reviewed again, and if found to be in violation of our policies and/or the ad is missing a "Paid for by" disclaimer, we disapprove it. The <u>Community Standards</u> prohibit ads that promote voter interference.
QRE 7.3.2	As mentioned in our baseline report, our <u>Advertising Standards</u> make clear that we enforce our policies against all advertisers, and as a general rule, advertisers must not evade or attempt to evade our review process and enforcement actions. If we find that an ad account, Page, user account or business account is evading our review process and enforcement actions, an advertiser may face advertising restrictions. Regarding specifically social issues, electoral, or political ads, advertisers who repeatedly run such ads <u>without being authorised</u> will face some restrictions, which could result in permanent restrictions of the advertisers' ability to advertise. From 2024 Meta launched a new AI Disclosure policy which helps people understand when a social issue, election, or political advertisement on Facebook has been digitally created or altered (including through the use of AI) – as a result, advertisers may also incur penalties for advertisements that demonstrably evade verification and transparency requirements.	As mentioned in our baseline report, our <u>Advertising Standards</u> make clear that we enforce our policies against all advertisers, and as a general rule, advertisers must not evade or attempt to evade our review process and enforcement actions. If we find that an ad account, user account or business account is evading our review process and enforcement actions, an advertiser may face advertising restrictions. Regarding specifically social issues, electoral, or political ads, advertisers who repeatedly run such ads <u>without being authorised</u> will face some restrictions, which could result in permanent restrictions of the advertisers' ability to advertise. From 2024 Meta launched a new AI Disclosure policy which helps people understand when a social issue, election, or political advertisement on Instagram has been digitally created or altered (including through the use of AI) – as a result, advertisers may also incur penalties for advertisements that demonstrably evade verification and transparency requirements.
Measure 7.4	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 7.4.1	Please refer to QRE 7.1.1 and SLI 7.1.1.	Please refer to QRE 7.1.1 and SLI 7.1.1.

III. Political Advertising

Commitment 8

Relevant Signatories commit to provide transparency information to users about the political or issue ads they see on their service.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	C.8	M 8.1	M 8.2
	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our previous reports, we continue to provide transparency on Facebook with tools such as the 'Why am I seeing this Ad' tool.	As mentioned in our previous reports, we continue to provide transparency on Instagram with tools such as the 'Why am I seeing this Ad' tool.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Beginning in October 2025, Meta will no longer allow political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.	Beginning in October 2025, Meta will no longer allow political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.

Measure 8.1	Facebook	Instagram

Measure 8.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 8.1.1 (for measures 8.1 & 8.2)	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.

III. Political Advertising		
Commitment 9		
Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with clear, comprehensible, comprehensive information about why they are seeing a political or issue ad.		
	C.9	**M 9.1**	**M 9.2**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our previous reports, we continue to provide transparency on Facebook with tools such as the 'Why am I seeing this Ad' tool.	As mentioned in our previous reports, we continue to provide transparency on Instagram with tools such as the 'Why am I seeing this Ad' tool.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation	Beginning in October 2025, Meta will no longer allow political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable	Beginning in October 2025, Meta will no longer allow political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable

measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.	requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.

Measure 9.1	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 9.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 9.1.1 (for measures 9.1 & 9.2)	Meta's Why am I seeing this ad?" feature allows people to see how factors like basic demographic details, interests, and website visits contribute to the ads that are shown in their Feeds. In our baseline report, we also discussed how: ● We removed Detailed Targeting options that relate to topics people may perceive as sensitive, such as options referencing causes, organisations, or public figures that relate to health, race or ethnicity, political affiliation, religion, or sexual orientation. ● Through the Ad Preferences tool, people are able to turn off all social issues, electoral or political ads from candidates or organisations that have the "Paid for by" political disclaimer on them. We also allow Facebook users to see how we decide which ads to show and how users can adjust their preferences to determine the ads users are shown. ● Our FAQs section in the Ad Library also provides more information on how we decide to show ads.	Meta's Why am I seeing this ad?" feature allows people to see how factors like basic demographic details, interests, and website visits contribute to the ads that are shown in their Feeds. In our baseline report, we also discussed how: ● We removed Detailed Targeting options that relate to topics people may perceive as sensitive, such as options referencing causes, organisations, or public figures that relate to health, race or ethnicity, political affiliation, religion, or sexual orientation. ● Through the Ad Preferences tool, people are able to turn off all social issues, electoral or political ads from candidates or organisations that have the "Paid for by" political disclaimer on them. We also allow Instagram users control to see fewer ads about social issues, elections or politics. ● Our FAQs section in the Ad Library also provides more information on how we decide to show ads.

III. Political Advertising		
Commitment 10		
Relevant Signatories commit to maintain repositories of political or issue advertising and ensure their currentness, completeness, usability and quality, such that they contain all political and issue advertising served, along with the necessary information to comply with their legal obligations and with transparency commitments under this Code.		
	C.10	M 10.1	M 10.2

	C.10	M 10.1	M 10.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our previous reports, starting in April 2024, the Ad Library in the EU contains more information about the Advertising or Community Standard that an ad violated (if applicable). We display this information for disapproved ads for a period of one year after their last impression is delivered and seven years if the ad is about social issues, elections, or politics. For disapproved ads that received delivery in the EU, images will be blurred and there will be messaging saying that the ad was removed. The user can click to see more ad details and see more detailed reasoning on why the ad was disapproved, including the specific Advertising or Community Standard it violated. This change is applicable only to ads that were added to the Ad Library on or after 17 August 2023.	As mentioned in our previous reports, starting in April 2024, the Ad Library in the EU contains more information about the Advertising Standards or Community Standards that an ad violated (if applicable). We display this information for disapproved ads for a period of one year after their last impression is delivered and seven years if the ad is about social issues, elections, or politics. For disapproved ads that received delivery in the EU, images will be blurred and there will be messaging saying that the ad was removed. The user can click to see more ad details and see more detailed reasoning on why the ad was disapproved, including the specific Advertising Standard or Community Standard it violated. This change is applicable only to ads that were added to the Ad Library on or after 17 August 2023.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Beginning in October 2025, Meta will no longer allow political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation. The Ad Library remains available.	Beginning in October 2025, Meta will no longer allow political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation. The Ad Library remains available.

Measure 10.1	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 10.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 10.2.1 (for measures 10.1 & 10.2)	As mentioned in our baseline report, the Ad Library provides advertising transparency by offering a comprehensive, searchable collection of all ads currently running from across Meta technologies. We currently store these ads in the library for 7 years.	As mentioned in our baseline report, the Ad Library provides advertising transparency by offering a comprehensive, searchable collection of all ads currently running from across Meta technologies. We currently store these ads in the library for 7 years.

III. Political Advertising

Commitment 11

Relevant Signatories commit to provide application programming interfaces (APIs) or other interfaces enabling users and researchers to perform customised searches within their ad repositories of political or issue advertising and to include a set of minimum functionalities as well as a set of minimum search criteria for the application of APIs or other interfaces."

	C.11	M 11.1	M 11.2	M 11.3	M 11.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report, our Ad Library application programming interface ("API") allows users to perform custom keyword searches of ads stored in the Ad Library. Users can search data for all active and inactive ads about social issues, elections or politics. For people less familiar with the API solution, we provide a simpler research solution with our Ad Library report.	As mentioned in our baseline report, our Ad Library application programming interface ("API") allows users to perform custom keyword searches of ads stored in the Ad Library. Users can search data for all active and inactive ads about social issues, elections or politics. For people less familiar with the API solution, we provide a simpler research solution with our Ad Library report.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Beginning in October 2025, Meta will no longer allow political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.	Beginning in October 2025, Meta will no longer allow political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.

Measure 11.1	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 11.2	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 11.3	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 11.4	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 11.1.1 (for measures 11.1–11.4)	As mentioned in our baseline report, the Ad Library API provides access to data about ads about social issues, elections or politics from countries where the Ad Library is live, including European Union countries. The Ad Library API provides programmatic access to information about ads about politics or issues in the Library. Users can search data for all active and inactive ads about social issues, elections or politics. People are able to search for any term, name or Page in the Ad Library. In the EU, anyone with a Facebook account can complete these steps to access the API.	As mentioned in our baseline report, the Ad Library API provides access to data about ads about social issues, elections or politics from countries where the Ad Library is live, including European Union countries. The Ad Library API provides programmatic access to information about ads about politics or issues in the Library. Users can search data for all active and inactive ads about social issues, elections or politics. People are able to search for any term or name in the Ad Library. For Instagram accounts that don't have a linked Facebook Page, people will be able to search for an advertiser's ad using their Instagram handle name.
QRE 11.4.1	As of June 2025, we've made targeting information for 39 million social issue, electoral, and political Facebook and Instagram ads globally available to academic researchers. More details on the original launch of this initiative are available in the baseline report.	As of June 2025, we've made targeting information for 39 million social issue, electoral, and political Facebook and Instagram ads globally available to academic researchers. More details on the original launch of this initiative are available in the baseline report.

III. Political Advertising
Commitment 12
Relevant Signatories commit to increase oversight of political and issue advertising and constructively assist, as appropriate, in the creation, implementation and improvement of political or issue advertising policies and practices.
This commitment applies to civil society organisations.

III. Political Advertising			
Commitment 13			
Relevant Signatories agree to engage in ongoing monitoring and research to understand and respond to risks related to Disinformation in political or issue advertising.			
	C.13	M 13.1	M 13.2	M 13.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the	No	No

implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]		
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?		

Measure 13.1	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 13.2	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 13.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 13.1.1 (for measures 13.1–13.3)	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.

IV. Integrity of Services
Commitments 14 – 16

IV. Integrity of Services

Commitment 14

In order to limit impermissible manipulative behaviours and practices across their services, Relevant Signatories commit to put in place or further bolster policies to address both misinformation and disinformation across their services, and to agree on a cross-service understanding of manipulative behaviours, actors and practices not permitted on their services. Such behaviours and practices, which should periodically be reviewed in light with the latest evidence on the conducts and TTPs employed by malicious actors, such as the AMITT Disinformation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Framework, include:

The following TTPs pertain to the creation of assets for the purpose of a disinformation campaign, and to ways to make these assets seem credible:
- 1. Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts)
- 2. Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g. likes, up votes, comments)
- 3. Use of fake followers or subscribers
- 4. Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains
- 5. Account hijacking or impersonation

The following TTPs pertain to the dissemination of content created in the context of a disinformation campaign, which may or may not include some forms of targeting or attempting to silence opposing views. Relevant TTPs include:
- 6. Deliberately targeting vulnerable recipients (e.g. via personalised advertising, location spoofing or obfuscation)
- 7. Deploy deceptive manipulated media (e.g. "deep fakes", "cheap fakes"...)
- 8. Use "hack and leak" operation (which may or may not include doctored content)
- 9. Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification, including attempts to deceive/manipulate platforms algorithms (e.g. keyword stuffing or inauthentic posting/reposting designed to mislead people about popularity of content, including by influencers)
- 10. Use of deceptive practices to deceive/manipulate platform algorithms, such as to create, amplify or hijack hashtags, data voids, filter bubbles, or echo chambers
- 11. Non-transparent compensated messages or promotions by influencers
- 12. Coordinated mass reporting of non-violative opposing content or accounts

	C.14	M 14.1	M 14.2	M 14.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new	Yes	Yes

tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]		

If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report, we continue to enforce and report publicly on our policies to tackle inauthentic behaviour.
	
	   – **Fake accounts:** In order to maintain a safe environment, we restrict or remove fake accounts that violate our Terms of Service. We expect the number of accounts we action to vary over time due to the unpredictable nature of adversarial account creation. We actioned 1 billion accounts against our fake accounts policy in Q1 2025 and 687 million fake accounts in Q2 2025 on Facebook globally.
	   – **Inauthentic behaviour:** We continue to <u>investigate</u> and take down coordinated adversarial networks of accounts, Pages and Groups on Facebook that seek to mislead people about who is behind them and what they are doing. We also work to scale our enforcement by feeding the insights we learn from investigating these networks globally into automated detection systems to help us find bad actors engaged in these and similar violating behaviours, including networks that attempt to come back after we had taken them down.
	
	We also continue to improve our detection of <u>inauthentic behaviour policy</u> violations to counter new tactics and more quickly act against the spectrum of deceptive practices – both Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour and other inauthentic tactics (often used by financially motivated actors) we see on our platforms – whether foreign or domestic, state or non-state.
	
	In July 2024, we <u>stopped removing content</u> solely on the basis of our manipulated video policy. We will continue to remove content if it violates our Community Standards, regardless of whether it is created by AI or not.
		As mentioned in our baseline report, we continue to enforce and report publicly on our policies to tackle inauthentic behaviour.
		
		   – **Inauthentic behaviour:** We continue to <u>investigate</u> and take down coordinated adversarial networks of accounts on Instagram that seek to mislead people about who is behind them and what they are doing. We also work to scale our enforcement by feeding the insights we learn from investigating these networks globally to help us automatically detect bad actors engaged in these and similar violating behaviours, including networks that attempt to come back after we had taken them down.
		
		We also continue to improve our detection of <u>inauthentic behaviour policy</u> violations to counter new tactics and more quickly act against the spectrum of deceptive practices – both Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour and other inauthentic tactics (often used by financially motivated actors) we see on our platforms – whether foreign or domestic, state or non-state.
		
		In July 2024, we <u>stopped removing content</u> solely on the basis of our manipulated video policy. We will continue to remove content if it violates our Community Standards, regardless of whether it is created by AI or not.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No

| If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months? | As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes. | As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes. |

Measure 14.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 14.1.1	To clarify what we've included in our baseline report, depending on the context, the actor, and the activity, several TTPs can be combined and are covered by several of our policies. We have highlighted some examples below: **Inauthentic Behaviour –** Our <u>Inauthentic Behaviour</u> policy is targeted at addressing deceptive behaviours. In line with our commitment to authenticity, we do not allow people to misrepresent themselves on Facebook or use fake accounts. **CIB Policy** – Our policy on <u>Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour</u> (CIB) addresses covert influence operations (IO). Defined as "particularly sophisticated forms of Inauthentic Behavior where inauthentic accounts are central to the operation," the policy informs how we find, identify and remove IO networks on our platforms. CIB can include a variety of different TTPs depending on the actors, context, and operation. Having said that, we often see (1) creation of inauthentic accounts; (2) the use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments); (3) the use of fake followers or subscribers; (4) the creation of inauthentic pages, groups, and domains; (5) inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification; (6) account hijacking or impersonation; and (7) inauthentic coordination. We also remove millions of fake accounts every day under our policy on <u>Account Integrity and Authentic Identity</u>. **Cybersecurity** – Attempts to gather sensitive personal information or <u>engage in unauthorised access</u> by deceptive or invasive methods are harmful to the authentic, open and safe atmosphere that we want to foster. Therefore, we do not allow attempts to gather sensitive user information or engage in unauthorised access through the abuse of our platform, products, or services. **Spam –** We work hard to<u> limit the spread of spam</u> because we do not want to allow content that is designed to deceive, or that attempts to	To clarify what we've included in our baseline report, depending on the context, the actor, and the activity, several TTPs can be combined and are covered by several of our policies. We have highlighted some examples below: **Inauthentic Behaviour –** Our <u>Inauthentic Behaviour</u> policy is targeted at addressing deceptive behaviours. In line with our commitment to authentic interactions, we do not allow people to misrepresent themselves on Instagram. **CIB Policy** – Our policy on <u>Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour</u> (CIB) addresses covert influence operations (IO). Defined as "particularly sophisticated forms of Inauthentic Behavior where inauthentic accounts are central to the operation," the policy informs how we find, identify and remove IO networks on our platforms. CIB can include a variety of different TTPs depending on the actors, context, and operation. Having said that, we often see (1) creation of inauthentic accounts; (2) the use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments); (3) the use of fake followers or subscribers; (4) the creation of inauthentic groups, and domains; (5) inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification; (6) account hijacking or impersonation; and (7) inauthentic coordination. **Cybersecurity** – Attempts to gather sensitive personal information or <u>engage in unauthorised access</u> by deceptive or invasive methods are harmful to the authentic, open and safe atmosphere that we want to foster. Therefore, we do not allow attempts to gather sensitive user information or engage in unauthorised access through the abuse of our platform, products, or services. **Spam –** We work hard to<u> limit the spread of spam</u> because we do not want to allow content that is designed to deceive, or that attempts to mislead users, to increase viewership. We also aim to prevent people from abusing our platform, products or features to artificially increase viewership or distribute content en masse for commercial gain.This can be pertinent for

	mislead users, to increase viewership. We also aim to prevent people from abusing our platform, products or features to artificially increase viewership or distribute content en masse for commercial gain. This can be pertinent for several TTPs depending on the context including (1) creation of inauthentic accounts (2) the use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments), (3) the use of fake followers or subscribers (4) the creation of inauthentic Pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains and (5) the use of deceptive practices. **Branded Content Policies** – <u>Branded content </u>may only be posted with the use of the branded content tool, and creators must use the branded content tool to tag the featured third-party product, brand, or business partner with their prior permission. Branded content may only be posted by Facebook Pages, Groups, and profiles with access to the branded content tool. This is pertinent to non-transparent promotional messages. **Privacy** – <u>We remove content</u> that shares, offers or solicits personally identifiable information or other private information that could lead to physical or financial harm, including financial, residential, and medical information, as well as private information obtained from illegal sources.	several TTPs depending on the context including (1) creation of inauthentic accounts (2) the use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments), (3) the use of fake followers or subscribers (4) the creation of inauthentic chat groups, fora, or domains and (5) the use of deceptive practices. **Branded Content Policies** – <u>Branded content</u> may only be posted with the use of the branded content tool, and creators must use the branded content tool to tag the featured third-party product, brand, or business partner with their prior permission. Branded content may only be posted by Instagram accounts with access to the branded content tool. This is pertinent to non-transparent promotional messages. **Privacy** – <u>We remove content</u> that shares, offers or solicits personally identifiable information or other private information that could lead to physical or financial harm, including financial, residential, and medical information, as well as private information obtained from illegal sources.
QRE 14.1.2	As mentioned in our baseline report, our approach to Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) more broadly is grounded on behaviour-based enforcement. This means that we are looking for specific violating behaviours, rather than violating content (which is predicated on other specific violations of our Community Standards, such as misinformation and hate speech). Therefore, when CIB networks are taken down, it is based on their behaviour, not the content they posted. In addition to expert investigations against CIB, we also work to tackle inauthentic behaviour by fake accounts at scale. Pages and Groups directly involved in CIB activity are removed when detected as part of the deceptive adversarial network. Automatically, as these accounts are taken down, posts published by these accounts go down as well. Taking this behaviour-based approach essentially allows us to address the problem at the source. We monitor for efforts to re-establish a presence on Facebook by networks we previously removed. For a comprehensive overview of our approach, see <u>here</u>.	As mentioned in our baseline report, our approach to Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) more broadly is grounded on behaviour-based enforcement. This means that we are looking for specific violating behaviours exhibited, rather than violating content (which is predicated on other specific violations of our Community Standards, such as misinformation and hate speech). Therefore, when CIB networks are taken down, it is based on their behaviour, not the content they posted. In addition to expert investigations against CIB, we also work to tackle inauthentic behaviour by fake accounts at scale. Accounts directly involved in CIB activity are removed when detected as part of the deceptive adversarial network. Automatically, as these accounts are taken down, posts published by these accounts go down as well. Taking this behaviour-based approach essentially allows us to address the problem at the source. We monitor for efforts to re-establish a presence on Instagram by networks we previously removed. For a comprehensive overview of our approach, see <u>here</u>.
Measure 14.2	Facebook	Instagram

| QRE 14.2.1 | As mentioned in our baseline report, we report quarterly on enforcement actions taken under the two policies most relevant to this Commitment:

Our fake accounts policies:

● In Q1 2025, we took action against 1 billion fake accounts. We estimate that fake accounts represented approximately 3% of our worldwide monthly active users (MAU) on Facebook during Q1 2025.
● In Q2 2025, we took action against 687 million fake accounts. We estimate that fake accounts represented approximately 4% of our worldwide monthly active users (MAU) on Facebook during Q2 2025.

Our coordinated inauthentic behaviour policies:

● In early 2025, we removed a network that originated in and targeted users in Romania. We took action against 658 accounts on Facebook, 14 Pages for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behavior. We detected and removed this activity as a result of our internal investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior. | As mentioned in our baseline report, we report quarterly on enforcement actions taken under the policy most relevant to this Commitment:

Our coordinated inauthentic behaviour policies:

● In early 2025, we removed a network that originated in and targeted users in Romania. We took action against two accounts on Instagram for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behavior. We detected and removed this activity as a result of our internal investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior. |

FACEBOOK
SLI 14.2.1 – SLI 14.2.4

| TTP OR ACTION 1: COORDINATED INAUTHENTIC BEHAVIOUR | **TTPs covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter**: This action covers the following TTPs in the context of coordinated inauthentic behaviour:
Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments)
Use of fake followers or subscribers
Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains
Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification
Account hijacking or impersonation

Methodology of data measurement: coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) covers coordinated efforts to manipulate public debate for a strategic goal, in which fake accounts are central to the operation. In each case, people coordinate with one another and use fake accounts to mislead others about who they are and what they are doing. When we investigate and remove these operations, we focus on behaviour rather than content — no matter who's behind them, what |

they post or whether they're foreign or domestic. <u>We included below any network (1) originating in Europe or (2) targeting one or more European country (effectively or potentially), removed from 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025</u>. We categorised them based on their originating country in the table below.

	SLI 14.2.1		SLI 14.2.2					SLI 14.2.3		SLI 14.2.4		
	Number of instances of identified TTPs	Number of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interaction/ engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Romania	658 accounts on Facebook, 14 Pages	Removal of 658 accounts on Facebook, 14 Pages		About 18,300 accounts followed one or more of these Pages	0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)		Fake accounts were used to manage Pages, drive people to off-platform websites, and pose as locals to comment on posts by politicians and news entities. The majority of these comments received no engagement from authentic audiences.				

TTP OR ACTION 2	**TTPs covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter:** This action covers the following TTPs:
	   – Creation of inauthentic accounts or botnets (which may include automated, partially automated, or non-automated accounts)
	   – Use of fake followers or subscribers
	   – Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains
	
	Methodology of data measurement: Total number of accounts Facebook took action on for being fake accounts from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024 globally. It includes both accounts reported by users and accounts found proactively. More information <u>here</u>.			

	SLI 14.2.1	**SLI 14.2.2**	**SLI 14.2.3**	**SLI 14.2.4**

	Number of instances of identified TTPs	Number of actions taken by type	Views/ impressions before action	Interaction/ engagement before action	Views/ impressions after action	Interactio n/ engagem ent after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narrative s used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/ impression s of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impr essions on the service)	Interaction/ engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/en gagement on the service)
GLOBAL Q1 2025	1 bn accounts	Removal of 1 bn accounts			0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)						
GLOBAL Q2 2025	687 million accounts	Removal of 687 million			0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)						

INSTAGRAM
SLI 14.2.1 – SLI 14.2.4

TTP OR ACTION 1	**TTPs covered by this action, selected from the list at the top of this chapter:** This action covers the following TTPs in the context of coordinated inauthentic behaviour:
	  – Use of fake / inauthentic reactions (e.g., likes, upvotes, comments)
	  – Use of fake followers or subscribers
	  – Creation of inauthentic pages, groups, chat groups, fora, or domains
	  – Inauthentic coordination of content creation or amplification
	
	Methodology of data measurement: We included below any network (1) originating in Europe or (2) targeting one or more European countries (effectively or potentially), removed from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024. We categorised them based on their originating country in the table below.

	SLI 14.2.1 SLI 14.2.2 SLI 14.2.3 SLI 14.2.4

Origin of network	Number of instances of identified TTPs	Number of actions taken by type	Views/impressions before action	Interaction/engagement before action	Views/impressions after action	Interaction/engagement after action	Penetration and impact on genuine users	Trends on targeted audiences	Trends on narratives used	TTPs related content in relation to overall content on the service	Views/impressions of TTP related content (in relation to overall views/impressions on the service)	Interaction/engagement with TTP related content (in relation to overall interaction/engagement on the service)
Romania	2 Instagram accounts	Removed 2 Instagram accounts		Around 40 accounts followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.	0 (deleted)	0 (deleted)		Fake accounts were used to manage Pages, drive people to off-platform websites, and pose as locals to comment on posts by politicians and news entities. The majority of these comments received no engagement from authentic audiences.				

Measure 14.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 14.3.1	We continue to engage with this working group now that the list of TTPs has been reached (as reported in our benchmark report), notably to discuss how we report for those TTPs under the SLIs 14.2.1–14.2.4 above.	We continue to engage with this working group now that the list of TTPs has been reached (as reported in our benchmark report), notably to discuss how we report for those TTPs under the SLIs 14.2.1–14.2.4 above.

IV. Integrity of Services
Commitment 15 Relevant Signatories that develop or operate AI systems and that disseminate AI-generated and manipulated content through their services (e.g. deep fakes) commit to take into consideration the transparency obligations and the list of manipulative practices prohibited under the proposal for Artificial Intelligence Act.

	C.15	**M 15.1**	**M 15.2**

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	We recognize that the widespread availability and adoption of generative AI tools may have implications for how we identify and address disinformation on our platforms. We also acknowledge that, under the AIA, certain AI techniques are considered purposefully deceptive or manipulative if they impact people's behavior and decision-making abilities and are reasonably likely to cause significant harm.

We want people to know when they see posts that have been made with AI. In early 2024, we announced a new approach for labeling AI-generated organic content. An important part of this approach relies on industry standard indicators that other companies include in content created using their tools, which help us assess whether something is created using AI.

In H2 2024, we rolled out a change to the "AI info" labels on our platforms so they better reflect the extent of AI used in content. Our intent has always been to help people know when they see content that was made with AI, and we've continued to work with companies across the industry to improve our labeling process so that labels on our platforms are more in line with peoples' expectations.

For organic content that we detect was only modified or edited by AI tools, we moved the "AI info" label to the post's menu. We still display the "AI info" label for content we detect was generated by an AI tool and share whether the content is labeled because of industry-shared signals or because someone self-disclosed.

In September 2024, we also began rolling out "AI Info" labels on ad creative images using a risk-based framework. When an image is created or significantly edited with our generative AI creative features in our | We recognize that the widespread availability and adoption of generative AI tools may have implications for how we identify and address disinformation on our platforms. We also acknowledge that, under the AIA, certain AI techniques are considered purposefully deceptive or manipulative if they impact people's behavior and decision-making abilities and are reasonably likely to cause significant harm.

We want people to know when they see posts that have been made with AI. In early 2024, we announced a new approach for labeling organic AI-generated content. An important part of this approach relies on industry standard indicators that other companies include in content created using their tools, which help us assess whether something is created using AI.

In H2 2024, we rolled out a change to the "AI info" labels on our platforms so they better reflect the extent of AI used in content. Our intent has always been to help people know when they see content that was made with AI, and we've continued to work with companies across the industry to improve our labeling process so that labels on our platforms are more in line with peoples' expectations.

For organic content that we detect was only modified or edited by AI tools, we moved the "AI info" label to the post's menu. We still display the "AI info" label for content we detect was generated by an AI tool and share whether the content is labeled because of industry-shared signals or because someone self-disclosed.

In September 2024, we also began rolling out "AI Info" labels on ad creative images using a risk-based framework. When an image is created or significantly edited with our generative AI creative features in our |

	advertiser marketing tools, a label will appear in the three-dot menu or next to the "Sponsored" label. When these tools result in the inclusion of an AI-generated photorealistic human, the label will appear next to the Sponsored label (not behind the three-dot menu). We will continue to evolve our approach to labeling AI-generated content in partnership with experts, advertisers, policy stakeholders and industry partners as people's expectations and the technologies change.	advertiser marketing tools, a label will appear in the three-dot menu or next to the "Sponsored" label. When these tools result in the inclusion of an AI-generated photorealistic human, the label will appear next to the Sponsored label (not behind the three-dot menu). We will continue to evolve our approach to labeling AI-generated content in partnership with experts, advertisers, policy stakeholders and industry partners as people's expectations and the technologies change.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	We began gradually rolling out "AI Info" labels on ad creative videos using a risk-based framework. When a video is created or significantly edited with our generative AI creative features in our advertiser marketing tools, a label will appear in the three-dot menu or next to the "Sponsored" label. When these tools result in the inclusion of an AI-generated photorealistic human, the label will appear next to the Sponsored label (not behind the three-dot menu). We plan to share more information on our approach to labeling ad images made or edited with non-Meta generative AI tools. We will continue to evolve our approach to labeling AI-generated content in partnership with experts, advertisers, policy stakeholders and industry partners as people's expectations and the technologies change.	We began gradually rolling out "AI Info" labels on ad creative videos using a risk-based framework. When a video is created or significantly edited with our generative AI creative features in our advertiser marketing tools, a label will appear in the three-dot menu or next to the "Sponsored" label. When these tools result in the inclusion of an AI-generated photorealistic human, the label will appear next to the Sponsored label (not behind the three-dot menu). We plan to share more information on our approach to labeling ad images made or edited with non-Meta generative AI tools. We will continue to evolve our approach to labeling AI-generated content in partnership with experts, advertisers, policy stakeholders and industry partners as people's expectations and the technologies change.

Measure 15.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 15.1.1	We address potential abuses from AI-generated content in two primary ways: (1) we remove content that violates our Community Standards regardless of how it was generated; and (2) our third-party fact-checkers can rate content that is false and misleading regardless of how it was generated. In February 2024 Meta's Oversight Board provided feedback regarding our approach to manipulated media, arguing that we unnecessarily risk restricting freedom of expression when we remove manipulated media	We address potential abuses from AI-generated content in two primary ways: (1) we remove content that violates our Community Standards regardless of how it was generated; and (2) our third-party fact-checkers can rate content that is false and misleading regardless of how it was generated. In February 2024 Meta's Oversight Board provided feedback regarding our approach to manipulated media, arguing that we unnecessarily risk restricting freedom of expression when we remove manipulated media

	that does not otherwise violate our Community Standards. It recommended a "less restrictive" approach to manipulated media, such as labels with context. We agree that providing transparency and additional context is now the better way to address this content. In <u>May 2024 we began labelling AI generated or edited content </u>(based on industry aligned standards on identifying AI as well as through users self declaring AI influenced content) with the label 'Made with AI'. While we work with companies across the industry to improve the process so our labelling approach better matches our intent, we've updated the "Made with AI" label to "AI info" across our apps, which people can click for more information. These labels cover a broader range of content in addition to the manipulated content that the Oversight Board also recommended labelling in their feedback. If we determine that digitally-created or altered images, video or audio create a particularly high risk of materially deceiving the public on a matter of importance, we may add a more prominent label so people have more information and context. In H2 2024, we rolled out a change to the "AI info" labels on our platforms so they better reflect the extent of AI used in content. Our intent has always been to help people know when they see content that was made with AI, and we've continued to work with companies across the industry to improve our labeling process so that labels on our platforms are more in line with peoples' expectations. For content that we detect was only modified or edited by AI tools, we are moving the "AI info" label to the post's menu. We will still display the "AI info" label for content we detect was generated by an AI tool and share whether the content is labeled because of industry-shared signals or because someone self-disclosed.	that does not otherwise violate our Community Standards. It recommended a "less restrictive" approach to manipulated media, such as labels with context. We agree that providing transparency and additional context is now the better way to address this content. In <u>May 2024 we began labelling AI generated or edited content </u>(based on industry aligned standards on identifying AI as well as through users self declaring AI influenced content) with the label 'Made with AI'. While we work with companies across the industry to improve the process so our labelling approach better matches our intent, we've updated the "Made with AI" label to "AI info" across our apps, which people can click for more information. These labels cover a broader range of content in addition to the manipulated content that the Oversight Board also recommended labelling in their feedback. If we determine that digitally-created or altered images, video or audio create a particularly high risk of materially deceiving the public on a matter of importance, we may add a more prominent label so people have more information and context. In H2 2024, we rolled out a change to the "AI info" labels on our platforms so they better reflect the extent of AI used in content. Our intent has always been to help people know when they see content that was made with AI, and we've continued to work with companies across the industry to improve our labeling process so that labels on our platforms are more in line with peoples' expectations. For content that we detect was only modified or edited by AI tools, we are moving the "AI info" label to the post's menu. We will still display the "AI info" label for content we detect was generated by an AI tool and share whether the content is labeled because of industry-shared signals or because someone self-disclosed.
Measure 15.2	Facebook	Instagram

QRE 15.2.1	Meta commits to continue investing in Responsible AI to address the hard questions around issues such as privacy, fairness, accountability, and transparency. • We display the "AI info" label for content we detect was generated by an AI tool and share whether the content is labeled because of industry-shared signals or because someone self-disclosed.	Meta commits to continue investing in Responsible AI to address the hard questions around issues such as privacy, fairness, accountability, and transparency. • We display the "AI info" label for content we detect was generated by an AI tool and share whether the content is labeled because of industry-shared signals or because someone self-disclosed.

IV. Integrity of Services

Commitment 16
Relevant Signatories commit to operate channels of exchange between their relevant teams in order to proactively share information about cross-platform influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerge on their respective services, with the aim of preventing dissemination and resurgence on other services, in full compliance with privacy legislation and with due consideration for security and human rights risks.

	C.16	M 16.1	M 16.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report, a key part of our strategy to prevent interference is working with government authorities, law enforcement, security experts, civil society and other tech companies through direct communication, sharing knowledge and collaboration.	As mentioned in our baseline report, a key part of our strategy to prevent interference is working with government authorities, law enforcement, security experts, civil society and other tech companies through direct communication, sharing knowledge and collaboration.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the	No	No

next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]		
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes to combat disinformation.	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes to combat disinformation.

Measure 16.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 16.1.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, a key part of our strategy to prevent interference is working with government authorities, law enforcement, security experts, civil society and other tech companies to stop emerging threats by establishing a direct line of communication, sharing knowledge and identifying opportunities for collaboration. In May 2025, we shared our Adversarial Threat Report with information on threat research into new covert influence operations that we took down. We detected and removed these campaigns before they were able to build authentic audiences on our apps. **Romania**: We took action against 658 accounts on Facebook and 14 Pages for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behavior. This network originated in and targeted users in Romania across multiple internet services. Fake accounts – some of which were detected and disabled by our automated systems prior to our investigation – were used to manage Pages, drive people to off-platform websites, and comment on posts by politicians and news entities. The majority of these comments received no engagement from authentic audiences. These accounts posed as locals in Romania posting about sports, travel, or local news and had a corresponding presence on YouTube, X, and TikTok, likely to backstop their fictitious personas and entities across the internet in an attempt to make them appear more credible. This campaign showed consistent operational security (OpSec) to conceal its origin and coordination, including by relying on proxy IP infrastructure. We found this network as a result of our internal investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region. ● Presence on Facebook: 658 accounts on Facebook, 14 Pages.	As mentioned in our baseline report, a key part of our strategy to prevent interference is working with government authorities, law enforcement, security experts, civil society and other tech companies to stop emerging threats by establishing a direct line of communication, sharing knowledge and identifying opportunities for collaboration. In May 2025, we shared our Adversarial Threat Report with information on threat research into new covert influence operations that we took down. We detected and removed these campaigns before they were able to build authentic audiences on our apps. **Romania**: We took action against two accounts on Instagram for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behavior. This network originated in and targeted users in Romania across multiple internet services. Fake accounts – some of which were detected and disabled by our automated systems prior to our investigation – were used to manage Pages, drive people to off-platform websites, and comment on posts by politicians and news entities. The majority of these comments received no engagement from authentic audiences. These accounts posed as locals in Romania posting about sports, travel, or local news and had a corresponding presence on YouTube, X, and TikTok, likely to backstop their fictitious personas and entities across the internet in an attempt to make them appear more credible. This campaign showed consistent operational security (OpSec) to conceal its origin and coordination, including by relying on proxy IP infrastructure. We found this network as a result of our internal investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region. ● Presence on Instagram: 2 accounts on Instagram.

	• Followers: About 18,300 accounts followed one or more of these Pages.	• Followers: Around 40 accounts followed one or more of these Instagram accounts.
SLI 16.1.1 – Numbers of actions as a result of information sharing	N/A	
Measure 16.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 16.2.1	We publish our Adversarial Threat Reports to share notable trends and investigations to help inform our community's understanding of the evolving security threats we see.	We publish our Adversarial Threat Reports to share notable trends and investigations to help inform our community's understanding of the evolving security threats we see.

V. Empowering Users
Commitments 17 – 25

V. Empowering Users			
Commitment 17			
In light of the European Commission's initiatives in the area of media literacy, including the new Digital Education Action Plan, Relevant Signatories commit to continue and strengthen their efforts in the area of media literacy and critical thinking, also with the aim to include vulnerable groups.			
	C.17	M 17.1	M 17.2	M 17.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report, the key part of our approach to combat misinformation is providing tools and products that will contribute to a more resilient digital society, where people are able to critically evaluate information, make informed decisions about the content they see, and self-correct. Below are some examples of that work relevant to the European Union. • Meta published its first Media Literacy Annual Plan on 21 July 2025, which set out its current approach to media literacy and the products and features we make available to users of Facebook and Instagram. • In 2025, Meta launched a campaign that ran in Ireland, France, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands which aimed to increase awareness of new tools available on Instagram to protect Youth well-being. These tools included private accounts, additional messaging and sensitive content restrictions, time limit reminders and sleep mode. The campaign ran for 8 weeks from January 13th 2025 on a range of channels including Meta-owned channels, print, digital, audio, TV and Outdoor.	As mentioned in our baseline report, the key part of our approach to combat misinformation is providing tools and products that will contribute to a more resilient digital society, where people are able to critically evaluate information, make informed decisions about the content they see, and self-correct. Below are some examples of that work relevant to the European Union. • Meta published its first Media Literacy Annual Plan on 21 July 2025, which set out its current approach to media literacy and the products and features we make available to users of Facebook and Instagram. • In 2025, Meta launched a campaign that ran in Ireland, France, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands which aimed to increase awareness of new tools available on Instagram to protect Youth well-being. These tools included private accounts, additional messaging and sensitive content restrictions, time limit reminders and sleep mode. The campaign ran for 8 weeks from January 13th 2025 on a range of channels including Meta-owned channels, print, digital, audio, TV and Outdoor.

	Facebook	Instagram
	• As part of our global anti-scam awareness campaign to protect people online, we share <u>relevant product tools</u> across Facebook. Additionally, we released new research on romance scams occurring across the internet, along with updates on our enforcement actions targeting scammers who impersonate military personnel and other individuals.	• As part of our global anti-scam awareness campaign to protect people online, we share <u>relevant product tools</u> across Instagram. Additionally, we released new research on romance scams occurring across the internet, along with updates on our enforcement actions targeting scammers who impersonate military personnel and other individuals.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 17.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 17.1.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, we have developed over the years a series of tools and resources – such as online tutorials, lesson plans for educators, tips for spotting false news, and awareness-raising ad campaigns - to educate and equip people with the necessary skills for navigating the digital world. A key pillar of our strategy is to inform our users by providing people with specific and relevant context when they come across a flagged post, we can help them be more informed about what they see and read. Here are some ways we provide context on relevant pieces of content that may be sensitive or misleading: • Warning screens on sensitive content on Facebook:	As mentioned in our baseline report, we have developed over the years a series of tools and resources – such as online tutorials, lesson plans for educators, tips for spotting false news, and awareness-raising ad campaigns – to educate and equip people with the necessary skills for navigating the digital world. A key pillar of our strategy is to inform our users by providing people with specific and relevant context when they come across a flagged post, we can help them be more informed about what they see and read. Here are some ways we provide context on relevant pieces of content that may be sensitive or misleading: • Warning screens on sensitive content on Instagram:

	- People value the ability to discuss important and often difficult issues online, but they also have different sensitivities to certain kinds of content. Therefore, we include a warning screen over potentially sensitive content on Facebook, such as: - Violent or graphic imagery. - Posts that contain descriptions of bullying or harassment, if shared to raise awareness. - Some forms of nudity. - Posts related to suicide or suicide attempts. - Verified badges on Facebook: - Our goal is to help people feel confident about the content and accounts that they interact with. - To combat impersonations and help people avoid scammers that pretend to be high-profile people, Meta provides verified badges on Pages and profiles that indicate a verified account. This means that we've confirmed the authentic presence of the public figure, celebrity or global brand that the account represents. - Notification screens on outdated articles on the Facebook app: - Our goal is to make it easier for people to identify content that's timely, reliable and most valuable to them. - To give people more context about a news article before they share it on Facebook, Meta includes a notification screen if the article is more than 90 days old. After which, we allow people to continue sharing it if they desire. This notification helps people understand how old a given news article is and its source. - To ensure that we don't slow the spread of credible information, especially in the health space, content posted by government health authorities and recognised global health organisations does not have this notification screen.	- To help people avoid coming across content that they'd rather not see, we limit the visibility of certain posts that are flagged by people on Instagram for containing sensitive or graphic material. Photos and videos containing such content will appear with a warning screen to inform people about the content before they view it. This warning screen appears when viewing a post in feed or on someone's profile. - Verified badges on Instagram: - Our goal is to help people feel confident about the content and accounts that they interact with. - To combat impersonations and help people avoid scammers that pretend to be high-profile people, Meta provides verified badges on Pages and profiles that indicate a verified account. This means that we've confirmed the authentic presence of the public figure, celebrity or global brand that the account represents.
SLI 17.1.1 – actions enforcing policies above	*We were not able to deliver this SLI for this report.*	*We were not able to deliver this SLI for this report.*

Measure 17.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 17.2.1	**National Elections:** We proactively point users to reliable information on the electoral process through in-app 'Election Day Information'. These are notices at the top of feed	**National Elections:** We proactively point users to reliable information on the electoral process through in-app 'Election Day Information'. These are notices at the top of

	on Facebook, reminding people of the day they can vote and re-directing them to national authoritative sources on how and where to vote. ● For instance, in preparation for the German federal election in February 2025, Meta partnered with the German Returning Officer to enhance civic engagement among German users by providing access to reliable voting information. Leading up to the election and on election day, we displayed top-of-feed notifications on both Facebook and Instagram for all users in Germany, directing them to the official website. Similar notifications were also sent out on election day. ● For the presidential elections in Poland, Meta partnered with the National Electoral Commission to promote civic engagement among Polish users by providing access to reliable voting information on election day for both rounds. We displayed top-of-feed notifications on Facebook and Instagram to all eligible voters in Poland, directing them to the National Electoral Commission's website. ● To enhance civic engagement among Portuguese users for the 2025 snap elections, Meta collaborated with the Portuguese Electoral Body to connect people with reliable information about voting. In the lead up to the election and on the election day, Meta showed on top of feed notifications on both Facebook and Instagram to all users in Portugal to redirect them to their website.	feed on Instagram, reminding people of the day they can vote and re-directing them to national authoritative sources on how and where to vote. ● For instance, in preparation for the German federal election in February 2025, Meta partnered with the German Returning Officer to enhance civic engagement among German users by providing access to reliable voting information. Leading up to the election and on election day, we displayed top-of-feed notifications on both Facebook and Instagram for all users in Germany, directing them to the official website. Similar notifications were also sent out on election day. ● For the presidential elections in Poland, Meta partnered with the National Electoral Commission to promote civic engagement among Polish users by providing access to reliable voting information on election day for both rounds. We displayed top-of-feed notifications on Facebook and Instagram to all eligible voters in Poland, directing them to the National Electoral Commission's website. ● To enhance civic engagement among Portuguese users for the 2025 snap elections, Meta collaborated with the Portuguese Electoral Body to connect people with reliable information about voting. In the lead up to the election and on the election day, Meta showed on top of feed notifications on both Facebook and Instagram to all users in Portugal to redirect them to their website.
SLI 17.2.1 – actions enforcing policies above	Below we provide the engagement statistics for some of the media literacy campaigns mentioned earlier (for statistics related to elections, please refer to the National Elections chapter): ● **Youth campaign**: On Meta owned platforms (Facebook and Instagram) the campaign reached 12.4 million users in Ireland, France, Spain, Italy and The Netherlands generating 555 million impressions. On channels outside of Meta owned platforms the campaign reached 92.9 million users in Ireland, France, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands generating 2.5B impressions (where calculated i.e. digital).	Below we provide the engagement statistics for some of the media literacy campaigns mentioned earlier (for statistics related to elections, please refer to the National Elections chapter): ● **Youth campaign**: On Meta owned platforms (Facebook and Instagram) the campaign reached 12.4 million users in Ireland, France, Spain, Italy and The Netherlands generating 555 million impressions. On channels outside of Meta owned platforms the campaign reached 92.9 million users in Ireland, France, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands generating 2.5B impressions (where calculated i.e. digital).

Measure 17.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 17.3.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta, working in partnership with experts, educators, civic society and governments around the world is central to our digital citizenship efforts. Our partners bring valuable subject matter expertise and are also important channels for distributing these tools and resources to a broader audience. Partners we work with include various government bodies (such as ministries of education and media regulators), our global network of third-party fact-checkers, parent-teacher associations, the European Association for Viewers Interests (EAVI), the UNESCO Institute for Information Technologies in Education (UNESCO IITE), Yale University, Harvard University, Micro:bit Educational Foundation, and many more. Meta also belongs to the Steering Committee of the EU Digital Citizenship working group, launched in December 2020 to contribute multidisciplinary expertise from civil society and industry to the current EU debate on digital citizenship.	As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta, working in partnership with experts, educators, civic society and governments around the world is central to our digital citizenship efforts. Our partners bring valuable subject matter expertise and are also important channels for distributing these tools and resources to a broader audience. Partners we work with include various government bodies (such as ministries of education and media regulators), our global network of third-party factcheckers, parent-teacher associations, the European Association for Viewers Interests (EAVI), the UNESCO Institute for Information Technologies in Education (UNESCO IITE), Yale University, Harvard University, the Micro:bit Educational Foundation, and many more. Meta also belongs to the Steering Committee of the EU Digital Citizenship working group, launched in December 2020 to contribute multidisciplinary expertise from civil society and industry to the current EU debate on digital citizenship.

V. Empowering Users

Commitment 18

Relevant Signatories commit to minimise the risks of viral propagation of Disinformation by adopting safe design practices as they develop their systems, policies, and features.

	C.18	M 18.1	M 18.2	M 18.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	N/A	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report, we continue to enforce our policies to combat the spread of misinformation.	As mentioned in our baseline report, we continue to enforce our policies to combat the spread of misinformation.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. Commitment 18 covers the current practices for Facebook in the EU. In keeping with Meta's public announcements on 7 January 2025, we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Facebook and we will keep under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes.	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. Commitment 18 covers the current practices for Instagram in the EU. In keeping with Meta's public announcements on 7 January 2025, we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Instagram and we will keep under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes.

Measure 18.1	N/A	N/A
QRE 18.1.1	N/A	N/A
QRE 18.1.2	N/A	N/A
QRE 18.1.3	N/A	N/A
SLI 18.1.1 – actions proving effectiveness of measures and policies	N/A	N/A
Member States		
Austria	N/A	N/A
Belgium	N/A	N/A

Bulgaria	N/A	N/A
Croatia	N/A	N/A
Cyprus	N/A	N/A
Czech Republic	N/A	N/A
Denmark	N/A	N/A
Estonia	N/A	N/A
Finland	N/A	N/A
France	N/A	N/A
Germany	N/A	N/A
Greece	N/A	N/A
Hungary	N/A	N/A
Ireland	N/A	N/A
Italy	N/A	N/A
Latvia	N/A	N/A
Lithuania	N/A	N/A
Luxembourg	N/A	N/A
Malta	N/A	N/A
Netherlands	N/A	N/A
Poland	N/A	N/A
Portugal	N/A	N/A
Romania	N/A	N/A
Slovakia	N/A	N/A
Slovenia	N/A	N/A
Spain	N/A	N/A
Sweden	N/A	N/A
Total EU	N/A	N/A
Measure 18.2	Facebook	Instagram

| QRE 18.2.1 | As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies and approach to tackle misinformation – which are summarised in QRE 18.1.3 – are published in our Transparency Centre:

  • Meta Community Standards – <u>Misinformation</u>
  • Content Distribution Guidelines ('Fact-checked misinformation') – <u>Misinformation</u>

These include specific actions taken against actors that <u>repeatedly</u> share misinformation. We take action against Pages, groups, accounts and domains that repeatedly share or publish content that is rated False or Altered, near-identical to what fact-checkers have debunked as False or Altered, and content we enforce against under our policy on vaccine misinformation. If Pages, groups, accounts or websites repeatedly share such content they will see their distribution reduced.

In 2023, we updated our penalty system to <u>restrict accounts</u> that violate our Community Standards on the platform. For most violations, the user's first strike will result in a warning with no further restrictions. If Meta removes additional posts that go against the Community Standards in the future, we'll apply additional strikes to the account, and the user may lose access to some features for longer periods of time.

These restrictions generally only apply to Facebook accounts, but they may also be extended to Pages that represent an individual, such as a celebrity or political figure. (Note that while we count strikes on both Facebook and Instagram, <u>these restrictions</u> only apply to Facebook accounts).

If content that users have posted goes against our more severe policies, such as our policy on dangerous individuals and organisations or adult sexual exploitation, the user may receive additional, longer restrictions from certain features.

For most violations, if the user continues to post content that goes against the Community Standards after repeated warnings and restrictions, we will disable the account.

These policies apply across all EU Member States. | As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies and approach to tackle misinformation – which are summarised in QRE 18.1.3 – are published in our Transparency Centre:

  • Meta Community Standards – <u>Misinformation</u>
  • Content Distribution Guidelines ('Fact-checked misinformation') – <u>Misinformation</u>

These include specific actions taken against actors that <u>repeatedly violate our policies</u>. We take action against accounts that repeatedly share or publish content that is rated False or Altered, near-identical to what fact-checkers have debunked as False or Altered, and content we enforce against under our policy on vaccine misinformation. If accounts repeatedly share such content they will see their distribution reduced.

For most violations, the user's first strike will result in a warning with no further restrictions. If Meta removes additional posts that go against the Community Standards in the future, we'll apply additional strikes to the account, and the user may lose access to some features for longer periods of time.

If content that users have posted goes against our more severe policies, such as our policy on dangerous individuals and organisations or adult sexual exploitation, the user may receive additional, longer restrictions from certain features.

For most violations, if the user continues to post content that goes against the Community Standards after repeated warnings and restrictions, we will disable the account.

These policies apply across all EU Member States. |
| **SLI 18.2.1 – actions taken in response to policy violations** | Number of unique contents that were removed from Facebook for violating our harmful health misinformation or voter or census interference policies in EU Member State countries from 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025. | Number of unique contents that were removed from Instagram for violating our harmful health misinformation or voter or census interference policies in EU Member State countries from 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025.

Country determined by inferred user (responsible for the content) location. |

	Country determined by inferred user (responsible for the content) location. *Meta's policies to tackle false claims about COVID-19 which could directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm changed in June 2023 following Meta's independent Oversight Board's advice. We now only remove this content in countries with an active COVID-19 public health emergency declaration (during the reporting period no countries had an active health emergency declaration). This change has impacted our enforcement metrics on removals for this reporting period but does not change our overall approach to fact-checking. These changes are an expected part of fluctuating content trends online*	*Meta's policies to tackle false claims about COVID-19 which could directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm changed in June 2023 following Meta's independent Oversight Board's advice. We now only remove this content in countries with an active COVID-19 public health emergency declaration (during the reporting period no countries had an active health emergency declaration). This change has impacted our enforcement metrics on removals for this reporting period but does not change our overall approach to fact-checking. These changes are an expected part of fluctuating content trends online*
Member States		
Austria	13	1
Belgium	5	2
Bulgaria	10	1
Croatia	0	4
Cyprus	1	0
Czech Republic	10	0
Denmark	2	1
Estonia	1	0
Finland	1	1
France	59	18
Germany	319	15
Greece	28	0
Hungary	4	1
Ireland	1	1
Italy	68	13
Latvia	0	0
Lithuania	1	0
Luxembourg	1	0
Malta	2	0
Netherlands	12	2
Poland	107	19

Portugal	33	7
Romania	25	3
Slovakia	3	1
Slovenia	0	0
Spain	21	15
Sweden	4	1
Total EU	731	106
Measure 18.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 18.3.1	As noted in our baseline report, the following are some key initiatives we have supported to empower the independent research community and to help us gain a better understanding of what our users want, need and expect: such as **Social Science Research, Data for Good, and the Influence Operations Research Archive** for coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) network disruptions. **Research Grants & Awards.** In our baseline report, we mentioned that every year, we invest in numerous research projects as part of our overall efforts to make the internet and people on our platforms safer and more secure. Details of our most recent awards can be found here.	As noted in our baseline report, the following are some key initiatives we have supported to empower the independent research community and to help us gain a better understanding of what our users want, need and expect: such as **Social Science Research, Data for Good, and the Influence Operations Research Archive** for coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) network disruptions. **Research Grants & Awards.** In our baseline report, we mentioned that every year, we invest in numerous research projects as part of our overall efforts to make the internet and people on our platforms safer and more secure. Details of our most recent awards can be found here.

V. Empowering Users
Commitment 19
Relevant Signatories using recommender systems commit to make them transparent to the recipients regarding the main criteria and parameters used for prioritising or deprioritising information, and provide options to users about recommender systems, and make available information on those options.

	C.19	M 19.1	M 19.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new	No	No

implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]		
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our transparency and recommender tools.	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our transparency and recommender tools.

Measure 19.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 19.1.1	The range of measures and policies put in place in relation to this measure have been described in previous reports and are explained in greater detail on Meta's Transparency Centre. For example, there it is possible to find detailed explanations relating to Facebook System Cards that help people understand how AI shapes their product experiences. The policies outlined apply across all EU Member States.	The range of measures and policies put in place in relation to this measure have been described in previous reports and are explained in greater detail on Meta's Transparency Centre. For example, there it is possible to find detailed explanations relating to Instagram System Cards that help people understand how AI shapes their product experiences. The policies outlined apply across all EU Member States.
Measure 19.2	Facebook	Instagram
SLI 19.2.1 – User Settings	*We were not able to deliver this SLI for this report.*	*We were not able to deliver this SLI for this report.*

V. Empowering Users
Commitment 20
Relevant Signatories commit to empower users with tools to assess the provenance and edit history or authenticity or accuracy of digital content.
As mentioned in our baseline report, the tools assessing provenance and edit history of digital content are one of several ways to empower users to make more informed decisions about the content they see online. Other tools to achieve this objective, including as set forth in Commitment 21 are relevant and pertinent to our subscribed products at this time.

V. Empowering Users				
Commitment 21				
Relevant Signatories commit to strengthen their efforts to better equip users to identify Disinformation. In particular, in order to enable users to navigate services in an informed way, Relevant Signatories commit to facilitate, across all Member States languages in which their services are provided, user access to tools for assessing the factual accuracy of sources through fact-checks from fact-checking organisations that have flagged potential Disinformation, as well as warning labels from other authoritative sources.				
	C.21	M 21.1	M 21.2	M 21.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	N/A	N/A	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our previous report, we updated our fact-checking program guidelines to clarify that our existing policies allow fact-checkers to rate digitally created or edited content – including through the use of artificial intelligence (AI) – when content risks misleading people about something consequential that has no basis in	As mentioned in our previous report, we updated our fact-checking program guidelines to clarify that our existing policies allow fact-checkers to rate digitally created or edited content – including through the use of artificial intelligence (AI) – when content risks misleading people about something consequential that has no basis in

	fact. We also employed measures to improve fact-checkers ability to apply their ratings to fake or manipulated audio content.	fact. We also employed measures to improve fact-checkers ability to apply their ratings to fake or manipulated audio content.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. Commitment 21 covers the current practices for Facebook in the EU. In keeping with Meta's public announcements on 7 January 2025, we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Facebook and Instagram and we will keep under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes.	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. Commitment 21 covers the current practices for Instagram in the EU. In keeping with Meta's public announcements on 7 January 2025, we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Facebook and Instagram and we will keep under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes.

Measure 21.1	N/A	N/A
QRE 21.1.1	N/A	N/A
SLI 21.1.1 – actions taken under measure 21.1	N/A	

SLI 21.1.2 – actions taken under measure 21.1	1. Number of distinct articles written by 3PFCs that were used to apply a fact-checking label to content on Facebook from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.* 2. Number of distinct pieces of content viewed on Facebook that were treated with a fact-checking label due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.. 3. Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Facebook that was treated with a fact-checking label in EU member state countries from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.. *This metric shows the number of distinct fact-checking articles written by Meta's 3PFC partners and utilised to label content in each EU member state. As articles may be used in multiple countries, and several articles may be used to label a piece of content, the total sum of articles utilised for all member states exceeds the number of distinct articles created in the EU (150,000). This is expected.			1. Number of distinct articles written by 3PFCs that were used to apply a fact-checking label to content on Instagram from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.* 2. Number of distinct pieces of content viewed on Instagram that were treated with a fact-checking label due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.. 3. Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Instagram that was treated with a fact-checking label in EU member state countries from 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.. *This metric shows the number of distinct fact-checking articles written by Meta's 3PFC partners and utilised to label content in each EU member state. As articles may be used in multiple countries, and several articles may be used to label a piece of content, the total sum of articles utilised for all member states exceeds the number of distinct articles created in the EU (43,000). This is expected.		
	Number of Articles written by third party fact checkers to justify rating on Facebook between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.	Content viewed on Facebook and treated with fact checks, due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content – Facebook between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.	Number of Articles written by third party fact checkers to justify rating on Instagram between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.	Content viewed on Instagram and treated with fact checks, due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content – Instagram between 01/07/2024 to 31/12/2024.
Member States	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Austria	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Belgium	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Bulgaria	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Croatia	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Cyprus	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Czech Republic	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Denmark	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Estonia	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Finland	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
France	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Germany	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Greece	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Hungary	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Ireland	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Italy	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Latvia	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Lithuania	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Luxembourg	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Malta	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Netherlands	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Poland	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Portugal	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Romania	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Slovakia	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Slovenia	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Spain	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Sweden	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Total EU	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Measure 21.2	N/A	N/A
QRE 21.2.1	N/A	N/A
Measure 21.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 21.3.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, the fact-checking programme's ratings as well as its labels were developed in close consultation with fact-checkers and misinformation experts. Meta also works closely with independent experts who possess knowledge and expertise to determine what constitutes misinformation that is likely to directly contribute to imminent harm.	As mentioned in our baseline report, the fact-checking programme's ratings as well as its labels were developed in close consultation with fact-checkers and misinformation experts. Meta also works closely with independent experts who possess knowledge and expertise to determine what constitutes misinformation that is likely to directly contribute to imminent harm.

V. Empowering Users
Commitment 22
Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with tools to help them make more informed decisions when they encounter online information that may be false or misleading, and to facilitate user access to tools and information to assess the trustworthiness of information sources, such as indicators of trustworthiness for informed online navigation, particularly relating to societal issues or debates of general interest.
As mentioned in our baseline report, trustworthiness indicators are one of several ways to empower users to make more informed decisions about the content they see online. This is acknowledged by the Commission's 2021 Guidance, which describes them as a tool signatories "could" explore, and negotiations of the updated Code which confirmed this to be a direction signatories are encouraged but not expected to follow. Other tools to achieve this objective covered elsewhere in this section – Commitment 21 in particular – are relevant and pertinent for our subscribed products at this time. We note however that we use several of the products and features listed under Measure 22.7 (in particular information panels, banners, pop-ups, and prompts) as already outlined under Commitment 21 above, as well as in our crisis monitoring reports below.

V. Empowering users			
Commitment 23			
Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with the functionality to flag harmful false and/or misleading information that violates Signatories policies or terms of service.			
	C.23	M 23.1	M 23.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No

If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report, we maintain a <u>specific report category</u> for users to flag to us what they believe is false information (in addition to content that they believe violates any of our other Community Standards).	As mentioned in our baseline report, we maintain a <u>specific report category</u> for users to flag to us what they believe is false information (in addition to content that they believe violates any of our other Community Standards).
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our user reporting tools or processes.	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our user reporting tools or processes.

Measure 23.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 23.1.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, users can report content that they specifically identified as false information through the following process <u>outlined on our website</u>. We also provide an appeal system. More details about these systems can be found in our baseline report.	As mentioned in our baseline report, users can report content that they specifically identified as false information through the following process <u>outlined on our website</u>. We also provide an appeal system. More details about these systems can be found in our baseline report.
Measure 23.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 23.2.1	Meta's processes include measures to uphold the integrity of our reporting and appeals systems. **Mass reporting:** We do not remove pieces of content based on the number of reports we receive. If a piece of content violates our Community Standards, one report is enough for us to remove it. If it does not violate our Community Standards, the number of reports will not lead to the content being removed, no matter how high. Because of the volume of content we review across our platforms, we always need to prioritise cases for our content moderators, and	Meta's processes include measures to uphold the integrity of our reporting and appeals systems. **Mass reporting:** We do not remove pieces of content based on the number of reports we receive. If a piece of content violates our Community Standards, one report is enough for us to remove it. If it does not violate our Community Standards, the number of reports will not lead to the content being removed, no matter how high. Because of the volume of content we review across our platforms, we always need to prioritise cases for our content moderators, and we do that

	we do that based on severity and virality. The amount of reports does not impact response times or enforcement decisions.	based on severity and virality. The amount of reports does not impact response times or enforcement decisions.
	Protection against misuse: We may suspend the processing of notices and complaints submitted through our notice and complaints mechanisms, for a limited period of time, where individuals and entities have, after being warned, frequently submitted notices and complaints that are manifestly unfounded.	**Protection against misuse:** We may suspend the processing of notices and complaints submitted through our notice and complaints mechanisms, for a limited period of time, where individuals and entities have, after being warned, frequently submitted notices and complaints that are manifestly unfounded.
	Anonymous reporting: When something gets reported to Facebook, we'll review it and take action on anything we determine doesn't follow our Community Standards. Unless a user is reporting an incident of intellectual property infringement, their report will be kept confidential and the account that was reported won't see who reported them.	**Anonymous reporting:** When something gets reported to Instagram, we'll review it and take action on anything we determine doesn't follow our Community Standards. Unless a user is reporting an incident of intellectual property infringement, their report will be kept confidential and the account that was reported won't see who reported them.

V. Empowering users
Commitment 24
Relevant Signatories commit to inform users whose content or accounts has been subject to enforcement actions (content/accounts labelled, demoted or otherwise enforced on) taken on the basis of violation of policies relevant to this section (as outlined in Measure 18.2), and provide them with the possibility to appeal against the enforcement action at issue and to handle complaints in a timely, diligent, transparent, and objective manner and to reverse the action without undue delay where the complaint is deemed to be founded.

	C.24	M 24.1
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No

If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report, we're committed to fighting the spread of misinformation on our platforms, but we also believe it's critical to enable expression, debate and voice. We let users know when we remove a piece of content for breaching our Community Standards or when a fact-checker rated their content. In June 2023, we also took steps to improve our penalty system to make it fairer and more effective. Relevant updates to user notice and appeal processes were also made in 2023, in line with DSA requirements.	As mentioned in our baseline report, we're committed to fighting the spread of misinformation on our platforms, but we also believe it's critical to enable expression, debate and voice. We let users know when we remove a piece of content for breaching our Community Standards or when a fact-checker rated their content. In June 2023, we also took steps to improve our penalty system to make it fairer and more effective. Relevant updates to user notice and appeal processes were also made in 2023, in line with DSA requirements.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our processes.	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our processes.

Measure 24.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 24.1.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, when we remove a piece of content, we let the user know that something they posted goes against our Community Standards. Moreover, we are transparent with users when their content is fact-checked, and have an appeals process in place for users who wish to issue a correction or dispute a rating with a fact-checker. Appeal procedures are outlined under QRE 23.1.1.	As mentioned in our baseline report, when we remove a piece of content, we let the user know that something they posted goes against our Community Standards. Moreover, we are transparent with users when their content is fact-checked, and have an appeals process in place for users who wish to issue a correction or dispute a rating with a fact-checker. Appeal procedures are outlined under QRE 23.1.1.
SLI 24.1.1 – enforcement actions	Number of unique contents that were removed from Facebook for violating our harmful health misinformation or voter or census interference policies in EU Member State countries from 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025.	Number of unique contents that were removed from Instagram for violating our harmful health misinformation or voter or census interference policies in EU Member State countries from from 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025.

	Meta's policies to tackle false claims about COVID-19 which could directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm changed in June 2023 following Meta's independent Oversight Board's advice. We now only remove this content in countries with an active COVID-19 public health emergency declaration (during the reporting period no countries had an active health emergency declaration). This change has impacted our enforcement metrics on removals for this reporting period but does not change our overall approach to fact-checking. These changes are an expected part of fluctuating content trends online	*Meta's policies to tackle false claims about COVID-19 which could directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm changed in June 2023 following Meta's independent Oversight Board's advice. We now only remove this content in countries with an active COVID-19 public health emergency declaration (during the reporting period no countries had an active health emergency declaration). This change has impacted our enforcement metrics on removals for this reporting period but does not change our overall approach to fact-checking. These changes are an expected part of fluctuating content trends online*
Member States		
Austria	13	1
Belgium	5	2
Bulgaria	10	1
Croatia	0	4
Cyprus	1	0
Czech Republic	10	0
Denmark	2	1
Estonia	1	0
Finland	1	1
France	59	18
Germany	319	15
Greece	28	0
Hungary	4	1
Ireland	1	1
Italy	68	13
Latvia	0	0
Lithuania	1	0
Luxembourg	1	0
Malta	2	0
Netherlands	12	2
Poland	107	19
Portugal	33	7
Romania	25	3

Slovakia	3	1
Slovenia	0	0
Spain	21	15
Sweden	4	1
Total EU	731	106

V. Empowering users
Commitment 25
In order to help users of private messaging services to identify possible disinformation disseminated through such services, Relevant Signatories that provide messaging applications commit to continue to build and implement features or initiatives that empower users to think critically about information they receive and help them to determine whether it is accurate, without any weakening of encryption and with due regard to the protection of privacy.

	C.25	M 25.1	M 25.2
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Messenger Whatsapp	Messenger Whatsapp	Messenger Whatsapp

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram	Service C – Messenger	Service D – WhatsApp
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	N/A	N/A	No	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A	As mentioned in our baseline report, we continue to regularly review the measures we have in place in Messenger, in conjunction with the measures on the linked social media platforms (Facebook and Instagram). We will continue to actively review measures, including as we launch new products and disinformation trends change.	As mentioned in our baseline report, WhatsApp is deeply committed to addressing misinformation while protecting people's privacy – without weakening encryption. Our approach is centred around limiting virality, preventing coordinated misuse, and empowering users.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	N/A	N/A	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A	As mentioned in our baseline report, misinformation is a complex and shared challenge, and we remain committed to doing our part. We continue working to improve our efforts against misinformation.	As mentioned in our baseline report, misinformation is a complex and shared challenge, and we remain committed to doing our part. We continue working to improve our efforts against misinformation.

Measure 25.1			Messenger	WhatsApp
QRE 25.1.1			As mentioned in our baseline report, content across Facebook and Instagram that has been rated false by our fact-checkers are prominently labelled when re-shared in Messenger, this includes: • Misinformation labels (clear, visual labels to content that has been debunked by fact-checkers, and surfaces their fact-checking articles for additional context) • Warning screens (when someone tries to share a post that's been rated by a fact-checker, we'll show them a pop-up notice so people can decide for themselves what to read, trust, and share).	As mentioned in our baseline report, we work to empower users to think critically about information they receive and help them easily connect with accurate information. To this purpose, WhatsApp partners with: • **O**rganisations certified by the IFCN around the world, including in the EU, to expand users' access to fact-checking services. Because private messages and calls on WhatsApp are secured with end-to-end encryption, only a user and the person they are communicating with can read or listen to them. That's why our fact-checking partnerships on WhatsApp rely on user-initiated reporting. Users can flag potential misinformation to trusted fact-checking organisations by sending them a message, and fact-checking organisations can reply by sharing a fact-checking article. • **Government agencies and nonprofit organisations** to help make authoritative information available to users on WhatsApp.

SLI 25.1.1			Please see section 17 for information on linked platforms' (Facebook and Instagram) work with fact-checkers.	**Partnerships with fact-checkers**: 13 fact-checking organisations in the EU operating in multiple languages are using WhatsApp products (the WhatsApp Business App and/or the WhatsApp Business Platform) to make sure that WhatsApp users have access to accurate information. The WhatsApp Business app is an optional app and partners may choose to use this tool or not. A reduction in the number of partners using the tool does not necessarily reflect a change in the number of fact-checking partners WhatsApp has in its WhatsApp fact-checking programme. WhatsApp has a formal fact-checking programme which utilises the WhatsApp Business Platform and has not seen a reduction during this reporting period in the number of partners.
Member States				
List actions per member states and languages (see example table above)				The WhatsApp Business app is an optional app and partners may choose to use this tool or not. Directory of fact-checking organisations using WhatsApp products (WhatsApp Business App and/or WhatsApp Business Platform) during the period of this report]: ● France: 　○ 20 Minutes (French) 　○ AFP France (French) 　○ AFP Africa (English) 　○ France24 (French) ● Germany 　○ CORRECTIV (German) 　○ AFP Faktencheck (German) 　○ dpa Faktencheck (German) ● Greece 　○ Ellinika Hoaxes (Greek) ● Italy 　○ Pagella Politica / Facta (Italian) ● Portugal

				○ Polígrafo (Portuguese)
				● Spain
				    ○ EFE Verifica (Spanish)
				    ○ Maldita (Spanish)
				    ○ Newtral (Spanish)

Measure 25.2			Messenger	WhatsApp
QRE 25.2.1			As mentioned in our baseline report, to help reduce the spread of viral misinformation and harmful content, we limit the number of chats that a message can be forwarded to at one time. We also have additional protections in place for content that has been identified as misinformation on Facebook and shared directly in Messenger. For example, when a user shares content from their feed into a private chat, and that content has been rated by a 3pfc, we continue to show the label on the content.	As mentioned in our baseline report, WhatsApp provides end-to-end encryption by default for all private messages and calls. In this context, we work to counter misinformation both by limiting virality on our platform, and by encouraging users to think about the messages that are forwarded to them. We do this by using: ● Forwarding labels ● Limits to messaging forwarding WhatsApp provides a simple way to double check messages that have been forwarded many times: using the "Search on web" tool. This tool helps our users find news results or other sources of information about content they have received. This feature works by allowing users to tap a link that enables them to upload the message via their browser. We continue to evolve our efforts and approaches to tackling misinformation on WhatsApp. This ongoing work is focused on making sure we have the most efficient surface impact and consistently improving reach of our partners.
SLI 25.2.1 – use of select tools				As mentioned in our baseline report, the introduction of the additional forwarding limits in April 2020 reduced virality immediately by 70%. When we introduced the new group chat forwarding limit in 2022, we saw a reduction of approximately 20% in the number of forwarded messages sent to groups on WhatsApp globally.
			Tools mentioned in QRE 25.2.1 are available across the EU.	*Tools mentioned in QRE 25.2.1 are available across the EU.*

VI. Empowering the research community
Commitments 26 – 29

VI. Empowering the research community

Commitment 26

Relevant Signatories commit to provide access, wherever safe and practicable, to continuous, real-time or near real-time, searchable stable access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated, or manifestly-made public data for research purposes on Disinformation through automated means such as APIs or other open and accessible technical solutions allowing the analysis of said data.

	C.26	M 26.1	M 26.2	M 26.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our previous reports, <u>Meta rolled out the Content Library and API tools</u> to provide access to near real-time public content on Facebook. Details about the content, such as the number of reactions, shares, comments and, for the first time, post view counts are also available. Researchers can search, explore and filter that content on a graphical User Interface (UI) or through a programmatic API. Together, these tools provide comprehensive access to publicly-accessible content across Facebook and Instagram. Individuals, including journalists affiliated with qualified institutions pursuing scientific or public interest research topics can apply for access to these	As mentioned in our previous reports, <u>Meta rolled out the Content Library and API tools</u> to provide access to near real-time public content on Instagram. Details about the content, such as the number of reactions, shares, comments and, for the first time, post view counts are also available. Researchers can search, explore and filter that content on a graphical User Interface (UI) or through a programmatic API. Together, these tools provide comprehensive access to publicly-accessible content across Facebook and Instagram. Individuals, including journalists affiliated with qualified institutions pursuing scientific or public interest research topics can apply for access to these

	tools through partners with deep expertise in secure data sharing for research, starting with the University of Michigan's Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. This is a first-of-its-kind partnership that will enable researchers to analyse data from the API in ICPSR's Social Media Archives (SOMAR) Virtual Data Enclave. Meta continues to publish reports with relevant data regarding content on Facebook via its Transparency Centre. We've shared our quarterly reports throughout 2025 there: • The Community Standards Enforcement Report • The Adversarial Threat Report	tools through partners with deep expertise in secure data sharing for research, starting with the University of Michigan's Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. This is a first-of-its-kind partnership that will enable researchers to analyse data from the API in ICPSR's Social Media Archives (SOMAR) Virtual Data Enclave. Meta continues to publish reports with relevant data regarding content on Instagram via its Transparency Centre. We've shared our quarterly reports throughout 2025 there: • The Community Standards Enforcement Report • The Adversarial Threat Report
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	We continue to, and are in process of adding new features and functionality to Meta Content Library, including improvements to the application processes for access to the research tools. In addition to this, we regularly seek feedback from the research community for critical updates.	We continue to, and are in process of adding new features and functionality to Meta Content Library, including improvements to the application processes for access to the research tools. In addition to this, we regularly seek feedback from the research community for critical updates.

Measure 26.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 26.1.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, we publish a wide range of regular reports on our Transparency Centre including to give our community visibility into how we enforce our policies or respond to some requests: https://transparency.fb.com/data/. We also publish extensive reports on our findings about coordinated behaviour in our newsroom and we have a dedicated public website hosting our Ad Library tools.	As mentioned in our baseline report, we publish a wide range of regular reports on our Transparency Centre including to give our community visibility into how we enforce our policies or respond to some requests: https://transparency.fb.com/data/. We also publish extensive reports on our findings about coordinated behaviour in our newsroom and we have a dedicated public website hosting our Ad Library tools.

QRE 26.1.2	Ad Library Tools: The dedicated website for the Ad Library allows users to search all of the ads currently running across Meta technologies. All ads that are currently running on Meta technologies show: the ad content; the basic information, such as when the ad started running and which advertiser is running it. For the ads that have run anywhere in the European Union in the past year, it includes additional transparency specific to the EU. Regarding Ads about social issues, elections or politics that have run in the past seven years, it shows: the ad content, the basic information, such as when the ad started running and which advertiser is running it and additional transparency about spend, reach and funding entities. As mentioned in our baseline report, we publish on our Transparency Centre numerous reports : • Community Standards Enforcement Report: We publish this report publicly in our Transparency Centre on a quarterly basis to more effectively track our progress and demonstrate our continued commitment to making our services safe and inclusive. The report shares metrics on how we are doing at preventing and taking action on content that goes against our Community Standards (against 14 policies on Facebook). • Adversarial Threat Report: We share publicly our findings about coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) and other networks we detect and remove from our platforms. As part of our Adversarial Threat Reports, we publish information about networks we take down to make it easier for people to see progress we're making in one place.	Ad Library Tools: The dedicated website for the Ad Library allows users to search all of the ads currently running across Meta technologies. All ads that are currently running on Meta technologies show: the ad content; the basic information, such as when the ad started running and which advertiser is running it. For the ads that have run anywhere in the European Union in the past year, it includes additional transparency specific to the EU. Regarding Ads about social issues, elections or politics that have run in the past seven years, it shows: the ad content, the basic information, such as when the ad started running and which advertiser is running it and additional transparency about spend, reach and funding entities. As mentioned in our baseline report, we publish on our Transparency Centre numerous reports : • Community Standards Enforcement Report: We publish this report publicly in our Transparency Centre on a quarterly basis to more effectively track our progress and demonstrate our continued commitment to making our services safe and inclusive. The report shares metrics on how we are doing at preventing and taking action on content that goes against our Community Standards (against 12 policies on Instagram). • Adversarial Threat Report: We share publicly our findings about coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) and other networks we detect and remove from our platforms. As part of our Adversarial Threat Reports, we publish information about networks we take down to make it easier for people to see progress we're making in one place.
SLI 26.1.1 – uptake of the tools and processes described in Measure 26.1	As of 30 June 2025, over 990 researchers globally had access to Meta Content Library user interface and/or programmatic API.	As of 30 June 2025, over 990 researchers globally now had access to Meta Content Library user interface and/or programmatic API.
Measure 26.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 26.2.1	Meta Content Library includes public posts and data on Facebook. Data from the Library can be searched, explored, and filtered on a graphical UI or through a programmatic API. Meta Content Library is a web-based, controlled-access environment where researchers can perform deeper analysis of the public content by using Content Library API in a secured clean room environment: • Searching and filtering: searching public posts across Facebook and Instagram is easy with comprehensive sorting and filtering options.	Meta Content Library includes public posts and data on Instagram. Data from the Library can be searched, explored, and filtered on a graphical UI or through a programmatic API. Meta Content Library is a web-based, controlled-access environment where researchers can perform deeper analysis of the public content by using Content Library API in a secured clean room environment: • Searching and filtering: searching public posts across Facebook and Instagram is easy with comprehensive sorting and filtering options.

	Post results can be filtered by language, view count, media type, content producer and more. ● Multimedia: Photos, videos and reels are available for dynamic search, exploration and analysis. ● Producer lists: customizable collections of content producers can be used to refine search results. Researchers can apply custom producer lists to a search query to surface public content from specific content owners on Facebook or Instagram. Content Library API allows programmatic queries of the data and is designed for computational researchers. Data pulled from the API can be analysed in a secure platform: ● Endpoints and data fields: With 8 dedicated endpoints, the Content Library API can search across over 100 data fields from Facebook Pages, posts, , groups, events, and a subset of personal accounts. ● Search indexing and results: Powerful search capabilities can return up to 100,000 results per query. ● Asynchronous search: allows for queries to run in the background while a researcher works on other tasks. Query progress is monitored and tracked by the API. For more details – see here.	Post results can be filtered by language, view count, media type, content producer and more. ● Multimedia: Photos, videos and reels are available for dynamic search, exploration and analysis. ● Producer lists: customizable collections of content producers can be used to refine search results. Researchers can apply custom producer lists to a search query to surface public content from specific content owners on Facebook or Instagram. Content Library API allows programmatic queries of the data and is designed for computational researchers. Data pulled from the API can be analysed in a secure platform: ● Endpoints and data fields: With 8 dedicated endpoints, the Content Library API can search across over 100 data fields from Instagram posts, including a subset of personal Instagram accounts. ● Search indexing and results: Powerful search capabilities can return up to 100,000 results per query. ● Asynchronous search: allows for queries to run in the background while a researcher works on other tasks. Query progress is monitored and tracked by the API. For more details – see here.
QRE 26.2.2	Meta Content Library and API provide near real-time public content from Facebook and Instagram. Details about the content, such as the post owner and the number of reactions and shares, are also available: ● Posts shared to and information about Pages, groups, events, and a subset of personal accounts. ● Available for most countries and territories but excluded from countries where Meta is still evaluating legal and compliance requirements ● The number of times a post or reel was displayed on screen For more details – see here.	Meta Content Library and API provide near real-time public content from Facebook and Instagram. Details about the content, such as the post owner and the number of reactions and shares, are also available: ● Posts shared by and information about Instagram business and creator accounts including from a subset of personal accounts. ● Available for most countries and territories but excluded from countries where Meta is still evaluating legal and compliance requirements ● The number of times a post or reel was displayed on screen For more details – see here.

QRE 26.2.3	Individuals, including journalists affiliated with qualified institutions pursuing scientific or public interest research topics are able to apply for access to these tools through a partner with deep expertise in secure data sharing for research, the University of Michigan's Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). For more details on the application process – see here.	Individuals, including journalists affiliated with qualified institutions pursuing scientific or public interest research topics are able to apply for access to these tools through a partner with deep expertise in secure data sharing for research, the University of Michigan's Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). For more details on the application process – see here.
SLI 26.2.1 – meaningful metrics on the uptake, swiftness, and acceptance level of the tools and processes in Measure 26.2	As of 30 June 2025, 990+ researchers globally had access to Meta Content Library user interface and/or programmatic API.	
Measure 26.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 26.3.1	We provide comprehensive developer documentation and in depth technical guides that walk through how to use the different tools directly on our website, which also include a dedicated help centre.	We provide comprehensive developer documentation and in depth technical guides that walk through how to use the different tools directly on our website, which also include a dedicated help centre.

VI. Empowering the research community					
Commitment 27 Relevant Signatories commit to provide vetted researchers with access to data necessary to undertake research on Disinformation by developing, funding, and cooperating with an independent, third-party body that can vet researchers and research proposals.					
	C.27	M 27.1	M 27.2	M 27.3	M 27.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures	N/A	N/A

(e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]		
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	N/A	N/A
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	N/A	N/A
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	N/A	N/A

Measure 27.1	N/A	N/A

QRE 27.1.1	N/A	N/A
Measure 27.2	N/A	N/A
QRE 27.2.1	N/A	N/A
Measure 27.3	N/A	N/A
QRE 27.3.1	N/A	N/A
SLI 27.3.1 – research projects vetted by the independent third-party body	N/A	N/A
Measure 27.4	N/A	N/A
QRE 27.4.1	N/A	N/A

VI. Empowering the research community

Commitment 28
Relevant Signatories commit to support good faith research into Disinformation that involves their services.

	C.28	M 28.1	M 28.2	M 28.3	M 28.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Meta continues to explore options for sharing insights with research groups on these issues, in addition to our sharing through the IO Research Archive and in our public Quarterly threat reports. As part of our ongoing efforts to enhance the Meta Content Library tool and incorporate feedback from researchers, we've introduced several improvements. We've made searching more efficient by adding exact phrase matching, text-in-image search, and researchers can now share content producer lists with their peers, enabling quick filtering of public data from specific content producers on Facebook. Throughout the first half of 2025, Meta has continued to release new features and improvements to the MCL, including collaborative dashboard editing, comment filtering, and filtering by account verified status. These enhancements have been designed to support our users and promote best practices in fact-checking. We've also updated Meta Content Library's product terms to enable Meta Content Library users to now publish information about organizations and specific entities. Users can now publish data about individual public posts, pages, accounts, and profiles as long as these entities are related to their approved research purpose and do not	Meta continues to explore options for sharing insights with research groups on these issues, in addition to our sharing through the IO Research Archive and in our public Quarterly threat reports. As part of our ongoing efforts to enhance the Meta Content Library tool and incorporate feedback from researchers, we've introduced several improvements. We've made searching more efficient by adding exact phrase matching, text-in-image search, and researchers can now share content producer lists with their peers, enabling quick filtering of public data from specific content producers on Instagram. Throughout the first half of 2025, Meta has continued to release new features and improvements to the MCL, including collaborative dashboard editing, comment filtering, and filtering by account verified status. These enhancements have been designed to support our users and promote best practices in fact-checking. We've also updated Meta Content Library's product terms to enable Meta Content Library users to now publish information about organizations and specific entities. Users can now publish data about individual public posts, pages, accounts, and profiles as long as these entities are related to their approved research purpose and do not contain personally identifiable

	contain personally identifiable information from non-disclosed users. The updated terms can be found in Section 5C of the *product terms*.	information from non-disclosed users. The updated terms can be found in Section 5C of the *product terms*.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	We continue to, and are in process of adding new features and functionality to Meta Content Library, including enhancing application processes for access to the research tools. In addition to this, we regularly seek feedback from the research community for critical updates. By developing these tools and supporting the research community we continue to support good faith research.	We continue to, and are in process of adding new features and functionality to Meta Content Library, including enhancing application processes for access to the research tools. In addition to this, we regularly seek feedback from the research community for critical updates. By developing these tools and supporting the research community we continue to support good faith research.

Measure 28.1	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 28.1.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta has a team dedicated to providing academics and independent researchers with the tools and data they need to study Meta's impact on the world. Relevant details about research tools are available on our <u>Transparency Centre</u>.	As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta has a team dedicated to providing academics and independent researchers with the tools and data they need to study Meta's impact on the world. Relevant details about research tools are available on our <u>Transparency Centre</u>.
Measure 28.2	Facebook	Instagram

QRE 28.2.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta provides a variety of data sets and tools for researchers and they can consult a chart to verify if the data would be available for request. All the data access opportunities for independent researchers are logged in <u>one place</u>.
	
	The main data available only to researchers are:
	  – **Meta Content Library and API.** The Library includes data from certain public profiles, public posts, pages, groups, and events on Facebook. Data from the Library can be searched, explored, and filtered on a graphical user interface or through a programmatic API. 990+ researchers globally now have access to Meta Content Library user interface and/or programmatic API.
		As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta provides a variety of data sets and tools for researchers and they can consult a chart to verify if the data would be available for request. All the data access opportunities for independent researchers are logged in <u>one place</u>.
		
		The main data available only to researchers are:
		  – **Meta Content Library and API.** For Instagram, it will include public posts and data. Data from the Library can be searched, explored, and filtered on a graphical user interface or through a programmatic API. 990+ researchers globally now have access to Meta Content Library user interface and/or programmatic API.
		  – **Ad Targeting dataset**, which includes detailed targeting information for social issue, electoral, and political ads that ran

	– **Ad Targeting dataset**, which includes detailed targeting information for social issue, electoral, and political ads that ran globally since August 2020. **200+ researchers globally have accessed Ads Targeting dataset since it launched publicly in Sept 2022.** – URL Shares Data Set, which includes differentially private individual-level counts of the number of people who viewed, clicked, liked, commented, shared, or reacted to any URL on Facebook between January 2017 and September 2022. Counts are aggregated at the level of country, year-month, age bracket, gender. Access to the URL Shares is granted by <u>Social Science One</u>, and new researchers are onboarded once per quarter. 200+ researchers globally have accessed the URL Shares dataset since its release in February 2020. – **Influence Operations Research Archive for** coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) network disruptions, as outlined in QRE 27.4.1. – **Data for Good.** Provides a range of dashboards that make our data easier to understand.	globally since August 2020. **200+ researchers globally have accessed Ads Targeting dataset since it launched publicly in Sept 2022.** – **Influence Operations Research Archive for** coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) network disruptions, as outlined in QRE 27.4.1.
Measure 28.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 28.3.1	No reporting possible at this stage	No reporting possible at this stage
Measure 28.4	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 28.4.1	No reporting possible at this stage	No reporting possible at this stage

VI. Empowering the research community
Commitment 29
Relevant Signatories commit to conduct research based on transparent methodology and ethical standards, as well as to share datasets, research findings and methodologies with relevant audiences.
Commitment 29 applies to research organisations.

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community
Commitments 30 – 33

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

Commitment 30

Relevant Signatories commit to establish a framework for transparent, structured, open, financially sustainable, and non-discriminatory cooperation between them and the EU fact-checking community regarding resources and support made available to fact-checkers

	C.30	M 30.1	M 30.2	M 30.3	M 30.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Meta continued providing all third-party fact-checkers (3PFCs) participating in our fact-checking programs with access to the Meta Content Library (MCL). This initiative aimed to enhance the fact-checking workflow and provide users with a more comprehensive toolset. Throughout the first half of 2025, Meta has continued to release new features and improvements to the MCL, including collaborative dashboard editing, comment filtering, and filtering by account verified status. These enhancements have been designed to support our users and promote best practices in fact-checking.	Meta continued providing all third-party fact-checkers (3PFCs) participating in our fact-checking programs with access to the Meta Content Library (MCL). This initiative aimed to enhance the fact-checking workflow and provide users with a more comprehensive toolset. Throughout the first half of 2025, Meta has continued to release new features and improvements to the MCL, including collaborative dashboard editing, comment filtering, and filtering by account verified status.These enhancements have been designed to support our users and promote best practices in fact-checking.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As currently drafted, this chapter covers the current practices for Facebook and Instagram in the EU. In keeping with Meta's <u>public announcements on 7 January 2025</u>, we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Facebook and Instagram and we will keep under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes.	As currently drafted, this chapter covers the current practices for Facebook and Instagram in the EU. In keeping with Meta's <u>public announcements on 7 January 2025</u>, we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Facebook and Instagram and we will keep under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes.

Measure 30.1	Facebook		Instagram	
QRE 30.1.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta's fact-checking partners all go through a rigorous certification process with the IFCN. As a subsidiary of the journalism research organisation Poynter Institute, the IFCN is dedicated to bringing fact-checkers together worldwide. All fact-checking partners follow IFCN's <u>Code of Principles</u>, a series of commitments they must adhere to in order to promote excellence in fact-checking. The detail of our partnership with fact-checkers (i.e., how they rate content and what actions we take as a result) is outlined in QRE 21.1.1 and <u>here</u>.		As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta's fact-checking partners all go through a rigorous certification process with the IFCN. As a subsidiary of the journalism research organisation Poynter Institute, the IFCN is dedicated to bringing fact-checkers together worldwide. All fact-checking partners follow IFCN's <u>Code of Principles</u>, a series of commitments they must adhere to in order to promote excellence in fact-checking. The detail of our partnership with fact-checkers (i.e., how they rate content and what actions we take as a result) is outlined in QRE 21.1.1 and <u>here</u>.	
QRE 30.1.2	Austria (German, Dutch, French)	<u>AFP</u> <u>dpa-Faktencheck</u>	Austria (German, Dutch, French)	<u>AFP</u> <u>dpa-Faktencheck</u>
	Belgium (Dutch, French, German)	<u>AFP</u> <u>dpa-Faktencheck</u> <u>Knack</u>	Belgium (Dutch, French, German)	<u>AFP</u> <u>dpa-Faktencheck</u> <u>Knack</u>
	Bulgaria (Bulgarian)	<u>AFP</u> <u>FactCheck.bg</u>	Bulgaria (Bulgarian)	<u>AFP</u> <u>FactCheck.bg</u>
	Croatia (Croatian)	<u>Faktograf.hr</u> AFP	Croatia (Croatian)	<u>Faktograf.hr</u> AFP
	Cyprus (Greek)	<u>AFP</u>	Cyprus (Greek)	<u>AFP</u>
	Czech Republic (Czech)	<u>AFP</u> <u>Demagog.cz</u>	Czech Republic (Czech)	<u>AFP</u> <u>Demagog.cz</u>
	Denmark (Danish)	<u>TjekDet</u>	Denmark (Danish)	<u>TjekDet</u>
	Estonia (Estonian, Lithuanian, Russian, English)	<u>Delfi</u> Estonia/Ekspress M	Estonia (Estonian, Lithuanian, Russian, English)	<u>Delfi</u> Estonia/Ekspress M
	Finland (Finnish)	<u>AFP</u>	Finland (Finnish)	<u>AFP</u>
	France (French, English)	<u>20 Minutes</u> <u>AFP</u>	France (French, English)	<u>20 Minutes</u> <u>AFP</u>

		Les Observateurs de France 24 Les Surligneurs		Les Observateurs de France 24 Les Surligneurs
	Germany (German, Dutch, French)	AFP Correctiv dpa-Faktencheck	Germany (German, Dutch, French)	AFP Correctiv dpa-Faktencheck
	Greece (Greek)	AFP Ellinika Hoaxes	Greece (Greek)	AFP Ellinika Hoaxes
	Hungary (Hungarian)	AFP	Hungary (Hungarian)	AFP
	Ireland (English)	TheJournal.ie	Ireland (English)	TheJournal.ie
	Italy (Italian)	Open Pagella Politica	Italy (Italian)	Open Pagella Politica
	Latvia (Latvian, Lithuanian, Russian, English)	Delfi Re:Baltica	Latvia (Latvian, Lithuanian, Russian, English)	Delfi Re:Baltica
	Lithuania (Lithuanian, Russian, English)	Delfi Patikrinta 15min	Lithuania (Lithuanian, Russian, English)	Delfi Patikrinta 15min
	Luxembourg (German, Dutch, French)	dpa-Faktencheck	Luxembourg (German, Dutch, French)	dpa-Faktencheck
	Netherlands (Dutch, German, French)	AFP dpa-Faktencheck	Netherlands (Dutch, German, French)	AFP dpa-Faktencheck
	Poland (Polish)	AFP Demagog	Poland (Polish)	AFP Demagog
	Portugal (Portuguese)	Poligrafo Observador	Portugal (Portuguese)	Poligrafo Observador
	Romania (Romanian)	AFP Funky Citizens/ Factual.ro	Romania (Romanian)	AFP Funky Citizens/ Factual.ro
	Slovakia (Slovak)	AFP Demagog.cz Demagog.sk	Slovakia (Slovak)	AFP Demagog.cz Demagog.sk
	Slovenia (Slovene)	Oštro	Slovenia (Slovene)	Oštro
	Spain (Spanish, Catalan)	AFP EFE Verifica Maldito Bulo Newtral	Spain (Spanish, Catalan)	AFP España EFE Verifica Maldito Bulo Newtral
	Sweden (Swedish, English)	Kallkritikbyran AFP	Sweden (Swedish, English) AFP	Kallkritikbyran
QRE 30.1.3	As mentioned in our baseline report, the list of fact-checkers with whom we partner across the EU is in QRE 30.1.2.		As mentioned in our baseline report, the list of fact-checkers with whom we partner across the EU is in QRE 30.1.2.	

SLI 30.1.1 – Member States and languages covered by agreements with the fact-checking organisations	Number of individual agreements we have with fact-checking organisations. Each agreement covers both Facebook and Instagram.	Number of individual agreements we have with fact-checking organisations. Each agreement covers both Facebook and Instagram.
	See list of countries and languages covered in QRE 30.1.2	*See list of countries and languages covered in QRE 30.1.2*

Measure 30.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 30.2.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta's fact-checking partners all go through a rigorous certification process with the IFCN. All our fact-checking partners follow IFCN's Code of Principles, a series of commitments they must adhere to in order to promote excellence in fact-checking. From 2024, third-party fact-checkers may also be onboarded to Meta if they are certified with the European Fact-Checking Standards Networks (EFCSN).	As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta's fact-checking partners all go through a rigorous certification process with the IFCN. All our fact-checking partners follow IFCN's Code of Principles, a series of commitments they must adhere to in order to promote excellence in fact-checking. From 2024, third-party fact-checkers may also be onboarded to Meta if they are certified with the European Fact-Checking Standards Networks (EFCSN).
QRE 30.2.2	As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta has a team in charge of maintaining our relationships with our fact-checking partners, understanding their feedback and improving our fact-checking program together. As part of this work, our team initiates regular initiatives to collect views and feedback via conversations, surveys or other tools. Meta has also dedicated the necessary resources to engage with the Taskforce including on work-streams related to fact-checking.	As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta has a team in charge of maintaining our relationships with our fact-checking partners, understanding their feedback and improving our fact-checking program together. Meta has also dedicated the necessary resources to engage with the Taskforce including on work-streams related to fact-checking.
QRE 30.2.3	*QRE 30.2.3 applies to fact-checking organisations*	*QRE 30.2.3 applies to fact-checking organisations*
Measure 30.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 30.3.1	As outlined in QRE 30.2.2 Meta has a team in charge of our relationships with fact-checking partners where we take on feedback including on ways to support their cooperation.	As outlined in QRE 30.2.2 Meta has a team in charge of our relationships with fact-checking partners where we take on feedback including on ways to support their cooperation.
Measure 30.4	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 30.4.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, Facebook is in touch with several EDMO regional hubs and looks forward to engaging with EDMO on our fact-checking efforts.	As mentioned in our baseline report, Instagram is in touch with several EDMO regional hubs and looks forward to engaging with EDMO on our fact-checking efforts.

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

Commitment 31

Relevant Signatories commit to integrate, showcase, or otherwise consistently use fact-checkers' work in their platforms' services, processes, and contents; with full coverage of all Member States and languages.

	C.31	M 31.1	M 31.2	M 31.3	M 31.4
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	N/A	N/A

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	There have been no updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no updates since the last submitted report.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As currently drafted, this chapter covers the current practices for Facebook and Instagram in the EU. In keeping with Meta's public announcements on 7 January 2025, we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Facebook and Instagram and we will keep under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes.	As currently drafted, this chapter covers the current practices for Facebook and Instagram in the EU. In keeping with Meta's public announcements on 7 January 2025, we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Facebook and Instagram and we will keep under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes.

Measure 31.1	Facebook		Instagram	
Measure 31.2	Facebook		Instagram	
QRE 31.1.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, when content has been rated by fact-checkers (as outlined in detail under QRE 21.1.1), We take action to (1) label it and (2) ensure less people see it. We also take action against accounts that repeatedly share misinformation. The current warning in place says that accounts that repeatedly share false information may experience temporary restrictions, including having their posts reduced. **Regarding rating AI-generated content.** Fact-checkers may rate AI-generated media under our fact-checking program policies. They often rely on AI experts, visual techniques, and meta data analysis to aid in the detection of this content.		As mentioned in our baseline report, when content has been rated by fact-checkers (as outlined in detail under QRE 21.1.1), We take action to (1) label it and (2) ensure less people see it. We also take action against accounts that repeatedly share misinformation. The current warning in place says that accounts that repeatedly share false information may experience temporary restrictions, including having their posts reduced. **Regarding rating AI-generated content.** Fact-checkers may rate AI-generated media under our fact-checking program policies. They often rely on AI experts, visual techniques, and meta data analysis to aid in the detection of this content.	
SLI 31.1.1 – use of fact-checks	Filtered to content created on Facebook in EU Member State countries from 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025: 1. Number of distinct pieces of content viewed on Facebook that were treated with a fact-checking label due to a falsity assessment by third party fact-checkers between 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025. 2. Number of distinct articles written by 3PFCs that were used on Facebook to apply an inform treatment to a content from 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025* *This metric shows the number of distinct fact-checking articles written by Meta's 3PFC partners and utilised to label content in each EU Member State. As articles may be used in multiple countries, and several articles may be used to label a piece of content, the total sum of articles utilised for all Member States exceeds the number of distinct articles created in the EU (150,000). This is expected.		Filtered to content created on Instagram in EU Member State countries from 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025: 1. Number of distinct pieces of content viewed on Instagram that were treated with a fact-checking label due to a falsity assessment by third party fact-checkers between 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025. 2. Number of distinct articles written by 3PFCs that were used on Instagram to apply an inform treatment to a content from 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025* *This metric shows the number of distinct fact-checking articles written by Meta's 3PFC partners and utilised to label content in each EU Member State. As articles may be used in multiple countries, and several articles may be used to label a piece of content, the total sum of articles utilised for all Member States exceeds the number of distinct articles created in the EU (43,000). This is expected.	
	Content viewed on Facebook and treated with fact checks, due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025.	Number of Articles written by third party fact checkers to justify rating on Facebook between 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025.	Content viewed on Instagram and treated with fact checks, due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025.	Number of Articles written by third party fact checkers to justify rating on Instagram between 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025.
Member States				
Austria	Over 750,000	Over 43,000	Over 63,000	Over 10,000
Belgium	Over 1,100,000	Over 52,000	Over 73,000	Over 11,000
Bulgaria	Over 720,000	Over 32,000	Over 28,000	Over 6,500

Croatia	Over 450,000	Over 31,000	Over 29,000	Over 6,800
Cyprus	Over 220,000	Over 25,000	Over 28,000	Over 6,600
Czech Republic	Over 690,000	Over 34,000	Over 42,000	Over 8,200
Denmark	Over 600,000	Over 36,000	Over 45,000	Over 8,700
Estonia	Over 100,000	Over 15,000	Over 12,000	Over 3,900
Finland	Over 290,000	Over 29,000	Over 41,000	Over 8,200
France	Over 4,300,000	Over 75,000	Over 170,000	Over 17,000
Germany	Over 4,200,000	Over 86,000	Over 270,000	Over 21,000
Greece	Over 960,000	Over 42,000	Over 57,000	Over 9,700
Hungary	Over 530,000	Over 31,000	Over 29,000	Over 6,700
Ireland	Over 730,000	Over 44,000	Over 69,000	Over 11,000
Italy	Over 4,300,000	Over 78,000	Over 190,000	Over 18,000
Latvia	Over 180,000	Over 16,000	Over 14,000	Over 4,300
Lithuania	Over 270,000	Over 23,000	Over 17,000	Over 4,600
Luxembourg	Over 110,000	Over 19,000	Over 13,000	Over 4,200
Malta	Over 110,000	Over 19,000	Over 11,000	Over 3,900
Netherlands	Over 1,200,000	Over 57,000	Over 110,000	Over 14,000
Poland	Over 1,800,000	Over 51,000	Over 75,000	Over 11,000
Portugal	Over 1,300,000	Over 48,000	Over 100,000	Over 13,000
Romania	Over 1,400,000	Over 42,000	Over 50,000	Over 9,000
Slovakia	Over 440,000	Over 26,000	Over 26,000	Over 6,300
Slovenia	Over 250,000	Over 22,000	Over 18,000	Over 5,100
Spain	Over 3,500,000	Over 71,000	Over 200,000	Over 18,000
Sweden	Over 840,000	Over 48,000	Over 85,000	Over 12,000
Total EU	Over 24,000,000	Over 150,000	Over 880,000	Over 36,000

SLI 31.1.2 – impact of actions taken	1. Number of distinct pieces of content viewed on Facebook that were treated with a fact-checking label due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025. 2. Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Facebook that was treated with a fact-checking label in EU Member State countries from 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025.		1. Number of distinct pieces of content viewed on Instagram that were treated with a fact-checking label due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025. 2. Rate of reshare non-completion among the unique attempts by users to reshare a content on Instagram that was treated with a fact-checking label in EU Member State countries from 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025.	
	Content viewed on Facebook and treated with fact checks, due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025.	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content – Facebook between 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025.	Content viewed on Instagram and treated with fact checks, due to a falsity assessment by third party fact checkers between 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025.	% of reshares attempted that were not completed on treated content – Instagram between 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025.
Member States				
Austria	Over 750,000	60%	Over 63,000	60%
Belgium	Over 1,100,000	57%	Over 73,000	57%
Bulgaria	Over 720,000	60%	Over 28,000	60%
Croatia	Over 450,000	59%	Over 29,000	59%
Cyprus	Over 220,000	64%	Over 28,000	64%
Czech Republic	Over 690,000	56%	Over 42,000	56%
Denmark	Over 600,000	59%	Over 45,000	59%
Estonia	Over 100,000	59%	Over 12,000	59%
Finland	Over 290,000	56%	Over 41,000	56%
France	Over 4,300,000	61%	Over 170,000	61%
Germany	Over 4,200,000	59%	Over 270,000	59%
Greece	Over 960,000	62%	Over 57,000	62%
Hungary	Over 530,000	59%	Over 29,000	59%
Ireland	Over 730,000	60%	Over 69,000	60%
Italy	Over 4,300,000	61%	Over 190,000	61%
Latvia	Over 180,000	59%	Over 14,000	59%
Lithuania	Over 270,000	59%	Over 17,000	59%
Luxembourg	Over 110,000	61%	Over 13,000	61%

Malta	Over 110,000	61%	Over 11,000	61%
Netherlands	Over 1,200,000	55%	Over 110,000	55%
Poland	Over 1,800,000	57%	Over 75,000	57%
Portugal	Over 1,300,000	66%	Over 100,000	66%
Romania	Over 1,400,000	57%	Over 50,000	57%
Slovakia	Over 440,000	53%	Over 26,000	53%
Slovenia	Over 250,000	59%	Over 18,000	59%
Spain	Over 3,500,000	59%	Over 200,000	59%
Sweden	Over 840,000	59%	Over 85,000	59%
Total EU	Over 24,000,000		Over 880,000	

SLI 31.1.3 – Quantitative information used for contextualisation for the SLIs 31.1.1 / 31.1.2	Average of monthly active users on Facebook in the European Union between 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025.	Average of monthly active users on Instagram in the European Union between 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025.
	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.
Monthly Active Users	Over a 6-month period, ending 30 June 2025 (i.e., 1 January 2025 – 30 June 2025), there were a total of approximately 263.6 million average monthly active users on Facebook in the EU. For monthly active user numbers at a Member State level, please refer to our most recent Facebook DSA transparency report.	Over a 6-month period, ending 30 June 2025 (i.e., 1 January 2025 – 30 June 2025), there were a total of approximately 281.8 million average monthly active users on Instagram in the EU. For monthly active user numbers at a Member State level, please refer to our most recent Instagram DSA transparency report.

Measure 31.3	N/A	N/A
QRE 31.3.1	N/A	N/A
Measure 31.4	N/A	N/A
QRE 31.4.1	N/A	N/A

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community

Commitment 32

Relevant Signatories commit to provide fact-checkers with prompt, and whenever possible automated, access to information that is pertinent to help them to maximise the quality and impact of fact-checking, as defined in a framework to be designed in coordination with EDMO and an elected body representative of the independent European fact-checking organisations.

	C.32	M 32.1	M 32.2	M 32.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

	Service A – Facebook	Service B – Instagram
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report, fact-checkers can identify hoaxes based on their own reporting, and Meta also surfaces potential misinformation to fact-checkers using signals, such as feedback from our community or similarity detection. Our technology can detect posts that are likely to be misinformation based on various signals, including how people are responding and how fast the content is spreading. We may also send content to fact-checkers when we become aware that it may contain misinformation.	As mentioned in our baseline report, fact-checkers can identify hoaxes based on their own reporting, and Meta also surfaces potential misinformation to fact-checkers using signals, such as feedback from our community or similarity detection. Our technology can detect posts that are likely to be misinformation based on various signals, including how people are responding and how fast the content is spreading. We may also send content to fact-checkers when we become aware that it may contain misinformation.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to	As currently drafted, this chapter covers the current practices for Facebook and Instagram in the EU. In keeping with Meta's public announcements on 7 January 2025, we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Facebook and Instagram and we will	As currently drafted, this chapter covers the current practices for Facebook and Instagram in the EU. In keeping with Meta's public announcements on 7 January 2025, we will continue to assess the applicability of this chapter to Facebook and Instagram and we will keep

put in place in the next 6 months?	keep under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes.	under review whether it is appropriate to make alterations in light of changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes.

Measure 32.1	Facebook	Instagram
Measure 32.2	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 32.1.1	As mentioned in our baseline report, all of our fact-checking partners have access to a dashboard that we built in 2016, specifically for our fact-checking program. The dashboard includes a variety of content formats across Facebook, including links, videos, images and text-only posts. It also provides data points to help fact-checkers prioritise what content to review. Fact-checkers then review the content, check the facts, and rate the accuracy. This process occurs independently from Meta and may include calling sources, consulting public data, authenticating images and videos and more.	As mentioned in our baseline report, all of our fact-checking partners have access to a dashboard that we built in 2016, specifically for our fact-checking program. The dashboard includes a variety of content formats across Instagram, including links, videos, images and text-only posts. It also provides data points to help fact-checkers prioritise what content to review. Fact-checkers then review the content, check the facts, and rate the accuracy. This process occurs independently from Meta and may include calling sources, consulting public data, authenticating images and videos and more.
SLI 32.1.1 – use of the interfaces and other tools	*See list in QRE 30.1.2 – all our third-party fact-checking partners have access to the same resources.*	
Measure 32.3	Facebook	Instagram
QRE 32.3.1	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.

VII. Empowering the fact-checking community
Commitment 33
Relevant Signatories (i.e. fact-checking organisations) commit to operate on the basis of strict ethical and transparency rules, and to protect their independence.
Commitment 33 applies to fact-checking organisations.

VIII. Transparency Centre
Commitments 34 – 36

VIII. Transparency Centre						
Commitment 34						
To ensure transparency and accountability around the implementation of this Code, Relevant Signatories commit to set up and maintain a publicly available common Transparency Centre website						
	C.34	M 34.1	M 34.2	M 34.3	M 34.4	M 34.5
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, [WhatsApp and Messenger]) co-funded the Transparency Centre website's development, to ensure transparency and accountability around the implementation of this Code.	
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No	

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	

Measure 34.1	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 34.2	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 34.3	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 34.4	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 34.5	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger

VIII. Transparency Centre							
Commitment 35							
Signatories commit to ensure that the Transparency Centre contains all the relevant information related to the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures and that this information is presented in an easy-to-understand manner, per service, and is easily searchable.							
	C.35	M 35.1	M 35.2	M 35.3	M 35.4	M 35.5	M 35.6
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) commits to upload its reports on the Transparency Centre in due course.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) commits to upload its reports on the Transparency Centre in due course.

Measure 35.1	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 35.2	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 35.3	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 35.4	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 35.5	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 35.6	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger

VIII. Transparency Centre				
Commitment 36				
Signatories commit to updating the relevant information contained in the Transparency Centre in a timely and complete manner.				
	C.36	M 36.1	M 36.2	M 36.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures	Yes

(e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) will both upload this report in due course and support other signatories in their efforts to upload their own reports.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report, Meta (representing Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger) will both upload all future reports in due course.

Measure 36.1	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 36.2	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 36.3	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
QRE 36.1.1 (for the Commitments 34–36)	We continue to upload our report according to the approved deadlines.
QRE 36.1.2 (for the Commitments 34–36)	The administration of the Transparency Centre website has been transferred fully to the community of the Code's signatories, with VOST Europe taking the role of developer.
SLI 36.1.1 – (for Measures 34 and 36) meaningful quantitative information on the usage of the Transparency Centre, such as the average monthly visits of the webpage.	The common Transparency Centre was viewed 38,817 times by around 11,367 users between 01/01/2025 to 30/06/2025, and 19,767 users downloaded the published reports. For Meta specifically, over 3,694 downloads (combined) occurred of our most recent and previous reports by over 2,382 unique users.

IX. Permanent Taskforce
Commitment 37

IX. Permanent Taskforce								
Commitment 37								
Signatories commit to participate in the permanent Taskforce. The Taskforce includes the Signatories of the Code and representatives from EDMO and ERGA. It is chaired by the European Commission, and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Taskforce can also invite relevant experts as observers to support its work. Decisions of the Taskforce are made by consensus.								
	C.37	**M 37.1**	**M 37.2**	**M 37.3**	**M 37.4**	**M 37.5**	**M 37.6**	**M 37.7**
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	

Measure 37.1	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 37.2	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 37.3	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 37.4	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 37.5	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
Measure 37.6	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
QRE 37.6.1	There have been no significant updates since the last submitted report.

X. Monitoring of Code
Commitment 38 – 44

X. Monitoring of Code

Commitment 38
The Signatories commit to dedicate adequate financial and human resources and put in place appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of their commitments under the Code.

	C.38	M 38.1
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger	

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Globally we have around 40,000 people working on safety and security.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report, our policies benefit from our experience and expertise.

Measure 38.1	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger
QRE 38.1.1	Globally we have around 40,000 people working on safety and security including around 15,000 content reviewers. All of these investments work to combat the spread of harmful content, including disinformation and misinformation, and thereby contribute to our implementation of the Code. Teams with expertise in content moderation, operations, policy design, safety, market specialists, data and forensic analysis, stakeholder and partner engagement, threat investigation, cybersecurity and product development all work on these challenges. These teams are distributed globally, and draw from the local expertise of their team members and local partners.

X. Monitoring of the Code
Commitment 39
Signatories commit to provide to the European Commission, within 1 month after the end of the implementation period (6 months after this Code's signature) the baseline reports as set out in the Preamble.

	C.39
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	This report was submitted within the required timeline.
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to	No

substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	This report was submitted within the required timeline.

X. Monitoring of the Code

Commitment 40

Signatories commit to provide regular reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs). The reports and data provided should allow for a thorough assessment of the extent of the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures by each Signatory, service and at Member State level.

	C.40	M 40.1	M 40.2	M 40.3	M 40.4	M 40.5	M 40.6
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger	Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	For this report, Facebook. Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger provided QREs and SLIs across the different chapters
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to	Yes

substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger will continue to provide relevant QREs and SLIs across the chapters of this Code.

X. Monitoring of the Code

Commitment 41
Signatories commit to work within the Taskforce towards developing Structural Indicators, and publish a first set of them within 9 months from the signature of this Code; and to publish an initial measurement alongside their first full report. To achieve this goal, Signatories commit to support their implementation, including the testing and adapting of the initial set of Structural Indicators agreed in this Code. This, in order to assess the effectiveness of the Code in reducing the spread of online disinformation for each of the relevant Signatories, and for the entire online ecosystem in the EU and at Member State level. Signatories will collaborate with relevant actors in that regard, including ERGA and EDMO.

	C.41	M 41.1	M 41.2	M 41.3
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram	Facebook Instagram

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	We continue to engage with the Taskforce Monitoring Working Group.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	We continue to engage with the Taskforce monitoring working group.

X. Monitoring of the Code
Commitment 42
Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Taskforce.

	C.42
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	We continue to engage in the Taskforce's election monitoring and crisis monitoring meetings.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	We continue to engage in the Taskforce's election monitoring and crisis monitoring meetings.

X. Monitoring of the Code
Commitment 43
Signatories commit to produce reports and provide data following the harmonised reporting templates and refined methodology for reporting and data disclosure, as agreed in the Taskforce.

	C.43
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation measures here [short bullet points].	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger provided their qualitative and quantitative information in the harmonised template provided.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Messenger continue to engage with the Taskforce working group on reporting/monitoring as the template evolves.

X. Monitoring of the Code

Commitment 44

Relevant Signatories that are providers of Very Large Online Platforms commit, seeking alignment with the DSA, to be audited at their own expense, for their compliance with the commitments undertaken pursuant to this Code. Audits should be performed by organisations, independent from, and without conflict of interest with, the provider of the Very Large Online Platform concerned. Such organisations shall have proven expertise in the area of disinformation, appropriate technical competence and capabilities and have proven objectivity and professional ethics, based in particular on adherence to auditing standards and guidelines.

	C.44
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment:	Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)? [Yes/No]	Yes
If yes, list these implementation	As mentioned in our baseline report, we are taking steps to ensure that, following conversion of the Code into a Code of Conduct under the DSA, relevant Meta services will be undergoing appropriate independent audits under the DSA.

measures here [short bullet points].	
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment? [Yes/No]	No
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?	As mentioned in our baseline report, we are taking steps to ensure that, following conversion of the Code into a Code of Conduct under the DSA, relevant Meta services will be undergoing appropriate independent audits.

Reporting on the service's response during a period of crisis

Reporting on the service's response during a crisis
War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
As outlined in our benchmark report, we took a variety of actions with the objectives of: - Helping to keep people in Ukraine and Russia safe: We've added several privacy and safety features to help people in Ukraine and Russia protect their accounts from being targeted. - Enforcing our policies: We are taking additional steps to enforce our Community Standards, not only in Ukraine and Russia but also in other countries globally where content may be shared. - Reducing the spread of misinformation: We took steps to fight the spread of misinformation on our services and consulted with outside experts. - Transparency around state-controlled media: We have been working hard to tackle disinformation from Russia coming from state-controlled media. Since March 2022, we have been globally demoting content from Facebook Pages and Instagram accounts from Russian state-controlled media outlets and making them harder to find across our platforms. In addition to demoting, labelling, demonetizing and blocking ads from Russian State Controlled Media, we are also demoting and labelling any posts from users that contain links to Russian State Controlled Media websites. - In addition to these global actions, in Ukraine, the EU and UK, we have restricted access to Russia Today (globally), Sputnik, NTV/NTV Mir, Rossiya 1, REN TV and Perviy Kanal and others. - On 15 June 2024, we added restrictions to further state-controlled media organisations targeted by the EU broadcast ban under Article 2f of Regulation 833/2014. These included: Voice of Europe, RIA Novosti, Izvestia, Rossiyskaya Gazeta. - On 17 September 2024, we expanded our ongoing enforcement against Russian state media outlets. Rossiya Segodnya, RT, and other related entities were banned from our apps globally due to foreign interference activities.
Our main strategies are in line with what we outlined in our benchmark report, with a focus on safety features in Ukraine and Russia, extensive steps to fight the spread of misinformation (including through media literacy campaigns), tools to help our community access crucial resources, transparency around state controlled media and monitoring/taking action against any coordinated inauthentic behaviour. This means (as outlined in previous reports) we will continue to: - Monitor for coordinated inauthentic behaviour and other adversarial networks (see commitment 16 for more information on behaviour we saw from Doppelganger during the reporting period). - Enforce our Community Standards - Work with fact-checkers - Strengthen our engagement with local experts and governments in the Central and Eastern Europe region
[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].
Policies and Terms and Conditions
Outline any changes to your policies

Policy	Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation)	Rationale
No further policy updates since our benchmark report	N/A	We continue to enforce our Community Standards and prioritise people's safety and well-being through the application of these policies alongside Meta's technologies, tools and processes. There are no substantial changes to report on for this period.

Scrutiny of Ads Placements		
As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools and processes.		
Measures taken to demonetise disinformation related to the crisis (Commitment 1 and Commitment 2)	As mentioned in our baseline report, our Advertising Standards prohibit ads that include content debunked by third-party fact-checkers and advertisers that repeatedly attempt to post content rated by fact-checkers may also incur restrictions to advertise across Meta technologies.	
	For the monetisation of initially organic content, (1) per our Content Monetisation Policies, any content that's labelled as false by our third-party fact-checkers is ineligible for monetisation, and (2) any actor found in violation of our Community Standards, including our misinformation policies, may lose the right to monetise their content, per our Partner Monetisation Policies.	
	As mentioned in our baseline report, we prohibited ads or monetisation from Russian state-controlled media. Before Russian authorities blocked access to Facebook and Instagram, we paused ads targeting people in Russia, and advertisers in Russia are no longer able to create or run ads anywhere in the world.	
Political Advertising		
As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.		
Integrity of Services		
As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.		

Measures taken in the context of the crisis to counter manipulative behaviours/TTCs (Commitment 14)	As mentioned in our baseline report, we have technical teams building scaled solutions to detect and prevent these behaviours, and are partnering with civil society organisations, researchers, and governments to strengthen our defences. We also improved our detection systems to more effectively identify and block fake accounts, which are the source of a lot of the inauthentic activity.
	Since the invasion began, we shared what measures we've taken to help keep Ukrainians and Russians safe, our approach to misinformation, state-controlled media and ensuring reliable access to trusted information. As mentioned in our baseline report, our security teams took down three distinct networks in Russia targeting discourse on the war (announced here, here, and here) and have continued to monitor and enforce against Russian threat actors engaged in coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB). The Q4 2024 Adversarial Threat Report shared information on the continued low efficacy of the Doppelganger operation's efforts on our apps, with most attempts to acquire fake accounts or run ads being quickly detected and blocked.
Relevant changes to working practices to respond to the demands of the crisis situation and/or additional human resources procured for the mitigation of the crisis (Commitment 14 –16)	As mentioned in the baseline report, throughout the war, we have mobilised our teams, technologies and resources to combat the spread of harmful content, especially disinformation and misinformation as well as adversarial threat activities such as influence operations and cyber-espionage.
	We continue to work with a cross-functional team of experts from across the company, including native Ukrainian and Russian speakers, who are monitoring the platform around the clock, allowing us to respond to issues in real time.

Empowering Users
As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools and processes.

Actions taken against dis- and misinformation content (for example deamplification, labelling, removal etc.) (Commitment 17)	**State controlled media:** We continue to take the actions we outlined in our benchmark report. We have taken further action to limit the impact of state controlled media, described above. **Escalation channel:** This channel continues to operate as outlined in our benchmark report. **Covert influence campaigns:** We have continued to monitor for and remove recidivist attempts by coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) networks that target discourse about the war in Ukraine. This covert activity is aggressive and persistent, constantly probing for weak spots across the internet, including setting up hundreds of new spoof news organisation domains.
Promotion of authoritative information, including via recommender systems and products and features such as banners and panels (Commitment 19)	As mentioned in our baseline report, we provided tools to help our community access crucial resources and take action to support people in need. We continued supporting the Halo Trust and the State Emergency Service of Ukraine to spread authoritative factual information about the risks in contaminated areas, risks related to unexploded ordinances and life-saving information around shelters. Notably we sponsored the targeted ads campaigns of Halo Trust and improved the WhatsApp chat bot run by the State Emergency Service of Ukraine to ensure a safe and secure infoline. In addition, we provided an ad credits budget to 'Ty Yak?', a national mental health awareness campaign, to promote mental health resources for people affected by the war.
	We continue to see funds raised on Facebook and Instagram for nonprofits in support of humanitarian efforts for Ukraine. We continue to work through our Data for Good program, which empowers <u>humanitarian organizations, researchers, UN agencies, and European policymakers</u> to make more informed decisions on how to support the people of Ukraine.
**Empowering the Research Community**
As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools and processes.
Measures taken to support research into crisis related misinformation and disinformation (Commitment 17-25)	As mentioned in our baseline report, the Data for Good program shares privacy-protected data externally to help tackle social issues like disasters, pandemics, poverty and climate change. In support of the Ukraine humanitarian response, the program's maps have been utilized to provide valuable assistance.
	As mentioned in our baseline report, we continued providing baseline population density maps (the high resolution settlement layer) of Ukraine and surrounding countries to humanitarian organisations for supply-chain planning and to aid demining efforts. These are the most accurate in the world with 30 metre resolution and demographic breakouts by combining updated census estimates with satellite imagery (i.e., no Facebook user data). Our Social Connectedness Index has been used by leading researchers, including the European Commission – Joint Research Centre unit on Demography, Migration and Governance to quantify the rate at which Ukrainian refugees seek shelter in European regions with existing Ukrainian diaspora.

Working with the Fact-Checking Community	
As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.	
Cooperation with independent fact-checkers in the crisis context, including coverage in the EU (Commitment 30-33)	As mentioned in our baseline report, for misinformation that does not violate our Community Standards, but undermines the authenticity and integrity of our platform, we work with our network of independent third-party fact-checking partners. The details of the network are outlined under the Empowering Fact-Checkers chapter above. As mentioned in our baseline report, our cooperation with fact-checkers is as outlined in the Fact-Checkers' Empowerment chapter above.
	In Europe, we partner with 46 fact-checking organisations, covering 36 languages. This includes 29 partners covering 26 countries and 23 different languages in the EU.

Reporting on the service's response during a period of crisis
Israel – Hamas War
Threats observed or anticipated at time of reporting: [suggested character limit 2000 characters]:   In the spirit of transparency and cooperation we share below the details of some of the specific steps we are taking to respond to the Israel - Hamas War.
Mitigations in place or planned - at time of reporting: [suggested character limit: 2000 characters]:   In the wake of the 07/10/2023 terrorist attacks in Israel and Israel's response in Gaza, expert teams from across Meta took immediate crisis response measures, while protecting people's ability to use our apps to shed light on important developments happening on the ground. As we did so, we were guided by core human rights principles, including respect for the right to life and security of the person, the protection of the dignity of victims, and the right to non-discrimination - as well as balancing those with the right to freedom of expression. We looked to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to prioritise and mitigate the most salient human rights risks: in this case, that people may use Meta platforms to further inflame an already violent conflict. We also looked to international humanitarian law (IHL) as an important source of reference for assessing online conduct. We have provided a public overview of our efforts related to the war in our Newsroom, as well as in our 2023 Annual Human Rights report. The following are some examples of the specific steps we have taken: **Taking Action on Violating Content:**

- We quickly established a dedicated crisis response staffed with experts, including fluent Hebrew and Arabic speakers, to closely monitor and respond to this rapidly evolving situation in real time. This allows us to remove content that violates our Community Standards faster, and serves as another line of defence against misinformation.
- We continue to enforce our policies around <u>Dangerous Organisations and Individuals</u>, <u>Violent and Graphic Content</u>, <u>Hate Speech</u>, <u>Violence and Incitement</u>, <u>Bullying and Harassment</u>, and <u>Coordinating Harm</u>.

Safety and Security:
- In addition to this, our teams detected and removed a cluster of Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) activity <u>attributed</u> to Hamas in 2021. These fake accounts attempted to re-establish their presence on our platforms.
- In <u>early 2025</u>, we removed 17 accounts on Facebook, 22 FB Pages and 21 accounts on Instagram for violating our CIB policy. This network originated in Iran and targeted Azeri-speaking audiences in Azerbaijan and Turkey. Fake accounts – some of which were detected and disabled by our automated systems prior to our investigation – were used to post content, including in Groups, manage Pages, and to comment on the network's own content – likely to make it appear more popular than it was. Many of these accounts posed as female journalists and pro-Palestine activists. The operation also used popular hashtags like #palestine, #gaza, #starbucks, #instagram in their posts, as part of its spammy tactics in an attempt to insert themselves in the existing public discourse.
- We <u>memorialise accounts</u> when we receive a request from a friend or family member of someone who has passed away, to provide a space for people to pay their respects, share memories and support each other.

Reducing the Spread of Misinformation:
- We're working with third-party fact-checkers in the region to debunk false claims. Meta's third-party fact-checking network includes coverage in both Arabic and Hebrew, through AFP, Reuters and Fatabyyano. When they rate something as false, we move this content lower in Feed so fewer people see it.
- We recognise the importance of speed in moments like this, so we've made it easier for fact-checkers to find and rate content related to the war, using keyword detection to group related content in one place.
- We're also giving people more information to help them decide what to read, trust, and share, by adding warning labels on content rated false by third-party fact-checkers and applying labels to state-controlled media publishers.
- We also have limits on message forwarding and we label messages that haven't originated with the sender so people are aware that something is information from a third party.

User Controls:
We continue to provide <u>tools</u> to help people control their experience on our apps and protect themselves from content they don't want to see. These include but aren't limited to:
- Hidden Words: This tool filters offensive terms and phrases from DM requests and comments.
- Limits: When turned on, Limits automatically hide DM requests and comments on Instagram from people who don't follow you, or who only recently followed you.
- Comment controls: You can <u>control</u> who can comment on your posts on Facebook and Instagram and choose to turn off comments completely on a post by post basis.
- Show More, Show Less: This gives people direct control over the content they see on Facebook.
- Facebook Reduce: Through the Facebook Feed Preferences settings, people can increase the degree to which we demote some content so they see less of it in their Feed.
- Sensitive Content Control: Instagram's Sensitive Content Control allows people to choose how much sensitive content they see in places where we recommend content, such as Explore, Search, Reels and in-Feed recommendations.

Policies and Terms and Conditions

For the duration of the ongoing crisis, Meta has taken various underlined actions to mitigate the possible content risks emerging from the crisis. This includes, inter alia, under the Dangerous Organisations and Individuals Policy, removes imagery depicting the moment an identifiable individual is abducted, unless such imagery is shared in the context of condemnation or a call to release, in which case we allow with a Mark as Disturbing (MAD) interstitial; and, remove Hamas-produced imagery for hostages in captivity in all contexts. Meta has some further discretion policies which may be applied when content is escalated to us.

Scrutiny of Ads Placements

As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.

Political Advertising

As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.

AI Generated or altered SIEP ads disclosure (Commitment 3)	Meta announced in November 2023 an AI Disclosure policy to help people understand when a social issue, election, or political advertisement on Facebook or Instagram has been digitally created or altered, including through the use of AI. This policy went into effect in early 2024 and is required globally. Advertisers now have to disclose whenever a social issue, electoral, or political ad contains a photorealistic image or video, or realistic sounding audio, that was digitally created or altered to: • Depict a real person as saying or doing something they did not say or do; or • Depict a realistic-looking person that does not exist or a realistic-looking event that did not happen, or alter footage of a real event that happened; or • Depict a realistic event that allegedly occurred, but that is not a true image, video or audio recording of the event.

	Meta will add information on the ad when an advertiser discloses in the advertising flow that the content is digitally created or altered. This information will also appear in the Ad Library. If it is determined that an advertiser did not disclose as required, Meta will reject the ad. Repeated failure to disclose may result in penalties against the advertiser. The AI Disclosure policy helps inform people about digitally altered or created Ads. This way, people will be more aware about the authenticity of messaging, which will help combat Disinformation.

Integrity of Services

As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools and processes.	
Removing a Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour Network (Commitment 14, Commitment 16)	In early 2025, we removed 17 accounts on Facebook, 22 FB Pages and 21 accounts on Instagram for violating our policy against coordinated inauthentic behavior. This network originated in Iran and targeted Azeri-speaking audiences in Azerbaijan and Turkey. Fake accounts – some of which were detected and disabled by our automated systems prior to our investigation – were used to post content, including in Groups, manage Pages, and to comment on the network's own content – likely to make it appear more popular than it was. Many of these accounts posed as female journalists and pro-Palestine activists. The operation also used popular hashtags like #palestine, #gaza, #starbucks, #instagram in their posts, as part of its spammy tactics in an attempt to insert themselves in the existing public discourse.
	We removed this network before it was able to build authentic audiences on our apps.

Empowering Users

As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.	
Warning Screens on sensitive content, Sensitive Content Control and Facebook Reduce: (Commitment 17)	The 07/10/2023 attack by Hamas was designated as a Terrorist Attack under Meta's Dangerous Organisation and Individuals policy. Consistent with that designation, we removed all content showing identifiable victims at the moment of the attack. Following that, people began sharing this type of footage in order to raise awareness and condemn the attacks. Meta's goal is to allow people to express themselves while still removing harmful content. In turn, we began allowing people to post this type of footage within that context only, with the addition of a warning screen to inform users that it may be disturbing. If the user's intent in sharing the content is unclear, we err on the side of safety and remove it. However, there are additional protections in place to ensure people have choices when it comes to this content. Instagram's Sensitive Content Control allows people to choose how much sensitive content they see in places where we recommend content, such as Explore, Search, Reels and in-Feed recommendations. We try not to recommend sensitive content in these places by default, but people can also choose to see less, to further reduce the possibility of seeing this content from accounts they don't follow.

	Through the Facebook Feed Preferences settings, people can increase the degree to which we demote some content so they see less of it in their Feed. Or if preferred, they can turn many of these demotions off entirely. They can also choose to maintain Meta's current demotions.
	These actions ensure that we balance the protection of voice with removing harmful content. In this context, it has allowed for important discussion and condemnation of violence, while also empowering people to make choices in reaction to the content they see on Facebook and Instagram.
Hidden words Filter (Commitment 18, Commitment 19)	When turned on, Hidden Words filters offensive terms and phrases from DM requests and comments, so people never have to see them. People can customise this list, to make sure the terms they find offensive are hidden.
	Hidden Words help people choose offensive terms and phrases to hide, so they are protected from seeing them.
Limits (Commitment 18, Commitment 19,)	When turned on, Limits automatically hide DM requests and comments on Instagram from people who don't follow you, or who only recently followed you.
	This tool gives people choice about DM and requests they receive, which may be important when engaging online around sensitive topics.
Comment Controls (Commitment 18, Commitment 19)	People can control who can comment on their posts on Facebook and Instagram and choose to turn off comments completely on a post by post basis.
	This tool gives people control over engagement with what they post on Facebook and Instagram.
Show more Show less: (Commitment 18, Commitment 19)	Show More, Show Less gives people direct control over the content they see on Facebook. Selecting "Show more" will temporarily increase the amount of content that is like the post a user gave feedback on, while selecting "Show Less" means a user will temporarily see fewer posts like the one that feedback was given on. This tool provides people with more direct control over what they see, which is important for protecting people's well-being during high profile crisis events.

Empowering the Research Community
As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.

Content Library and API tools (Commitment 26)	As we previously reported, <u>Meta has opened access to tools such as the Content Library and API tools</u> to provide access to near real-time public content from Pages, Posts, Groups and Events on Facebook and public content on Instagram. Details about the content, such as the number of reactions, shares, comments and, for the first time, post view counts are also available. Researchers can search, explore and filter that content on both a graphical User Interface (UI) or through a programmatic API. Together, these tools provide the most comprehensive access to publicly-accessible content across Facebook and Instagram of any research tool built to date. Individuals from qualified institutions, including journalists that are pursuing scientific or public interest research topics are able to apply for access to these tools through partners with deep expertise in secure data sharing for research, starting with the University of Michigan's Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. This is a first-of-its-kind partnership that will enable researchers to analyse data from the API in ICPSR's Social Media Archives (SOMAR) Virtual Data Enclave.
	Qualified individuals pursuing scientific or public interest research, including journalists can gain access to the tools if they meet all the requirements.

Empowering the Fact-Checking Community

As noted in our baseline report, our policies are based on years of experience and expertise in safety combined with external input from experts around the world. We are continuously working to protect the integrity of our platforms and adjusting our policies, tools, and processes.

Working with fact checker in the region and deploying keyword detection (Commitment 30)	Meta is working with third-party fact-checkers in the region to debunk false claims. Meta's third-party fact-checking network includes coverage in both Arabic and Hebrew, through AFP, Reuters and Fatabyyano. We recognise the importance of speed in moments like this, so we've made it easier for fact-checkers to find and rate content related to the war, using keyword detection to group related content in one place.
	When they rate something as false, we move this content lower in Feed so fewer people see it.
Content Warning Labels Commitment 31)	Meta is adding warning labels on content rated false by third-party fact-checkers and applying labels to state-controlled media publishers. We also have limits on message forwarding and label messages that haven't originated with the sender so people are aware that something is information from a third party.
	Meta is supporting people in the region by giving them more information to decide what to read, trust and share by adding warning labels onto relevant content.

Reporting on the service's response during an election

Reporting on the service's response during an election
National Elections
Meta's Approach to Elections

Meta is committed to providing reliable election information while combating misinformation across languages on our platforms. Our <u>policies and safeguards for elections</u> have been developed over many years and informed by our experiences of working on more than 200 elections around the world. Those experiences have resulted in the development of a robust election program, which uses mature policies, processes, and tools to both protect speech on our platform and safeguard the integrity of the elections. We continuously improve these measures to ensure they remain appropriate and responsive to emerging risks, and we have reinforced these efforts in light of the regulatory framework set out under the Digital Services Act, the Election Guidelines, and our commitments under this Code.

1. **Community Standards and Guidelines Relevant to Election:**

Our <u>Community Standards</u> set out strict rules for content that can and cannot be posted to our platforms. These policies cover voter interference, voter fraud, electoral violence, and misinformation, among other categories such as hateful conduct, coordinating harm and promoting crime, bullying and harassment. Our policies have been refined over many years, by partnering with academics, civil society, and third-party fact-checkers to find the appropriate balance between protecting people and protecting freedom of expression and information. These policies are regularly reviewed, and they are made available to the public through our <u>Transparency Centre</u>.

Our comprehensive approach to elections continued for European elections held between <u>1 January – 30 June 2025.</u> The election responses covered in this report include:

1. Germany (Parliamentary), 23 February 2025
2. Romania (Presidential), 4 May, 2025
3. Romania (Presidential Runoff), 18 May 2025
4. Portugal (Parliamentary), 18 May 2025
5. Poland (Presidential), 18 May 2025

2. Our Election Risk Management Processes

We have a dedicated team responsible for driving Meta's cross-company election integrity efforts, leveraging experts from a full range of business functions to foster a holistic approach to tackling election-related risks. Those functions include colleagues in Meta's intelligence, data science, product and engineering, research, operations, content and public policy, and legal teams.

Building on our experience of the 2024 European Parliament (EP) Elections, we continued to conduct in depth preparations and risk assessments for elections covered in this reporting period, deploy mitigation measures and utilise our Election Operation Centres established to address risks in real time ahead of the elections day.

We continued to work closely with a full range of external stakeholders to inform our processes and procedures ahead of elections. This included collaboration with Member State Digital Service Coordinators (DSCs), national authorities, electoral bodies, as well as taking part in the EU Code of Practice ("CoP") <u>Rapid Response System</u>. As part of the rapid response system framework, we onboarded designated civil society organisations and fact checkers to our direct escalation channels to report time sensitive content, accounts or trends that could threaten the integrity of the electoral process.

We remained focused on providing users with reliable information about the election for their Member State through in-app notifications, where legally permitted. In Germany, Romania, Portugal and Poland, we launched our Voter Information Units and Election Day Information features on both Instagram and Facebook, reminding people on the day they can vote and re-directing them to local authoritative sources on how and where to vote.

Overview of Cooperation with External Stakeholders and Election Integrity Efforts

Meta engages with a full range of external stakeholders to inform our processes and procedures as part of our day-to-day business, and this practice continued during our election preparation and integrity efforts for Germany, Romania, Portugal and Poland. Meta values the networks and channels we have with our external stakeholders to work together in identifying risks on our platforms, and as such, we have welcomed many of the Election Guidelines recommending cooperation and points of contact with national authorities, civil society organisations, and others.

Germany

External engagement and election preparations started in the second half of 2023 as part of Meta's overall 2024 EU Parliamentary election integrity efforts. For the 2025 German Federal elections, these efforts included participating in over 15 engagements with German and EU Level authorities including: the Ministry of Interior (MoI), the German Digital Service Coordinator (DSC) "BNetzA", the German Government Election Taskforce, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), the Federal Returning Officer and German intelligence services. Many of these engagements took the form of bilateral meetings or round tables chaired by the German MoI, or the BNetzA in close partnership with the European Commission. We onboarded the German DSC to our direct regulatory reporting channel, as well as other relevant authorities such as the Federal Returning Officer, the BSI or the For the German election taskforce.

Meta also participated in the 'DSA Stress Test: Tabletop Exercise on German Elections' organised by the German DSC, BNetzA, and the European Commission. The event brought together representatives from social media platforms, as well as national authorities and civil society organisations, who took part in the stress test exercise.

In close partnership with the BSI, Meta organised a capability building session reaching more than 90 MPs, members of Parliamentary Groups as well as candidates. The training focussed on Meta's election preparedness narrative, our advertising and organic best practices, business messaging and general safety updates to raise awareness of security threats and possible misinformation and disinformation campaigns around the elections.

Ahead of the German Elections, we also partnered with the German Returning Officer to support their "Get out the vote" campaign through ad credits, reaching almost 18 million users and more than 26 million video plays.

Overview of partners and notifications received during the Rapid Response Implementation period (February 6th to March 5th):

- Number of onboarded non-platform signatories to our direct reporting channels: 6.
- Number of reports received during the election period through the rapid response system: 16.

Voter Information Units and Election Day Information Features

We remain focused on providing users with reliable election information while combating misinformation across languages. That is why we continue to connect people with details about the election for their Member State through in-app notifications, where legally permitted. We proactively point users to reliable information on the electoral process through in-app 'Voter Information Units (VIU)' and 'Election Day Information' reminders (EDR).

Facebook	Instagram
• VIU Reach: Over 17.4 million • EDR Reach: Over 11.3 million	• VIU Reach: Over 29.5 million • EDR Reach: Over 23.4 million

Romania (First Round and Run Off)

The election preparations efforts for Romania started in the second half of 2023 as part of the overall 2024 EU Parliamentary elections preparation efforts, and continued until the 2025 Presidential election. Meta engaged with a full range of external stakeholders to inform our processes and procedures. This included regular engagement with Romania's Permanent Electoral Authority (PEA), the Romanian Digital Service Coordinator "AnCOM", the Ministry of Digitalisation, Research and Innovation, the Ministry of Interior, the Cyber Security Directorate (DNSC) and the Audiovisual Council, all of whom were onboarded to our direct regulatory escalation channels where they were able to report content.

As an active member of the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation Taskforce's Working Group on Elections, we took part in its Rapid Response System. Through this, we were regularly in touch with civil society organisations from Romania through various meetings and roundtables organised by the Disinformation working group. In addition to this, we also participated in a Stress Test organised by AnCOM in Bucharest, alongside national authorities, civil society and other very large online platforms.

Meta also engaged Romanian Political Parties in advance by organising online training sessions on our policies and products, including how to contact Meta in case of an escalation. Meta also created a direct escalation channel for 5 Romanian partners to report Community Standards violations and unlawful content, and collaborated with the Electoral Body to support civic engagement for Romanian users and connect people with reliable information about voting.

Overview of partners and notifications received during the Rapid Response Implementation period: (April 7 till May 25)

- Number of onboarded non-platform signatories to our direct reporting channels: 7.
- Number of reports received during the election period: 57.

Voter Information Units and Election Day Information Features

Facebook	Instagram

• First Round
  ○ EDR Reach: Over 6.9 million
• Runoff
  ○ EDR Reach: Over 7.2 million
	• First round:
	  ○ EDR Reach: Over 3.0 million
	• Runoff
	  ○ EDR Reach: Over 2.9 million

Portugal

Election preparations efforts for the March 2025 Portugal election started in the first half of 2024, following the announcement of the snap election. This included establishing formal communication channels with the Portugal Electoral Commission (CNE), the Portuguese Digital Service Coordinator, "ANACOM", and comprehensive outreach to each political party to ensure that political parties and candidates' teams were aware of the critical resources, policies, and escalation channels.

Meta also supported civic engagement for Portuguese users by collaborating with the Portuguese Electoral Body to connect people with reliable information about voting. In the lead up to the election and on the election day, Meta showed on top of feed notifications on both Facebook and Instagram to all users in Portugal to redirect them to their website.

Overview of partners and notifications received during the Rapid Response Implementation period (April 7 till May 25):

- Number of onboarded non-platform signatories to our direct reporting channels: 2.
- Number of reports received during the election period: 2.

Voter Information Units and Election Day Information Features

Facebook	Instagram
• VIU Reach: Over 4.6 million • EDR Reach: Over 3.3 million	• VIU Reach: Over 5.2 million • EDR Reach: Over 4.3 million

Poland

Meta conducted a series of targeted initiatives to enhance external collaboration with key stakeholders ahead of the Polish election, engaging close to 200 stakeholders from across government, politics, academia, and NGOs. This included engagements and workshops with: the National Electoral Office, representatives from the Cybersecurity Directorate, Internal Intelligence, Counter Espionage, and Police HQ to streamline cooperation in processing data requests and escalations. We also conducted engagements with with the Polish Research and Academic Computer Network (NASK) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs to aid understanding of our content escalation channel and provide training on key content policies to improve moderation and reporting,

In addition to this, one-on-one workshops with teams from each registered presidential candidate were arranged by Meta. These sessions focused on clarifying our policies, establishing communication channels, and providing access to "Meta Support Pro" for priority technical issue resolution. Training was also provided to the Polish Ministries, including with the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, to train their communication teams on effective cybersecurity incident prevention.

As part of the rapid response system, Meta maintained regular contact with civil society organisations and created a direct escalation channel for Polish partners to report Community Standard violating and unlawful content. This included: Alliance4europe, CEE Digital Democracy Watch, GLOBSEC and DEMAGOG.

Overview of partners and notifications received during the Rapid Response Implementation period (22 April – 24 June 2025):

- Number of onboarded non-platform signatories to our direct reporting channels: 4.
- Number of reports received during the election period: 3.

Voter Information Units and Election Day Information Features

Facebook	Instagram

- First Round
    ○ EDR Reach: Over 12.8 million
- Runoff
    ○ EDR Reach: Over 12.4 million
	- First Round
	    ○ EDR Reach: Over 7.3 million
	- Runoff
	    ○ EDR Reach: Over 7.0 million

Responsible Approach to Gen AI

Meta's approach to responsible AI is another way that we are safeguarding the integrity of elections globally, including for the EU national elections.

Community Standards, Fact-Checking, and AI Labelling:

Meta's Community Standards and Advertising Standards apply to all content, including content generated by AI. AI-generated content is also eligible to be reviewed and rated by Meta's third-party fact-checking partners, whose rating options allow them to address various ways in which media content may mislead people, including but not limited to media that is created or edited by AI.

Meta labels photorealistic images created using Meta AI, as well as AI-generated images from certain content creation tools.

Meta has begun labelling a wider range of video, audio, and image content when we detect industry-standard AI image indicators or when users disclose that they're uploading AI-generated content. Meta requires people to use this disclosure and label tool when they post organic content with a photorealistic video or realistic-sounding audio that was digitally created or altered, and may apply penalties if they fail to do so. If Meta determines that digitally created or altered image, video, or audio content creates a particularly high risk of materially deceiving the public on a matter of importance, we may add a more prominent label, so that people have more information and context.

Continuing to Foster AI Transparency through Industry Collaboration:

Meta has also been working with other companies in the tech industry on common standards and guidelines. Meta Platforms, Inc. is a member of the Partnership on AI, for example, and signed onto the tech accord designed to combat the spread of deceptive AI content in 2024 elections globally. Meta receives information from Meta Platforms, Inc. in the progress of these initiatives, and benefits from these partnerships when addressing the risks of manipulated media.

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories' abilities to measure them].
Scrutiny of Ads Placements
The measures outlined in Chapters 1 to 3 of this report were in place for the elections covered in this report. They were complemented by the prohibited ads policy outlined above. Most pertinently, under these policies, content that is fact-checked cannot be used for an ad under our Advertising Standards.
Political Advertising
As outlined in Section 6, Beginning in October 2025, Meta will no longer allow political, electoral and social issue ads on our platforms in the EU, given the unworkable requirements and legal uncertainties introduced by the EU's Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising regulation.
Integrity of Services
All the measures outlined in Chapters 14 to 16 of this report were in place ahead of the European national elections.
Empowering the Research Community
Since 2023, researchers in Europe have had access to the Meta Content Library, enabling them to study various topics, including disinformation.